

East Asian Affairs

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V. K. R. V. Rao

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BOOK REVIEWS

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India's First Five-Year Plan— A Descriptive Analysis

V. K. R. V. Rao

INDIA'S first Five-Year Plan is perhaps not a plan in the normally accepted sense of the term. It does not offer a description and assessment of national resources, either natural or human, nor does it contain a survey of the extent to which these resources have been utilised so far or of the full range of the task that is still to be done. In contrast to the much-publicised "Bombay Plan", there is no talk of doubling the per-capita income in fifteen years. The official Five-Year Plan does not lay down targets for achievement in terms of national income or specified over-all increases in national standards of living. Nor does it contemplate the planned production, distribution and exchange of the entire economic output of the country. Thus, the analogy with the Soviet first Five-Year Plan is more in name than in actual content or ideology. There is neither a revolutionary background nor a totalitarian regime behind the Indian Plan. In truth, it is altogether a more modest venture.

It deals with the beginning of a planned economic development of India rather than with all of its stages. It is concerned primarily with rationalising and increasing capital expenditure in the public sector rather than with controlling and directing all private investment. It is concerned more with effectuating the postwar and post-Partition readjustments required by the economy of the country than with solving at one stroke all of its economic problems. The Plan undoubtedly contemplates a closer integration of the private sector with the public sector and the guidance of the former by the latter, and, therefore, sets out details of the machinery that is required for this purpose in the fields of agriculture, industry and trade. Yet the economy visualised is not a socialist economy but what is called a mixed economy. The targets listed in the Plan are modest; and the finances needed do not run into astronomical magnitudes. Moderation and realism rather than grandeur and display are its keynotes. How did India come to put forward such a modest Plan?

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Partly, of course, the explanation is to be found in the character of the personnel of India's first Planning Commission. The Chairman of the Commission was the Prime Minister himself; but this was intended more to give the Commission the inspiration of his personality and ideas, not to mention the prestige and authority with Central ministries and state governments that his association with the Commission carried, rather than to ensure his participation in its daily and continuous work. The Deputy Chairman was Mr. Gulzarilal Nanda, a Congressman of long standing and an ex-Labour Minister of Bombay State, known throughout the country for the ability, realism and patience with which he had built perhaps the most efficient and powerful trade union in India. The membership included Sir Chintaman Deshmukh, a former member of the Indian Civil Service, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India for nearly six years, and widely respected by all political parties not only for his profound knowledge of the structure and problems of the Indian economy but also for the practical and non-doctrinaire approach which he displayed in his policy decisions. Another member was Sir V. T. Krishnamchari, an experienced and successful administrator who over a series of years had managed with conspicuous ability the affairs of Baroda State and had contributed to its economic development as well as having acquired wide economic knowledge in the course of his chairmanship of a number of government committees and commissions. The two other members also brought knowledge, ability and experience to its labours. One was Mr. G. L. Mehta, a well-known industrial executive, Chairman of the Indian Tariff Board for more than two years; the other was Mr. R. K. Patil, a former civil servant who had resigned his post under the British government at the call of the nation and subsequently rose to high political office in Madhya Pradesh State (formerly the Central Provinces), where he won an excellent reputation as a practical and successful Minister of Food and Agriculture. Thus the Commission consisted of wise and practical men rather than of theorists or mere idealists.

Moreover, the Commission had neither a blank nor a clean slate on which to write its Plan. Public expenditures on economic development, both capital and revenue, had been in progress during the postwar period on the part of both the central and the state governments, and had already involved large sums of money. In addition,

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this expenditure was presumably based on carefully prepared plans for economic development, both central and provincial, though these had never been coordinated or integrated in terms of a national plan. The fact was that even during the war, the then government of India had begun to discuss postwar economic reconstruction and development. A Planning Member was appointed to the Viceroy's Executive Council in 1944 in the person of Sir Ardeshir Dalal, a leading industrialist and a signatory of the famous "Bombay Plan". The Finance Member, Sir Jeremy Raisman, calculated that in the first five years after the end of the war a budgetary surplus of ten billion rupees would be available for economic reconstruction and development on the assumption that wartime taxes and tax yields would continue while wartime military and civilian expenditure would decline to more normal levels. At the same time, the provincial governments were assiduously accumulating reserves for postwar development from their wartime budgetary surpluses. The non-realisation of Sir Jeremy's calculations of a central budgetary surplus did not lead to the abandonment of the plans for expenditure in the public sector. On the contrary, the state governments persisted with their schemes, financing them partly from the development funds they had built up during the war and partly from central grants and loans; and so did the central government, its sources of funds being the cash balances it had accumulated during the war.

The result was that when the Planning Commission was appointed in April 1950 and began to survey the field, it found that a large number of development schemes, especially in the fields of irrigation and power, had already been started and were, in fact, in varying states of execution. It was obviously impossible to scrap these schemes and thus to waste the millions of rupees that had already been spent on them. The Planning Commission, therefore, had to build upon what had already been undertaken, especially in cases where the schemes in question had advanced well beyond the stage of initial preparation and preliminary expenditure. Inevitably it followed that the Commission could not draw up a plan on an *a priori* basis of assessment of requirements on a national scale, but had to some extent to content itself with the task of coordinating and integrating the central and state programmes of expenditure already in operation, eliminating some and economising on others. Its task thus became one of

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bringing order out of the chaos of existing public expenditure rather than one of drawing up a plan *de novo* for the economic development of India.

Finally, the Commission had to work against an inflationary background of high prices and physical shortages coupled with the ravages wrought in the economy by the partition of the subcontinent. The five years following the termination of the war had borne ample evidence to the fallacy of the wartime myth that money did not matter and that deficit financing could do the trick of building bricks without straw. The large volume of cash balances required by the central government during the war had begun to approach dangerously low levels. Provincial development funds were nearing exhaustion and state governments were incurring budgetary deficits of large magnitudes. The sterling balances amassed during the war had been liquidated to the extent of more than sixty per cent without any corresponding benefit to the country in the form of capital equipment. At the same time, prices had shown a substantial rise, the index number of wholesale prices reaching 447 in July 1951, the month of publication of the Commission's Report, as against 244 in August 1945. Imports of food had reached new and startling levels after the end of the war, the country's basic food position having been worsened by Partition. Partition had also deprived the country of its previous supplies of cotton and jute and had made India dependent upon imports from Pakistan for the operation of the most important of its major industries. With Partition had also come the refugees and the problem of their relief and rehabilitation. Wartime and postwar inflation, combined with the economic and political consequences of Partition, needed attention before anything spectacular or significant could be attempted by way of economic development. Inevitably, therefore, the Planning Commission's task became one of halting inflation, removing the most acute of the physical shortages, and redressing the deficiencies created by Partition, rather than one of drawing up an *a priori* plan for the economic development of the country.

Moreover, political and administrative factors limited the scope of the Commission's recommendations. The party in power—the Congress Party—was not a socialist party. True, its leader, Mr. Nehru, professed admiration for socialist ideas; but he was too good a democrat to subordinate his party to his own personal views, especially

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when he himself was not convinced of their immediate practicability. Moreover, the administrative personnel was already overstrained and could not stand the much greater stretching that would be involved in any large extension of public ownership and operation of economic activity. Nor could the country's public finance afford the expenditure which, consistent with the principle of compensation enshrined in the Constitution, such extension would necessitate. Then again, the country was committed to the democratic process, and its government functioned on the basis of parliamentary responsibility. Planning had, therefore, to proceed without the ease of operation afforded by a totalitarian regime. At the same time, *laissez-faire* and free enterprise could not secure planned development, nor were they politically acceptable to the vast majority of the population. Under the circumstances, the rather anaemic compromise of a mixed economy naturally became the political background against which the Commission had to project its Plan for economic development.

Thus it was inevitable that India's first Five-Year Plan should be moderate and modest rather than grandiose or doctrinaire, and that it should take the form largely of rationalising and increasing public expenditure on development rather than of calling for over-all ownership, operation or even control by the government of the country's entire productive resources. After this general description of the background, it is possible to turn to a more detailed discussion of the Plan itself, what it sets out to achieve and how it proposes to do so. It should be noted, however, that what the Commission has proposed is not the final version of the Five-Year Plan but only a draft outline which is to be revised in the light of public comment and suggestions. The following discussion, therefore, deals only with this draft outline and not with the final version, which is still to be published.

THE Commission has framed its immediate objectives for the five-year period 1951-52 to 1955-56 in the light of the economic policy laid down in the Constitution of Republican India. To quote from its Report:

"Briefly, the Directive Principles visualise an economic and social order based on equality of opportunity, social justice, the right to work, the right to an adequate wage and a measure of social security for all citizens. They do not prescribe any rigid economic or social framework but provide the guiding lines of State policy. Planning in India has to follow these guiding

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lines and to initiate action which will, in due course, produce the desired economic and social pattern."¹

Having thus stated the long-term background for its proposals, the Commission goes on to formulate the short-term problem, which it regards partly as one of readjustment to postwar and post-Partition influences and partly as one of building up the basic forces that are requisite for rapid economic development. The objectives which the Commission has thus set before itself for the Five-Year Plan may best be stated in its own words:

"The problem before the country is, firstly, to rectify the disequilibrium in the economy caused by the War and Partition, and, secondly, to initiate the development of certain basic resources so as to lay the foundation of more rapid economic growth in the future. The rehabilitation of displaced persons links up with both these aspects. Further, in finding solutions to this two-fold problem, considerations of social justice and the need for a progressive re-orientation of the economy along the lines suggested in the Constitution have to be borne in mind."²

The Commission has recognised that the analogy of advanced countries in which full employment is accepted as a goal of policy is not directly applicable to the conditions of a backward economy.

"In an under-developed economy, the problem is mainly structural in character. Corresponding to idle labour, there are no adequate supplies of other co-operating factors of production such as land and capital equipment. If the programme of full employment increases money incomes in the community but does not increase production correspondingly, the main outcome will be to stimulate an upward movement of prices. In the ultimate analysis, a programme of full employment can be implemented only after some progress has been made in removing the structural deficiencies in the economy which now stand in the way of its expansion. A development plan is essentially an effort to create conditions for full employment."³

At the same time, the Commission realises that its Plan will not

¹ Government of India Planning Commission, *The First Five Year Plan—A Draft Outline*, Government of India, Delhi, 1951, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 19. As the present writer noted in his presidential address to the Indian Economic Conference in December 1949: "Economic development of an under-developed economy cannot be brought about by a blind application of Keynesian techniques. These are, after all, really intended for an industrialized economy with unemployed resources and constitute a contra-cyclical rather than a developmental apparatus. It is, therefore, necessary that all development schemes for an economy such as ours be strictly based on genuine savings. It must also be remembered that an under-developed economy has first to be made fit for development, and elasticity created in the supply curves of its factors of production, before it can have the Keynesian technique applied to it without causing inflation."

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lead to any immediate dividends in terms of an improvement in the standards of living. "With all the effort that the First Five Year Plan will represent, it will be possible barely to restore by 1955-56 the pre-war standards of consumption in regard to essentials like food and cloth."⁴ The Commission also stresses fairly and squarely the place of private enterprise and the importance of the private sector. "The private sector has to continue to play an important part in production as well as in distribution. Planning, under present conditions, thus means, in practice, an economy guided and directed by the State and operated partly through direct State action and partly through private initiative and effort."⁵ In actual fact, however, the Commission has limited itself to the public sector. "The scope of our Planning is limited, in the first instance, to the public sector and to such developments in the private sector as follow directly from investments in the public sector, or, on the whole, are more amenable to planning and control."⁶ As regards the bulk of the private sector, the point of view adopted is directed more to the long term. "In agriculture, cottage industries, and large scale industries which fall largely within the private sector, the aim of the Plan is to establish during the next few years suitable machinery through which, in increasing measure, the community will be able to exercise a certain measure of control over the rate and pattern of its economic and social development."⁷

The three main objects, then, of the first Five-Year Plan may be very briefly described as being (1) to rectify the disequilibrium in the economy caused by the war and Partition, (2) to develop the basic resources necessary for making possible a rapid rate of economic development, and (3) to organise in the fields of agriculture, cottage industries and large-scale industries such machinery as will permit the exercise of guidance and control over these activities by the public sector and public policy. In concrete terms, the three objectives do tend to get mixed up, but it is possible to separate them and to treat them independently for purposes of analysis.

TO begin with, the disequilibrium caused by the recent war has been reflected in the high prices and cost of living currently prevailing in

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

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the country. The food-supply situation, which took a serious turn during the war, has deteriorated steadily since then despite an increase in the area under food crops and much expenditure of funds and energy on the "Grow More Food" campaign. Imports of foodgrains have been rising and have more than doubled in comparison with the largest yearly wartime imports, thus dissipating valuable foreign exchange that would otherwise be available for economic development. At the same time, food prices have recorded a steady rise, and there has been no possibility of dealing with the inflation in the absence of a substantial increase in the domestic production and procurement of foodgrains. Partition also added to the magnitude of the country's food problems by depriving it of a normal marketed supply of at least one million tons formerly available from districts which now constitute part of Pakistan. Thus, the food problem, having become India's number-one priority, had to be tackled in the first Five-Year Plan.

The country also lost valuable supplies of better-quality cotton through the creation of Pakistan. This not only increased its dependence on imports, with a consequent loss of foreign exchange, but also led to difficulties in the operation of the domestic textile industry owing to the frequent interruption as well as a chronic insufficiency of supplies from Pakistan because of the political tension existing between the two countries. The same factors have loomed even larger in the case of the Indian jute industry, which is the country's prime export industry; Pakistan has been the only foreign source of raw jute. Considerations of prudence, calling for maximisation of domestic industrial output and a larger supply of foreign exchange, have demanded an expansion in the production of raw materials such as cotton, jute and oilseeds. It is necessary also to augment supplies of certain essential consumer goods by increasing both domestic output and imports, while transport facilities, badly damaged by the war, must be at least restored to prewar standards of efficiency. There is a need also to tackle the problem of housing, which has grown more serious on account of the wartime and postwar trend towards urbanisation and concentration of economic activity.

These considerations, so largely a result of the war and of Partition, account for the targets set by the Planning Commission in the agricultural, industrial, housing and transport fields for the period 1951-52 to 1955-56. The goals in the agricultural field involve increases of 7.2

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million tons in the output of foodgrains, 2.06 million bales (of 400 lbs. each) in that of jute, 1.2 million bales (of 392 lbs.) in that of cotton, 375,000 tons in that of oilseeds, and 690,000 tons in that of raw sugar. In the industrial field, the Plan envisages increases of 835 million yards in the production of cloth, of 110,000 tons in glassware, of 167,000 cases in matches, of 56,000 tons in paper and pasteboard, of 453,000 tons in salt, of 168,000 tons in soap, and of 400,000 tons in refined sugar. The bulk of these increases is expected to result from a fuller utilisation of, rather than from an increase in, installed capacity. In the field of housing, attention is to be concentrated primarily on the needs of urban low-income groups, the target being the construction each year of 25,000 housing units for industrial workers in the principal industrial centres, coupled with financial and other assistance to housing for other low-income groups.

In the field of transport, railways are to receive the most attention, in the form of track renewals, maintenance and replacement of wagons and coaches, restoration of lines dismantled during the war, and provision of passenger amenities; as already noted, the effect of these measures is, generally speaking, expected to be the restoration of railway facilities to prewar standards of efficiency and convenience. As for shipping, an increase of 80,000 tons for the coastal trade and of 185,000 tons for the overseas trade is contemplated during the five-year period. In the field of civil aviation, considerable development is contemplated in ground facilities and corresponding capital works as well as replacement, modernisation and some expansion of aircraft operating on domestic and overseas services. In the case of roads, priority is given to the national highways, provision being made for the construction of 750 miles of missing links and 60 of the major missing bridges, and for the up-grading of approximately 2,200 miles of road surface; some provision is made also for the extension of road-transport services owned or operated by the state governments.

Taking into account population increases during the period, it is expected that achievement of the aims mentioned above will restore standards of consumption approximately to prewar levels while at the same time remedying the major damage inflicted on the economy by the war and Partition.

Next comes the question of expansion of the basic factors involved in an accelerated economic development. First place under this head is

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accorded power, production of which is to increase by one million kilowatts in the period embraced by the Plan. The entire increase contemplated is in the public sector, and will result partly from multipurpose river-valley projects like Bhakra-Nangal, Damodar Valley, and Hirakud Dam and partly from multi- as well as single-purpose projects undertaken by state governments. Also in the public sector are some important producer goods industries to be operated by the central government—e.g., the Sindri Fertiliser Factory, the Chittaranjan Locomotive Works, the Dry Core Cable Factory and various schemes for the production of machine tools, telephone equipment, mathematical instruments, etc. In the private sector, the Commission envisages the following increases in production: centrifugal pumps, 47,834 units; Diesel engines, 41,597; power alcohol, 14.5 million gallons; aluminium, 16,400 tons; automobile manufacturing (important component parts), 21,160; cement, 2.02 million tons; fertilisers, 180,000 tons; heavy chemicals, 130,000 tons; and steel, 310,000 tons. With the exception of that for steel, the percentages of increase over existing production represented by these figures are quite considerable. The Commission notes that, although achievement of these particular goals will not substantially assist the country to accelerate its rate of development in the period of the Plan, it "will strengthen the basis on which more rapid industrial development can be envisaged in subsequent years".⁸

The third set of objectives sought by the Five-Year Plan—viz., the establishment of suitable machinery in the fields of agriculture, cottage industries and large-scale industries—fall as much within the realm of implementation of the Commission's first two goals as they do within that of an independent third objective. Moreover, they represent rather a formulation of economic policy than planned increases in production, the targets contemplated being more qualitative than quantitative in character. And their financial implications to the State are of a much lower, if not an altogether negligible, magnitude. It may perhaps be better, therefore, to defer consideration of this subject and to proceed at once to a description and discussion of the means which the Commission proposes to employ to achieve its goals in fulfilment of its twofold aim of rectifying the disequilibrium caused

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

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by the war and Partition and building up the basic forces necessary for accelerating the economic development of the country.

THE Plan involves a total public expenditure of Rs.17,930 million and envisages an expenditure of Rs.2,500 million to Rs.3,000 million in the private industrial sector; but the targets mentioned above account for an expenditure of only Rs.14,930 million in the public sector. That is because the Commission has divided its Plan into two parts: Part I involves a public expenditure of Rs.14,930 million, and Part II, one of Rs.3,000 million; but only the former appears in the Five-Year Plan as published in draft form. The Commission adopted this procedure because "the implementation of the Plan in full would require a considerable measure of foreign assistance, but a part of the Plan, involving an expenditure of Rs. 14,930 millions and consisting largely of projects in execution, has to be implemented in any case".⁹ Presumably the second part of the Plan awaits negotiations concerning foreign aid before being considered fit for publication in detail. It is also possible that Part II may undergo modification in the light of public comment and suggestions with respect to Part I of the Plan. As far as the Commission's present Report is concerned, therefore, the targets presented relate only to Part I of the Plan, and the public expenditure envisaged amounts to only Rs.14,930 million.

The following table classifies the proposed public expenditure according to the different segments of the economy concerned.

	<i>Outlay, 1951-56 (in million rupees)</i>	<i>Percentage of total outlay, 1951-56</i>
Agriculture and rural development	1,916.9	12.8
Irrigation and power	4,503.6	30.2
Transport and communications	3,881.2	26.1
Industry	1,009.9	6.7
Social services	2,542.2	17.0
Rehabilitation	790.0	5.3
Miscellaneous	285.4	1.9
Total	14,929.2	100.0

These figures demonstrate that the primary aim of the Plan is to improve agricultural production. In the words of the Commission,

"In a predominantly agricultural economy, the tempo of development will depend, in the initial stages, largely on the volume of agricultural production

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

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and the surpluses that are available from it. In India, besides the stagnation which has been evident in the agricultural sector, the impact of Partition has fallen heaviest on this sector. The Plan, therefore, seeks to meet the more glaring deficiencies in regard to agricultural production and thereby secure a better balance in the economy."¹⁰

Expenditure on "industry" excludes the Rs.2,500 million to Rs.3,000 million envisaged in the private sector, but even if that is taken into account, agriculture remains the most pressing concern of the Plan.

Of the expenditure of Rs.14,930 million, the central government accounts for Rs.7,340 million.¹¹ This excludes a sum of Rs.2,110 million which is to be made available by the Centre in the form of loans and grants to the state governments. Moreover, even of the amount included under the central head, the cost of the Bhakra-Nangal, Hirakud, and Harike schemes (Rs.1,760 million) and a large portion of the expenditure on refugee rehabilitation will, in fact, form part of the outlay of state governments and should, therefore, really figure in the state sector. If allowance is made for the factors mentioned above, the share of state governments amounts to nearly Rs.10,000 million, or about sixty-seven per cent of the total, though, as will presently appear, their share of the financing comes to less than thirty-three per cent of the total.

The following table shows the internal resources which the Commission expects to mobilise for the financing of the Plan.¹²

(in million rupees)

	<i>Centre</i>	<i>States</i>	<i>Total</i>
Budgetary surplus on revenue account	1,300	810	2,110
Normal revenue provision on development, including items contained in the Plan	1,180	2,750	3,930

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹¹ The share of the state governments would then be Rs.7,590 million, distributed as follows:

(in million rupees)

Assam	125.0	Punjab	154.7	Pepsu	83.0
Bihar	557.0	U. P.	911.2	Rajasthan	152.1
Bombay	1,203.8	West Bengal	687.8	Saurashtra	215.2
Madhya Pradesh	436.7	Hyderabad	405.3	Travancore-Cochin	260.7
Madras	1,370.2	Madhya Bharat	227.7	Other states	283.0
Orissa	150.0	Mysore	366.0		
					<hr/>
					GRAND TOTAL 7,590.0

Ibid., p. 42.

¹² Based on Appendix III to Part II of the Report.

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Available on capital account, including loans and small savings	3,630	1,240	4,870
Railway surplus set aside for development	300	300
Total	6,410	4,800	11,210

The figure of Rs.810 million shown as budgetary surplus on account of state governments is a net figure and does not give a full picture of the additional revenues they are expected to raise. The total figure comes to Rs.2,130 million, of which Rs.1,320 million would be used to cover the deficit that would be incurred at present levels of development expenditure by the state governments on revenue account. Details of increased tax yields are not given in the Report, but the taxes mentioned are higher land estate duties, broader sales taxes, betterment levies and water rates and certain minor taxes on entertainment. The Centre proposes to levy death duties. Both the Centre and the states expect less tax evasion, better tax administration, and economies in expenditure. The important point is the acceptance of the principle of using taxation deliberately to create a budgetary surplus and employing it for financing expenditure on development. The figures mentioned are not too difficult of attainment, always provided that war does not intervene to increase the country's military expenditure. Also financed from the public revenues would be expenditure of the order of Rs.3,930 million, with the difference that this would not be new and represents no more than placing on a five-year footing expenditure already being incurred on development from the revenue account. Thus, a total sum of Rs.6,040 million—fifty-four per cent of the internal finance, or forty per cent of the total finances required from public revenues—consists predominantly of taxes, both central and state. Taxation, therefore, occupies an important place in the financing of the economic development envisaged in India's first Five-Year Plan; and this is a matter of significance not only for India but also for other under-developed economies that may resort to planned economic development.

The other large item is represented by funds expected to be available on capital account, in the amount of Rs.4,870 million. It is significant that of this only Rs.1,150 million is expected to be raised over the five-year period by long-term borrowing from the public on the part

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of both the central and state governments. Of the balance, Rs.2,500 million is expected to accrue to the Centre from small savings and unfunded debt. The remainder, viz., Rs.1,220 million, is expected to be obtained from miscellaneous funds, such as provident funds, governmental insurance funds, etc., in the possession of the central and state governments. Long-term borrowing or Public Debt proper thus accounts for less than eight per cent of the total finances required for the Plan. This makes the financial basis of the Plan not only more realistic, lending it an orthodoxy worthy of Gladstonian finance, but also leaves more room to the private sector, especially in organised industry, for financing its requirements for both capital replacement and capital expansion.¹³

There still remains a balance of Rs.6,720 million in order to finance both Parts I and II of the Plan, i.e., including that part which has not yet been published. Leaving aside the latter, a sum of Rs.3,720 million is required to finance the draft Plan proposed by the Commission which, in its opinion, must be implemented in any case. Of this amount about Rs.750 million will be available from the rupee proceeds of the wheat loan granted by the United States government in 1951, while approximately Rs.150 million will be obtained from the Colombo Plan funds donated by the governments of Canada and Australia. Still to be found is a balance of Rs.2,820 million, which indicates the measure of foreign assistance required even if only Part I of the Plan is implemented. As the Commission, however, is determined on the implementation of this Part in any case, it is prepared to recommend recourse to deficit financing for this amount, even though its general attitude is one of strong opposition to "created money".¹⁴ The Commission is of the view that the inflationary effect of this deficit financing would be insignificant, since an almost equivalent amount, viz., Rs.2,900 million, would be available to the country through withdrawals from its sterling balances during the period, thus very likely offsetting the increased purchasing power that would

¹³ The Commission envisages an expenditure of between Rs.2,500 million and Rs.3,000 million by organised industry in the private sector during the five-year period. This amount is broken up into Rs.1,250 million for the capital cost of expansion programmes and between Rs.1,250 million and Rs.1,750 million for repairs and replacements. A part of the latter sum is expected to come from the accumulated depreciation funds of the industries concerned, while Rs.800 million to Rs.900 million of the former is expected to be supplied by the capital market, the balance being made up by loans from government-sponsored industrial finance corporations.

¹⁴ *The First Five Year Plan, cit.*, p. 36.

result from deficit financing by providing increased supplies of imported goods—assuming, of course, that equilibrium would otherwise have been attained in the country's balance of payments.

In regard to Part II of the Plan, which requires Rs.3,000 million for its implementation, the Commission, while stressing its importance from the point of view of ensuring "a balanced and sustained utilisation of the technical organisation built up in connection with the various projects included in the first part" and also of attaining a rate of progress somewhat greater than that necessary for restoration of pre-war levels of availability of essential consumer goods, emphasises its dependence on the procurement of foreign aid. "The scale of investment expenditure envisaged under it is based on the assumption that the necessary foreign assistance is forthcoming. . . . The implementation of the schemes in the second part of the Plan will have to be phased with due regard to the availability of foreign aid and in a manner that will not add to the inflationary pressures in the economy."¹⁵ In the absence of such aid, the Commission would rather defer Part II of its Plan than resort to further deficit financing for its implementation.

The total foreign aid that will thus be required to implement the entire Plan, including both Parts I and II, after exhausting all available internal and external resources, and without resort to deficit financing, will be Rs.5,900 million, or approximately \$1,242 million, i.e., an average of about \$250 million a year during the five-year period. Part of this, no doubt, will be available from the balance of the United States wheat loan, further contributions from the Colombo Plan participants, and loans from the International Bank; but it is doubtful whether these will total more than what will be necessary to make up the foreign balance of the funds required for implementing the first part of the Plan. This means, in turn, that the second part of the Plan—on which the Commission lays so much stress¹⁶—is in jeopardy unless some other foreign aid is forthcoming or resort is had to deficit financing with its possible inflationary consequences so inopportune in the context of the disinflationary and development objective of the Five-Year Plan.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 37, 50.

¹⁶ "The first and second parts together represent, in our view, an order of outlay necessary not only for achieving greater progress in the period of the Plan but for holding out promise of a pace of development that would inspire the country to greater and more sustained efforts." *Ibid.*, p. 37.

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The problem would have lent itself to easy solution, and the economic development of India in a democratic manner would have been greatly facilitated, if the United Nations had accepted either the suggestion made in 1949 by the writer, as chairman of the United Nations Sub-commission for Economic Development, that a United Nations Economic Development Administration be established; or the recommendation put forward in 1951 by the Ad Hoc Committee of United Nations Experts (a) that an International Development Authority be established, and (b) that the International Bank set itself the objective, to be achieved within the next five years, of lending one billion dollars annually to under-developed countries; or the resolution repeatedly introduced by Sir B. R. Rau before the General Assembly for the creation of a World Development Fund. Unfortunately, none of these projects, all of which constitute variations on the same theme, has secured the support of the United States government; and international action designed to finance rapid economic development remains, therefore, an unsolved problem before the United Nations, though it continues to elicit much vocal sympathy and support at each session of the Economic and Social Council and of the General Assembly.

THUS far we have dealt with the financial implementation of the Five-Year Plan. It is now in order to turn to a brief description of the means proposed for the concrete implementation in physical terms of the targets set out in the Plan. As already noted, expanded agricultural production is the most important part of the Commission's proposals, priority being accorded the proposed increase of 7.2 million

<i>Type of project</i>	<i>Area (in thousand acres)</i>	<i>Additional production (in thousand tons)</i>
Major irrigation schemes	8,712	2,272
Minor irrigation schemes	7,621	1,932
Land improvement and reclamation schemes	7,405	1,524
Central tractor organisation	1,500	
Cultivation of fallow lands	4,000	
Other land-improvement schemes	1,905	
Manure and fertiliser schemes		584
Seed-distribution schemes		370
Other schemes		520

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tens in the country's output of foodgrains. This goal is to be achieved partly by extension of irrigation, partly by land reclamation, and partly by better cultivation.¹⁷

The Report lacks similar details regarding the means proposed for securing the desired increases in production of cotton, jute, oilseeds and sugar; the Commission appears to rely on natural forces to do the job.¹⁸ This seems to be a weakness in the Plan, which, no doubt, will be rectified in the final version. The Commission recognises that, while the action described above will permit an increase in agricultural production, "these programmes can succeed only if the cultivator is filled with enthusiasm and determination to achieve his best".¹⁹ For this reason, special machinery has been proposed for organising the peasantry and stimulating its enthusiasm. Zamindari or absentee landlordism is to be abolished, but nationalisation of land or restrictions on the size of farms will not be countenanced. Farms above a certain size will be registered and placed under special obligations in respect of efficiency, labour conditions, scientific cultivation and marketing surpluses, and in return will be afforded the necessary facilities by way of technical and financial aid and supplies of agricultural goods and implements. Farms below this size are to be encouraged to form cooperative village management units, a unique feature being that, while rights of ownership will be recognised and compensated through an ownership dividend payable at each harvest, landowners who work in the village and workers who are non-owners will receive remuneration for work done, according to the nature of the work. Village production councils, comprising registered farms, cooperative units and individual peasants, are to be formed and will function as formulating and implementing agencies for village production plans. Rural extension services are to be organised on a broad scale. Intensive development will be promoted by the creation of development blocks, of fifty to sixty villages with sub-units of ten villages each, necessary provision being made for administrative coordination of the services relevant to agricultural efficiency and rural welfare. At least one such

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹⁸ "Increase in the production of commercial crops may be expected in the ordinary course in view of the favourable factors which prevail at present and appear likely to continue. Increase in the production of foodgrains, on the other hand, will require positive measures of assistance to the farmer." *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

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block is to be set up in each district, but more blocks will be established in areas of irrigation or assured rainfall. The development programme and its implementation will be through village production councils, while financial aid will be channelled through village cooperative societies. Thus it is hoped not only to induce the farmer to achieve the agricultural goals contained in the Plan, but also to create machinery that will permit more extensive and better-coordinated planning in the future.

In regard to industry, reliance is placed mainly on fuller utilisation of existing capacity for reaching the desired goals. The Commission points out: "For increasing the output of consumer goods, efforts must be concentrated on the fuller utilisation of existing capacity, by removing raw material shortages and by improving the efficiency of the existing units through modernisation of plant and machinery, reorganisation of uneconomic units, standardisation of production and scientific management."²⁰ The Commission is concerned over the deterioration that has taken place in the calibre of management and the attitude of workers in the postwar period; it also desires to effect a reorientation of outlook on the part of the industrialist, the entrepreneur and the worker so that they will function in conformity with the social and economic policy of the government. With this end in view, it recommends the creation of a central board that will license the establishment of new industrial units as well as the expansion of existing ones, conduct investigations into specific industries that show inefficiency, issue directives for the improvement of their management and policies, and be prepared, in the last resort, to assume control of such units as fail to carry out its instructions. In addition, the Commission suggests the creation for each important industry of development councils comprising government-appointed representatives of industry, labour and technical management. The task of these councils would be to recommend production targets, improve efficiency, protect consumer interests, and otherwise function as a link between the central board and the industries concerned. The Commission believes that, with the help of this machinery, it will be possible not only to achieve the industrial goals in the Plan but also to facilitate more effective and coordinated planning in the future. The Commission has also made provision for the participation of

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

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foreign capital in industry, and has reiterated the safeguards expressly guaranteed to foreign capital in the government's policy statement of April 1949 on the subject. More specifically, the Commission has indicated its preference for joint enterprises of foreign concerns and Indian businessmen in the establishment of new industries, such joint participation being subject to government approval. One respect in which it has made a practical advance in the direction of inducing a flow of foreign equity capital into the country is through its categorical recommendation that "the share of national capital in joint enterprises, the facilities for the training of Indians, the disclosure of patented processes to Indian associates, etc. are matters in respect of which no hard and fast rules need be prescribed".²¹ The wisdom of this policy can already be seen in the recent establishment of two foreign oil-refining concerns in Bombay. More such concerns in other industrial sectors will very likely follow in due course.

Finally—and this should please particularly foreign critics of the Indian economic scene—the Commission clearly recognises the need for slowing down the growth of population in India.

"It is necessary in the present context only to stress the fact that unless measures are initiated at this stage to bring down the birth-rate and thereby to reduce the rate of population growth, a continuously increasing amount of effort on the part of the community will be used up only in maintaining existing standards of consumption. . . . Increasing pressure of population on resources (which must inevitably be limited) retards economic progress and limits seriously the rate of extension of social services, so essential to civilised existence. A population policy is, therefore, essential to planning."²²

The Commission has, accordingly, recommended that the government provide facilities for sterilisation, advice on contraception upon medical grounds, and research on inexpensive, safe and efficacious methods of birth control suitable for all classes of people.

THE foregoing brief analysis of India's first Five-Year Plan is deliberately descriptive and not critical, partly because the Plan proposed is a draft outline and partly because criticism would be more political than strictly economic in character. Nevertheless, it may be worth noting some of the difficulties that stand in the way of implementation of the Plan.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

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It is a plan for development and, therefore, necessarily carries with it inflationary implications; yet it has to function against a highly inflationary background and must be disinflationary in character. Foreign aid may help, but foreign aid of the required magnitude and without the impediment of either explicit or implicit political strings does not appear to be immediately available. The success of the Plan, in the words of the Commission itself, "will depend on the extent to which it enlists the association and co-operation of the people".²³ Yet the Plan charts no fundamental social or economic changes that are likely to appeal to the vast mass of the people, nor does it hold out hopes of a sufficiently large or inspiring magnitude to evoke mass enthusiasm. The Plan is modest in character, moderate in aim, and concerned more with constructing the economic base for subsequent development than with supplying the psychological base so essential for the success of a great and dynamic social experiment, such as planned economic development for a country of the size and population of India. Above all, the Plan is based on a desire to walk in the middle of the road in a world in which pedestrians are fast straying away from the centre and taking their places either on the left or on the right side. It is true that the uneasy compromise of a mixed economy may provide the benefits of both a capitalist and a socialist economy, but it is equally probable that it may result only in producing the disadvantages inherent in both.

The Plan, therefore, may well fall between two stools. Yet there is no use in blaming the Commission for having pursued this approach. Power came to India by consent and not by force; the background is not revolutionary, the social, economic and class structures remaining largely intact despite political change; and the Indian seeks to retain Western liberal values alongside attempts at what may be called Eastern economic planning. Whether India's first Five-Year Plan will succeed, no one can say. But there is no denying that it is a great and perhaps unique experiment. Its success may well pave the way for social transformation free from class violence. If any one person can make it succeed, it is Prime Minister Nehru; and if any one thing

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 3. Note also: "The ability of Government to plan, to work out consistent policies and to implement them effectively is, in a democratic country, a direct function of the measure of support and co-operation it receives from the public. Such support and co-operation are the real sanctions behind the Plan." *Ibid.*, p. 9.

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can, under the limitations imposed by the existing political and social situation in India, concretely and effectively aid him in achieving its success, it is vision, imagination and understanding on the part of those economically developed nations of the world that are in a position to give assistance in finance, technique and equipment. If the most powerful nations of the world will only realise that economic development of the under-developed areas constitutes at least as effective insurance against war as armaments do, not only will world peace be much nearer attainment but also India's first Five-Year Plan will be much more certain of achievement, and possibly also of expansion and enlargement. Whether such wisdom will dawn on these nations, and in time, is a question to which no wise man would venture an answer.

Delhi, January 1952

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Chinese Agrarian Reform and Bolshevik Land Policy

Ya-lun Chou

THE significance of the Chinese Communist land-reform program as a factor in the economic and social development not only of China but possibly also of other parts of Asia lends interest to a comparison of it with the only other recent agrarian program of comparable magnitude—that undertaken in the Soviet Union. For this purpose, it is necessary first to recall the essential features of the agrarian problems with which the two revolutionary governments had to deal. Even a cursory examination of the rural economies of pre-revolutionary Russia and China suggests that they exhibited more similarities than differences.

The problems presented by pre-revolutionary rural conditions were of two distinct types in both countries. Belonging to the first type were those which originated in natural or technical disadvantages, such as scarcity of arable land, poverty or exhaustion of soil, destruction of forests, flooding of rivers, primitive methods of cultivation, and an immense rural population. Belonging to the other were those which resulted from defects in the social, economic and political systems, such as "feudalistic" organization of production,¹ which represented the

¹ The propriety of the term "feudalism" to describe the social order of rural China before the incidence of Communist reform may be questioned because the meaning of the term has never been standardized. Even in the case of Western Europe, whose feudal period lends itself perhaps more easily to analysis than feudalism elsewhere because it has passed into history, the concept of feudalism remains ambiguous. Yet, while definitions of the term differ and even conflict, there is wide agreement that a feudal social order did exist in Western Europe before the rise of capitalism.

With regard to the existence of feudalism in pre-Communist China, there is no agreement whatsoever. Many writers strongly oppose application of the term to Chinese conditions on the ground that such usage invites either looseness or subjectivism in thought, or both. On the other hand, many students of China, Chinese as well as Western, persist in referring to traditional Chinese rural society as feudalistic, perhaps because they regard the term as less unsatisfactory than others. Such usage can be justified by the fact that there have traditionally existed in Chinese villages certain phenomena which, though not equivalent to feudalism of the Western European variety, have had much in common with it. For example, the state in China has been weak, and localism strong; landownership has been the main source of rural economic, social and political power; most tenants have been tied to the land through permanent indebtedness to their landlords, while those who have leased out land have possessed more than they could cultivate with

main obstacle to agricultural modernization; inequality of landownership, which permitted landlords to abuse their tenants; poverty of the rural population, which made possible the exploitation of the peasants by moneylenders; and the combination of the landlords' economic wealth with their great social and political influence, which enabled them to dominate the poor peasantry.

The first set of problems, relating to the modernization of cultivation, can be removed only by a scientific revolution in farming methods. The second, resulting from the structure of rural organization, can be modified only by reform of existing institutions. The two sets obviously interact, but different methods and a different time sequence are required for remedying them. For example, since a revolution in agricultural technology cannot occur in a wholly unfavorable environment, the first set of problems cannot be taken in hand until the second has been modified. In nineteenth-century Europe, reconstruction of the legal basis of the land system preceded modernization of productive techniques and of the business side of farming; without the former, the latter would not have been possible. In the cases of both pre-revolutionary Russia and China, the two fundamental causes of the poor peasantry's grievances were the persistence of certain "feudal" practices and the extreme inequality of land distribution. It is not surprising, therefore, that the land policies of Soviet Russia and of revolutionary China were designed primarily to break up large estates by means of equalizing peasant holdings, as a brief examination of the Bolshevik Party's decree liquidating landed estates and the recent Chinese agrarian laws makes clear.

The Russian decree contained the following provisions:² (1) Private ownership of land by estate owners was abolished without payment of any kind of compensation. (2) All land belonging to estate owners, Crown appanage estates, convents and monasteries, etc., with all of their livestock, machinery, buildings and productive equipment, were to be transmitted to the provisional custody and administration of regional rural committees or to the district soviets of peasants' repre-

their own labor; and the tenants have usually supplied all of the means of production, with the exception of course of land.

In any case, so long as common usage is not violated, it is of no great moment how a term is employed if its meaning is consistent. If, as used in the present article, the term "feudalism" is understood in the sense of the characteristics noted above, it should occasion no confusion.

² As summarized in Alexander Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System*, London, 1947, pp. 16-17.

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sentatives, pending the election of a Constituent Assembly. (3) Any damage done to property confiscated from the estates would be punished according to law, since all such property was to be considered as belonging to the whole people. (4) Land belonging as private property to peasant farmers was not to be confiscated.

The Chinese Communist Party has been attempting to change rural conditions for a quarter-century, during which its agrarian policy has, of course, undergone many shifts in response to changing conditions and increasing experience. Its present policy is reflected in two documents: "The Basic Program of the Chinese Agrarian Law", approved by a Nation-wide Agrarian Conference of the Chinese Communist Party on September 13, 1947, and "The Agrarian Law of the People's Republic of China", adopted by the Central People's Government Council on June 28, 1950. These laws contain the following important statements: (1) The general purpose of land reform in China is to abolish the landownership system of feudal exploitation by the landlord class and to establish a system of giving the "land to the tillers". (2) To realize this purpose, the land, draft animals, farm implements and surplus grain of the landlords will be confiscated and redistributed equitably among the rural population. Land thus redistributed will become the private property of the cultivators. (3) In confiscating land and property, no infringement upon industry or commerce is permitted. Thus, industrial and commercial enterprises run by landlords and the land and other properties used directly by landlords for the operation of industrial or commercial enterprises shall not be confiscated. (4) In order to strengthen the leadership of the people's government in the work of agrarian reform, the people's governmental agencies at the district level or above should, at the time of agrarian reform, organize agrarian-reform committees composed of persons elected or nominated by the people's representative councils or persons appointed by the people's governments of a higher level. These committees of peasant associations are the legal organizations for reforming the agrarian system. (5) To maintain order during agrarian reform and to protect the people's property, it is strictly prohibited to slaughter draft animals or to fell trees without authorization, to let land lie untended, to destroy farm implements, irrigation works, buildings, crops, or the like. Offenders will be tried and punished by the people's court.

Clearly, both the Bolshevik and the Chinese Communist Parties undertook confiscation and redistribution of land in order to bring

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"peace and land to the peasants". It is worth noting, however, that even though both governments took similar measures to solve similar problems, the Chinese Communists may have found the inspiration for their policies in Chinese history rather than in Soviet practice. The ideal of equal distribution of land, as well as the policy of land confiscation, was well known to students of Chinese history long before the Russian Revolution. Indeed, more than two thousand years ago Mencius advocated "equal distribution of land" as the most important economic foundation of a "kingly" government. His ideal has been known as the "well-field system", under which every square *li* (one-fifth of a square mile) of land was to have been divided into nine plots, each consisting of 100 *mow* (16.7 acres). "The central square is known as the 'public field', while the eight surrounding squares are the private land of eight farmers with their families, each family having one square. These farmers cultivate the public field collectively and their own field individually. The produce of the public field goes to the government, while each family keeps for itself what it raises from its own field. The arrangement of nine squares resembles in form the Chinese character for "well", which is why it is called the 'well-field' system."³ When such an ideal land system has been established, wrote Mencius, everyone under the kingly government can "nourish the living and bury the dead without the least dissatisfaction [a state of affairs] which marks the beginning of the kingly way".⁴

Since the time of Mencius, China has witnessed numberless attempts to equalize landownership; those by the usurper Wang Mang at the beginning of the Christian era and by the eleventh-century statesman Wang An-shih are the most famous. Again, in the early 1850s the Taiping advocates of a social and economic reorganization of Chinese life urged the abolition of private ownership of land. According to their program, the agricultural estates of landlords and rich peasants were to be confiscated, divided into nine classes on the basis of fertility, and redistributed among the farming population according to the size of each household and the number of working members therein, with preference being given men and women above sixteen and below fifty years of age.⁵

³ Fung Yu-lan, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, New York, 1948, p. 75.

⁴ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 75.

⁵ Such a policy was enunciated in a formal decree issued in 1853 under the title "Land System of Tai-Ping Tien-Kuo", which provided that "if there are six members in the family,

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Hence, both the concept of equal distribution of land and the policy of land confiscation are indigenous to China and not necessarily imports from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, insofar as actual application of the theory is concerned, there is a fundamental and important ideological difference between the land policies of the Soviet Union and those of China. The latter provide that land is to be redistributed to individual peasants immediately after confiscation, and that it thereupon becomes their private property which they may "manage, buy, sell, or rent out . . . freely" (Article 30, 1950 Agrarian Law). The Soviet policy involved transferring estate lands temporarily to rural committees and district soviets only until such time as specific legal procedures for disposing of confiscated land could be established; not until then was redistribution of land among the peasants to take place. When such distribution did occur, the Soviet government had already nationalized all land (including that belonging to individual peasants and peasant committees) under the provisions of the Statutory Law Concerning Land of February 19, 1918. Thus, whereas the Bolsheviks attempted to lay the basis for socialism in agriculture immediately after the initiation of reform, the Chinese Communists instituted a type of capitalist agricultural organization which is currently in force.

The difference, however, is merely temporary and relates to timing and procedure rather than to final objective. The ultimate goal of land reform in China, as Communist leaders have repeatedly stated, is to establish socialism in agriculture through the development of collective farming, even though "for quite a long time the agricultural economy will be basically scattered and individual".⁹

THE present Chinese agrarian policy of private ownership is closely connected with the general program of the "new democratic" movement, which is based upon Leninist theories of imperialism and revolution in semi-colonial countries. Since, according to Mao, Chinese society is still semi-feudal and semi-colonial in nature, the Chinese revolution must pass through two distinct phases. The object of the first is

three are to receive good land and the other three, poorer land. . . . Men and women above sixteen and under fifty are to receive a full share of land; others, half a share. . . ." (*Tai-Ping Tien-Kuo*, "The Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace", was the dynastic name of the Taipings.) Quoted in Pin Sing, *A Short History of China's Democratic and Institutional Movements* (in Chinese), Shanghai, 1945, p. 8.

⁹ Mao Tse-tung, *Turning Point in China*, New York, 1948, p. 17.

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to liberate China from imperialism and "feudalism", while that of the second is to push forward to the establishment of a socialist society. At present, the Communists are striving to change the basis of Chinese social organization from a semi-colonial, semi-feudal to an independent, democratic type. During this phase the development of capitalism of a sort is not only necessary but "progressive".⁷

But why should it be thought necessary and expedient to adopt a provisional policy of private ownership in the villages rather than to nationalize land? One answer to this question has been provided by a Communist writer who argues that the backwardness and conservatism of the peasantry, which is firmly wedded to private property, prevents the farmers from comprehending the economic advantages to be gained from nationalization of the land in comparison with those offered by the retention of private small property. In consequence, they are not ready to support such a program; yet, without their support, any attempt at agrarian reform must fail.⁸

Even though the difference between the Chinese policy of private ownership and the Soviet one of nationalization is only one of timing, it is nevertheless profoundly significant. Chinese policy has taken into account existing conditions and has been framed in accordance with the social psychology of the peasantry. It has, therefore, aroused greater enthusiasm among the peasants and made them more willing to co-operate in the initiation of land reform than did the program that was adopted in the Soviet Union several decades ago.

During the course of reform, both the Bolsheviks and the Chinese Communists relied upon the peasant associations as the legal instruments for executing the policy of land confiscation and redistribution. Here again, however, marked differences existed between the courses followed by the two governments. The Bolshevik Party came to power suddenly in late 1917, and the redistribution of land took place more or less simultaneously in all peasant communities. Since regional rural committees and district soviets existed in only a few villages in 1918, liquidation and redistribution were carried out blindly by the masses and, in most localities, without any sort of leadership. The effect of this lack of leadership was intensified by the fact that the social grievances

⁷ Mao Tse-tung, *China's New Democracy*, New York, 1945, Sections 3-6.

⁸ Shih Mei, "On Agrarian Reform in China at the Present Stage", *Theory and Fact* (in Chinese), Hong Kong, March 1948.

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of the peasantry against the landowners often outweighed their economic grievances. Consequently, as they set out to liquidate the estates and to distribute the land, the peasants commonly burned buildings, demolished equipment and slaughtered livestock, despite a government regulation prohibiting the destruction of property confiscated from estates on pain of severe punishment. This behavior was an important factor in the continuous decline in agricultural production that marked the next years.

Unlike the Bolsheviks, the Chinese Communists fought against the established government for almost three decades, and did not vault into power overnight. Their land-reform policy was initiated in one place after another under the close guidance and supervision of Communist cadres. During the years 1948-49, when its forces were overrunning all of China, the new government was cautious about carrying out land reforms in newly-won areas. It did not attempt to employ similar measures in all localities or to undertake land reform everywhere at the same time. Instead, it framed different immediate measures for different regions, even though ultimately reform in every village will include the confiscation and redistribution of land. In explanation of this approach, which is termed "the policy of differentiation between regions and stages", Mao Tse-tung spoke as follows to Communist Party workers in the spring of 1948:

"By differentiation between regions we mean that strength should be concentrated in those regions that can be firmly occupied, to carry on appropriate agrarian reform work suitable to the demands of the masses of that region; while in those regions which it is still temporarily difficult to occupy firmly, do not be in too much of a hurry to carry out agrarian reform, but rather do some practical work beneficial to the masses in accordance with the existing conditions, pending a change of those conditions.

"By differentiation between stages we mean that in areas which the People's Liberation Army has just occupied, the tactics of neutralizing the rich peasants and small and middle landlords should be set forth and carried out, reducing the sphere to be struck to only eliminating the Kuomintang's reactionary armed forces, hitting at big feudal tyrannical elements—concentrating all strength for fulfilment of this task as the first stage in the work of new areas. Afterwards, according to the circumstances of the raised level of consciousness and organization of the masses, develop step by step to the stage of eliminating the whole feudal system."⁸

⁸ Mao Tse-tung, "Address to the Conference of Communist Cadres of Shansi and Suiyuan", April 1, 1948, as reproduced in *The Present Situation and Our Tasks* (in Chinese), Hong Kong, 1949.

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In accordance with these instructions, the Central Committee of the Communist Party decreed in May 1948 that the universal application of the measures of confiscation and equitable distribution of land would have to await the fulfilment of three conditions: (1) The environment would have to be relatively stable; that is, all Nationalist troops must have been driven off. (2) The overwhelming majority of the masses (i.e., all poor peasants and tenants) would have voluntarily to demand confiscation and redistribution of land. (3) There would have to be enough capable agrarian-reform workers to guide the peasant movement and to ensure the success of the reform in each locality. In the new areas where these conditions have not been fulfilled, a policy of reduction in rents and interest rates must be adopted before equitable distribution of movable property and land can be undertaken.¹⁰ Furthermore, the 1950 Agrarian Law provides that land reform will not be executed in the near future in "areas of national minorities". The reasons for this exception have been explained by Liu Shao-ch'i: "... the application of the 1950 Agrarian Law to the areas inhabited by a population of about 20 million of the national minorities will have to be decided on the basis of work within the national minorities and the level of political consciousness of the masses of the people. We should give the national minorities more time to consider and prepare for reform among themselves and we must not be impetuous" if land reform is to be carried out smoothly among them.¹¹

As a result of the precautions outlined above, land reform in Communist China has been carried out in a much more orderly fashion than was the case in Soviet Russia in 1918. Destructive practices by the peasants themselves have been kept to a minimum.

The use of peasant associations as the legal instruments of land reform is based on Lenin's theory of rural struggle. Lenin thought that, in winning their freedom from "feudal" bondage, the rural poor could expect no help from any quarter so long as they did not unite as a single class against the landlords. He regarded the middle peasants as literally standing midway between the opposing forces of rural society and as constituting a class which would offer the poor peasants at most a friendly neutrality as long as the outcome of the struggle against serf-

¹⁰ "May Directive Concerning the Work of Agrarian Reform and Purifying the Party in the New Areas", New China News Agency, May 25, 1948.

¹¹ "Report on Problems Concerning Agrarian Reform", *People's China*, Peking, July 16, 1950.

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dom remained undecided. He believed, moreover, that the rich peasants would tend naturally to ally themselves with the landlords in the course of an agrarian struggle, but the possibility of such an alignment did not worry him unduly since he thought that an alliance between the rural poor and the urban workers would be immeasurably wider and stronger. In reality, as in theory, all of the measures of Soviet land reform were carried out in an atmosphere of "class war" under the political slogan, "With the support of the poor peasants, in alliance with the middle peasants—fight against the 'kulaks'". In consequence, conditions of civil war prevailed for some time in several important agricultural areas.

The tactics presently employed by the Chinese Communists for "class struggle" in the villages, as revealed in a speech which Mao Tse-tung delivered in 1948, accord in general with Lenin's fundamental principle, but appear to be comparatively liberal and progressive in detail. "The general line of the agrarian reform," Mao said, "is to rely on the poor peasants, unite them with the middle peasants, in order to abolish systematically and discriminately the feudal system of exploitation and to develop agricultural production." But "the target of the agrarian reform is only and must be the feudal system of exploitation on the part of the landlord and the old-type rich peasant classes, and neither the liberal bourgeoisie nor the industry and commerce operated by landlords and rich peasants can be infringed upon; special attention must be given to non-encroachment on middle peasants, all of whom do not engage in exploitation or engage in slight exploitation".¹²

¹² "Address to the Conference of Communist Cadres of Shansi and Suiyuan", cited.

According to a document, "How to Analyze Classes", issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1933, the sole criterion for defining classes is the relationship of exploiter to exploited, determined by ownership or non-ownership of the means of production, the type and amount of production goods, and the ends for which they are employed. Thus, *landlords* are those who possess much land or do not work their land themselves but instead rely upon exploiting tenants directly by employing them or renting them land; also included are those who profit without working and those who engage in usury. *Rich peasants*, besides owning a large amount of land, draft animals and farm implements, work on the land themselves but also exploit the labor of hired peasants or rent out some portion of their land. *Middle peasants* own land, draft animals and farm implements, work on the land themselves and exploit other peasants only slightly or not at all. *Poor peasants* own no land or other farming property, and sell their labor to others.

According to this criterion, differentiation between middle and rich peasants is clearly difficult under certain circumstances. In general, middle peasants do not exploit others; yet those who do so only slightly or incidentally are considered middle peasants. What, then, is the standard for determining whether exploitation is slight or incidental or not? On this point, another document ("Decisions on Questions of the Agrarian Struggle", issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1933) states that those engaged in slight exploitation (which

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Thus the Chinese Communists today rely not only upon cooperation between poor and middle peasants but also attempt to absorb the liberal elements among the landlords and, especially, the rich peasants into the revolutionary camp. In order to win over the rich peasants, they differentiate between them and landlords by inviting the former to assist in deliberations of the peasant union committees (comprising poor and middle peasants) and thus giving them a voice in the confiscation and redistribution of land. To reduce the landlords' resentment, these receive the same amount of land and of movable property as other classes do in the course of the reform, and their industrial and commercial interests are protected from encroachment.¹³

Therefore, in contrast to the Soviet procedure, the Chinese Communist policy for rural struggle is to win the rich peasantry over to full cooperation with the poor and middle peasants. This line, which they call "the policy of preserving the rich-peasant economy", was first adopted in 1947 and reinforced in 1950. Even though, under the 1947 Agrarian Program, rich peasants and landlords received different treatment, the surplus land and property of the former were liable to requisition. Under the 1950 Law, however, rich peasants' land and property, unlike the landlords', will in general not be confiscated. Mao Tse-tung explained this shift in policy in June 1950:

"The war has been fundamentally ended on the mainland. The situation is entirely different from that between 1946 and 1948, when the People's Liberation Army was locked in a life-and-death struggle with the Kuomintang reactionaries and the issue had not yet been decided. Now the government is able to help the poor peasants solve their difficulties by means of loans to balance up the disadvantage of having less land. Therefore, there should be a change in our policy toward the rich peasants, a change from the policy of requisitioning the surplus land and property of the rich peasants to one of preserving a rich-peasant economy, in order to help the early restoration of production in the rural areas. This change is also favorable for isolating the landlords and protecting the middle peasants and small 'renters out' of land."¹⁴

includes the hiring of others to herd cattle or sheep, the hiring of part- or full-time laborers, the renting out of a little land, or the lending of small sums), the income from which does not exceed fifteen per cent of their gross income, are considered middle or well-to-do middle peasants. According to a report by Jen Pi-shih ("Important Questions Arising during the Agrarian Reform", in *Typical Experiences of Land Reform and Reorganization of the Party*, Hong Kong, 1948), the standard adopted in 1933 gave way in 1947 to a more liberal one, according to which those persons for whom the exploitation of others provides more than twenty-five per cent of their gross income in three successive years are considered rich peasants.

¹³ These procedures are stipulated in the Agrarian Laws of 1947 and 1950.

¹⁴ "Report by Mao Tse-tung to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Peking, June 5, 1950", American Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Supplement No. 3*, June 28, 1950.

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Thus, the change in policy toward rich peasants—like other policy shifts which the Chinese Communists have announced from time to time—is dictated essentially by changing political, military and economic conditions. Since the policy of a rich-peasant economy has been embraced before—and scrapped before—by the Chinese Communists under various circumstances, one may wonder how long the present line will last. To this question, Liu Shao-ch'i gave an answer in his report "On Problems Concerning Agrarian Reform" to the Second Session of the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference in June 1950:

"The policy adopted by us of preserving a rich-peasant economy is . . . not a temporary but a long-term policy. That is to say, a rich-peasant economy will be preserved in the whole stage of the New Democracy. Only when the conditions mature for the wide use of mechanical farming, for the organization of collective farms and for the Socialist reform of the rural areas can the need for a rich-peasant economy cease, and this will take a somewhat lengthy time."

Whatever the reasons for the adoption of the rich-peasant line, and whatever its duration, its significance in the rural struggle at the present stage must not be minimized. It may be presumed to have won over the rich peasants to at least a neutral attitude and thereby to have weakened the resistance of the propertied classes to land reform. This policy, together with the grant of a measure of economic security to landlords mentioned earlier, may explain in considerable measure why there appears to have been far less organized resistance by landlords and rich peasants against the central government in China than there was in the Soviet Union during the period of land reform there.

Another pronounced difference between the agrarian policies of the two governments exists in respect of procurement and distribution of food. The Soviet government, after the redistribution of land, fixed prices for grain and other basic foods, but because of the pressure of inflation and a shortage of manufactured consumers' goods, the peasants were unwilling to deliver food to the government purchasing bodies. As a result, the problem of purchasing grain for the urban population—a problem which had existed before the October Revolution—became much more complicated, and during the civil-war period the government had to resort to a series of special regulations in order to relieve the situation. In May 1918 it was decreed that any peasant family refusing to sell its surplus grain at legal prices to the government pur-

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chasing bodies would suffer imprisonment, confiscation of property and expulsion from the community. Armed units of industrial workers and poor peasants were thereupon organized to enforce grain deliveries, and two years later their functions were assumed by special detachments of the "komissariat for internal security and combat against counter-revolution and speculation". "By means of these compulsory methods, the amount of food distributed increased and the acute difficulty in supplying the town and industrial population was partly overcome, but the peasantry from whom the food was taken replied to these coercive measures by reducing the production of foodstuffs."¹⁵

Thus far, the Peking government has not imposed price controls on farm produce. Farmers remain free to sell their surplus at open-market prices, and government purchases of food are usually made at the prevailing prices. In the case of agricultural export products, the government seems to have adopted a policy of encouraging the state trading companies to buy these above the market prices when export of them encounters difficulties, since "the possibility and speed of marketing agricultural products are of great importance to the livelihood [of the rural population]. We must maintain the appropriate prices for these products in order to protect farmers' proper profits."¹⁶ Furthermore, the prices of certain agricultural products, such as cotton, are fixed by the government on the basis of the prices of related manufactures, such as cotton piece goods. These prices are subject to occasional change, and are so regulated that they always favor the farmers over the manufacturers.¹⁷ Under such conditions, peasants are unlikely to hesitate before disposing of their surplus either in the open markets or through the government agencies. Moreover, rising prices and the favorable treatment accorded farm produce doubtless encourage the peasants to increase their output.

It is worth noting that the liberal agricultural price policy may have been a major factor in the government's ability to transfer food from

¹⁵ Baykov, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

¹⁶ Ch'en Yun (Chairman of the Economic and Financial Committee of the Central Government of the People's Republic of China), "Report on the Economic Situation and the Adjustments of Industry, Commerce and Taxation to the National Political Council of the People", June 15, 1950. (Reproduced in *The China Weekly*, San Francisco, July 22, 1950.)

¹⁷ "It is the policy of the government to reduce the prices of industrial products. For instance, in Northeast China each ton of grain can now be exchanged for three times as much cloth as formerly." (Yang P'ei-hsin, "China Tackles Her Financial Problem", *People's China*, February 1, 1950.)

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surplus to deficit areas during the 1950 famine, which was reportedly the most catastrophic in half a century. Some fifteen million persons were affected by the disastrous crop failure in the famine provinces, but only a very small fraction of them are said to have starved—a notable achievement in view of the unfavorable domestic and international situations prevailing at the time.

IN both the Soviet Union and China, after redistribution of the land, peasant holdings remained subdivided and thus an impediment to modernization of agriculture. Both countries resorted to collective farming to increase output, but the procedure employed in Soviet Russia was quite different from that in China. The Soviet Union used *kolkhozy* (collective farms) and *soukhozy* (state farms) to achieve its purpose, but their development was very slow in the early years. Subsequently the large-scale organization of agriculture received increasing emphasis, and by the end of the first Five-Year Plan in 1932 more than two-thirds of all land under cultivation had been collectivized. The process, however, had involved ruthless coercion which aroused stubborn resistance among the peasantry and cost millions of lives and a vast amount of national wealth.

To overcome the disadvantages inherent in a small-farm economy, the Peking government has resorted to cooperative organization. Of the many kinds of rural cooperatives in China, three are designed to assist agricultural production directly. One of these, the "labor-exchange brigade", is a very simple form of producer cooperative which organizes farm labor for collective use. An outgrowth of this device is the second system, "teams for joint use of farm tools", which attempts to rationalize the use of scarce equipment. For instance, if one farmer owns a water buffalo, another a wheel-hoe, and a third a water pump, none of the three can cultivate his land so efficiently as if all of their equipment is pooled. The third type, "collective-cultivation cooperatives", is much more advanced and broader in scope than the first two. In return for contributions of equipment or money, members receive shares of stock representing their equity in the cooperative. The cooperative purchases seeds, fertilizers and tools, and applies them to the members' land according to a definite plan. Crop yields and by-products are distributed to members in proportion to the number of shares they hold. The labor of member families is utilized just as it is

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under the system of labor-exchange brigades, and is paid for directly by the cooperative according to the amount and kind of labor contributed. In other words, member-cultivators are treated as if they were laborers hired by the cooperative. Collective-cultivation cooperatives differ from the other kinds of cooperative organizations mentioned above in that they are permanent in character, not merely temporary mutual-help corps formed to accomplish special tasks, such as cultivating, haying or harvesting. They are much more advanced than such simple mutual-help devices, and have eliminated certain of the disadvantages associated with small parcels of land since they permit expansion of the basic unit of cultivation and thus pave the way for the introduction of machinery.

Despite the obvious advantages offered by these rural cooperatives, the government has been sparing in its use of coercion to speed their development, which thus far has been dependent upon voluntary peasant participation. The role of the government has been one of encouragement, guidance and assistance. Mao Tse-tung has repeatedly stressed that the organization of rural cooperatives is essential to increased agricultural production, and that "the more cooperatives organized the better"; but "all joint ventures of this type, whether they be temporary or permanent, must be based on voluntary participation" and under no circumstances should coercion be permitted.¹⁸

Both in organizational methods and in tempo of development, the Chinese cooperative movement differs significantly from the compulsory collectivization which the Soviet Union launched in 1929. The former must necessarily be very slow in comparison with the latter, but its results will probably be less painful and destructive. Both China and the Soviet Union adopted revolutionary methods to eliminate "feudalism" in the one case and "serfdom" in the other; yet, in advancing toward socialism in agriculture, China has thus far followed a relatively evolutionary approach, while Soviet Russia chose a more radical policy.

It is worth noting, however, that although the government still

¹⁸ Mao Tse-tung, "On Cooperatives", *Organization of Production and Investigation of Villages* (in Chinese), Hong Kong, 1946.

An editorial released by the New China News Agency, Peking, declared: "According to past experience . . . all cooperatives organized under coercion from any source have always proved unsuccessful, because under such circumstances it is impossible to get the active cooperation and participation of the farmers." ("To Push the Agricultural Production in the Liberated Areas One Step Upward", July 25, 1948, reproduced in *The Problems of Agrarian Reconstruction*, in Chinese, Hong Kong, 1949.)

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devotes its attention primarily to the organization of private cooperatives, Soviet-style state farms have already appeared in China as a basic model of socialist reform. The Peking government was recently reported to have called for "greatly increasing development of state farms this year on regional, provincial, county and even subcounty levels, provided the land is available".¹⁹ This drive may not have much immediate effect on the principle of voluntary development of "mutual aid" groups and collective-cultivation cooperatives because the state farms are being established at present only on reclaimed and marginal lands. If, however, the drive should be intensified and the Communists should decide in the near future to speed up the cooperative movement, the government might be constrained to introduce certain coercive measures similar to those employed in the Soviet Union, since the "educational" method is necessarily very slow in obtaining results.

It should be noted further that the principle of voluntary participation is strictly confined to the cooperative movement and is not observable elsewhere in the reform procedures of present-day China. The policies of land confiscation and the struggle against landlords which precedes the actual distribution of land are coercive in nature. There are, for example, persistent reports of executions of "enemies of the people" in the course of rural struggle. At the present stage in the countryside these "enemies of the people" include a small faction of those landlords who have committed "crimes" and whose cases have been decided by provincial government headquarters.²⁰

Although by no means exhaustive, the foregoing comparison of the land policies pursued by the Moscow and Peking governments serves to indicate some of their fundamental differences and similarities. By way of summary, it may be pointed out that the Chinese policy, which transfers landlords' holdings to private peasant ownership, is at present quite unlike the land-nationalization program adopted in the Soviet Union in 1918. Moreover, land reform has been much more orderly in

¹⁹ Henry R. Laebberman, "Soviet-Type Farms Set Up in Red China", Hong Kong dispatch in *New York Times*, February 18, 1952.

²⁰ In this connection, a Canadian missionary teaching at West China Union University in Chengtu recently reported: "Thus while there is hate toward the landlord class aroused in the farmers, there is no discrimination toward individual landlords. There are comparatively few landlords executed during the land reform—only those who have been guilty of all three crimes: murder, rape and swindling land from the farmers. Less than three results in varying lengths of prison sentences." Earl Willmott, "More Light on Land Reform", *The Canadian Far Eastern Newsletter*, Toronto, January 1952.

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China than in Soviet Russia, thanks to more careful planning and preparation. Again, the Soviet policy of rural struggle, noted above, was much narrower in scope and more uncompromising than the Chinese device of the "united front", which "comprises workers, peasants, independent laborers, professional people, intelligentsia, liberal bourgeoisie, and enlightened gentry who split off from the landlord class".²¹ Furthermore, from the 1917 Revolution until the second world war, the Soviet government persistently strove to appropriate agricultural products through compulsory requisitioning or the creation of disparities between prices of agricultural and industrial goods, thus depriving the peasants of any incentive to expand their production for market, whereas in China a policy of "free" marketing of farm produce has been followed. Finally, Soviet collectivization was achieved by compulsory and revolutionary methods; in China, on the other hand, the co-operative movement has proceeded thus far on a voluntary basis.

The general conclusion, therefore, is that, until now at least, the Chinese government appears to have adopted a land policy which, though it cannot be regarded as "liberal" in the Western sense, is nevertheless less revolutionary in principle and more progressive in nature than the Russian. The facts that there are pronounced differences in content as well as in form between the Chinese and Soviet models of land reform, and that both the policy of land confiscation and the ideal of equitable distribution of landownership have their historical roots in China, raise the question whether the changes that are taking place there today may not be necessitated by special local conditions rather than by commitment to a foreign ideology or interest.

Hampton, Virginia, February 1952

²¹ Mao Tse-tung, "Address to the Conference of Communist Cadres of Shansi and Suiyuan", cited.

NOTES AND COMMENT

Burma Looks Ahead

THE current Burmese national "welfare budget", as Finance Minister U Tin likes to call it in contrast to the "police budgets" of earlier years, offers the first clear sign that the country has emerged unbeaten, albeit somewhat battered, from the bitter struggle for survival which it has had to wage since shortly after gaining independence in January 1948. At a conservative estimate, total revenue should approximate 584 million rupees, which will provide a surplus of some Rs.41 million over planned current expenditure. Welfare services, which hitherto have of necessity lagged near the bottom of the priority scale, are now to receive 24.6 per cent of the total outlay. Thus education gets Rs.46 million on current and Rs.12.4 million on capital account; Rs.35 million is earmarked for housing schemes; capital outlay on health services amounts to Rs.26 million; and rehabilitation receives a current grant of Rs.5 million.

Government foreign-exchange earnings totaled Rs.720 million in 1950-51, and are being employed to keep down the cost of living by means of imports of essential consumer goods on private account. Export trends are promising. Exports of rice, the largest single item, are expected to exceed the 1.2 million tons registered in 1950-51, while those of timber showed an increase of sixty-six per cent in the latter year over the 16,000 tons recorded in 1949-50. Given time and perseverance, the prewar export figures of 3.5 million tons per year for rice and of 250,000 tons for timber do not seem wholly out of reach.

To afford relief to lower-income groups, the upper limit of total private income exempt from taxation has been raised from Rs.3,000 to Rs.3,500 per year. The government has also decided to write off outstanding revenues and loans issued to agriculturists between the end of the war and 1949, thus canceling a capital credit amounting to Rs.109 million.

The budget message announces that provision has been made for payment of the first membership dues for admission to the International Monetary Fund and to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a long-held wish whose fulfilment has heretofore been denied because of distressed circumstances. A reminder that all is not yet normal appears in the large allowance granted the defence and security forces, accounting for thirty-five per cent of total current and capital expenditures, and in the allocation of Rs.3.5 million for evacuee welfare. There is an over-all deficit of Rs.174 million, but hope is expressed that this gap will be closed by increased trade earnings and by recourse to existing cash reserves. Even if borrowing

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proves to be necessary, it may perhaps involve less embarrassment than on previous occasions, for the country is now proving itself to be a going concern.

Time was, not long ago, when Burma subsisted on loans from friends and by spending the barest minimum and selling what it could collect. The 1949-50 budget, for example, was one of strict austerity and placed entire emphasis on the restoration of peace and order: the security forces consumed about seven times as much as education and the medical and public health services together, or fourteen times as much as agriculture, irrigation, the veterinary and forest services and industries together. A twenty-five percent curtailment of personnel in all government departments except the armed forces was attempted; and an emergency reduction in salaries, ranging from fifteen to twenty-five per cent, was imposed on all of the survivors of the retrenchment programme—the president, ministers and other officials whose salaries are protected by statute voluntarily surrendering from one-quarter to one-half of them. It was indeed a grim year, and U Tin closed his budget speech in Parliament by remarking that the internecine strife which gripped the country had shattered its economy and that he could see no immediate prospect of the “economic felicity which our people hoped the Independence would bring”. The road from 1949 to 1952 has been hard and long.

THE end of the Pacific war left Burma a vast expanse of ruins.¹ The economy had been completely disrupted, and the established social structure had crumbled. The existing political forces, impelled by unruly passions and nationalistic fervour, were incapable of the self-control necessary for constructive action. The nation was intellectually and morally bankrupt. Pent-up feelings and inhibitions imposed by the war sought vehement release. In the aftermath of war and of nationalist struggle, opportunity for adventure was not wanting: the government was not yet firmly established; arms abounded throughout the country, as did unprincipled men anxious to organise and lead unthinking battalions; communications were bad and large areas were not easily accessible; in short, hit-and-run tactics appeared profitable and, more important, safe. Communists, Trotskyist Reds and Stalinist “White Flags” led in taking advantage of the situation, establishing themselves in Prome, the nerve-centre of the country's river traffic, and preying on Pyinmana and the Pegu districts. Members of the People's Volunteer Organisation (PVO), bewildered and befuddled, plodded like men in a trance behind the Communists. The most formidable of the government's challengers were the Karens—trained soldiers and disciplined men following a trusted leader towards a common goal, a separate state of their own. There

¹ For a discussion of events in Burma between 1945 and early 1949, see J. S. Furnivall, “Twilight in Burma”, *Pacific Affairs*, March and June 1949, pp. 3-20, 155-72.

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were many anxious months, during which the tired voice of the Premier, Thakin Nu, was occasionally heard on the Rangoon radio, promising the insurgents a general amnesty if they would lay down their arms and come forward to settle their demands at the conference table.

The Communists had taken an honorable part in the organisation of the wartime resistance movement, and after liberation had stood out as the one party with an ideology to offer. The party office in Rangoon became the headquarters of the nationalist elements, and its politburo their general staff. The party exploited to the full its advantage of being the first in the field, but, intoxicated with success, took to issuing edicts to the Buddhist clergy as well as to the people, neither of which appreciated such guidance. The Burmese mind is too refined and sensitive to endure the shocks of public criticism that formed an important part of Communist activity. Soon criticism led to abuse and to the branding of one leader a Trotskyist, another a deviationist, and so on, until major splits were inevitable.

The most potent factor in the early failure of the Communists was Aung San, who, emerging from the war a national hero and declining an important command in the reconstituted Burma Army, undertook to consolidate the nationalist forces under the banner of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League. Almost overnight the League became a united front, quite unlike anything that had been seen in Burma before. The Communists, having failed to capture the leadership of the League, set about to wreck it from within and were expelled for their efforts. Disgruntled at discovering that they were not indispensable, they watched from the sidelines as Aung San formed a government and negotiated successfully with Great Britain for the transfer of power to an independent Burma. The only way to make themselves felt seemed to be through rebellion, which the Communists accordingly launched some three months after independence. In their early adventures, they won large followings in certain areas where their programme of land reform and tax abolition had appeal, but before long the people discovered that their programme and their practice were in violent disagreement. The Karen revolt broke out just in time to save the Communists from final defeat, and when the revolt had spent its force, they, too, having fought their class war to the last PVO and the last Karen, dispersed to the shelter of the jungle. A negotiated settlement with the Communists is now desirable, but any prospect of it is remote; Parliament has emphatically rejected a recent motion for parley with them. Doctrinaire Marxism has, on the whole, little chance in Burma, although pursuance of the general principles of social and economic justice, which have been embodied in the Constitution, offers scope for fruitful activity. The Burma Workers and Peasants Party, a young organisation led by Marxist intellectuals and run on "consti-

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tutional" lines, is receiving a fair hearing, and its representation in Parliament, though small, may well become the nucleus of an orderly opposition.

The People's Volunteer Organisation was a semi-military group into which Aung San hoped to absorb the former personnel of the Patriot Burmese Forces and partisans of the resistance movement. It was an open secret that, if negotiations with Britain for the transfer of power should fail, the PVOs would again become guerrillas and attack the British troops stationed in the country; if the negotiations should succeed, some of them would be settled on the land and the rest taught a trade while helping to repair the war damage. Before Aung San's plans for the PVO could mature, he was murdered, and in the ensuing confusion the PVO broke up into factions which, after the fashion of the Communists, called themselves "White" and "Yellow". The Whites went "underground"; most of the Yellows stood by the government. The majority of the PVOs have now joined rehabilitation battalions, and are once again peacefully occupied.

The Karen revolt was the most tragic event of the many that occurred in the first two years of independence. The government had accepted, in principle, the creation of a separate Karen state within the Union of Burma, and an Enquiry Commission, on which the Karen National Union and other Karen elements were adequately represented, had been charged with recommending practical steps towards its establishment. Although the Karens doubtless believed that they had to take matters into their own hands because national affairs were so confused that results could not be expected from the Commission, the revolt, in which only a minority of the Karen population participated, appeared to be based on opportunist considerations. The government was in distress; several of its key military posts were held by Karens; and the Karen National Defence Organisation had received arms from the government on the understanding that it would help to suppress the widespread waves of insurrection. Whatever its causes, the revolt was almost fatal to the tottering government, gave a fresh lease of life to the Communists, reopened old wounds left by previous Karen-Burman discord and inflicted new ones. In the death of Saw Ba U Gyi, the head of the Karen National Union, the Karens lost their hope and inspiration, and Burma an able leader. The Karens and Burmans are now back more or less where they were when the revolt broke out. The Enquiry Commission has resumed its work, and Parliament has passed the Constitution Amendment Act of 1951, giving legislative blessing to the new Karen state.

Although some of the government's Karen troops joined the insurrection, those in high command positions remained loyal. Mutiny in the forces was not, however, confined to Karen troops; certain of the Burmese units sent into the field chose to seek their fortunes there. When officers had been ap-

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pointed on the re-establishment of the Burma Army after the Pacific war, the Communists and other parties had managed to have some of their candidates selected for commissions. Since most of these officers placed allegiance to their party above that to the government, the seeds of mutiny had been sown at the very inception of the army. In the months of crisis, it was only the loyalty of the troops contributed by the frontier peoples and of the Burman units commanded by General Ne Win, the most trusted of Aung San's deputies, that saved the situation. Some of them virtually lived in army transport airplanes and requisitioned aircraft, now flying off to fight an action in Mandalay, then hastening to repulse a threat on Pegu. The airmen flew endless sorties, dropping handmade grenades and bombs on rebel positions over a wide area. In the creeks and tidal rivers the small craft of the infant navy patrolled night and day. It was a rough and ready war but not without its feats of heroism and loyalty.

If 1949 was a year of agony, doubt and despair, 1950 brought some relief. The Karens' bid for a quick, decisive victory failed, and, dislodged from their Toungoo and Insein strongholds, they withdrew to their villages in disorganisation and disillusionment. The PVOs, awakened from their trance, joined the rehabilitation brigades, as did many of the less extreme Communist supporters. The government forces, purged by the mutinies, have gradually gained the people's respect and thus constitute a deterrent to prospective adventurers.

In 1951 a commonly-heard slogan—"From peace to stability"—reflected the general mood of hopefulness. Parliamentary elections were held for the first time since independence, and in June polling began in 75 of the 250 constituencies. Proceeding on a regional basis, with elections moving forward as additional districts were reclaimed by the government, voting had taken place in most of the constituencies by the end of the year. The regional arrangement may appear unusual and certainly had defects, but there was a strong demand for elections, which had a tonic effect on popular morale. In electioneering, the people and parties have found a useful outlet for their feelings; new parties have appeared, and old leaders have emerged from retirement. Since party programmes are generally much alike, personalities carry the day; all candidates profess to be "leftist" and "progressive" and champions of the peasants, who represent about sixty-five per cent of the electorate, and of the workers, who comprise the majority of the remainder. In most cases the elections have been conducted fairly and freely, and although the Government coalition, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, drawing on Socialist support, has emerged on top, it has met shattering and unexpected defeat in some constituencies—a happy sign that the voters can

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think for themselves, and that an organised opposition can be expected in Parliament. The Burman is not addicted to violence in politics. After one or two general elections, all political opinions should be able to find their way into the two chambers of Parliament and there thresh out their differences.

The building of a welfare state, initiated after independence, was disturbed by the unrest in the country but never abandoned. The "colonial economy" is to be replaced by one based on equality of opportunity and social justice. There will be no "master class and slave class, the governing class and the governed," Thakin Nu has said, interpreting the state socialism endorsed by the Constitution; "people working together to the best of their power and ability must strive to convert the natural resources into consumer commodities to which everybody will be entitled according to his needs". The economic reformers have directed their attention mainly to agriculture; their programme includes modernisation of farming methods, experimentation with collective farming, crop rotation, model farms, agricultural schools, and so forth. The land-distribution policy has peasant proprietorship as its goal; landlordism has been abolished by legislation; and former landowners, most of whom are Indian moneylenders and absentee landlords, are to receive compensation. There is perhaps a trace of romanticism in the popular view of the farmer as the downtrodden victim and of the landlord as the wealthy oppressor, and the politicians have not forgotten that peasants comprise the bulk of the electorate. Yet, if properly administered, the Land Nationalisation Act should encourage agricultural development, and it has, after all, taken much wind out of the Communists' sails.

With regard to industrialisation, the first thought was to nationalise foreign-owned enterprises. The Irawaddy Flotilla Company was the earliest of these to be taken over, and its successor, the state-managed Inland Water Transport, functioned but fitfully in the face of the adverse conditions attending its birth. A state timber project was launched by taking over one-third of the timber trade from three British-owned companies. State trading in rice has proved successful, if only because there is an assured world market for as much as Burma can sell. The Civil Supplies Department, created to undertake bulk-buying and retailing to consumers at low prices, has had a precarious existence—"white elephant" being one of the milder epithets attached to it—and, with the development of consumer cooperatives, its operations should gradually diminish. Experiments in nationalisation have not always brought the desired results. The Inland Water Transport experience, for one, was sobering. Most of the Company's boats lay on river bottoms, its shipyards needed rebuilding, and technical and managerial skill were wanting: the government, it was discovered rather late, had bought another

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white elephant. The experience, however, was worth the price, and the venture, now assuming a more successful cast, has at least indicated the unwisdom of haste in taking over enterprises which the state is not ready to manage. "Progressive nationalisation of the means of production, distribution and transport, with all our countrymen participating in full measure in the ventures,"² remains the guiding principle, but the trend is towards joint operations, with the government buying an interest in undertakings and sharing in both management and profits, as in the cases of the equal partnership that has produced the Burma Corporation (1951) Ltd. to work the Namtu mines, and the joint venture with the Burmah Oil Company, in which the government will hold one-tenth of the total shares issued. The attitude towards the entry of foreign capital into the country has at no time been unduly suspicious. As early as June 1949 the Prime Minister formally stated that friendly foreign capital would be welcomed on terms of mutual benefit to investors and to the economic development of the country. In view of the unsettled conditions then prevailing, the invitation met with only a feeble response, but the increasing stability achieved since may make it more attractive in the future.

Burma owes its stout recovery mainly to the recuperative vitality of its peoples, especially those who till the soil. Men with guns and preachers of ideologies come and go, but the peasantry remains. Another important factor has been the leadership of Thakin Nu and of those of his colleagues who have survived the test of power and responsibility—and one must mention also the devotion of the men and women in the public services whose efforts increased as requirements of economy reduced their numbers and salaries. Of great assistance, too, have been the friendly nations which offered support when the need was great. Great Britain, after having waived repayment of £35.5 million out of a total of £72 million owed it by Burma, contributed £3.75 million towards the Burma Commonwealth loan, in which Australia, Ceylon, India and Pakistan also were associated. The United States has made available approximately \$10 million in Economic Cooperation Administration funds, which are being devoted to the rehabilitation of education, agriculture and public health, and to the reconstruction of the port of Rangoon and airfields. United Nations special agencies also have sent missions and teams of experts to study the needs of the country and to proffer material aid and technical advice.

THE problems that still confront Burma go much deeper than the balancing of a budget or the winning of a precarious peace by military means. Even

² Statement by the Finance Minister in Parliament, August 30, 1951.

Burma Looks Ahead

Utopia needs firm foundations. Talk of democracy is all very well, but the people must be educated to make it work. The literacy rate in Burma is among the highest in Asia, but general educational standards will have to be raised if the people are not to remain an easy prey to political adventurers. It has been suggested that the government should be democratised in such a way that its entire structure will become a pyramid broadly based on popular village councils; yet proposals of this kind can offer little positive advantage unless the people acquire self-reliance and come to think and decide for themselves instead of expecting to be spoon-fed. Peasants are gaining title to their plots of land and are receiving protection and generous loans from the government; but unless they learn to use their income constructively, they will only dissipate it on village festivals, weddings and funerals.

Until technicians and able administrators have been trained, Burma's high hopes for basic industrialisation must remain unrealised and its natural resources unworked. Plans, whether of the two-year, five-year or other variety, may pour out by the dozen, but they are no more than empty documents in the absence of suitable machinery to execute them. The permanent civil service is being rebuilt anew, and the danger of inheriting the defects, but not the traditions and efficiency, of the old bureaucracy is a real one. Under the British, the Burma Civil Service was not much loved by the politicians; its "heaven-born" members were answerable only to Whitehall and, though that arrangement was conducive to honest, efficient service, it created a privileged official class to which few Burmans were admitted. The real weakness of the Burma Civil Service was that it produced too few indigenous administrators too slowly.

Numerous and diverse as the problems are, they are being tackled with enthusiasm in every field, and the question is how long the élan will last. New state schools are being opened; tuition in the schools and Rangoon University is now free; additional teachers are being trained, though not on a wholesale basis; more students are being sent abroad for study and advanced training; a government-sponsored mass-education movement is dispatching workers into the countryside; the production of school and college texts in Burmese and of books of a general educational nature for popular consumption has been entrusted to the University and to the Burma Translation Society; and a mission of leading educationists is visiting the United Kingdom, the United States, Mexico and other countries for the purpose of collecting information and useful materials in connection with the drive to educate Burma. The recruitment of suitable personnel for the civil services has made progress, and the earlier practice of distributing jobs to political favourites regardless of their qualifications has been discredited. The reorientation of

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mental attitudes—perhaps more important than material rehabilitation—is beginning to have visible results: graft and corruption seem to be on the wane, and “economic insurgents”—those who misappropriate public funds or abuse positions of trust—are being exposed. There is in general a growing “Union consciousness”.

Time and circumstances permitting, Burma should be able to put its house in order and become a worthy member of the family of nations. Its conduct in world affairs is guided by loyalty to the principles of the United Nations Charter and by a policy of correct and friendly neutrality in a divided world. Burma's experience with the wartime Japanese-sponsored Co-prosperity Sphere was not a happy one, and the country is therefore shy of rival power-blocs and alliances, whatever their declared purpose, and reluctant to commit itself to even the idea of an “Asian bloc”, while prepared to enter into bilateral treaties of friendship with India, Indonesia, Pakistan and other Asian states. Burmese ties with India are especially close, both because the two countries endorse neutralism and independence in international relations and because their premiers are good friends. An exchange of ambassadors with the Soviet Union took place recently, but, although all parties pay much lip service to the desirability of closer relations with that country, no practical steps to achieve them have been suggested. The “Marxist League”, which at one time Thakin Nu hoped to organise in order to bring together all leftist elements and thus create “leftist unity which will form the core of national unity”, was stillborn—after all, Russia is “far away”. The general belief is that neutralism need not rule out special friends, and it is not difficult to discover what nations these are; long association and many continuing ties make Great Britain an obvious one.

With the People's Republic of China, Burma has cordial diplomatic relations, though the presence on the border of a division of Chinese Nationalist troops is a source of embarrassment to Rangoon. At the 1952 meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in Paris, the Burmese delegate appealed unsuccessfully for help in removing this threat to Burma's, and perhaps world, peace. The government, which is trying to solve the problem through diplomacy on the one hand and military action against the trespassers on the other, appears anxious to retain the initiative in the matter as long as possible. The incident serves to remind Burma that, to maintain its policy of strict neutralism in a world strained by the forces of power politics, it must command the physical stamina, balance, agility, clear sight and cool head of a tightrope-walker.

London, February 1952

MAUNG MAUNG

The Vietnamese Community in France

ALTHOUGH that in Thailand is larger and those in Rangoon and Prague are more revolutionary, the community in France constitutes the most important overseas Vietnamese group of any because of its location in the heart of Western Europe, its special composition, and its political evolution. Furthermore, the relationship between its ultra-nationalist elements and the French government is probably unique in the annals of dependent peoples.

At its peak, from 1940 to 1946, the Vietnamese community in France numbered nearly 25,000 persons, almost all of whom were young men, and it was sharply divided as between workers and intellectuals. Its postwar political evolution has both reflected and differed from that of Vietnam itself, and has also affected and been influenced by the fluctuating politics of France. Even though its numbers have now declined to fewer than 8,000 and its political activities are in comparative abeyance, the potential importance of the Vietnamese now resident in France is enormous, for they represent the great majority of their country's trained elite.

On the eve of the recent world war fewer than 3,000 Vietnamese lived in France, and of these about 1,000 were relics of the first world war. Most of them were artisans; only a minority were intellectuals, either students or others who, having completed their studies, preferred to remain in France. Many, particularly among the worker group, were married to or living with European women. Professionally and socially they were treated as Frenchmen, and they realized that to return to colonial Indochina would entail a marked decline in their status. Organizationally they grouped themselves into *amicales*, or friendly societies, composed of technicians, students, seamen, and professional men. By and large this group, scattered in many French cities, became assimilated to its environment and since the end of the last war has remained aloof from the political activities of its more recently arrived compatriots.

In 1939 and early 1940 France received an influx of Vietnamese. As in the first world war, it drew upon the Indochinese peasantry as a source of workers and soldiers in its struggle with Germany. By the time that France surrendered, in June 1940, only some 20,000 (out of the 100,000 whom it had been intended to import) were in the country. Of these, a small number were soldiers; the majority were laborers, known as "MOI" (Main d'Oeuvre Indigène). They were organized into Legions, on a quasi-military basis, and were stationed in camps on the outskirts of French industrial towns, notably Paris, Lyons and Marseilles.

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When control of the MOI was turned over to the Vichy government in the summer of 1940, officials to administer the program were hastily recruited, mostly from among former non-commissioned officers and functionaries who had served in Indochina. Such confusion and dishonesty characterized their administration that after the war the official bulletin of the Ministry of Colonies expressed regret for "the scandalous abuses" and "*indélicatesse* of which Indochinese workers were the first victims". Part of their food rations were sold for private profit by the officials in charge of the camps, and the unhappy Vietnamese workers—often without warm clothing or shoes—had to walk miles in search of remunerative work. As for the Vietnamese students, the handful that responded to Nazi propaganda and volunteered to go to Germany for study managed to steal back to France when they saw that Germany was losing the war and found that living conditions in the Reich were becoming very difficult. The Japanese in Paris organized a Greater East Asia *amicale* for resident Orientals, but the Vietnamese were not greatly attracted to it and, in any case, were fearful of French reprisals if they should join.

Towards the end of the war, 3,000 to 4,000 of the Vietnamese soldiers (who lived apart from the workers) joined the French Resistance; a few hundred—mostly prisoners of war—went to Germany, and after the war there remained a Vietnamese battalion among the French occupation forces serving across the Rhine.

A GREAT change in the status of the Vietnamese in France occurred after the liberation of Paris. In October 1944 the intellectuals among them organized a movement intended to comprise all groups of domiciled Vietnamese for the purpose of improving their living conditions, supporting nationalist demands for the autonomy of their country, and promoting their cause among the French public. At about the same time, René Pleven, then Minister of Colonies for General de Gaulle, invited the various dependent peoples living in France to associate themselves with his plan to carry out the resolutions of the Brazzaville Conference, which had been convened in 1944 by the Fighting French to discuss reform of the French colonial administration, particularly in Africa. But in the case of the Vietnamese, Pleven approached only the conservative elements, known as the "juristes" because so many of them held law degrees. It was Pleven's courtship of the Rightists that impelled the Vietnamese workers and liberal intellectuals to establish a more widely representative organization.

This group, with the support of sympathetic French officials, initiated a literacy campaign among the workers, some seventy per cent of whom could neither read nor write. Then, in December 1944, it convened a congress

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at Avignon, which was attended by more than 200 delegates chosen by the various *amicales*. The mayor of Avignon proved most cooperative: the congress was held in the city hall, and in the square facing it the tricolor and the Vietnamese flag flew side by side.

Since four-fifths of the delegates were workers' representatives and only one-fifth were intellectuals, the former group dominated the congress. Student leaders chaired the discussions, but the decisions were made by the workers, particularly the Trotskyists, who were better organized and had a clearer program than the Stalinists had. (The latter had only recently become affiliated with the French Communist Party and their strength was confined to the Paris region.) The congress organized a "Délégation Générale des Indochinois en France", whose administration and public-relations work were entrusted to the intellectuals, notably the philosopher-mathematician Tran Duc Thao, and the ophthalmologist Hoang Xuan Man. Its program, on the other hand, as embodied in a manifesto, expressed the workers' demands, which naturally emphasized the need for redress of economic grievances and demanded good food, warm clothing, full employment, and repatriation to Indochina.

Thanks to the temper of the French government at that time, the efforts of the Delegation in the economic field were successful. Vietnamese workers secured rights and wages equal to those of French workers, the administration of their camps was improved, they were given better food and clothing and opportunities to acquire new occupational skills. The intellectuals pressed ahead with the workers' education, both political and cultural. Students went to teach workers living in nearby camps. A fortnightly periodical, *Revue Vietnam* (printed in *quoc ngu*, or romanized Vietnamese), devoted articles to politics, science and literature, and contained a very popular "letter-box" column. The activities of the Delegation were financed by contributions from the intellectuals and by dues, amounting to twenty francs per month, paid by employed workers.

It was not until March 1945—after the Japanese coup in Indochina, followed by the Gaullist declaration regarding the future status of Vietnam—that the Delegation made its political debut on the French scene. It published a point-by-point criticism of the declaration, taking particular exception to the Gaullists' failure to accord Vietnam its own diplomatic personality and a national army and currency. This period also saw an intensification of the Delegation's contacts with the Confédération Générale de Travail, with French political parties and, to a lesser extent, with newspapermen. As a result of this activity, the French government was no longer able to deal exclusively with the Rightist Vietnamese but had to treat with the Delegation also, at least on a *de facto* basis.

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Concurrently, in the economic field, the Delegation succeeded in having French officials replaced by Vietnamese in some of the workers' camps. By this time, however, the situation of the workers had so greatly improved—almost ninety per cent of them were now literate (in *quoc ngu*), and close to eighty per cent were employed—and their nationalism had been so greatly stimulated that their political interests had superseded all other concerns. Word of the establishment of the Vietnam Republic at Hanoi reached them almost simultaneously with news of the French coup at Saigon on September 23, 1945, and both events accelerated this evolution. Having no knowledge of the Republic beyond what could be gotten from the extremely fragmentary reports available to them, underestimating the recuperative powers of France and of the French conservatives, and placing exaggerated hopes in American and Chinese intervention on behalf of the Republic, the Vietnamese workers were carried away by the chauvinism of their Trotskyist leaders. Their ultra-nationalism and lack of accurate information about the world situation were responsible in large part for the bewilderment that they felt later when, in March 1946, Ho chi Minh came to an agreement with the French which involved what they considered to be intolerable concessions regarding the sovereignty of Vietnam.

As a result of pressure from the workers' groups, the Delegation was compelled virtually to break off the good relations with French officialdom which it had been at great pains to establish. In consequence of this and of the growing Rightist trend of French politics, the attitude on both sides stiffened. Occasionally, in fact, the French police arrested Vietnamese workers and intellectuals on the charge of endangering the internal security of the state. It was with some difficulty that the Vietnamese were able to hold another congress, this time at Marseilles in December 1945, for the purpose of determining their policy in the light of the altered situation. A new bureau was set up by this congress, in which Trotskyists predominated and the moderates were all but eliminated. Strikes, some of them involving bloodshed, were organized with the participation of Vietnamese soldiers in order to register the workers' protest against the French policy in Cochinchina. During this period the services offered the Vietnamese workers by the French Confédération Générale de Travail and their intellectual compatriots were ignored. The latter group, in consequence, began to angle for the support of the Republic in Hanoi. Since all of the Vietnamese in France enthusiastically supported the Republic, whichever element won its official recognition would also automatically win control of the others.

For its part, the Republic was unaware of the struggle for ascendancy among the Vietnamese in France until April 1946. In that month, at the first Dalat conference (where French and Vietnamese delegates discussed

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implementation of the March 1946 agreement), friendly French officials placed in the hands of the Vietnamese representatives a report and letter from the Delegation in Paris. These were discussed at length in a Republican cabinet meeting, and the letter was given wide publicity by a Hanoi newspaper. Great interest was aroused in Indochina by word of the existence of pro-Republican organizations among the Vietnamese in France, especially when it was learned that the latter had raised a fund of 1,500,000 francs as a gift to the Republic. Since for tactical reasons the moderate and Stalinist Vietnamese in France supported the March 1946 agreement, they were in a better position than were the Trotskyists and extreme nationalists, who opposed it, to receive the official blessing of the Republic. This state of uncertainty about the future was reflected in the decision taken by the third congress of Vietnamese in France, in April 1946, at which it was decided to dissolve the Delegation.

In May 1946 the dispatch of a parliamentary mission to France by the Republican government introduced a decisive element into the confused local picture. Henceforth, it was clear, the Republic would concern itself officially with its compatriots in France. Though care of the local Vietnamese was only a relatively minor task of the mission, its arrival in Paris was enthusiastically acclaimed by all groups and had the practical effect of strengthening the hand of the moderate and Stalinist elements at the expense of the Trotskyists. Because much of the energy of the moderate intellectuals was employed in helping the mission and later the Republican delegation at the Fontainebleau conference of July 1946 in its negotiations with the French, the Trotskyists at this juncture encountered competition only from the Stalinists for domination of the workers. In the latter half of 1946, however, two new elements entered the scene. Disillusionment over the failure of the Fontainebleau conference and dissatisfaction with the *modus vivendi* of September 1946 were intensified by the outbreak of hostilities at Hanoi in December 1946, and this had the effect of reuniting all of the Vietnamese in France who supported the Republic. Moreover, by the end of 1946 so many Vietnamese workers had been repatriated that the remaining community was smaller and more homogeneous.

With respect at least to the desirability of repatriating the Vietnamese war-workers as rapidly as possible, the French and Vietnamese were in complete accord. (Not only did the French need man power in Indochina, but violent outbreaks in the Vietnamese workers' camps in France, between Stalinists and Trotskyists and among operators in the black market, had resulted in numerous murders.) Even ships of other nationalities were chartered by the French government for this purpose, and by mid-1949 the

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last of the workers' camps had been broken up and all but 1,000 of the wartime laborers had returned to their homeland. On reaching Indochina, the repatriates were concentrated in a camp at Cap St. Jacques before being screened and sent back to French-held towns as close to their native villages as hostilities permitted. Inevitably the most actively pro-Republican elements among them found their way into Vieuminh territory; the others were absorbed into the new army being built by the Bao Dai government or were offered jobs in French-held territory, which was acutely short of labor. Reports differed concerning the subsequent activities of the most radical repatriates. Some Republican sources claim that, once returned to their homeland, the Trotskyists sublimated their special ideology and supported the Republic actively. On the other hand, some French officials contend that their arrival served as a restorative for the Trotskyist group in Indochina, which had been moribund after its purge by the Vietminh in late 1945. In any case, the departure of the workers radically altered the character of the Vietnamese community in France, the worker element declining in both numerical and political strength. At the same time, the intellectual group increased in numbers as well as in political activity.

As the workers' ranks thinned, the Republican Delegation in France had an increasingly clear field in which to operate. Its activities were carried on until August 1949 despite the spread of hostilities in Indochina and even after French policy, as announced by High Commissioner Bollaert in September 1947, closed the door to further negotiations with the Ho regime. Various explanations have been offered for this tolerance in the capital of France of virulently anti-French operations by a group officially representing a regime in revolt against France and headed by two Moscow-trained communists, one of whom had spent sixteen years in a French penal colony. (Hoang minh Giam, later Ho's Foreign Minister, had been the original head of the Republican Delegation, but the events of December 19, 1946, prevented his return to France, so his post was entrusted to Tran ngoc Danh and Duong bach Mai.)

A rather legalistic explanation of this situation holds that if the French government had dissolved the Republican Delegation, this act would have implied recognition of a state of belligerency with the Ho government. A more likely explanation is that the possibility of reopening discussions with the Republic served as a potential trump card for France in the protracted negotiations with Bao Dai. Still another, and more convincing, explanation may be found in the skill with which members of the Republican Delegation played off rival French politicians and political parties against one another. The immediate and stormy protests by French liberals and radicals against the arrests of Danh and Mai suggested to the government

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that firm action against the Delegation would be politically unwise. The dissolution of the Republican Delegation in France in August 1949 resulted from a voluntary decision taken by the Republic itself, not by the French government. Officially this step indicated Republican concentration upon relations with Asia rather than with Europe; in reality it probably reflected the increasingly Marxist orientation of Republican policy. In any case, it evidenced Republican belief that further negotiations with France would be futile, entailed a marked decrease in pro-Republican activity in France, and paved the way for further political dissension among the Vietnamese domiciled there.

FROM 1947 on, the flow of Vietnamese students into France assumed unprecedented proportions. The Vietnamese community was enlarged also by the arrival of businessmen seeking for their capital the security and opportunities no longer available in Indochina, and by "refugees" temporarily out of office as a result of the numerous political intrigues which were mushrooming in the French-sponsored governments of Cochinchina and Vietnam.¹

Today the majority of Vietnamese students in Paris are members of the *Amicale des Etudiants* and are believed to be pro-Republican. Another student group, the *Association des Etudiants Vietnamiens à l'Etranger*,

¹ Between 1939 and 1950 the Vietnamese population in France grew from 2,854 to 7,550. The predominance of students as of 1950 appears in the following table (expressed in round numbers).

<i>Locale</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Total</i>
Paris	3,000	3,850
Marseilles-Aix region	1,500	2,000
Bordeaux	70	300
Montpellier	100	500
Toulouse	150	250
Grenoble	30	100
Lyons	50	250
Le Havre	—	300
	<hr/> 4,900	<hr/> 7,550

Paris became the nerve center of the intellectuals, whereas Marseilles had the largest floating population, composed chiefly of seamen. In 1939 Tonkinese predominated among the Vietnamese community in France; figures showing origins are not available for 1950, but presumably the proportion of Cochinchinese in the total had markedly increased. As of 1950, according to an official French source, some 500 Vietnamese in France were French citizens and about 200 had French wives; according to a Vietnamese Republican source, only about 100 were French citizens and some 75 per cent of these were married to Europeans. There is more agreement concerning the age and social class of the community as a whole. The average age is believed to be between 25 and 30 years, and the derivation predominantly bourgeois; even the 2,000 or so workers are now in the process of merging with the artisan and small commercial class in France.

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formed in January 1951, is theoretically neutral in politics but in fact is an appendage of the Bao Dai Delegation in Paris. The difference between these two groups is strikingly illustrated by the appearance of their respective Paris headquarters. Those of the Amicale des Etudiants, in the heart of the Latin Quarter, are modest to the point of squalor; they consist of a small reading room and a canteen. In sharp contrast, the Bao Dai group functions in an elegant building in the 17th arrondissement and obviously enjoys a wealthy patronage. Both groups function as social clubs, hold meetings, and issue bulletins.

After the war, some resident Vietnamese intellectuals who had completed their studies formed the Union Culturelle. Recently this organization has extended its scope to include students and even workers, who are, however, not formally enrolled among its 400-odd members. It is lodged with the Amicale des Etudiants, from which it rents a room for meetings. For almost a year it, along with certain radical youth and women's associations, was a member of the Lien Viet, established in Paris towards the end of 1949 as a replica of the similarly-named organization in the Republic. Officially the Lien Viet in France was dissolved in 1950—although French officials assert that it has survived clandestinely—and the Union Culturelle has resumed its former identity. Since the closing down of the Republican Delegation in August 1949, the Union Culturelle has become its heir unapparent, as the rallying point for Republican sympathizers in France. It plays no official role, however, and operates under close though not oppressive police surveillance.

In contrast to the Union Culturelle, the Bao Dai Delegation functions as an officially recognized and supported body. Its auxiliary, the Association des Etudiants Vietnamiens à l'Etranger, has only some 200 members. Bao Dai's Vietnamese supporters in France, never numerous, have latterly become fewer since many among the older contingent have been recalled to Indochina for service in Bao Dai's short-handed administration and new recruits have not appeared in force.

It was not until the formation in 1948 of the central Vietnam government, headed by General Xuan until Bao Dai took over in 1949, that a group opposed to the pro-Republican elements assumed form in France. Its core consisted of the conservative "juristes", led by the emperor's cousin, Prince Buu Loc. Some of its prominent members had served as legal and economic advisers to the Republican representatives at the Fontainebleau conference in 1946. Even now it cannot be said that this group is pro-French. Its leaders are nationalists whose juridical temperament and training incline them towards an ordered, stable government, preferably a constitutional monarchy patterned on the British model. The revolutionary and

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increasingly communist character of the Ho regime, more than the French concessions embodied in the Bao Dai-Auriol Agreement of March 1949 and the Pau Agreements of 1950, has impelled them to rally to the "legitimate emperor". It is this group more than any other that has pressed for the establishment of a Vietnamese diplomatic service, for representation in international organizations and conferences, and in general for the substantiation of French pledges to grant Vietnam sovereign status.

There are in addition a few small splinter groups in France which are strongly anti-Republican and only slightly less anti-Bao Dai. Generally speaking, these consist of followers of such individuals as General Xuan and Governor Phan van Giao, who are currently out of favor with the Bao Dai coterie. Such political "refugees" from French-occupied Vietnam invariably gravitate to Paris, theoretically "on leave". There they have contributed to the turbulence and confusion of French political intrigues, with the object of displacing French and Vietnamese officials in Indochina with others more favorable to their own special interests. Rumor has it that some of these men have amassed considerable sums in France by various means and that they are therefore content to bide their time comfortably in Paris until the wheel of political fortune returns their own particular candidates to power.

Far more important, both numerically and spiritually, than these small cliques of opportunists are the two to three hundred Vietnamese Catholics in France, whose spokesman is Ngo dinh Diem. Although Diem may be remaining over-long in the United States, where he is closely associated with American Catholicism, his organization both in Indochina and in France seems strong enough not only to survive his absence but even to attract additional, non-Catholic, support. For Diem enjoys widespread respect and prestige and, even more important, his group alone offers the possibility of forming a Third Force—one that is both strongly nationalist and opposed equally to a communist republic and to a French-backed monarchy. A very weak counterpart of this Catholic movement was the short-lived anti-Vietnam and anti-Bao Dai Republican Party in France, whose erstwhile leader has recently gone over to Bao Dai.

No clear-cut picture of the Vietnamese community in France can be drawn. Membership in all of the groups fluctuates with the changing political situation, and family relationships as well as personal loyalties cut across political lines. Prudent Vietnamese matriarchs in Indochina frequently arrange to have one son with the Republican Resistance, another with the Bao Dai group, and still another studying in France, so that the family will have one foot in whichever camp wins.

Recognition of the Republic by the Soviet Union and China, and United

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States support for Bao Dai, which catapulted the problem of Indochina into the international arena, created fresh divisions among the Vietnamese community in France. On only two matters can there now be said to be agreement: independence for Vietnam and denigration of everything about France except its culture. Until early 1950, when communist ascendancy in the Republic was becoming apparent, there was a further area of agreement: assent to Ho chi Minh's leadership of the independence struggle, and belief that he could keep domestic Marxism free from dominance by international communism. While Ho is still deeply venerated as a nationalist leader, his ability to save the Republic from becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union and of China has begun to be questioned. Probably the sharpest divergence of opinion among the Vietnamese in France centers on the future leadership of sovereign Vietnam.

It is much less the return of Bao Dai to head the government of Vietnam than the entry of the Vietnamese problem upon the international scene that has begun to have the effect, long sought by France, of weaning many nationalists away from support of the Republic. But those nationalists who fear control of Vietnam by international communism are increasingly split among themselves and are by no means rallying to the support of Bao Dai. They believe that the likelihood that France will really loosen its hold on Vietnam is diminishing in proportion as the United States strengthens the French expeditionary force in Indochina. The net result to date has been an increase in the number of "attentistes"—those who wait and see.

For the Vietnamese who have been trained in France and long resident there, the prospect of returning now to Indochina to serve either the Republic or Bao Dai is becoming more and more unattractive. Professional men and technicians accustomed to life in a democratic society do not relish the idea of serving under dictatorial political commissars. On the other hand, most of the Vietnamese now in France do not want to be accused of serving the French-maintained regime of Bao Dai. In any case, their education and training assure them of posts in the homeland, since any regime that rules Vietnam will need their services. There is a very difficult choice, and they are postponing the necessity of making it as long as their resources allow them to remain in France. This group of attentistes may be expected to increase in numbers until such time as the international situation permits a crystallization of the political status of Indochina.

Paris, December 1951

VIRGINIA THOMPSON

25.5.11 REVIEW ARTICLES

Recent Soviet Writings on the Far East

THE purpose of this article is to present a review of selected books and pamphlets concerned with the Far East and published in the Soviet Union since 1945. It is intended to serve both the specialist on the Far East who neither reads Russian nor has access to Russian materials and the general reader who wishes to become acquainted with the more important recent writings on East Asia. It also seeks to give the student of social science an insight into the Soviet interpretation of developments in this area. This article does not include periodical literature, for two reasons. One is that articles in periodicals are so numerous that treatment of such writings on China, Manchuria, Mongolia, Japan, Korea and Siberia would require a whole volume. The other reason is that since some time *Soviet Press Translations*¹ and *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*² have been publishing extensive translations and abstracts of periodical literature.

China

Books on China comprise a large portion of recent Russian materials in the Far Eastern field. Among them is G. S. Kara-Murza's work, whose title may be given as "The Taipings—The Great Peasant War and the Taiping State in China 1850-1864",³ the second edition of which appeared in 1950, nine years after the first. In his introduction to the volume, G. B. Erenburg pays tribute to Kara-Murza as a scholar and war hero who died of wounds received in fighting the Japanese in Manchuria in 1945. The book is significant because it presents the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the causes of the outbreak and failure of the Taiping Rebellion. Feudalism is regarded as having been the determining factor in both cases. Kara-Murza analyzes in great detail the conditions which precipitated this movement, and emphasizes the feudal and oppressive character of Chinese society. He states that the downfall of the Taiping "state" was due in part to the Manchu "feudalists" and the "Anglo-American-French interventionists", but he finds the main reason for its failure in the absence of a condition described by Stalin as follows: "Peasant rebellions may prove successful only in the event that they are combined with workers' rebellions and if the workers lead

¹ Published by the Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington, Seattle.

² Published by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, Washington, D. C.

³ *Taipiny—Velikaya Krest'yanskaya Voina i Taipinskoe Gosudarstvo v Kitae 1850-1864*, State Teachers' Publishing House (Uchpedgiz), 141 pp.

Unless otherwise indicated, materials cited in this article were published in Moscow.

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the peasant rebellions." The Taipings, according to Kara-Murza, established a state whose very leaders became feudalists. Peasants who participated in the rebellion had no real leadership, because there was no working class to lead them. The final blow to the Taipings was dealt by foreign intervention in 1862-64. The Manchus made a bargain to sell China to the British, Americans and French in order to preserve their own diminishing power. Thereafter, China's colonial enslavement by the Western powers progressed rapidly.

The scholarly character of this book is questionable. Essentially a polemical essay, it cites few sources other than Marx, Lenin and Stalin. The value of the work lies in its presentation of Soviet theory applied in particular to one phase of Chinese history and in general to peasant rebellions.

A book on a more recent period of Chinese history is "The People's Revolution in China", by V. Nikiforov, G. Erenburg and M. YUrev.⁴ Written in a semi-popular style and dealing with the years 1925-50, it describes the Chinese Revolution in three stages, according to Stalin's theory of revolution. The first stage was the united national-front revolution, when the spearhead of the revolution was directed mainly against foreign imperialism. The second stage was the bourgeois-democratic revolution, when the national bourgeoisie withdrew from the revolution and "the agrarian movement grew into a mighty revolution of some tens of millions of peasants". The third stage was the "Soviet revolution", encompassing the so-called national-liberation war (1927-36), the war of liberation against the Japanese (1937-45) and the people's liberation war (1946-49).

The general thesis of this work is that the Chinese Revolution was greatly influenced by Marxist-Leninist doctrine and guided by Stalin's theory on the Chinese revolutionary movement and his work on revolutionary problems in general. The authors' interpretation of certain issues in the Chinese Revolution is of particular interest. One of these is the temporary collaboration of the Chinese Communist Party with the Kuomintang. It is asserted that the Communists joined the Kuomintang as individuals, that the Communist Party fully preserved its organizational and ideological independence, and that the Kuomintang was at that time an anti-imperialist organization. The alleged objective was to present a united front of those classes which, although having diverse aims in the revolution, were opposed in common to the imperialist, feudal landlords, the militarists and the compradore bourgeoisie.⁵ The authors assert that it was the Kuomintang

⁴ *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Kitae*, Gospolitizdat, 1950, 141 pp.

⁵ A distinction is made between the national bourgeoisie, which was still opposing the imperialists, and the compradore bourgeoisie, which is said to have been in the "imperialist camp".

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which terminated the alliance with the Communists, who were willing to cooperate in the fight against imperialism and feudalism. Soon afterward Ch'en Tu-hsiu, then the head of the Communist Party, was branded a traitor, an enemy of the people, and a right-opportunist who had viewed the united front as demanding the complete and unconditional subordination of the Communist Party to the Kuomintang. It was further charged that, under the guise of preserving unanimity with the Kuomintang, Ch'en had failed to adopt a critical attitude toward it, thus endangering the independence of the Communist Party. Mao Tse-tung, who was prominent early in the history of the Party, is listed among those Central Committee members who led the struggle to oust Ch'en.

In treating the Canton uprising, the authors assert that the revolutionaries were defeated because the combined strength of the feudalists and the imperialists was at that time superior, and because the combination of class forces in China did not yet favor revolution. It was this event, however, that supposedly ushered in the "Soviet" stage of the revolution. Stalin is quoted as having stated that many errors were made and many opportunities missed in this period, but that this was to have been expected since in Russia, too, the Party had undergone "numerous changes" in the period of its early development. The authors explain that the dissimilarity of the proletarian, socialist revolution in Russia and the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, bourgeois-democratic revolution in China accounts for the difference between the soviets (councils), the organs of proletarian dictatorship in the USSR, and the organs of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry in China.

The book returns repeatedly to a discussion of the relationship of the proletariat to the peasantry and to the other classes. Stalinist doctrine has established that a peasant revolution cannot succeed unless it enjoys proletarian leadership. That Communist revolutionary forces took root not in the industrial centers of China but in the agricultural regions is recognized and explained by the cliché of the "peculiar historical development" of China. Since, the argument runs, the important cities were under the influence of foreign "imperialists" who maintained military and naval forces in addition to their banks and other enterprises in these locations, the revolutionary movement was forced to confine itself to the countryside, where it assumed the form of a peasant war. The authors insist, however, that the war was "led by the proletariat and its vanguard—the Communist Party". They assert that recent history demonstrates that this phenomenon is characteristic also of other colonial and semi-colonial Eastern countries in their struggles for independence.

Despite this emphasis on the predominance of the proletariat, the book offers little explanation of exactly how the proletariat played its all-important

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role in the peasant war. Exceptional stress and importance are, however, attached to such workers' strikes and demonstrations as did occur. In the same way, the success of the revolution is attributed in part to the fact that the postwar united front, which comprised the "urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie in addition to the working class and peasantry",⁶ differed from the united front of 1923-27 because the proletariat enjoyed indisputable leadership in the latter. The authors recognize the temporary importance of the national bourgeoisie for the country's economic development throughout the period, but stress that this class is incapable of leading a revolution. Although the book attempts to depict conditions in contemporary China in favorable colors, for the most part its claims merely echo government resolutions, and the sparse figures cited to demonstrate the effects of industrial development and land reform are unconvincing. The scattered citations are mainly from the works of Mao Tse-tung, Stalin and, to a lesser degree, Molotov. Material is drawn also from *Pravda* and from such documents as "The Common Program of the People's Political Consultative Council of China",⁷ which is of interest because it presents an integrated and comprehensive Soviet interpretation of China's most recent history.

Descriptive of the latest developments in China is "The Establishment of the Chinese People's Republic—A Great Victory for the Chinese People", by A. Kuznetsov.⁸ Written for popular consumption, this pamphlet deals superficially with economic and cultural affairs and with the international position of the Chinese People's Republic, making much of the importance of Soviet aid.

Another publication on a popular level is N. Ermashaev's "Light over China",⁹ a history of the country in its "old" and "new" periods. Its stated purpose, pursued throughout, is to describe the enslavement of China by the capitalist powers and to trace the stages in the struggle of the Chinese people for "freedom and independence". A brief historical survey begins with the third century B.C., but the main emphasis is on the nineteenth and, particularly, the twentieth centuries. This book, containing numerous illustrations and the usual references to Soviet sources, is of interest as a Soviet interpretation of Chinese history in both its broader and narrower aspects and as an example of the type of thing being written for the Soviet people—in this case, the youth of the country.

⁶ The tendency is to group the workers and peasants together. The two groups are said to constitute eighty to ninety per cent of the population of China, but the percentage represented by the workers alone is never mentioned.

⁷ *Obshchaya Programma Narodnovo Politicheskovo Konsultativnovo Soveta Kitaya*, State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1950.

⁸ *Sozdanie Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki—Velikaya Pobeda Kitaiskovo Naroda*, State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1951, 59 pp.

⁹ *Svet Nad Kitaiem*, The Young Guard, 1950, 469 pp.

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Also of value for the insight it affords into Soviet writings on China is "The Modern and Recent History of China—A Brief Survey",¹⁰ the body of which was written in 1947 by an anonymous group of teachers in the Tung-pei Political and Military Academy who were supposedly direct participants in the war against Japan. First published in Mukden in 1949, this joint effort constitutes a detailed examination of the 1925-45 period from the Chinese Communist point of view. Thus, in describing the war against Japan, for example, it places great emphasis upon the people's front of the "liberated" areas and tends throughout to stress the importance of the Communist Party among the revolutionary forces and to attack Chiang Kai-shek in bitter terms.

The introduction to the book, supplied by its Soviet editor, N. Nikiforov, is significant for its display of certain elements which the Soviets consider essential in a presentation of recent Chinese history. Nikiforov commends the work as a pioneer attempt to systematize the history of recent events in China, which, to the Soviets, mean events in the struggle against Japanese and American "imperialism and its internal agent, the Kuomintang". Its presentation of detailed accounts by living witnesses, themselves participants in the national-liberation war, is viewed as providing valuable "new, fresh material". In discussing the shortcomings of the book, however, Nikiforov indicates what the Soviets expect of their writers. He complains that its authors fail to give adequate credit to the aid rendered the Chinese Revolution by the Soviet Union in its "Great Patriotic War", since they concentrate exclusively on China's internal history. They neglect to note, for example, that the Soviet victories at Stalingrad and Kursk, the turning point in the war, made possible the Chinese counter-attack against the Japanese in 1944-45. Moreover, Nikiforov holds that the book does not adequately expose the "expansionistic imperialist" powers, particularly the United States, and does not even take note of the beginning of the imperialist epoch (of importance in the Soviet version).

Apparently the most inexcusable of the authors' numerous theoretical blunders is their failure to mention the "stages" in the Chinese Revolution, which in Soviet writings appear of prime importance. They therefore commit a "crime of omission" when, after dutifully describing the betrayal on Chiang Kai-shek's part in April 1927, they turn directly to the betrayal by Wang Ching-wei in July, by-passing the period in which the revolution entered its second, "higher" stage of development. Seemingly to remedy this oversight, Nikiforov stresses the importance of Stalin's three stages of the Chinese Revolution. The authors err again, in his opinion, when they divide the

¹⁰ *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya Kitaya*, translated from the Chinese by A. V. Kotov and L. P. Delyusin. Publishing House of Foreign Literature, 1950, 268 pp.

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national-liberation war into five periods, divorcing it from the second world war, which, the Russians believe, should be treated as an integral part of the national-liberation war. Moreover, they omit certain desired generalizations, such as that in the second world war the Soviet Union secured "victory for the freedom-loving peoples of the globe", and the like. Nor do they paint a sufficiently vivid picture of United States "collaboration" with the Japanese and with Chiang Kai-shek in plotting against the Soviet Union. Nikiforov regrets that they do not discuss the preparation by the United States of a "Far Eastern Munich" in early 1941—a favorite topic among Soviet writers on the Far East.

The editor shares the growing tendency among such writers to encourage the "liberation" movements in Asia and the Pacific basin by constant reference to a "crisis" in the capitalist and colonial systems and to the importance of China as a model. This peculiar brand of internationalism appears in his assertion that more than one-third of the world's population is to be found in a single camp—that of the Soviet Union. Although the publishers state that this book contains factual material for the historian as well as for the "broad circles" of Soviet readers, its value for Western scholars lies in its presentation, not of historical data, since the main work is undocumented, but of impressions recorded by anonymous Chinese Communists.

One of the more scholarly exhibits among recently-published materials is Yan Hing-shung's "The Ancient Philosopher Lao-Tse and His Teachings",¹¹ edited by L. V. Simonovskaya and O. I. Sayapina. This work is interesting because it reveals how an ancient classic is interpreted to conform to Soviet theory, apparently in an attempt to embed this theory more deeply in the culture of the country in question. It includes a brief historical summary of Chinese philosophy, with a thread of materialism running throughout, and a description of the social and historical setting in which *Tao-Te-Ching* appeared. That this is a new interpretation of Lao-tse is apparent from the effort expended to discredit Western translations and, indeed, even those by certain Marxist historians, such as V. I. Avdiev, who have depicted Lao-tse as a mystic and reactionary.¹² After explaining the difficulties involved in translating *Tao-Te-Ching*, the book presents a Russian translation, accompanied by the Chinese text.

¹¹ *Drevnĭkh kitaiskii Filozof Lao-Tsĭ i Ego Uchenie*, Moscow-Leningrad, Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy, 1951, 159 pp.

¹² Noting that "A Short History of China", edited by Fan Wen-lan and published originally in Shanghai in 1947, terms Lao-tse's teachings highly reactionary and labels Lao-tse himself an extreme "adventurist". Simonovskaya and Sayapina explain that "this merely shows that the history of philosophy and the history of the native land has been little studied in China as yet". They devote considerable space, however, to describing the extent to which *Tao-Te-Ching* has been studied in Russia since pre-revolutionary times.

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Another highly-specialized work on China is the "Sun-tszy Treatise on Military Science", by N. I. Konrad,¹⁸ most of which consists of extensive commentaries on the treatise, while the translated treatise itself consists of only twenty-six pages. Copious explanatory footnotes frequently contain the original Chinese characters, occasionally citing the interpretations given in earlier studies. The main contributions of the work, a highly technical one because of its nature and treatment, are its fairly extensive discussion of the problems encountered in translation and the lengthy commentaries which reflect a peculiarly Soviet interpretation of this classic work.

In the voluminous series of pamphlets recently published by *Pravda*, many concern China. That these pamphlets, largely transcripts of public lectures and heavily charged with propaganda, are designed for the general public is indicated by the number of copies printed, ranging from approximately 125,000 to 160,000—extremely large for Soviet publications. Since these booklets are typically journalistic in content and, furthermore, are in large part available in *Soviet Press Translations* and *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, a brief examination of them should suffice.

G. Erenburg's "The National-Liberation Movement in China Following the Great October Socialist Revolution"¹⁴ develops the thesis that the October Revolution opened the way for the "liberation" of all peoples everywhere and, in this case, of the Chinese specifically. In "The National-Liberation War of the Chinese People against Japanese Imperialism (1937-1945)",¹⁵ V. N. Nikiforov, a prolific writer on Far Eastern affairs, makes the usual accusations against the Western powers and the Kuomintang, while making great claims for the Soviet Union—e.g., "The Soviet Union accomplished literally in days what the Western powers had attempted for four years in their fighting against Japan." V. YA. Avarin's "The Attainments of the Chinese People's Republic"¹⁶ is a glowing account of the state of affairs in the Chinese Republic, with emphasis on Tibet and Formosa; this pamphlet contains slightly more substance than can be found in the preceding one. In "The Historic Victory of the Chinese People over American Imperialism and the Kuomintang Reaction (1945-1949)",¹⁷ M. F. YUrev merely carries forward the standard approach, adding a brief

¹⁸ *Sun-tszy Traktat o Voennom Iskusstve*, Moscow-Leningrad, USSR Academy of Sciences, Institute of Orientology, 1950, 402 pp.

¹⁴ *Natsionalno-Osvoboditelnoe Dvizhenie v Kitae posle Velikoi Oktyabrskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Revolyutsii (1918-1924 gg)*, Pravda, 1950, 31 pp.

¹⁵ *Natsionalno-Osvoboditel'naya Voina Kitaiskogo Naroda protiv Yaponskogo Imperializma (1937-1945 gody)*, Pravda, 1950, 31 pp.

¹⁶ *Uspekhi Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki*, Pravda, 1950, 31 pp.

¹⁷ *Istoricheskaya Pobeda Kitaiskogo Naroda nad Amerikanskim Imperialismom i Gomindanovskoi reaktsiei (1945-1949 gg)*, Pravda, 1950, 31 pp.

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discussion of the function of the Central People's government. This topic is developed further in one of the better pamphlets, "The State Structure of the Chinese People's Republic",¹⁸ by O. A. Arturov, who provides relatively substantial material on the government and administration, the Party and the judicial system. S. YA. Sakhnin's "The Korean People in the Struggle for Unity and Independence"¹⁹ is interesting because it supposedly was published before the outbreak of the Korean war, at which time a supplement describing the "attack on North Korea" was added.

Manchuria

P. I. Glushakov's "Manchuria, An Economic-Geographical Description"²⁰ is an extensive survey of physical and economic geography that considers the region first as a whole and then by districts. It draws on both Russian and Western sources, and bases a five-page bibliography on them; scattered throughout the book are numerous maps, charts, tables and other illustrations. Economic geography is not its sole concern; it gives fairly detailed consideration, for example, to the political aspects of the railways.

A more popular work is V. A. Anuchin's "Geographic Essays on Manchuria",²¹ which is intended to introduce the non-specialist to Manchuria as a whole and not to provide a detailed analysis. It contains much scattered information, supposedly with the purpose of correlating the physical geography, history and economy of the country. Of considerable interest are a thirty-one-page historical and bibliographical exposition of Russian geographic explorations in Manchuria from 1643 to the early twentieth century and numerous maps showing routes of exploration, populations and city plans. Although anti-Western propaganda appears in both Glushakov's and Anuchin's works, it receives far more emphasis in the latter.

Mongolia

The Mongolian People's Republic is the subject of four informative books, two of which—the more scholarly—are by E. M. Murzaev. The first, "The Mongolian People's Republic—A Description of Physical Geography",²² contains much valuable data. Of interest is an eight-page discussion of Mongolian geographic names and terms. According to Murzaev, the Mongolian People's Republic "is an independent state of workers (arat-cattle

¹⁸ *Gosudarstvenii Stroi Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki*, Pravda, 1951, 24 pp.

¹⁹ *Koreiskii Narod v Borbe za Edinstvo i Nezavisimost*, Pravda, 1950, 31 pp.

²⁰ *Manchzhuria, Ekonomiko-Geograficheskoe Opisanie*, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, 1948, 264 pp.

²¹ *Geograficheskie Ocherki Manchzhurii*, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, 1948, 300 pp.

²² *Mongolskaya Narodnaya Respublika—Fiziko-Geograficheskoe Opisanie*, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, Academy of Sciences Institute of History, 1948, 314 pp.

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men, workers and intelligentsia) which has abolished the imperialist and feudal yoke, and has embraced the non-capitalist way of developing the country for the further transition to socialism"—the standard description for almost twenty years. Only eighteen pages are devoted to the structure of the state, population and economy. Numerous maps, tables and illustrations are included.

Murzaev's other book, "Geographical Explorations of the Mongolian People's Republic",²³ represents an expansion of one portion of the preceding volume. It is a detailed account of various scientific expeditions and of their work in Mongolia. In addition to an introduction containing the customary encomiums of the Soviet record in Mongolia, the work consists of chapters recounting the early explorations (thirteenth to sixteenth centuries), the travels of envoys, missionaries, traders and early scientists (seventeenth century to 1870), significant Russian explorations (1870 to 1917), and the fruits of systematic research on the geography of the Mongolian People's Republic (1918 to 1946). It provides almost no collateral material on the social institutions of the area. It does, however, contain the most extensive list of explorations compiled thus far, and although the full accounts must be obtained elsewhere, their chronicling and evaluation by a Soviet writer is systematically presented. While of more value to the natural historian than to the social scientist, the book reveals how active the Russians, and particularly the Soviets, have been in investigating the geology, botany, zoology and topography of this highly strategic area.

Of greater interest to the political scientist and the historian, although it lays claim to being nothing more than a popular survey, is I. YA. Zlatkin's "The Mongolian People's Republic—A Country of New Democracy".²⁴ In a lengthy introduction which presents Soviet theory as applied to Mongolia, I. M. Maiskii states that, while the book is useful, it does not go far enough: "We must hope that in the near future Soviet historical science will present us with new and serious works on Mongolia." The body of the work concerns Mongolia's transition from the early national-liberation movement through the establishment and development of the Mongolian People's Republic, and the rise and subsequent liquidation of deviationist trends. In the course of a broad historical sketch of Outer Mongolia from 1911 to 1946, Zlatkin notes that this period witnessed the destruction of Mongol feudalism, the establishment of a centralized state and the organization of a state-controlled economy. "The experience of the Mongolian

²³ *Geograficheskie Issledovaniya Mongolskoi Narodnoi Respubliki*, Publishing House of the Academy of Science, Institute of Geography and the Mongolian Commission, 1948, 210 pp.

²⁴ *Mongolskaya Narodnaya Respublika—Strana Novoi Demokratii*, Moscow-Leningrad, Academy of Sciences Popular Science Series, 1950, 291 pp.

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People's Republic shows that in the transitional period from feudalism to socialism the stage of constructing the basis for a continuous or prolonged transition to a non-capitalist path of development is necessary for countries and peoples that are opposing imperialism and feudalism and are progressing toward socialism, by-passing capitalism." Zlatkin regards United States foreign policy as equivalent to Japanese imperialism because American "imperialism" is attempting, through the Marshall Plan, to block the progress of weak and backward peoples, in contrast to Soviet economic assistance, which is exemplified by the disinterested aid rendered to the Mongolian People's Republic by the USSR. A six-page chronology of what the Soviets consider to be the main events in Mongol history (1543-1946) naturally deals most intensively with the Soviet period. One item in it constitutes an admission of close rapport among the Comintern, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolution Party in the famous decision of 1932 to liquidate the "leftists".

Another, smaller book, "The Mongolian People's Republic" by N. V. Tsapkin,²⁸ is designed for a still wider readership, as is evidenced not only by its popular approach but also by the fact that 50,000 copies were printed, as compared with 10,000 copies of Murzaev's first book, 3,000 of his second, and 8,000 of Zlatkin's. An "enlightenment" book, containing material on subjects considered appropriate for Soviet readers and embodying accepted contemporary Soviet attitudes, it offers a sketchy survey of the geography, culture and history of the Mongolian People's Republic, with progress toward socialism constituting the underlying theme. The book contains significant economic data, such as material on the current Five-Year Plan (1948-52).

A work of great value in its field is "A Bibliography of Buriat Mongolia, 1890-1936, Volume III, Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting, Fur-Farming and Fishing", compiled by N. V. Zdobnov, G. T. Petrov and M. I. Pomus, with the assistance of the Buriat-Mongol State Scientific Research Institute of Culture and Economics.²⁹ Volumes I and II of this bibliography appeared before the last war.

Korea

Recent Soviet writing on Korea, such as the following two books for popular consumption, is highly propagandist in tone and content. "The

²⁸ *Mongol'skaya Narodnaya Respublika*, State Publishing House of Political Science Literature, 1948, 112 pp.

²⁹ *Bibliografiya Buryat-Mongolii, 1890-1936, Tom III, Sel'skoe, Lesnoe, Pushno-Zverevoe i Rybnoe Khozyaistvo*, Moscow-Leningrad, Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1946, 534 pp.

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Korean People's Struggle for Independence", by P. Kraynov,²⁷ presents a brief survey of the more remote past, together with a discussion of conditions under Japanese rule and of postwar problems before 1948. Its eloquent portrayal of reforms in North Korea and vitriolic description of corruption within the South Korean government offer an interesting example of Soviet handling of the Korean problem prior to the outbreak of war.

In "We Have Seen Korea"²⁸ Alexander Gitovich and Boris Bursov, employing a narrative device, recount impressions formed while traveling in North Korea. They emphasize "democratic" trends in the North and describe South Korea as being "greatly in need of liberation". The "publisher" contributes a ten-page exposition of the Soviet view of political forces in postwar Korea. The assertion is made that a divided Korea "will not" contribute to peace and security in the Far East, and that the Korean people are certain to attain full "independence". Books such as these are of interest primarily as examples of Soviet propaganda technique.²⁹

Japan

Recent Soviet writing on Japan displays two major tendencies: emphasis on the long history of Japanese aggression against the Soviet Union, and propaganda attacks upon the "imperialists". Thus, in B. A. Romanov's "A Survey of the Diplomatic History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1895-1907",³⁰ which is of interest as a Soviet interpretation of the history of Russia in the Far East, the underlying thesis is that the Russo-Japanese War was an imperialist war in the Leninist sense (imperialism being regarded as the highest stage of capitalism). In keeping with this theme, and perhaps in some measure to ease the memory of Russia's defeat, Romanov asserts that this war was part of Japan's original program for seizing Korea and Manchuria, and had been directed first against China, not Russia, ten years earlier. He depicts the Tsarist regime as having been weak, unstable and imperialist, incompetent in domestic affairs and yet endeavoring to compete in the international imperialist arena. Much attention is given to the interplay of political forces among the powers concerned, to the alleged causes of the war, and to its political results. The treatment of these topics is keyed to the general thesis that all of the chief powers involved were imperialist. The main distinction is that Russia was attempting to defend the mainland, while England, and particularly the United States, aided Japan and, through

²⁷ *Borba Koreiskovo Naroda Za Nezavisimost*, State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1948, 104 pp.

²⁸ *My Videli Koreyu*, Leningrad, Young Guard, 1948, 141 pp.

²⁹ See, in this connection, John N. Washburn, "The Soviet Press Views North Korea", *Pacific Affairs*, March 1949, pp. 53-59. *Editor's note*.

³⁰ *Ocherki Diplomaticheskoi Istorii Russko-Yaponskoi Voiny, 1895-1907*, Moscow-Leningrad, Academy of Sciences Institute of History, Leningrad Division, 1947, 496 pp.

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the Treaty of Portsmouth, provided it with a "firm foothold on the Asian mainland—in anticipation of an opportune moment for renewed attack". The book, which includes sixty pages of relevant documents, affects a pseudo-scholarly manner reflecting an officially announced determination to try to make available works that, while supposedly scholarly enough for the specialist, are so written as to enable the masses to satisfy the "growing interest" which they are told that they possess.

A similar orientation characterizes "Japan from the First to the Second World War" by K.H. Eidus,⁸¹ which attempts in the main to fit Japan into the Soviet mold of an imperialist power and to reiterate the theme that imperialist Japan offers a constant threat to the Soviet Far East. Going back to the nineteenth century, Eidus asserts that the "bourgeois revolution" of 1868 opened the door for the capitalist development of Japan. He then provides a somewhat sketchy treatment of the Soviet view of Japanese domestic affairs before the first world war, a chronological presentation of events in that war, and a summary of Japan's domestic and foreign affairs at the time. In accordance with Soviet practice, he emphasizes the importance of Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East and describes in detail how it proceeded and eventually encountered such firm resistance that Japan never quite fully recovered. His treatment of the period between the world wars stresses the growing economic crisis, the internal conflicts and the aggressive policy pursued after the militarists came to power. The book as a whole seems to be intended to furnish an integrated view of the major part of a period which the Soviets describe as a half-century of Japanese aggression. Published in 1946, it arrogates far less credit to the Soviet Union for the defeat of Japan in the preceding year than do more recent studies.

In "Japanese Monopolistic Capital (The Zaibatsu)—During World War II and the Postwar Period",⁸² YA. A. Pevzner offers an intensive analysis of the Zaibatsu. He describes the peculiar type of monopoly that developed in Japan, how it was assisted by the state, and how state monopoly capitalism was able to gain a firm hold on the country through control of domestic trade, industry and man power. The large concerns are discussed at considerable length, both individually and as a group. Economic policy in the occupied areas also receives extensive treatment. The latter part of the book, apparently an attempt to provide a documentary basis for Soviet propaganda against United States postwar policy in Japan, is of interest as an example of Soviet propaganda technique. It severely criticizes the way in which the

⁸¹ *Yaponia ot Pervoi do Vtoroi Mirovoi Voyny*, Leningrad, State Publishing House of Political Literature, Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and World Politics, 1946, 248 pp.

⁸² *Monopolisticheskii Kapital Yaponii ("Zaibatsu")—v Gody Vtoroi Mirovoi Voyny i Posle Voyny*, Moscow-Leningrad, Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics, 1950, 449 pp.

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United States dealt with Japan in defeat, on the ground that it supported reactionary elements against the democratic forces in the country. The "agrarian reforms" insisted upon by the Occupation are asserted to have aided the kulaks and landowners but to have created a "veritable hell" for the working peasants. In the course of painting the usual Soviet picture of a growing movement of workers and peasants inspired and organized by the Communist Party, considerable space is devoted to the leftist forces within the country. Many of the sixty-five tables included are derived from Western sources. As might be expected in so recent a work, "Wall Street" is charged with having secured a grip on the Japanese economy, and the Economic Stabilization Program becomes the butt of bitter criticism. Despite the vehemence of its attack on the Japanese monopolies and the United States, the book was itself condemned in the Soviet Union not long after publication.⁸³

The development of rivalry between Japan and the United States is the theme of V. Avarin's "Struggle for the Pacific Ocean—The Japanese-American Conflict";⁸⁴ whose general thesis is that the war in the Pacific was precipitated by the struggle of capitalist monopolies for markets and sources of raw materials. Avarin points out that trade with China began early in the economic life of the United States, and adds that monopolistic tendencies were not long in gaining momentum. Japan entered the field later but nevertheless enjoyed great success. This study, which appeared relatively early in the postwar period, seems to be another attempt to lend factual substance to Soviet propaganda concerning the Far East. Its documentation is drawn largely from the writings of Lenin and Stalin.

In the Soviet propaganda attack on the Western powers, the Tokyo war-crimes trials have been a favorite topic. Thus, in "The International Trial of the Chief Japanese War Criminals";⁸⁵ M. YU. Raginski and S. YA. Rozenblit discuss the history of international trials in general, the Allied agreement concerning the responsibility of the enemy leaders, and the mechanics and procedures of the Tokyo trials themselves. They offer many criticisms regarding the selection of the staff, the introduction of evidence,

⁸³ In a review article in *Pravda* on August 29, 1951, I. Kalinin declared, "Pevzner's erroneous book has been published as a result of an irresponsible attitude to the work on the part of both author and editor." The essence of his criticism was that, since the United States is relying above all on the Zaijatsu and is thus defending them, the author should have been at more pains to depict this group as a powerful force for evil in both past and present, and should have revealed the "criminal aims" of the "alliance" between the Japanese and American monopolies. (An English translation of Kalinin's article appears in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. III, No. 33.)

⁸⁴ *Borba za Tikhii Okean—Yaponno-Amerikanskije Protivorechia*, Leningrad, Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and World Politics, State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1947, 469 pp.

⁸⁵ *Mezhdunarodnyi Protsess Glavnykh Yaponskikh Voennykh Prestupnikov*, Moscow-Leningrad, Academy of Sciences Institute of Law, 1950, 264 pp.

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and the general conduct of the trials. Their thesis is that the "imperialist" powers, acting in their own interests, attempted to prevent a full exposure of the Japanese war criminals. The book is interesting as another example of the Soviet technique of establishing "documentary" underpinning for propaganda.

Travel and Geography: China, Mongolia and Siberia

An examination of recent Soviet materials on the Far East would be incomplete if it failed to note at least some of the numerous publications on travel and geography. The emphasis on this field is part of a movement to eulogize Russian explorers and to inform the "masses of the people" about the Far East. Because of its nature, this material is relatively free of the propaganda characteristic of works concerned primarily with political or economic matters. Apparently the writer on natural science can fulfill his Marxist obligations by means of an introduction designed to justify his work and to fit it within the Marxist pattern; he is then free to concentrate on his subject matter with, perhaps, occasional references to Marx, Lenin, Stalin or one of the lesser authorities.

Typical of this category is the abridged account of Grigorii Efimovich Grumm-Grzhimailo's "Description of Travels in Western China",⁸⁶ which concerns his expedition in 1889-90 under the auspices of the Russian Geographic Society. This Soviet edition was prepared for rank-and-file readers, and much of the original work, first published in 1896-1907, has been omitted. Because of the nature of the material and also, perhaps, the fact that the editor of the Soviet version is the author's son, deliberate distortion seems unlikely; yet the scholar will regret the omissions and will consult the original wherever possible.

"Travels through China and Mongolia", by M. V. Pevtsov,⁸⁷ deals largely with the author's expedition in 1878-79 through Mongolia and the northern provinces of Inner China—Shansi and Chihli (now Hopei). In addition to a description of geography, ethnography, trade and natural history, it contains a chapter on the tribal composition of the Mongol population, the people, their mode of life and administration.

Two popular-type books, part of a series called "Russian Travelers", and both titled "Through Inner Asia", contain brief biographical sketches of explorers. One, by YU. N. Bessonov and V. YA. YAKubovich,⁸⁸ deals with CH. CH. Valinkhanov and G. N. Potanin; the other, by V. V. Obruchev and

⁸⁶ *Opisanie Puteshestviya v Zapadnyi Kitai*, edited by A. G. Grumm-Grzhimailo, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, 1948, 684 pp.

⁸⁷ *Puteshestviya po Kitayu i Mongolii*, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, 1951, 284 pp.

⁸⁸ *Po Vnutrennei Asii*, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, 1947, 80 pp.

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N. G. Fradkin,³⁹ reviews the work of M. V. Pevtsov and V. A. Obruchev. Both pay high tribute to their subjects, since "in the Stalin epoch the Soviet people place great value on the service which these explorers have rendered to Russian geographic science".

Of more scholarly value are two volumes by P. K. Kozlov: "Mongolia and Kam—A Three-Year Journey through Mongolia and Tibet (1899-1901)",⁴⁰ an abridgment of part of the original work, on geographic materials; and "Mongolia and Amdo and the Dead City of Khara-Khoto",⁴¹ which contains much valuable information as well as ten pages on the archeological discoveries of this student of Przhevalski.

In a more limited sphere, V. A. Obruchev's "Eastern Mongolia—A Geographic and Geologic Description, Parts I and II"⁴² surveys Russian and foreign literature on the geography, geology and paleontology of this region by means of an annotated bibliography and a description of explorations, topographical features, means of communications, and so forth. A ten-page list of elevations is included, as are several small maps and a larger one based on materials available as of 1945.

N. M. Przhevalski's writings also have received much attention in connection with the recent tendency to eulogize early "Russian" explorers. In typical fashion, praise is accorded the work and heroism of Przhevalski—a "true Russian, who always remained a Russian and an ardent patriot of Russia, his native land, regardless of where fate took him". Moreover, he is depicted as the personification of high principles and of service to his country and his people—as a *bogatyř*, a legendary figure.

"Nikolai Mikhailovich Przhevalski, First Explorer of Nature in Central Asia",⁴³ a biography in semi-popular style by N. M. Karataev, recounts the explorer's extensive travels, making frequent reference to his relations with other, chiefly Russian, explorers.

Of Przhevalski's four expeditions, the first and least well known is described in "Travels in the Ussuri Region—1867-1869",⁴⁴ which presents this work as originally published in 1870, with minor changes by the Soviet editor, M. A. Tensin, who has abridged the last chapter, checked and cor-

³⁹ *Po Vnutrennei Azii*, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, 1947, 88 pp.

⁴⁰ *Mongoliya i Kam—Tryokhletnee Puteshestvie po Mongolii i Tibetu (1899-1901)*, abridged edition, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, 1948, 438 pp.

⁴¹ *Mongoliya i Amdo i Mertvii Gorod Khara-Khoto*, abridged edition, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, 1948, 328 pp.

⁴² *Vostochnaya Mongoliya—Geograficheskoe i Geologicheskoe Opisaniye, Chasti 1 i 2*, Moscow-Leningrad, Mongol Commission of the Academy of Sciences All-Union Geographic Society, 1947, 351 pp.

⁴³ *Nikolai Mikhailovich Przhevalski—Pervii Issledovatel Prirody Tsentralnoi Azii*, Moscow-Leningrad, Popular Science Series of the Academy of Sciences, 1948, 284 pp.

⁴⁴ *Puteshestvie v Ussuriiskom Krae—1867-1869*, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, 1947, 311 pp.

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rected names, and added recent Tass photographs. In this rather detailed account, the flora and fauna of the region receive extensive attention. A lengthy appendix includes a list of local birds as well as population tables, the author's meteorological journal, a map, and so forth.

"From Kuldzha beyond the Tien Shan and to Lob-Nor"⁴⁵ is an account of Przhevalski's second expedition, based on his report published originally in 1887. Since this report did not cover the entire expedition, extracts from his diary have been added. E. M. Murzaev, the Soviet editor, discusses the background and significance of the expedition as well as briefly describing later travels in the area.

Przhevalski's next expedition is the subject of "Mongolia and the Tangut Country",⁴⁶ an abridgment of the original work first published in 1875. The Soviet editor, again Murzaev, considers this to be the best of Przhevalski's writings by virtue of its originality, caliber of scientific material, and ability to sustain general reader interest without sacrificing scientific standards. The work is best known as a source of geographic, ethnic and zoological data.

Przhevalski's fourth and final expedition, his second Tibetan journey in 1883-85, is recorded in "From Kyakhta to the Source of the Yellow River",⁴⁷ first published in St. Petersburg in 1888. According to the Soviet editor, once more Murzaev, the Soviets regard this volume as a classic of scientific yet popular geographic writing.

Another history of exploration—L. G. Kamanin's "The First Explorers in the Far East",⁴⁸ published in the popular "Russian Travelers" series—contains brief descriptions of travel in three areas: in Kamchatka, by Vladimir Atlasov and S. P. Krashennikov; in the Sea of Okhotsk, by V. Poyarkov; and in Yakutsk and the lower Amur, by G. I. Nevelskoy.

L. S. Berg gives a fuller discussion of Kamchatka in "The Discovery of Kamchatka and the Bering Expeditions—1725-1742".⁴⁹ Here Bering's two expeditions are treated in some detail, and considerable information is given on his work in Siberia as well as on other areas visited, such as the Aleutians. The exposition is scholarly and is accompanied by extensive documentation, numerous explanatory footnotes, illustrations and maps.

Another interesting work is A. V. Efimov's "On the History of Russian Expeditions in the Pacific Ocean during the First Half of the XVIII

⁴⁵ *Ot Kuldzhi za Tyan-shan i na Lob-Nor*, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, 1947, 156 pp.

⁴⁶ *Mongoliya i Strana Tangutor*, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, 1946, 335 pp.

⁴⁷ *Ot Kyakhty na Istoki Zheltai Reki*, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, 1948, 266 pp.

⁴⁸ *Pervye Issledovateli Dalnego Vostoka*, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, 1946, 80 pp.

⁴⁹ *Otkrytie Kamchatki i Ekspeditsii Beringa—1725-1742*, Moscow-Leningrad, Academy of Sciences, 1946, 380 pp.

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Century",⁵⁰ which is presented as a scientific study for the trained reader—"generals, admirals and officers of the Armed Forces of the USSR". Besides affording a historical description of expeditions and explorations along the Pacific coast, it presents the Soviet view of exploration in the North Pacific. The book "clarifies the question of the discovery of America from the Russian side", and belittles the Western role in geographical discoveries along the Pacific coast. It is recommended to Soviet students of history as an example of careful study and analysis of the "raw materials" of science, which in this case take the form largely of old maps and archives.

One of the more scholarly studies of Siberia is S. V. Kiselyov's "The Ancient History of Southern Siberia",⁵¹ which is based on the findings of archeological investigations, especially those of a twenty-year expedition organized jointly by the Academy of Sciences Institute of the History of Material Culture and the State Historical Museum. It presents detailed material on the various epochs from the Stone Age to the end of the tenth century, and considers in a scholarly manner the two main regions of Southern Siberia—the Minusinsk Basin and the Altai—their society, culture, economy, trade and government. The text is well documented and includes numerous tables.

The more recent history of Siberia is described in V. I. Shunkov's "History of Siberian Colonization—From the XVII Century to the Beginning of the XVIII Century",⁵² which offers a comprehensive survey of migration beyond the Urals; the role of the government; agriculture, pre-Russian and Russian; grain production and trade; the rise of feudalism and the *obrok*i (dues in kind or in money). Documentary references and tables are included.

R. M. Kabo's "The Cities of Western Siberia—A Sketch of Historic-Economic Geography—XVII to the First Half of the XIX Century",⁵³ examines the origin, development and distribution of the Russian cities of Western Siberia as a manifestation of Marxist geo-historical doctrine and is described as a "study of the development of the cities, each in its precise place as a link of the socio-geographical division of labor and depending on the historical distribution of the means of production". This volume, the first of three planned by the author, deals with the feudal period, when the first Russian cities appeared in Western Siberia and became economic centers. It is extensively documented, largely from the works of G. F. Muller,

⁵⁰ *Iz Istorii Russkikh Ekspeditzii na Tikhom Okeane—Pervaya Polovina XVIII veka*, Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Armed Forces, 1948, 342 pp.

⁵¹ *Drevnyaya Istoriya YUzhnoi Sibiri*, Academy of Sciences Institute of the History of Material Culture, 2nd edition, 1951, 643 pp.

⁵² *Ocherki po Istorii Kolonizatsii Sibiri v XVII—Nachale XVIII vekov*, Moscow-Leningrad, Academy of Sciences Institute of History, 1946, 228 pp.

⁵³ *Goroda Zapadnoi Sibiri—Ocherki Istoriko-Ekonomicheskoi Geografii—XVII-pervaya polovina XIX vv.*, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, 1947, 219 pp.

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P. N. Butsinsky, and S. V. Bakhrushin; an eight-page index of geographical names is included. The second volume will discuss the period of capitalist development, and the third, the Soviet period.

Although it does not concern geography, a recent study of Siberia worthy of mention is M. Vetoshkin's "On the History of the Bolshevik Organizations and the Revolutionary Movements in Siberia",⁵⁴ a description of the revolutionary movement in Siberia before and during the 1905 revolution. The factors underlying that movement are identified as the industrial development responsible for the creation of a proletariat; the presence of political exiles in Siberia; the effect of the Russo-Japanese War on Siberia; the rise of the Social-Democratic movement; and the establishment of local revolutionary committees. The documentation is largely from Party literature.

In a somewhat lighter vein typical of popular Soviet descriptions of the Far East is "The Island of Sakhalin—A Popular Geographic Essay", by S. L. Lutskii.⁵⁵ In addition to a brief treatment of the discovery and development as well as the political and economic geography of the island, it contains a map indicating the distribution of natural resources and industries, and a short bibliography.

Seattle, January 1952

WILLIAM BALLIS and EMILY TIMMINS

Taking Stock in Indonesia

IN Indonesia, as in many other countries, there exists an urgent need for the publication by non-governmental agencies of official documents so that these may be made available to interested persons to whom they might otherwise remain more or less inaccessible. Particularly in young countries like Indonesia, such publication helps to afford the general public an explanation of the background and aims of the documents in question. Insofar as they fulfill the latter function, Indonesian publications are of interest to non-Indonesians as well, for they serve to reveal both how the Indonesian general public becomes acquainted with the formal and institutional origins of the new state and how prominent Indonesian publicists view the institutions under discussion—a factor of some importance where controversial matters, such as, for example, the Netherlands-Indonesian Union or the position of

⁵⁴ *In Istori Bol'shevistskikh Organizatsii i Revolyutsionnogo Dvizheniya v Sibiri*, Leningrad, State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1947, 306 pp.

⁵⁵ *Ostrov Sakhalin—Populyarnyi Geograficheskiy Ocherk*, Moscow-Leningrad, Glavseморput Publishing House, 1946, 55 pp.

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village headmen, are at issue. With two exceptions, the volumes reviewed here contain official documents and texts: certain of them are merely collections of related items which, as published originally in official form, were so scattered as to prevent any but an expert from making full use of them; others present special documents for purposes of explanation or other commentary.

In "The Proclamation [i. e., the Proclamation of Independence of 1945] and the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia",¹ Mr. Muhammad Yamin² offers a lengthy commentary on the two basic documents of the Indonesian state. In the course of a broad discussion of their underlying ideas, he notes their historic origins and draws a wide range of comparisons with foreign institutions and traditions, thus providing a fair amount of general information about modern ideas and practices the world over. The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with the struggle for independence and with the content of the proclamation of independence. The second explains some of the basic ideas of the 1950 constitution—e.g., popular democracy, the constitutional state, the republic, the unitary state, fundamental human rights, and so forth. The third part discusses the text of the constitution. Appendices contain the official texts of the documents in question. The author's political views become apparent in the course of certain of his explanations. For instance, at one point he makes the remarkable statement that the three main trail-blazers of Indonesian freedom have been Tan Malakka, Soekarno and Muhammad Hatta (in that order!). His frequent references to Soviet documents point in the same direction. There is, therefore, a danger that, particularly because this book meets a need for information on Indonesian constitutional history, it may leave uncritical readers—and most of its readers must inevitably be uncritical since they lack the means to be otherwise—in a welter of ideas in which Soviet professions and Soviet practices are wholly indistinguishable.

Professor Supomo's booklet on the Netherlands-Indonesian Union statute³ should command wide interest at the present time. The author headed the Indonesian delegation that visited the Netherlands to discuss replacement of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union by a normal, bilateral international treaty; previously he had been a member of the Indonesian delegation at the Round Table Conference in the Hague at which the Union statute had been drafted and signed. Instead of expressing his personal ideas about the statute, Pro-

¹ Muhammad Yamin, *Proklamasi dan Konstitusi Republik Indonesia*. 242 pp. Unless otherwise described, titles cited here were published by Penerbit Djambatan (Jakarta and Amsterdam) in 1951.

² The title "Mr." in Dutch usage stands, not for "mister", but for "master of law".

³ R. Supomo, *Status-Uni Indonesia-Belanda; Dengan Sekedar Pendjelasan Dibawah Tiap-tiap Pasal Menurut Pembicaraan Pada Waktu Perundingan di Konperensi Medja Bundar di Den Haag*. 1950. 48 pp.

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fessor Supomo contents himself with appending to each article of it clear and succinct comments by way of summary of the official explanations that were agreed upon during the Round Table Conference.

According to Mr. Soenarko, who teaches constitutional law in Malang, his two books are to be regarded as complementary works. One, "The Organization of Our State",⁴ deals in its first volume with developments since the transfer of sovereignty, and concentrates in its second upon the period since the proclamation in August 1950 of a unitary Indonesian state. The other book, "General Constitutional Principles",⁵ is intended to provide a general background for the facts related in the first. As a whole, these three volumes represent one of the earliest attempts to provide the Indonesian student of law with a simple, clear text on constitutional law and related matters. In contrast to that of Yamin's book, its scope is restricted to Indonesia; where it strays beyond this frame of reference, it does so not so much by making comparisons with other countries or earlier periods in world history but rather by drawing attention to problems of general application. Even so, and particularly in the second book, there are many references to foreign lawyers and writers. Since Mr. Soenarko proves to be a thoughtful lawyer with a deep interest in constitutional matters and an adequate knowledge of his sources, his books, which are designed to acquaint a wide public with its constitutional background, constitute valuable contributions to the necessary integration of the Indonesian state. That his work is descriptive instead of critical should be regarded as an advantage rather than a drawback in the prevailing situation. The frequent use of foreign terms and expressions seems to be unavoidable at present in Indonesian scientific circles; yet, especially in the case of works intended for general circulation, it presents dangers which should not be blinked.

Unlike the other volumes previously noted, neither Soedjono's "Political Science"⁶ nor Mr. Soedjono Hardjosoediro's "The Village Headman in a Democratic State"⁷ contains official documents. Instead, Soedjono offers the common reader general information about political practices, which he discusses under three heads: general; national government, with particular reference to the civil service; and international policy. His simple descriptions provide a useful complement to Mr. Soenarko's books.

Mr. Hardjosoediro comes to grips with one of the most important and difficult problems in Indonesian life resulting from the transfer of sovereignty

⁴ Soenarko, *Susunan Negara Kita*. I. *Sedjak Penjerahan Kedaulatan*; II. *Sedjak Proklamasi Negara Kesatuan*. 2 vols. 112 and 166 pp. .

⁵ Soenarko, *Dasar-dasar Umum Tata Negara*. 103 pp.

⁶ Soedjono, *Ilmu Politik*. I, *Umum*; II, *Kepamong-pradjaan*; III, *Diplomasi dan Politik Luar Negeri*. 2 vols. 112 and 101 pp.

⁷ Soedjono Hardjosoediro, *Lurah-desa dalam Negara Demokrasi*. 63 pp.

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and the replacement of a colonial by a democratic government. Under the colonial administration the village headman was a pillar of government. Obviously his functions, activities and attitudes must change to fit the new pattern, but the nature and degree of the change required have not yet been decided. Although the author remarks that his booklet, addressed directly to village headmen and other officials, represents no more than a tentative attempt to outline the necessary changes, nevertheless his effort possesses both moral and practical value in view of the need for continuing self-appraisal in the new state.

A book of quite a different kind is the "Report on the All-Indonesian Conference of Central, Regional and Local Administrative Offices for Religion",⁸ published by the Ministry of Religion of the United States of Indonesia, the precursor of the unitary Indonesian state. This is a collection of all of the statements made at the conference in question, to which are added practically every document on religious affairs that had been published officially before the appearance of the volume. It contains a wealth of information on the policy and regulatory activities of the government in the field of religion, and thus constitutes an up-to-date successor to a prewar collection of all official regulations pertaining directly or indirectly to religious, and particularly Muslim, matters (*Perkara Boemipoetera yang Bersangkoetan dengan Agama Islam*). Since, however, the materials in this volume are scattered about in a most disorderly manner, and no index of any kind is provided, its value for ordinary reference purposes as a complete collection of documents for the years 1945-50 is much less than would have been the case had the editors bothered to follow an understandable plan of compilation.

Although Wiradiputra devotes less than a third of his book⁹ to a description of agrarian laws and regulations that have been carried over to the present from the earlier period of Netherlands control, his account, which is based largely on Dutch sources, should prove to be a valuable mine of data for students of landholding rights in Indonesia. This complex subject is of particular interest because of the well-known success of the Netherlands Indies government in preventing landlordism, which is endemic in so much of southern Asia. Most of the volume is given over to appendices containing official documents, standard contract forms, and the like.

Mr. Djatmika's well-organized collection¹⁰ of official regulations and communications having to do with the position of government officials is

⁸ *Pertelaan Konperensi Kementerian, Departemen, Djawatan Agama Seluruh Indonesia; Diadakan di Jogjakarta Tg. 14-18 April 1950.* Djakarta: Penjiaran Kementerian Agama. 1950. 3 vols. 1078 pp.

⁹ R. Wiradiputra, *Agraria: Hukum Tanah Seperti yang Masih Berlaku Sampai Sekarang.* 158 pp.

¹⁰ S. Djatmika, *Peraturan-peraturan dan Pengumuman-pengumuman Mengenai Kedudukan Pegawai Negeri; yang Dikeluarkan dalam Tahun 1950, 1951.* 3 vols. 131, 228 and 227 pp.

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the product of much painstaking work for which the compiler's experience—he holds a responsible position in the legislation section of the Indonesian government personnel administration bureau—qualifies him admirably. The present work, which is apparently to be kept up to date by the publication of supplementary volumes at half-yearly intervals, will prove indispensable to most Indonesian government administrative offices as an aid in coping with at least some of the many complications created in the field of officialdom by the transfer of sovereignty.

Leiden, March 1952

C. A. O. VAN NIEUWENHUIJZE

American Policy Re-examined

THE tremendous interest aroused in many countries by Mr. Kennan's book¹ is both a tribute to the quality of his writing and a sign of the importance which the world attaches to the success or failure of American diplomacy. It has been said that this book is compulsory reading for all serious students of international affairs, and so indeed it is. It throws light upon past United States policies and thereby explains much in present American thinking. Moreover, it derives additional significance from the fact that its author is no mere arm-chair critic but a lifelong professional diplomat, recently director of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State, and now United States Ambassador-designate to the Soviet Union.

The book consists of a series of lectures given by Mr. Kennan at the University of Chicago during a period of extended leave in 1950-51, and contains as an appendix two articles on Soviet policy and the American attitude to it, first published in 1947 and 1951, respectively.

Mr. Kennan has not attempted a comprehensive survey of United States policy in the last half-century, but has endeavoured by judicious selection of examples to illustrate the evolution of American thinking on foreign relations and to consider how far traditional concepts remain appropriate to the tasks which the United States has to face today. His conclusions are not flattering to the policy-making of the past, and amount to a drastic "debunking" of several common assumptions about it which may be disturbing to Americans. Yet there is nothing supercilious about his objective analysis of his predecessors' ideas, and he freely admits that later developments have often enabled him to see more clearly what was necessarily obscure at the time.

¹ AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950. By George F. Kennan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1951. 154 pp. \$2.75.

The first lecture, on the War with Spain, shows with devastating clarity how a war which began ostensibly to save a colonial people from imperialist domination ended in the annexation of a new colony, the Philippines, by the Americans themselves. In the story of this incident we can already see some of Mr. Kennan's various themes emerging—the incalculable influence of United States domestic politics upon her international actions, the emotional responses of public opinion, and the illusion of high moral principle, which, as so often in foreign affairs, had to give way before the reality of power relationships.

Mr. Kennan then goes on to tilt disrespectfully at that pride of his country's diplomacy, the policy of the Open Door in China. Americans have been taught to think of this as essentially an American idea, set up in contrast to, and morally superior to, the "spheres of influence" policy practised by other nations. He will have none of this, and attributes it all to a British official of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service, who sold the idea to John Hay in Washington. The policy, appealing as it did to the idealism of the American public, was useful to the administration as a plank in their election programme, but was never sufficiently rooted in reality to lead the United States to lift a finger in practical support of it. Its main effect, Mr. Kennan thinks, was to create a myth which has been of great importance in subsequent United States relations with the Far East.

As Mr. Kennan develops the theme of the United States and the Orient, he stresses more and more the element of pure make-believe in American thinking which "would not really prevent the conflict of interests in China from living themselves out pretty much in accordance with their own strategic, political and economic necessities. It would not prevent, in other words, much of that happening which was bound to happen. But toward the end of this period it would come dangerously close to the most vital interests of some of the powers. . . ."

These reflections seem well worth applying to some aspects of Far Eastern policy at the present time.

The make-believe element included the concept not only of the Open Door but of the territorial integrity of China, and also the belief, never justified, that other great powers, especially Russia and Japan, had accepted these concepts. As Mr. Kennan points out, the United States itself was never prepared to put material weight behind its declarations of principle on these subjects until the final catastrophe of Pearl Harbor. During all of this period the compulsions affecting Japanese statesmanship and the power relationships in the Far East were ignored until the clash of interests could have no issue but major war.

It is at this point that the message of Mr. Kennan's book becomes clear—the message that international law and morality are dangerous illusions; that

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what matters is a cold appraisal of the realities of power; and that the secret of successful diplomacy is the passionless pursuit of means to moderate the inevitable clashes of interest, means whereby an expanding power may have just enough of its way to keep it from desperate courses, while saving the face, and at least some of the body and soul, of its intended victim.

This message, which might not have seemed very original to a Metternich, let alone a Machiavelli, must come as something of a shock to a generation brought up in the post-Wilsonian epoch of the League and the United Nations. Yet even those who are wedded, as Mr. Kennan evidently is not, to the code of international principles set out in the United Nations Charter cannot dismiss this challenge as merely the cynicism of a disillusioned diplomat. For there is a real danger that if one thinks of aggression primarily in moral terms and asserts that all men everywhere have a moral obligation to join in resisting it, one thereby turns every local war into a world war, and ensures that every war must be fought to a finish, since to compromise with the aggressor is to compromise with evil.

In Mr. Kennan's view, one of the tragic blunders made by the Allies in both world wars was to whip their peoples into a moral fury, which then took charge of policy and made it impossible to end the fighting until the balance of power, which alone could have offered postwar security to the world, had been destroyed. The numerous critics of the policy of "unconditional surrender" will feel that, so far at least, they can agree. In regard to the first world war especially, they will feel that to consider this as a straightforward battle between the forces of good and evil is to ignore the many complex causes of the war which lay deep in European history and in the technical and social revolution of our times.

Yet it is hard to follow Mr. Kennan all the way in his attempt to eliminate "legalistic-moralistic" considerations from world affairs. Granted that we cannot expect the world to remain static within the framework of the legally acquired rights of the satisfied powers, and granted that international disputes are more often clashes of interest than clashes of principle, nevertheless there are surely, at any given moment, forces which "ought" to be supported and others which "ought" to be opposed. This view takes some account of both legalistic and moralistic considerations, but essentially depends upon the more elusive conception that at any given moment the processes of history require that one trend rather than another should be followed if the aspirations of the present generation are to find any satisfaction in the next.

This is the ideological element in world politics which has become immensely important now that foreign policy affects every citizen and requires his active cooperation. Men will not give their cooperation in peace or their lives in war unless they can be persuaded that the cause is worth the price. To persuade them thus is not to deceive them, for, despite Mr. Kennan's

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view to the contrary, national policies can surely be for "good" or for "bad" in the broad ideological sense referred to above.

Moreover, to talk exclusively in the language of power is often to overlook the importance of ideas as a factor in the creation of national or international power itself. Foreign ministries are very prone to this error and Mr. Kennan seems almost to be falling into it. Not quite, however, for in the last pages of his book he pins his faith to the possibilities of the United States "giving meaning and substance" to the hopeful forces in the world "by something which goes deeper and looks further ahead than the mere prevention of war or the frustration of imperialistic expansion. . . ." This, he says, is a "question of the spirit and purpose of American national life itself". Thus ideology, having been pushed out at one door, comes insistently back again through another.

Where one finds Mr. Kennan's thesis exaggerated, one can often see how he has been led into excess by the contrary excesses of current popular, and some official, thinking, which he seeks to combat. The cool analytical approach, the plea for moderation in all things, the cold douche poured upon national and international self-righteousness are all things well worth expounding at the present time, not to Americans alone, but perhaps to Americans above all. Mr. Kennan says many things which are wise; and even where his wisdom is open to question, his honesty of purpose, his clarity of expression, and the challenge he lays down to our conventional thinking entitle him to the gratitude of everyone who seeks to find the true path through the jungle of international affairs.

Mr. Morley's book² presents a strong contrast to Mr. Kennan's, both in its approach and in its conclusions. Despite the author's claim that he has "endeavoured to be scientific", what he has in fact written is a piece of special pleading, whose barely concealed objective is to lambast the late President Roosevelt, the present administration and the Department of State which has been serving them.

The early part of the book represents an attempt—not very successful, it must be said—to compress all previous human history into a few pages so as to show how the world today has inevitably become divided between the United States and the Soviet Union. These two are the modern Rome and Carthage, the latter role being of course reserved for the Soviet Union. There is also some elementary theorising about the role of the state and about the nature and objects of socialism which is too crude to claim a place in serious political discussion.

² *THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES*. By Felix Morley. New York: Knopf. 1951. 175 pp. \$2.50.

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Mr. Morley appears at one point to agree with Mr. Kennan in rejecting moral standards in international affairs, and states that it is "unjustifiable" to define a national foreign policy at any given moment as either "good" or "bad". Yet this does not deter him from condemning the administration's policy toward China as "morally indefensible", or from praising Mr. Dulles' conception of a Japanese Peace Treaty as "more ethical" than the British attitude, which incidentally he misrepresents.

In discussing the Far East, Mr. Morley accepts as gospel the view of the traditional policies of the Open Door and of the territorial integrity of China which Mr. Kennan regards as myths. Moreover, unlike Mr. Kennan, he seems to overestimate seriously the extent of the role which the United States could have played in postwar Asia, almost to the point of ignoring the influence of Asians upon their own affairs. This seems, on any "scientific" view, to accord but little with his argument elsewhere that the administration's policy is seriously overstraining American resources, and that the Monroe Doctrine should be restated as the basis for a much more modest American role in the world.

On the United Nations, Mr. Morley's comments are as critical as one would expect. He shows little understanding of the motives which led the statesmen of the world in 1945 to attempt the creation of an organisation capable of containing rival great powers within a single framework of over-all unity. He clearly thinks that the experiment was too unrealistic to have been worth trying, and shows satisfaction at the thought that even the administration, by its decision to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, has in effect rejected internationalism for the pursuit of narrower national interests. It is, moreover, interesting that in his view the question whether the Korean campaign should be treated as a United States national war or as a United Nations operation was the essence of the quarrel between the administration and General MacArthur.

In the United States Mr. Morley's book may be welcomed by those who happen to share his views, as a contribution to the polemics of an election year. For non-American readers it will shed little light on the problems under discussion. It may, however, be of some clinical interest as an exposition of one American point of view which commands little sympathy in any other country.

London, February 1952

K. G. YOUNGER



BOOK REVIEWS

COLLISION OF EAST AND WEST. By Herrymon Maurer. With an introduction by Hu Shih. Chicago: Regnery. 1951. 353 pp. \$4.50.

Mr. Maurer's book is interesting and well written. It expresses his point of view with emotion and with a certain cogency that derives from prolonged reflection. It therefore deserves particular attention, in contrast to a number of recent works which deal in a rather sentimental and uncritical way with East-West relations. I recommend it to readers who are interested in that subject. Having said that, I pass on to some critical observations, which I make not in any captious spirit but because I think that the book is worth careful and critical examination.

Mr. Maurer's interest is focused mainly upon the years of conflict, 1937 to 1947. His treatment is conditioned by certain conclusions he has reached about history. His project, he says, grew out of an urgent sense that history would have to be written currently or it could not be written at all. But as his researches progressed, "it became clear that what happens now has such tenacious lodgement in what has happened in the past that it would be misleading to describe either the fall of states or the price of fish except in terms of age-old drives and urges". He goes on to explain that, as facts accumulated for this somewhat forbidding panorama, the conviction grew upon him "that the facts were embraced by one great fact—the inward persistent cultural collisions of individuals and peoples". And he promises in another book to argue philosophically the theory of cultural collisions.

Dr. Hu Shih, in his Introduction, writes in the same key when he says that Mr. Maurer's book exemplifies "a new method for the study of current history" because it is "an evaluation of present events through the use of psychological and historical tools". Perhaps I have not grasped their meaning, but it certainly comes as a surprise to me to learn that there is anything new in this method; and I confess to some doubts as to whether it is possible to develop a "theory of cultural collisions" which will throw light on the problems of human behaviour.

Fortunately the—as I think—imperfect philosophical foundations of Mr. Maurer's book do not detract from the interest of its separate chapters or from the validity of most of his suppositions. He gives clear and sympathetic pictures of the leading cultures of the Far East and shows with considerable skill how they have met and collided with Western cultures through mutual unawareness. He does not suggest that these collisions are peculiar to the relations of East and West, but he thinks that there are singular advantages in "telling the account in terms of an ancient cultural area now prostrate before the jejune confusion of Europe, Russia

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and America". Here there seems to be a stylistic lapse, if not a lapse in reasoning; but there may be such advantages in the use of this method, and certainly his account is full of telling instances and sage commentary. He reaches the conclusion—I think he began with it—that the intense cultural collision between the East and West has arisen from "the mistake of treating Eastern peoples not straightforwardly as persons who are valuable in themselves but rather as units of population which can be used as means to some greater end". But by his own argument such collisions are common between all societies and within all societies; so that in trying to follow his reasoning I am left with a baffled feeling that he remains too long upon a transcendental height. I do not disagree with his diagnosis of cultural conflicts, but I feel that in a work dealing specifically with East and West relationships he should descend from time to time to lower levels of generalisation and description. Does he really think that it is such things as a feeling of superiority, a desire to dominate, that brought the West into collision with the East? Is he sure that nineteenth-century Western self-righteousness and condescension are in truth ultimate or even proximate causes of such collision?

I wish he had discussed, if only to dismiss it, the possibility that conflicts of material interest, real or supposed, are the most potent causes of collision. I think he should have explained why collisions occur between cultures that are almost identical, and within seemingly homogeneous cultures. In short, I wish he could have been a trifle less metaphysical and a trifle more practical in dealing with a question so urgent in point of time.

He says in conclusion that we must recognise that "various persons and various cultures stand on a common ground in a free search for truth. . . . The contemporary denial that there is such common ground of truth is essentially a denial that there is anything meaningful in human life." But that statement leaves me wondering what, in this context, is the meaning of "meaningful".

New York, January 1952

G. B. SANSOM

ASIA'S LANDS AND PEOPLES. A Geography of One-third the Earth and Two-thirds Its People. By George B. Cressey. *New York: McGraw-Hill. 1951. 2nd edition. 597 pp., illus., maps. \$7.*

THE subtitle of this book—an enlarged and generally improved revision of the original, 1944 edition—underscores the importance of the Asian land-mass. Although Dr. Cressey's inclusion of the Soviet Union in this complex may be questioned (since, if it is adherence to communist ideology that today most clearly separates Asia from Europe, the former ought perhaps to be regarded as extending as far west as Warsaw and

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Prague), yet the line had to be drawn somewhere, and his decision is by no means indefensible. There will always be an arbitrary element in the delimitation of Asia and Europe; neither geographers nor historians should object to the line not being drawn at the Urals.

There have been great changes in the political and economic situation of Asia since 1944, changes that clearly have not yet run their course, and the region still suffers from dangerous instability more severely than any other part of the world. All the more reason for not delaying the necessary adjustments, even though they may be only provisional. In the confusion of events, it is more important than ever to maintain a few solid positions and to recognize certain permanent factors underlying the shifting sands of history. In this connection, as Dr. Cressey remarks, "geographic ignorance is immeasurably expensive".

A work of this kind does not lend itself to summarization, but it may be noted that it is intended primarily for an American public. The reader approaches Asia by way of the Pacific Ocean, after stopping off briefly in Hawaii. Interesting comparisons are drawn between the climates of Asia and North America, and between Canadian pressure in the Far West and Slavic pressure in the Far East. The exposition is clear and the discussion well balanced among the different "realms" treated: China, Japan and Korea, the Soviet Union, Southwestern Asia (a better term than "Near East" or "Middle East"), India and Pakistan, and Southeastern Asia. Following a description, in the case of each "realm", of the major features of physical and human geography, come chapters devoted to regional geography. Instead of enumerating "land forms regions" and "vegetation regions", it might have been better to provide synthetic accounts firmly based on geology and climate, but that may be asking too much in the present state of our knowledge; and, as the author says, generalizations too often seem extravagant. Thus, he repeatedly and rightly insists on the complexity and diversity of the so-called monsoon climates in South and East Asia. His concise descriptions are frequently enlivened by personal recollections drawn from extensive travels.

An account of such breadth clearly demanded extensive reading. The volume contains a very valuable selected bibliography, though European geographers will note certain regrettable omissions. Pierre Gourou, for example, will doubtless be surprised to find mention of his early study, *L'Indochine française* (published in 1929), but none of his *Paysans du delta tonkinois* (1936) or of *Utilisation du sol en Indochine française* (1940). N. Krebs's *Vorderindien und Ceylon* (1939) and A. Kolb's *Die Philippinen* (1942) certainly deserved mention, as did F. Grenard's chapters on Inner Asia (in *Géographie Universelle*, 1929), which, although divided between Russian and Chinese sovereignty, retains a marked unity in respect of relief and climate.

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The Indochinese expert will find no reason for distinguishing in ethnical terms between Cambodians and Khmers, and will not accept the statement that cattle breeding and rubber cultivation constitute important activities in the uplands of Indochina. He will also question the remark that "the development of colonial self-government had no place in French policy", but this sort of comment is easily pardoned the author in view of his criticisms of United States administration in the Philippines.

In conclusion, Dr. Cressey deserves high praise for his broad knowledge, calm outlook and constant striving for objectivity. The latter quality is exemplified by his measured opinion of the Soviet Union—a blend of admiration for past accomplishments and of reservations about the future. His warm sympathy with the efforts of the young Asian nations and his fundamental optimism do not blind him to the gravity of the problems which face them and which his book helps to explain.

Paris, November 1951

CHARLES ROBEQUAIN

LA FIN DES EMPIRES COLONIAUX. By Hubert Deschamps. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1950. 128 pp. 90 frs.

VOYAGE AUX INDES. By André Siegfried. Paris: Armand Colin. 1951. 160 pp., maps. 280 frs.

PROFESSOR Deschamps, a former colonial governor, has succeeded remarkably well in his difficult task of describing in few pages the course of empires during the past 500 years. His approach is French in the best sense: humane, humorous and clearly defined. The reader in search of details about a given period in a particular region will find all of the information that he is likely to need in this volume, whose three parts deal with (1) the growth of empires since the time of Columbus, and their condition at the beginning of the present century, (2) the seeds of change sown by Western expansion, and (3) the course of events since 1939. Thus, Deschamps discusses Soviet Russian methods of dealing with minority groups as well as the sense of magic that informs communal living in primitive societies; the Arab League as well as the general concepts underlying the French political system; English empiricism as well as the Dutch combination of this outlook with a sense of method; Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes* and Valéry's Europe, a cape of the Asian continent. Concluding on a note supplied by Queen Wilhemina—"colonialism is dead" and "a people should be strong enough to start anew"—Deschamps asks whether humanity may not eventually return to its original sources of inspiration and there find new strength. He is realistic enough to suggest that the alternative is mass suicide.

In connection with Deschamps' general survey of all colonial empires, it is pleasurable to read the series of articles which the erudite journalist Siegfried wrote for *Le Figaro* on the basis of a visit to Pakistan, the Republic

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of India, Pondicherry and Goa in late 1950. Although the material in the numerous short chapters is somewhat repetitious, its treatment is clear, lively and penetrating. In his article on the psychology of Indians in business, for example, the author asserts that the Indian mentality inclines more to commerce than to management, and that there is a lack of administrative personnel that can be relied on to interpret and execute instructions from above. He notes that, although clearly anti-communist, India is impressed by Soviet Russian methods of speedy industrialisation of backward societies. Western objections to the suppression of personal freedom in a communist state make no impression on people who live on the verge of starvation. It is useful to have stressed the fact that Westerners who experienced semi-starvation in German-occupied territory or, even worse, in wartime concentration camps, whether German or Japanese, can grasp more readily than others what it means to be constantly undernourished. Western impatience with Asian "laziness" is thus shown in its proper light. Siegfried draws a vivid picture also of the spiritual differences between the monotheistic "Abraham belt" and the Hindu concept of life. Equally clear is his account of the position of Pondicherry and Goa as "foreign" enclaves in the Indian subcontinent. The two concluding chapters contain a defense of Western culture and logic, although Siegfried recognises the tragic dilemma confronting India: shall she embrace efficient modernism or save her soul?

Amsterdam, September 1951

JOHANNA FELHOEN KRAAL

PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION. *Edited by C. M. MacInnes. London: Butterworths. 1950. 252 pp. 30s.*

THE present volume results from the third in a series of symposia sponsored by the Colston Research Society as a means of maintaining the links which it had previously built up between the University of Bristol and the City. The Colston Society has done a service in providing a platform for students of colonial administration representing most of the colonial powers. This effort considerably surpasses in scope the Royal Institute of International Affairs publication of a similar nature, *Colonial Administration by European Powers* (1947).

As Professor J. H. A. Logemann suggests in his contribution, the normal pattern is for expositions of colonial policy to contain a "slight note of apology". This volume is no exception, and its contents reflect a widespread defensiveness among the spokesmen for the colonial powers. Even Klaus Knorr, in his generally mature and by no means uncritical analysis of "American Government of Overseas Dependencies", ends on a somewhat boastful note concerning American success in the Philippines. There is, however, some useful exposition of the administering practices of colonial powers, including a thoughtful commentary on British use of the technique

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of indirect rule by E. W. Evans, Lecturer at the University of Bristol. Perhaps the greatest value of the volume lies in its revelation of typical national reactions to the colonial upheaval and the new adaptation of international organization to cope with colonial issues. Particularly striking is the plea by Professor A. Marzorati of Brussels University for unity among the colonial powers to counterbalance the dangerously democratic organization of the United Nations to deal with non-self-governing territories. He is disturbed that the United Nations majority should have found it necessary to set up machinery, in the form of the Special Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, to receive the information concerning colonies provided for in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter.

Among the better contributions to the volume are Dr. Lucy Mair's analysis of the role of the anthropologist in colonial territories, and Professor Logemann's summary lecture in which he presents a highly-enlightened Dutch view of the role of "advanced" metropolitan countries in contributing to the progress of underdeveloped areas toward higher and stable levels of welfare and dignity.

New York, December 1951

LAWRENCE S. FINKELSTEIN

BRITISH AND SOVIET COLONIAL SYSTEMS. By *Kathleen M. Stahl*. New York: Praeger, 1951. 114 pp. \$2.50.

"COMMUNISM," Mrs. Stahl writes, "is one of the most powerfully evocative words in the world today." It has, as she notes, a strong appeal for colonial peoples because of its attitude to racial matters. It is to be hoped that such peoples will read her book, which compares communist colonial policies and practices, as exemplified by the Soviet Union on the one hand, and Western democratic colonial policies and practices, as exemplified by Britain on the other.

The first half deals with the British system. It describes what is so difficult to describe—the Commonwealth—and gives an account of the colonial dependencies, noting the character and long-term aims of the colonial relationship, and the parts played by the British Parliament, by the Colonial Office, and by the local governments. This section of the book concludes with a note on the constitutional development of Ceylon.

The second half deals with the Soviet system, outlining the geographical, ethnic and political facts; it includes a brief survey of the five Central Asian Union Republics and some notes on the Far Eastern Territory, which is one of several colonial areas. Then follows an account of the character and long-term aims of the Soviet colonial relationship, together with a discussion of Stalin's *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*. Mrs. Stahl argues that the large preponderance of Europeans over Asians in the U.S.S.R. as a whole makes the Soviet solution of the racial question relatively

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easy, the more so as the R.S.F.S.R., one of the sixteen autonomous Republics, accounts for more than ninety per cent of the territory of the Soviet Union and for more than fifty per cent of its population.

The principal differences between the British and Soviet colonial systems are summarised in a final section.

This is a short book, with few footnotes and a modest reference to bibliographical sources, but it is a distillation of authentic knowledge and understanding, mature in outlook, without pretence, and admirably written. Mrs. Stahl's treatment is as original as it is interesting. Her book is much needed, especially in the United States.

Canberra, January 1952

W. R. CROCKER

THE RIDDLE OF MACARTHUR: Japan, Korea and the Far East. By John Gunther. New York: Harper. 1951. 240 pp. \$2.75.

THIS book is something more than the frame in which we find a portrait of General MacArthur: it is part of the evidence on which the history of our stormy era will be written, and, as such, it is of real value. The author, one of the ablest of American journalists, went to Japan during the latter part of the MacArthur regime in order to find out for himself, and to transmit to his many readers, the truth about the somewhat controversial policy pursued by the Supreme Commander. The picture of Japan that emerges from the cataclysm of defeat as we survey the Far Eastern scene in 1951 is that of a rich and lovely island whose people have experienced for the first time a change in their fortunes so radical that it may turn out to be a major turning point in their history. MacArthur himself has described his task in Japan as "the greatest revolution of a people ever attempted". We may note here the word "attempt", which suggests awareness of the uncertainty of the undertaking. The General's further assertions that he has erected in Japan "a bastion of the democratic concept", and that what he has achieved in Japan is "the greatest spiritual revolution the world has ever known", are claims which the cautious reader will hesitate to accept.

MacArthur's political judgment is the weak point in an otherwise distinguished and vital personality. On Gunther's own showing, the General has no time to think. He has no secretary; he reads all of his own mail and writes much of his own correspondence in longhand. It was no doubt this radical fault in the General's personality and action that contributed to President Truman's courageous decision to withdraw him from Japan. Gunther himself is clearly sceptical about the lasting results of the MacArthur regime; and it is manifestly true that the real postwar Japan will not emerge until the American Occupation has been brought to an end and Japan herself can take her new course. It is idle to suppose that even so vital an instructor as MacArthur can teach a whole nation a set of new lessons. Nations learn lessons only by their own experience, and in the long run no

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power on earth can interpret that experience for them. It is only at the beginning of the process of education, and even then only for a short time, that either MacArthur or the United Nations could play a part in making the new Japan.

The first stage was the defeat of Japan, demonstrated to her by Allied Occupation, followed by disarmament and such reparation to China as the Chinese could accept without injury to themselves. Beyond that point, which must necessarily be reached at an early moment in the time-table, the problem becomes one of the interaction of Allied reconstruction policy in the Pacific and throughout the world on the one hand and of domestic movements in Japan itself on the other. If the victorious Powers are in earnest of their professions, if they pursue the purpose of the Four Freedoms, and if they create a Security Council which will make the new order both collective and secure, the German and the Japanese problems alike will become, not easy, but tractable.

London, November 1951

A. F. WHYTE

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE. By David H. James. London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan. 1951. 409 pp. \$5.

Mr. James's many years of residence in Japan and Southeast Asia gave him an opportunity to study the character and mentality of the Japanese more fully than have most other Western writers of books about the Pacific war. Unfortunately his closeness to the subject has tended to obscure his aim, which was to synthesise Japanese history in order "to shed light on Bushido, Shinto, Buddhism, Hakko-ichi-u and Samurai lore and on the inaccurate claims about loyalty to the Tenno existing in all ages, under all conditions".

The first half of the book, a history of Japan from its mythological beginnings to the opening of the Malayan campaign, describes the rise of the militarists and their close connection with the financiers, the new element in the economy after the Meiji Restoration. Mr. James demonstrates that thenceforward, as a result of the combination of the state religion and militarism backed by growing industrial power, Shintoism menaced the other countries of Asia. His treatment of these matters is of considerable interest both to the student of Japanese history and to those of us who, like Mr. James himself, were prisoners of war of the Japanese and thus became acquainted with the "Sons of Nippon" under most undesirable circumstances. It explains the cult of Hakko-ichi-u, "under heaven a single household", which, together with Shintoism, lay at the root of the atrocities of 1941-45.

The balance of the book is far more personal in content—a description of the Malayan campaign, the fall of Singapore and life as a prisoner of war. On the basis of his services as interpreter between the Japanese and Allied

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officers in Changi, Mr. James gives a provocative account of the reactions of the opposing forces. His account of the Malayan operations will be of much interest to Australians. He repeats many of the well-worn criticisms and adds many of his own, some of which are totally unjustified. In almost every case his criticisms are immediately followed by excuses justifying the events. In other words, he seems to have had a grudge against Malaya Command Headquarters, though his sense of fair play eventually triumphs over his personal likes and dislikes. In any case, his comments on the Australian Imperial Forces in Singapore and particularly on the reinforcements will not be popular in Australia.

Melbourne, January 1952

W. S. KENT HUGHES

CHINA'S RED MASTERS. By Robert S. Elegant. New York: Twayne. 1951. 264 pp. \$3.50.

UNTIL recent months there have been available very few books dealing with the development of Chinese Communism and based upon solid documentation rather than upon personal experience and observation. The current crop has included some disappointing publications and at least three rewarding volumes, of which *China's Red Masters* is one.

This is not to say that writings based largely on personal observation and experience—books like Edgar Snow's *Red Star over China*—have not proved extremely valuable. But the nature of Communist theory and action is such that what appears on the surface is only a small, and often completely misleading, manifestation of Bolshevik underground workings. Writing about what he sees and hears of Communist activity can be, for the non-Communist, a bit like describing a coal mine according to what is observed on the surface. Mr. Snow, of course, did a remarkable job of probing, but his analyses suffered from his lack of the bed-rock documents which Mr. Elegant has used in his book.

Admittedly, Mr. Elegant, in turn, suffers from a lack of Mr. Snow's rich personal experience and acquaintance with the Chinese Communists. The book under review gives remarkable details in the lives of important Communist leaders, but it does not breathe life into them. On the contrary, it leaves one with the feeling that a truly great book about the Chinese revolution remains to be written. Whether the prerequisite personal experience, documentary knowledge, critical competence, and writing ability exist in any one person is problematical. In the meantime, we shall be making valuable use of Mr. Elegant's book and a few others of equal reliability.

In general, Mr. Elegant avoids the two greatest pitfalls besetting the Western observer who writes about the Chinese Communists. He neither develops them into utter creatures of Moscow, nor assigns them an independence of action which they did not enjoy—or seek. That he does not may

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result both from his use of first-rate documentation and from his sense of balanced synthesis. In any case, it is a pleasant change from the blind fury of certain ex-Communists as well as from the hopeful but strained rationalizations of more liberal persons who have not yet recovered from the fact that during the united-front period many Chinese Communists acted charmingly.

Mr. Elegant might have worked a bit longer and harder on the organization of his book. Even one who is relatively familiar with Chinese Communist chronology finds it necessary to pause occasionally in order to orient himself. Admittedly, it is a difficult task to weave a whole series of separate biographies into a unified, interest-sustaining pattern. But in these days of utter confusion about China, it is unfortunate when a worthy book cuts itself off from many lay readers simply because this problem has not been adequately dealt with. Finally, a greater use of important Russian sources would have rounded out neatly the various important and sometimes elusive Chinese-Russian relationships as they developed and changed through the years.

Despite these deficiencies, Mr. Elegant has written a book which anyone interested in contemporary China will want to keep on his desk for some time to come. There is more information in it than most of us can assimilate in the course of several readings.

Stanford University, September 1951

ROBERT C. NORTH

REPORT ON CHINA. Edited by H. Arthur Steiner. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Philadelphia, September 1951. 291 pp. \$2.

THIS issue of *The Annals* is to be warmly welcomed for its summation of the first two years in office of the Peking regime. If a general criticism may be made of the work of so many different hands, it is that the whole is more than the sum of its parts and that the difficult task of trying to determine where the heart of the matter lies has been left to the reader. More specifically, it may be said that, while the facts have been gathered and explained intelligently, Chinese feelings are nowhere assessed. Yet the Chinese revolution can never be understood simply in terms of land reform or economic planning, vital as these are.

The symposium contains four main sections. The first places the revolution in the historical perspective of the past half-century; the second analyses the political structure of the new regime; the third deals with its economic and social policies; and the fourth gives an account of its foreign policy. The discussion ends with essays on the overseas Chinese and the policies of the Nationalist government, and with a short but very

useful note by Mary Wright on "How We Learn About Communist China", which makes the point that official published sources are far more important and reliable than one might imagine—a fact which the student in this so-called listening post soon discovers.

One difference among these various sections strikes the reader immediately: the historical, political and economic essays are in the main careful, factual and balanced, while those dealing with foreign relations, where admittedly the facts are more scanty, open the door to strong draughts of unobjectivity. Thus, both Edmund Clubb and William Ballis are apparently convinced that the Soviet Union dominates China, yet neither writer produces the evidence on which his conviction is based. One might ask also whether the time has not come for those who believe in the existence of a "pro-Moscow group led by Liu Shao-ch'i"—a somewhat bedraggled cliché—to give a little evidence for this belief. Robert North, whose ear is altogether closer to the ground, appears to the reviewer to come closer to the truth in suggesting that Liu Shao-ch'i may remain more a scholar than a man of action. One must be patient and cautious in appraising the position of China in the international scene.

The domestic foundations of the new state, which have been laid far more quickly and deeply than most observers would have thought possible, are carefully described in several papers. In particular, William Skinner's account of peasant organisation provides an essential background for an understanding of current events in China; he, Chao Kuo-chün and Theodore Hsi-en Ch'en stress those aspects of Chinese society whose reform was essential irrespective of prevailing ideologies.

One sphere in which the facts are still rather unclear is the extent of state trading and economic planning. Douglas Paauw is quite right in pointing out that the moderate economic policies outlined by Mao Tse-tung in *The New Democracy* have been in large part jettisoned, but he seems to imply that this development represents another bit of hoodwinking from the Yenan days. Surely the truth is that the economic deterioration of China in the decade that followed the announcement of these plans was so great that a major change in them was unavoidable. Nor does Dr. Paauw mention the main reason for that change—the paramount need for a stable currency. Indeed, to an English reader, Dr. Paauw's view of socialist economic planning smacks strangely of a world now in limbo.

A reading of these essays suggests two melancholy conclusions. The first, that very little of this sort of careful study of China in revolution seems to penetrate the higher political reaches; the second, that a view of the over-all situation may bear no relation to a knowledge of a particular aspect of it.

Hong Kong, January 1951

RICHARD HARRIS

Pacific Affairs

NEW CHINA: THREE VIEWS. By *Otto B. van der Sprenkel, Robert Guillain and Michael Lindsay. With an Introduction by Kingsley Martin.* New York: John Day. 1951. 241 pp. \$3.

THIS is a collection of reports by three European observers of liberal leanings who have had firsthand experience of the initial phase of Communist rule in China. The authors deal mostly with the economic problems of New China, the role of the intellectuals in the Revolution, the future of democracy in the country, and Sino-Russian relations. The main and most interesting contribution is offered by Mr. van der Sprenkel. The other contributions suffer from certain disadvantages. M. Guillain's, a collection of newspaper dispatches, while racy in style, is marred by a superficial outlook, dictated perhaps by the necessity for appealing to the casual reader of *Le Monde*. Mr. Lindsay, though not suffering from any such handicap, has burdened his essay with too much exposition of his favorite theory, that "scientific" and "dogmatic" Marxism are locked in a struggle in New China; he has tried to compress every phenomenon of modern China into a discussion of this conflict.

Many Chinese and foreign observers have described the events of the last five years as constituting a "liberation" of China. According to Mr. van der Sprenkel, China has been liberated from the "economic misery, moral degradation, corruption and lawlessness that marked the close of the Kuomintang era. In a wider sense the whole of China's population is being liberated from poverty, disease, illiteracy and feudal backwardness." The paramount importance of the Chinese Revolution lies in its efforts to solve the agrarian problem. But its greatest test will come when it tries to improve the people's livelihood through industrialisation. All of Asia is awaiting an answer to the question: can China industrialise without the aid of foreign capital? Many Western observers believe, as M. Guillain does, that the answer must be "no" and that the Chinese Communists will break themselves upon this problem. Mr. van der Sprenkel argues that they will succeed in their task and may even outstrip Soviet Asia in this regard. He suggests that Western observers tend to minimise the potential contribution of rural areas towards raising money-capital for industrialising China. Many students of modern economics will agree with him. In reality, the problem of industrialisation in backward, densely-populated, agricultural countries is not primarily fiscal but organisational in nature. The problem is not merely one of raising enough money-capital to finance various schemes of construction, but one of transferring the surplus rural population to the cities, engaging it in industrial work, and feeding it. Proper leadership, combined with confidence on the part of the peasants in this leadership, should be able to accomplish these tasks. In any event, the success or failure of the Communists' experiment in China is likely to depend on whether they can industrialise China without the aid of foreign capital.

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All three contributors to the volume are agreed that the new regime has been able to enlist wide support among the intelligentsia. They also believe that New China is neither a Russian satellite nor likely to become another Yugoslavia in the foreseeable future. China "inclines" toward the Soviet camp mainly because of historical reasons, ideological ties, and the mistakes of United States policy during the past seven years.

The importance to the Western world of this book lies in the useful information it affords about New China. To Asian readers, an added attraction is the insight it provides into the "liberal mind", and especially its outlook on modern Asia. In this connection it is worth noting one undesirable aspect of the book, namely, the slight anti-Asian and anti-Chinese bias shown by M. Guillain, whose prejudices, quite common among Western journalists and "China hands", have no place in a work of this calibre. A few examples must suffice. The Chinese are "docile and easy to regiment" (p. 80). "There is a Chinese disorder about the movement they [the Communists] lead" (p. 81). Asians suffer from "traditional xenophobia" (p. 81). "Chinese do not like to struggle for abstract principles. . . . They want money in their purses and rice in their bowls" (p. 83). (A liberal version of the bowl-of-rice soldier theory. And what people has struggled harder or longer than the Chinese for abstract principles?) "The administration of the law is more bewilderingly Chinese than ever" (p. 105).

Delhi, September 1951

BIPAN CHANDRA

HERRIJZEND AZIË. Opstellen over de Oosterse Samenleving. By W. F. Wertheim. Arnhem: van Loghum Slaterus. 1950. 187 pp.

IN his most recent book, "Resurgent Asia: Essays on Eastern Society", Professor Wertheim is concerned mainly with the nature of colonial society as it has existed in Indonesia. His broad knowledge of this society permits him to delve deeply into its background and to discuss most suggestively the forces which are likely to shape its future. A natural coherence characterizes the ten problems that he singles out for discussion in separate essays, since each reflects merely a different aspect of the basic problem created by the conflict between the driving forces behind modern Western society and the aspirations for freedom from foreign tutelage of colonial and semi-colonial peoples. Whether this conflict can be resolved before it ushers in open warfare on a global scale obviously requires careful examination; and it is to this task that Wertheim here addresses himself. The catholic sweep of his scholarship lends great distinction to these essays, which represent a notable addition to existing literature on the problems arising from East-West contacts. Inasmuch as a brief review cannot do justice to the book, the following remarks touch upon only those parts of it that are of most interest to the reviewer.

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Wertheim notes that where profits resulted from contact between the agrarian East and the late-capitalist West, they accrued mainly to representatives of the latter, who, in the case of Indonesia, were mostly Netherlands. The structure of native society was preserved as long as was feasible, since the large profits drawn from the colony were in great part due to the low living standards and low productivity of that society. For Western enterprises in Indonesia, wages constituted the crucial element in production costs: low wages permitted large profits. In striving to perpetuate the traditional forms of native agrarian society, the colonizing Western world sought to ensure an inexhaustible reservoir of cheap labor. The objective was, as van Gelderen has noted elsewhere, to make of the Indonesian people "a nation of wage-earners and a wage-earner among nations".

This economic outlook was of course reflected in social relations. Westerners occupied the pinnacle of colonial society, enjoying prestige and privileges unobtainable by Indonesians. The line of racial demarcation was sharp and enjoyed legal sanction: no matter how superior his intellectual and cultural attainments might be to those of the ordinary European, the native, whatever his rank, was formally classified as an *inlander*, a native.

In the course of the present century, as capital investment increased and exploitation became more intensive, the situation began to change rapidly. As before, top management personnel continued to be drawn from Holland, but the high cost of imported man power brought about the recruiting in the domestic labor market of candidates for intermediate positions. The government now improved public educational facilities, both general and vocational, and Indonesians received opportunities to prepare themselves for positions which formerly had been monopolized by Europeans. At the same time, the ancient caste structure of native society began to give way before the gradual emergence of new classes. Thus, the growth of an Indonesian middle class threatened the monopoly of retail trade long exercised by Chinese merchants.

The people of the country, demonstrating a marked capacity for adaptation of Western ideas and techniques, prepared to compete with Western man. In the resulting, essentially anti-Western struggle, they increasingly employed its own weapons against the West. The new classes—Indonesian government officials and employees of private enterprise—were the standard-bearers of nationalism against non-indigenous elements, whether symbolized by the European master-caste, the Chinese middle class, or foreign capital.

Western influences affected the Indonesian social structure as early as the nineteenth century, but their impact became particularly noteworthy after 1900. By that time the population was increasing at such a rate that the traditional agrarian village community was no longer able to feed all of its members, and consequently the traditional social relations based on this unit began to disintegrate. The overabundant labor supply depressed wages

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to such a point that more enterprising individuals sought new means of subsistence, mainly in small industries. A new agrarian class appeared, with spiritual tendencies of its own, rebellious against the existing order and lacking the security formerly afforded by life in the village since production for the world markets is a highly speculative undertaking.

Wertheim describes the effects of these socio-economic changes on Indonesian patterns of thinking and living. He discerns a narrow relationship between a people's ideologies and their socio-economic system and behavior; the latter he regards as the principal source and stimulus of mass attitudes. Changes in the production process, he notes, lead to the discovery of fresh economic possibilities, giving rise to new groups and classes as protagonists of novel ideologies. This irreversible process makes itself felt in every social and cultural sphere. In Indonesia the process operated unperceived by the Europeans, who lived in a world carefully sealed off from the Indonesian. To them, the proclamation of Indonesian independence was a stunning, unforeseen blow. They could not acknowledge that independence was the logical—indeed, the inevitable—consequence of Indonesian nationalism, which itself stemmed inexorably from Dutch colonial exploitation. Only after years of suffering have they come to perceive the truth.

Wertheim's explanation of these social phenomena is illuminating, but it is his familiarity with his subject that makes the book so valuable. He is not the first writer to have thus analyzed Indonesian society, but he has done so with unsurpassed ability.

Bandung, August 1951

D. M. G. KOCH

INDONESIA. By P. S. Gerbrandy. London, New York and Melbourne: Hutchinson. 1950. 224 pp. 18s.

It is an event of some importance when the wartime Prime Minister of the Netherlands presents what should be an authoritative statement on the Indonesian question. Yet readers seeking either new evidence or a balanced account of the events leading to Indonesian independence will find this a sadly disappointing book. Since Professor Gerbrandy, employing the antiquated language of nineteenth-century imperialism, expresses firm belief in the need for continued Western guidance of Asian peoples—because these lack the “powerful God-given stimulus” of the Christian nations, who must therefore provide a “guardian shield” for them—it is not surprising that he makes no serious attempt to understand the aims and policies of Indonesian nationalism or to appraise its position within the wider context of a changing Asia. He characterises the activities of the United Nations Security Council in the years 1947-50 as meddlesome interference in the affairs of a sovereign power, which was unjustly placed on the “penitents’ bench” and prevented from fulfilling its “elementary duties” towards its “loyal” Indonesian subjects. The policy of the Security Council has led, he suggests, to chaos.

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Professor Gerbrandy's description of the proceedings in the United Nations during the period under discussion is both emotionally coloured and factually misleading. Contrary to his analysis, the Great Powers in the Security Council, with the exception of Soviet Russia, supported the Netherlands in varying degrees until the second "police action" in December 1948. Great Britain and the United States, which receive rough treatment from the author, gave guarded but unmistakable support to the Netherlands, despite the first "police action" in July 1947, of which they disapproved. French policy, as he concedes, was uncompromisingly pro-Dutch, to the extent of preventing the Security Council, through employment of the veto, from considering the reports of the United Nations Committee of Good Offices.

The author is so eager to prove the justice of the Dutch cause that he forgets to mention the numerous breaches of faith on the part of the Dutch authorities and their unconcealed contempt for the activities of the Committee throughout the critical period. In this they were encouraged by the pro-Dutch leanings of most of the permanent members of the Security Council who had refused to accord the Committee the more satisfactory status of a United Nations Commission. If, despite this situation, the Indonesians ultimately achieved their aim, that was due more to the ill-considered second "police action" than to any Security Council sympathy with Indonesian aspirations. One of the many shortcomings of this book is its failure to explain why countries as different as Australia, India, Nationalist China and others supported the Indonesian cause. Australia's policy is described as "fishing in troubled waters", and Mr. Nehru is obliquely referred to as a "Soviet Jockey".

Professor Gerbrandy tries to strengthen his case by frequently stressing the danger of Soviet expansion, but fails to realise that, had the Netherlands government enjoyed complete freedom of action in Indonesia, Russian influence would have been immeasurably increased and the Western position severely undermined in Asia. By a timely, if reluctant, recognition of the Indonesian claim to independence, the Security Council made a substantial contribution to stability in Southeast Asia and to the over-all position of the West in the area.

Melbourne, September 1951

H. A. WOLFSOHN

THE INDONESIAN STRUGGLE. By I. Chaudhry. Lahore, Peshawar and Karachi: Ferozsons. 1950. 273 pp. Rs.4.

BECAUSE of the natural interest of Pakistan in Muslim Indonesia, Mr. Chaudhry's account of events there might be expected to be informed if not wholly objective. Unfortunately, it is riddled with inaccuracies and lacks even an elementary understanding of its subject. The errors are too numerous to bear listing, but a few examples may help to indicate the

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caliber of scholarship involved. Thus, Islam was not "introduced in 1400 A.D. by Arabs and Indian Muslims"; in reality, the main islands of the archipelago came under Muslim influence early in the thirteenth century, and direct contact between Indonesia and the Arab world was not established until the sixteenth century. Again, the "dessa system" was not "introduced by the Muslim rulers of Malacca"; Malaccan domination of Indonesia was limited to a small area in northern Sumatra for a very brief period in the sixteenth century, whereas the "dessa system" has existed since time immemorial and is based on the indigenous social structure that antedates the birth of Islam. A "wedono" is not the head of a *desa*, but the head of an administrative district—a very different thing. This list of inaccuracies could be extended for pages, but there is little point in doing so since the book has nothing to offer serious students of Indonesia.

Leiden, December 1951

L. METZEMAEKERS

AM RANDE DES PAZIFIK. Studien zur Landes- und Kulturkunde Suedostasiens. By Karl Helbig. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 1949. 324 pp., illus., maps.

IN this volume Dr. Helbig, whose firsthand knowledge of Indonesia is probably more extensive than that of any other geographer, offers a series of nine articles on various aspects of the physical and cultural geography of Indonesia and other regions of Southeast Asia.

The first and most extensive paper contains a sketch of Indonesia as a whole—the nature of the country, the people, the political development and economic structure—and ends with a survey of German contributions to the history of exploration and development in the archipelago. The second one, analyzing the growth, structure and physical appearance of Batavia (now Djakarta), is of particular interest because Helbig's field work there in 1929 represented perhaps the first geographical study of a tropical Asian city. The next two papers concern Borneo, which Helbig crossed in 1937, mostly afoot or in native craft, from Pontianak on the west coast to Samarinda on the east, thence proceeding southward to Balikpapan and Bandjermasin. Of special interest to the geographer is an essay on the Dayak entitled "Menschen im Urwald"; its description of the tropical rainforest is among the best known to the reviewer.

One paper discusses the Chinese element in Indonesia; another analyzes the Chinese penetration of Southeast Asia as a whole. "Die 'Touristen-Insel' Bali, einmal geographisch gesehen" is a very informative regional-geographic survey of both that small section of Bali which has established the fame of the island in recent years and the relatively undeveloped and little-known, arid northern coastal, western and eastern regions of the island.

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"Suedostasien in der laenderkundlichen Literatur seit dem ersten Weltkrieg" is a condensation of an extensive bibliographical survey of Southeast Asia published in 1942 in the *Geographisches Jahrbuch*, to which a certain number of more recent titles have been added. The final paper, "Die kolonial-kulturelle Leistung Europas in Niederlaendisch Indien", appraises the contributions of European (and especially German) scholars and technicians in the physical and social sciences and the humanities; it also describes the uses made of the results of research and the skills and techniques of the various disciplines in the government services.

New Haven, January 1952

KARL J. PELZER

BURMA. By D. G. E. Hall. London: Hutchinson; New York: Longmans, Green. 1950. 184 pp. 7/6; \$1.60.

THE shortcomings of Professor Hall's book are attributable to the impossibility of writing a readable history of Burma in 176 pages. The work is nonetheless valuable. The only other history of Burma written in this century is G. E. Harvey's, which does not carry the narrative beyond 1825; moreover, since 1925, when his work was published, research in archaeology and inscriptions has added to our knowledge.

Professor Hall sets out to give a completely up-to-date outline and interpretation of Burmese history. Narrowness of space has prevented him from writing history proper, that is to say, describing in detail the more extraordinary or dramatic events, or attempting to analyse the more remarkable personalities. In other words, he has perforce omitted the most interesting and readable aspects of his subject, and has been content merely to establish its framework. Nevertheless, he has given the student a clear and reliable summary. He is impartial throughout, or as impartial as an Englishman can be supposed to be, and in this respect differs from Harvey, whose work is impaired by a curious animosity to the race about which he was writing.

The content of the book is roughly as follows: 28 pages are given to the early, and perhaps the most striking, period of Burmese history, namely, that preceding the conquest of the country by the Mongols in 1287. The next sixty pages take the account up to the first entry of the English in 1825, centuries during which the country was generally in a state of turmoil and its history was disjointed and often dull. The balance is devoted to the British period and its disastrous close. The volume includes, in addition, a note on Burmese pronunciations and a select bibliography.

There are many disputed points in Burmese history. Professor Hall is aware of the arguments on both sides and seems to put forward the reasonable interpretation in each case. The few small errors that have crept in will no doubt be corrected in future editions. One of them is a reference to the old capital of Arakan as Myohaung instead of Mrauk-u, a mistake copied

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from Harvey's history. All in all, however, this little book will be found extremely useful, both because the information it contains is not collected elsewhere, and because it is wholly reliable.

Maidenhead, September 1951

MAURICE COLLIS

INTERVIEW WITH INDIA. *By John Frederick Muehl. New York: John Day. 1950. 310 pp. \$3.50.*

THIS unusual book is the product of six months spent in the countryside of the western strip of peninsular India from Kutch in the north to Kanara in the south and thence branching eastward through parts of Madras along a route of some 2,000 miles. Mr. Muehl's journey was extremely arduous, made at times on foot and occasionally on horseback or on a camel or in a bullock cart. But the discomfort paid rich dividends in the opportunities it afforded of meeting people in obscure villages, in forests, among gypsy-like bands constantly on the move, and among communists who had created a little pocket of self-rule in the south. The impressions gathered in these wanderings are recorded in a manner which attests to the author's faculty for observation and to his skill as a writer. His pages provide a moving account of the unsophisticated Indian whose elementary living problems are as yet nowhere near solution. The ignorance, poverty, superstition and slow pace of life in the villages are vividly portrayed. Indeed, Mr. Muehl's sympathetic regard for the villagers, his capacity for sharing their joys and sorrows, and, above all, his sensitive understanding of their age-old problems endow his book with a missionary quality.

Two general comments are, however, in order. Mr. Muehl seems to believe that the villains of the piece in the Indian village are the Brahmin and the Bania (trader-moneylender). One wonders whether he is not perhaps oversimplifying when he implies that, if these two elements had been eliminated, the village would present a picture quite different from the present one that is such an eyesore to all observers. The situation is really much more complicated. Once the "community" of the village had been destroyed through centralisation of power in the hands of an alien, imperialist government which assiduously pursued a policy of non-interference in social and religious matters, everyone who could do so became an exploiter of whoever was weaker than himself. The social prestige of the Brahmin and the economic resources of the Bania no doubt contributed to their advantageous positions, but that alone does not explain the phenomenon of exploitation. The non-Brahmin, non-Bania landlord was as good or as bad an exploiter as the petty bureaucrat or the moneylender. The system was the same from top to bottom. In many villages in Maharashtra, for instance, there may not be a single Brahmin in any position of influence or authority and the Bania may live entirely on the

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sufferance of the local leaders; yet the weaker members of such villages are not immune to exploitation by their stronger neighbours. Most Western observers (and many Indians influenced by them) have attributed such economic exploitation to the working of the caste system because they wished to indicate a means of coping with the problem without having to grapple with the fact and the consequences of imperialist domination. This is not to suggest that the reviewer is an advocate of the caste system in "modern" India.

Another, more fundamental question that must occur to the careful reader of Mr. Muehl's book concerns the degree of truth in its implicit suggestion that the *real* India lies in the hundreds of thousands of villages. Certainly, the vast majority of the people do live in villages. But is it correct to suggest that the cities are of no significance in the contemporary scene? Is it not from these busy centres of industry, trade, transport, education and administration that the *ideas* which seek to reorganise the economy of the whole country flow? No claim of completeness can really be made for an interview with India that ignores the great movements of ideas which are taking shape in the cities and towns and without which India would have to be regarded as a dead country.

These remarks are not intended, however, to detract from the excellence of Mr. Muehl's work, which cannot be too strongly recommended to foreign as well as to Indian readers.

Poona, December 1951

S. V. KOGEKAR

THE POPULATION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN. By Kingsley Davis. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1951. 263 pp. \$7.50.

STUDENTS of demography will welcome this study of the Indian subcontinent, a region that contains one-fifth of the world's population and offers demographic data that are both more reliable and broader in scope than those available for any other underdeveloped area of comparable size.

The basic problem confronting India and Pakistan is not only that they are already overpopulated but that since the 1920s their populations have greatly increased because of a declining death rate and a consistently high birth rate. The situation is obviously unstable. Dr. Davis carefully considers the possibilities: a rise in the death rate, a fall in the birth rate, or an immense increase in economic productivity. He finds that the influence on the death rate which has been achieved by technological means largely independent of the social environment is tenuous; that the effect of urbanisation on the birth rate has been slight; and that the lower reproduction rate associated with higher socio-economic status is due to the relative infrequency of re-marriage among widows in the higher social classes rather than to deliberate control. In the economic field, agricultural productivity in the subcontinent

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is meagre—for which Dr. Davis would place the major responsibility on overpopulation. As for industrialisation, though it was undertaken quite early, its development has been retarded by social and political factors, including foreign rule.

Since emigration does not offer India or Pakistan a solution to their demographic problem, they must find one at home. Dr. Davis has little hope that deliberate employment of birth-control measures will become widespread in either country, largely because of social customs and lack of government interest. He appears to have more faith in industrialisation, though less as an alternative to than as an aspect of a planned population policy. A degree of industrialisation sufficient "to include not only economic but political, social and religious revolution" would, he believes, cause the two peoples to limit births; but, since this will take time, "the demographic situation in India and Pakistan will get worse before it gets better. . . ."

While agreeing in general with this illuminating analysis, the reviewer wishes to note several deficiencies in an otherwise admirable study. In the first place, Dr. Davis does not adequately discuss certain highly relevant features of the demographic picture in the Indian subcontinent—in particular, the over-all sex disparity, the large proportion of married women, and the early age at which most of them marry. Also, while it is interesting to know the facts and causes of differential fertility, for example by castes, the conclusions would gain more importance if some light were thrown upon the changing numerical importance of different groups. In the second place, he does not underscore the basic weakness of the Indian life tables, which are based on extremely unreliable age statistics collected by census operators instead of on correctly reported statistics of mortality by age. In the third place, in dealing with the slow rate of industrialisation, he verges on the apologetic on behalf of the former rulers of India. If, as he believes, large-scale industrialisation is possible in, say, the next twenty years, it must have been even more possible during the past fifty or seventy-five years. And if, as he hopes, industrialisation can play an important role in the future as a tool of population policy, it could have done so in the past and thus have eased the population problem. Finally, in dealing with Partition, Dr. Davis fails to indicate that, whatever its justification on other grounds, it aggravated the demographic situation of both countries. The book as a whole, it should be noted, is concerned mainly with the pre-Partition situation.

In discussing a vast and complex sociological problem of the type so competently treated in this volume, the author is often surer of his analysis than of his conclusions. Since a high birth rate exists, while rapid extension of birth control or speedy industrialisation is still very much in the future, readers may agree with the author's analysis and yet differ with his estimates of possibilities. The reviewer is inclined to place more faith in direct birth-

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control measures than in industrialisation as a solution to the problem because nothing in the basic social institutions of either country—whether caste, religion or the joint family—is positively opposed to the adoption of the former. If a serious attempt is made to overcome the technological difficulties, the sociological impediments, great as they are, will not prove insurmountable. Public opinion in both countries must be educated, but the difficulties will be those created by organisation and technique rather than by any deep-seated popular opposition.

New York, October 1951

D. GHOSH

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVIDED INDIA. By C. N. Vakil. Bombay: Vora. Distributed in the United States by the Institute of Pacific Relations. 1950. 556 pp. Rs.21; \$5.50.

PROFESSOR Vakil's study is a rich mine of recent data, organized under useful headings and indexed. His basic purpose is to compare the relative positions of Pakistan and the Republic of India as contenders in a race. He spells out this comparison in numerous fields—all kinds of human and material resources, types of land and land use, crops, irrigation, banks, factories, transportation facilities, ports, insurance companies, public finance, foreign trade, etc. An important by-product of this comparison is the presentation of considerable material that is essential to an evaluation of the economic structure of each region by itself. The book is, therefore, of great value to the student of economic development.

Interesting chapters describe the enormous migration of people resulting from the division of the Indian subcontinent, and discuss the administrative, financial and political strains which that event exerted on the new Indian government. Analysis of the consequences of division in both their short- and long-term aspects leads to the general conclusion that, although the Indian economy has been seriously disrupted for the time being, yet, because of her more varied resources and higher previous development, India will be able in the long run to make a more satisfactory adjustment to Partition than Pakistan will.

The main emphasis of the book is on the consequences of Partition, but it throws considerable light on the basic economic causes of that event. The Pakistan movement appears as a protest on the part of the industrially backward part of the subcontinent against the more developed section. Since the best irrigation works and most productive lands fell to Pakistan, this was not true in the agricultural sphere. The area that is now Pakistan was the hinterland, the "economic colony" of the major industrial centers of India. It supplied Indian industry with cheap raw materials—cotton, jute, wool, hides, etc.—in return for high-priced manufactures that were protected in recent years by a tariff wall against cheap imports. The Pakistan movement

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calls in question the comfortable assumption, held in some quarters, that since the economies of backward countries complement those of more advanced ones—the agricultural East supplying raw materials in return for the manufactures of the industrial West—there should be no rivalry between the two areas, but harmony and mutually beneficial cooperation. Partition dramatizes the desire of the so-called backward countries to alter once and for all that pattern of interdependence and specialization of function in favor of a diversified and relatively self-sufficient economic development, however difficult of achievement this goal may be. Indian economic development failed to generate sufficient momentum to extend to all parts of the country; the movement for Partition grew out of this failure.

Another revealing insight into the economic background of Partition is provided by Professor Vakil's statistics on the occupations, wealth and status of the Hindu and Muslim emigrants. By and large, the Muslims fleeing India were poor peasants, artisans and craftsmen, and some industrial workers. By contrast, the Hindus fleeing Pakistan were disproportionately wealthy, that is, there was a far higher proportion of wealth among them than in the general population, either Muslim or Hindu. As landlords, moneylenders, middlemen and traders, the Hindu minority dominated the economic life and the flow of wealth in predominantly Muslim areas and was particularly powerful in what little urban development had taken place within what is now Pakistan. What a perfect situation for those leaders who worked tirelessly to arouse the Muslim masses to a religious war against the Hindus!

Cambridge, Massachusetts, September 1951

HELEN B. LAMB

WELTMACHT INDIEN. By Heinrich Wenz. Bielefeld: Velhagen und Klasing. 1951. 268 pp.

THIS introduction to India begins with a brief account of its earliest history and a survey of its major religions. The second part concerns events in the Muslim and Mongol periods and places almost exclusive emphasis on wars and personalities. The third and longest part covers many subjects. Beginning with a historical account from the colonial period to self-government and independence, it next provides an optimistic description of Indian economic development, followed by a brief discussion of the intellectual and religious currents of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, short sketches of outstanding modern leaders, an evaluation of British rule, and, finally, a survey of the position of India in Asia and in the world.

In writing this book, its author was mindful of European ignorance of, and indifference to, the great changes that have been occurring in postwar Asia. His account is accordingly rather factual and, as a result of limitations of space, somewhat superficial: but it is carefully balanced wherever interpretation is attempted and it pays due attention to outstanding events and

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personages. Yet it hardly conveys an understanding of India, mainly because the four hundred million Indians do not seem to exist for the author, who utterly neglects the social life of the country. Only when recorded in terms of their social background do the wars, personalities, beliefs and economic developments have real meaning. As a result the fascinating story of India lacks life in this book, which is less an interpretation than a lengthy encyclopaedia article in traditional form.

Minneapolis, January 1952

WERNER LEVI

INDIA. LAND VAN HINDOES EN MOHAMMEDANEN. By J. J. Fahrenfort. Meppel: Boom. 1950. 201 pp., illus., maps.

IN writing this book, the first of its kind in the Dutch language, Professor Fahrenfort of the Municipal University of Amsterdam has sought to provide a survey of "the whole society of the Indian subcontinent". He deals in turn with physical environment, races and languages, political history, Hindu religious systems, Hindu, Moslem and Christian communities, the Partition of 1947, and social, political and economic affairs. To compress such a wide range of material within less than 200 pages of text required extreme selectivity, which inevitably invites criticism from others who might have chosen differently. Yet it is questionable whether the demands of popularization necessitated quite so marked a predominance of picturesque anecdotes over plain facts which, while less colorful, are more informative. Fahrenfort's treatment of his subject is illustrative of the fact that sound popularization of the knowledge accumulated by Orientalists has a long way to go before discarding the paraphernalia of the "romantic" approach which for so long has obscured rather than illuminated the common Western view of historical perspectives in Asian development. He is relatively generous in the amount of space that he devotes to such exotic matters as the caste system, yogis, suttee and marriage customs, while virtually ignoring those of far greater basic importance—for example, the early Indus River civilizations, the development of the arts, present-day language problems, and so forth. The book is nevertheless useful, and will become even more so if future editions are more consistent in transliteration, explain unfamiliar terms, correct existing misprints, and greatly expand the present list of recommended literature.

Philadelphia, January 1952

MARK J. DRESDEN

THE CONSTITUTION OF CEYLON. By Sir Ivor Jennings. Bombay: Oxford University Press. 1949. xii, 262 pp. \$3.

THE good fortune of the University of Ceylon in obtaining the services of Sir Ivor Jennings as its vice-chancellor proved to be the good fortune also of the government of Ceylon, which thereby secured, during the negotiations which preceded the achievement of dominion status in February

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1948, the counsel of one of Britain's most distinguished constitutional authorities.

This study is more than a straightforward analysis of the constitution of Ceylon. It is an extended essay on parliamentary government with particular reference to its history and practice in Ceylon. The reader may suspect that some of the exposition of the principles and practice of cabinet government was included to serve as a useful source of reference in a new Dominion whose experience of responsible government has been brief. The book is divided into two parts, the first of which outlines the historical background of the island's new constitution, analyses its present status, and discusses its political institutions. The second part contains the relevant documents, to which Sir Ivor has appended explanatory comments.

The island for some twenty years has had an adult franchise, although many electors are still illiterate. Its electoral system provides for proportionate representation and for an over-weighting of the rural vote. Since the sparsely populated areas are also those in which minorities are strongest, the expression of minority opinion is thus facilitated, although territorial, not communal, representation is provided. A desire to safeguard minorities also underlay the requirement that a constitutional amendment must be approved by two-thirds of the 101 members of the House of Representatives. A similar explanation accounts for the unusual proviso that if, after a general election, the governor-general is satisfied that any important interest in the island either is not represented at all or is inadequately represented, he may appoint up to six additional members of the House of Representatives. Such an "interest" might be a race, a class, an industry or a religious group. Party lines are less strictly drawn than in Great Britain and most of the other Dominions, and differences tend to arise less on questions of political principle than on racial, religious and caste distinctions. The number of independent members is large, and it is consequently difficult to secure the stable disciplined majority and the organised, cohesive opposition which are desirable, if not necessary, for the effective functioning of parliamentary government. Also difficult to obtain is the arrangement of the business of the House by agreement, which is normal in other countries with responsible government. As the author points out, the cabinet system "assumes reasonableness and moderation on both sides"—an assumption not always warranted by Ceylonese practice.

The constitutional development of Ceylon is of value to the student of comparative politics, not only for its own intrinsic interest, but also because the island has had to face many problems similar to those of India and Pakistan, though on a smaller scale. All three countries have a mixture of races, more or less acute class divisions, widespread illiteracy, and extreme poverty. Of the three, Ceylon enjoys the highest standard of living, is the most literate, and is the least crowded. Most English-speaking

students of politics are far less familiar with the government and institutions of Ceylon than with those of the Dominions which originated as British settlement colonies. They are the more indebted to Sir Ivor for his characteristically lucid and sympathetic analysis of the constitutional structure and the political problems of the youngest Dominion in the Commonwealth.
Toronto, November 1951 ELISABETH WALLACE

HAWAII'S WAR YEARS, 1941-1945. By Gwenfread Allen. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 1950. 418 pp. \$5.

IT is difficult to overpraise this book. Writing simply and concentrating on those facts relevant to the telling of her story in a clear and understandable fashion, Miss Allen has written what may well be taken as a model of the best kind of factual community war history. She has succeeded admirably in what must have been her major task: to write an account of Hawaii during the war that would make sense to the large majority of literate Islanders. Many non-Hawaiian readers will regret that Miss Allen has deliberately kept her comment and interpretation to a minimum. An evaluation of the facts which she presents would undoubtedly have increased the usefulness of the volume for those trying to make up their minds about the influence of the war years upon the explicit social structure of Hawaii and upon the more implicit attitudes of the people of Hawaii about themselves and their relations with other parts of the Eastern and Western worlds. The documentary value of the book is greatly increased by the inclusion of many excellent illustrations which constitute in themselves a secondary but vivid pictorial record of Hawaii's years of war crisis.

One of the most interesting chapters deals with the effects of the stress and tension of war upon governmental forms. Because of the important strategic position of Hawaii, military government of the Territory seemed inevitable to the military mind. Martial law was very soon declared, and equally quickly the civilian courts fought the power of the courts martial. It is a rather important story, this, because the result, a triumph for the civil courts, not only indicated a significant re-affirmation of a vital American tradition, but also offers a lesson to war-torn Asia that may pay handsome dividends in the not too far future. If the East can learn to appreciate the fact that the United States is not a country ruled—or rutable—by military dictators but, on the contrary, one in which civil rights are in theory supreme over military power and in practice triumphant in times of crisis, then the basis may well be laid for a lasting foundation of trust and understanding among peoples of many diverse traditions and ways of life.

It was natural that the Hawaiian statehood movement, which had marked time during the war, should have subsequently received new impetus from a realisation of the way in which the multi-racial groups in Hawaii, put to the

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test of a war crisis, showed that they were American citizens first, last and always. Although several postwar Congressional committees have visited the Islands and held hearings there, no resolution to admit Hawaii to statehood has yet been enacted. Now that the racial bogey-man has been laid to rest, it may be hoped that charges of communist domination in Hawaii will not for long be allowed to block a Hawaii statehood bill and thus prevent the people of the Islands from participating fully in that American citizenship and political responsibility which they have so richly earned and so patiently awaited.

Wellington, September 1951

ERNEST BEAGLEHOLE

THE FIJI ISLANDS. A Geographical Handbook. By R. A. Derrick. Suva: Government Printing Department. 1951. xxxvii, 334 pp., illus., 25s.

DESIGNED primarily to provide factual information, this geographical handbook achieves its purpose admirably. The author, drawing on thirty years of residence in Fiji, sympathetic understanding of its peoples, and wide acquaintance with the other island groups in the Southwest Pacific, has compiled a body of material for which even the reader with only a casual interest in the area will be grateful.

The book has four parts. The first describes the archipelago as a whole, its discovery, charting and exploration. The accompanying plates and sketch-maps reflect the scholarship of a historian as well as that of a geographer. The second part deals with the physical structure of the islands, their geological history, natural features and scenery, and also discusses coral reefs and islands.

Part III, on "The Environment", is less well organized than the preceding parts. It includes information on the weather and climate, the people, flora and fauna, industries, trade and communications. In view of present-day international tensions, the chapter on the people should have been the most important in the book. Unfortunately, only its last paragraph deals with social relationships among the three main racial groups—Fijian, Indian and European—although much more space might well have been devoted to an account of their respective social structures, special interests and ambitions. It is no secret that the immediate problem of the government is how to assure a fair distribution of political, economic and social power among the three races so that each may have its proper share in the progress of the archipelago. Mr. Derrick compensates for his omission in this respect by the inclusion of many well-chosen data descriptive, for instance, of the arrangement of houses in a Fijian village, the leveling effect of life in Fiji on the caste system among the Hindu communities, population trends, and so forth.

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The final part, which deals with each of the larger islands and with small nearby groups, concerns mainly physical features and drainage but includes also short accounts of industries, the population and towns. These detailed descriptions of individual islands, based for the most part upon the author's own observations, are intended for reference rather than for sustained reading, and repeat some data contained in earlier chapters.

The book is admirably illustrated and provides many maps and diagrams. Two appendices list, in Fijian and phonetic spelling, all of the islands and islets in the archipelago.

Cincinnati, January 1952

JOHN WESLEY COULTER

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Western Policy in Asia

Kenneth Younger

WESTERN Policy in Asia" would have seemed a natural title for an article at any time during the last two hundred years. In these centuries, Western influences, emanating from Europe and America, have been pressing in upon the social and political structure of the East, and in some areas Westerners have come to wield the state power over hundreds of millions of Asian people. By contrast, no one would have thought of writing about "Asian Policy in the West". Not since the Mongol invasions, or the threat of Islam to Christian Europe, has Asia been in a position to make its weight felt in other continents.

This contrast illustrates the balance of power between Asia and the West to which we have become accustomed since the West took the lead in science and technology. These two hundred years, however, are no more than an interlude in history. There is no reason to suppose that the relationship then established between Asia and its neighbors has any historic permanence. It did not exist in previous ages, and there is every sign that it is now beginning to revert to the more normal pattern of equality, as Asian peoples pick up the techniques developed by others in the machine age.

It may therefore be wise to preface consideration of what Western countries should do with an attempt to see how Asia looks to Asians themselves. Asia is too vast and too varied to be a legitimate subject for easy generalisations. There should, however, be very general assent to a diagnosis given in October 1950 by Mr. Nehru when he said: "The common features of Asia today are a reaction from the previous colonial regimes, a resurgent nationalism, agrarian movements, a desire to get rid of our economic backwardness and a passionate urge for freedom. In varying degrees these urges are found in different parts of Asia."

The fact of rising nationalist and anti-colonial sentiment in Asia is too well known to require elaboration here, though its strength is still often underestimated by those who regard it simply as the artificial product of subversive agitation. The questions of economic backwardness and agrarian reform merit closer analysis, since they pose for the Western countries some of the most intractable problems these have to face. The mass of Asian peoples everywhere are desperately

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poor and hungry; their methods of producing food are antiquated and inefficient; and, with a few exceptions, they have scarcely begun to tap the resources which could be theirs through irrigation, power development and industrialisation.

If these shortcomings are to be made good within a reasonable time, both outside assistance from industrially advanced countries and drastic social reforms at home are needed. Technical advice and capital equipment can best be got from the countries of Western Europe, North America and perhaps Japan. Most of these countries have experience of Asian conditions, and their methods are familiar to Asians. While there is still, on the Asian side, a lingering suspicion of imperialism, all of the areas which have known Western rule are anxious to establish cooperation on a new and equal basis, and are hopeful of being able to adapt the democratic procedures of the West to their own needs.

Along with these favourable factors there is, however, one great difficulty. Before Asian countries can go ahead with economic development at an adequate speed, they nearly all require a drastic overhaul of their own social systems, amounting almost to revolution. The landlords and moneylenders, the feudal chiefs and religious hierarchies, are an intolerable drag upon progress. These elements, in the past, were usually upheld by the colonial authorities who wanted only a quiet life. Their tenure of power is likely to be prolonged if their regimes are bolstered up by foreign aid. Yet their very existence prevents the aid from being put to proper use.

The experience of the United States in China and Korea after 1945 and the attempts at Middle Eastern development bear witness to the reality of this dilemma. It is this that gives the alternative Communist solution its attraction. The Communist countries may not be able to spare capital goods or technical advice on the scale which the West could offer, but at least the Communists would begin by clearing away the social debris of the centuries, by enforcing agrarian reform and rooting out corruption. This seems a fair deduction from the Chinese experience, and it offers a powerful incentive to emulation elsewhere in Asia. The probability that totalitarian methods will quickly breed a new corruption of their own to replace what they have swept away is as yet too uncertain a prophecy to take away the glamour from the achievements in Soviet Asia and the new promise of China.

This problem is acutest where colonial rule has left least to build

Western Policy in Asia

on. In the Indian subcontinent and in Burma, the departure of the British did not lead to a collapse of government. Enough administrative ability and integrity had been created to permit of a progressive though troubled development. Elsewhere, as in Korea or Indochina, the political vacuum had to be filled by persons and groups who, to say the least, have not shown their competence to mould the future of their peoples; while in Malaya the conflict of interests among the inhabitants has so far defied all constructive statesmanship.

When one adds to these reflections the undoubted facts that, over a wide area of the continent, the illiterate, penurious and often diseased populations have had no experience of self-government and that food rather than individual freedom is their first concern, it can be no surprise that the challenge of Communism is far more formidable in Asia than in Europe. The sophistications of parliamentary democracy seem irrelevant to all but a tiny minority, compared with the need for land for the peasant, fertilisers for the land, tractors, transport and all of the apparatus of industrial production. It is these things which the West must offer if in the long run the challenge of Communism is to be met in Asia.

ONCE this Asian attitude to Asia's problems is appreciated, it is easy to understand the desire of so much of Asia to remain neutral in the conflict between the Communist and non-Communist worlds, a desire which excites the indignation of the more ardent Western crusaders. Asian peoples want material help from the West, but not if the price for it is to be dragged into Western quarrels. They want trade with the Communist world, and the maximum of peaceful intercourse. Above all they dread the prospect of a world-wide clash in which Asians would be fighting Asians, and in which countries which were just looking forward to their new independence would find themselves once again providing military bases and facilities for Western forces.

The leading exponent of these views has been India, and especially her Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, to whom an armed conflict between the major Asian powers at the very moment of Asia's liberation from Western rule would be the ultimate tragedy. It would not be surprising if in the near future the Indian view came to be shared by Japan, whose interest in peaceful co-existence with Communist neighbours in Asia is quite as compelling as India's. Indeed, the more democratic and

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peace-loving the post-treaty development of Japan, the more strongly will this point of view be held, since none but military reactionaries, dreaming of regaining an Asian empire in the course of a world crusade against Communism, can possibly contemplate calmly the rigid division of the Far East into two exclusive camps.

From the end of the Pacific war until about 1948, it seemed as though the gigantic developments in Asia might roll on without any disastrous clash with the Western powers. The areas of European rule were evolving in a manner better than any could have hoped, largely because of the decisiveness with which Britain effected the transfer of power in her former Indian Empire. Country after country, from the Philippines to Pakistan, embarked on self-government; war damage was made good; production and trade in all but a few areas began to revive. Although in two of the newly-independent countries, Indonesia and Burma, internal disorders from time to time threatened stability, the governments never broke down, and conditions slowly improved. Only in Indochina, where French colonial thinking seemed to lag behind events, was the shadow of serious future difficulty becoming apparent.

Meanwhile in China the tide of Communist revolution began to flow too fast to be stemmed by any outside intervention. Even the United States government was becoming disillusioned about the Chinese Nationalists, and for a while it seemed likely that, whatever the outcome, all of the Western nations would accept the verdict and make the best of what could only be a somewhat anxious job.

During this period, in Asia as elsewhere, a serious obstacle to the re-establishment of normal international relations was the undue polarisation of power in the postwar world. Japan was, in effect, absent. India, preoccupied with her new freedom and with the Kashmir dispute, could command only limited influence abroad. Britain's financial difficulties restricted the role she could play. It was therefore all too easy to regard the Chinese problem, even in its early stages, as merely one more aspect of the world-wide struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. The latter, in particular, began to think of China's revolution not as a relatively natural Asian development, which it was, but as a Moscow-directed plot, which must be frustrated in order to preserve the world balance of power. Had there been a number of other major powers, especially Asian powers, active upon the scene, a far better perspective might have been achieved.

Western Policy in Asia

Before passing to the current problems which face Western statesmen, it is relevant to ask whether "the West" as a whole has a collective attitude to Asia, and, if so, what it is. In the past, the countries of Western Europe, together with czarist Russia, were interested in Asia as a field for colonial projects or, as in China, for privileged trading positions. During most of the period the United States had not come upon the scene as a colonial power. Her main concern was to set some limit to the depredations of the Europeans in order to ensure for American traders adequate scope for their activities. Moreover, the American anti-colonial tradition made the United States an opponent of the policies of the other Western powers rather than a participant in them.

Today, European colonialism is on the way out. Large areas of the former British and Dutch empires are already independent. Self-government is theoretically established in the Associated States of Indochina and is promised to Malaya. The special positions enjoyed by the powers in China are gone, and would have gone even if there had been no Communist revolution. It is true that several Western powers, above all Britain, have had great commercial interests in China and elsewhere in Asia, and quite legitimately wish to preserve them. They realise, however, that these can be preserved only in the context of quite new relations between the European interests and the governments of the areas. No European nation would now fight to secure a preferential position for its nationals or to maintain colonial rule in the teeth of opposition from the local population.

This attitude, new for Europeans, corresponds with traditional American sentiment. Americans have never shown any disposition to fight for British interests in Hong Kong or, at the other end of Asia, for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, any more than they fought for their own oil concessions in Mexico. There is now, however, a new factor affecting the American attitude to the defense of vested interests both in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia, namely, the identification of the Western position in these areas with resistance to Communist aggression. As the main protagonist of the policy of "containment" of Communism, the United States has become interested in the maintenance of Western power in Asia just at the moment when other Western countries are evolving in the opposite direction. There is not of course anything necessarily illogical in this apparent change of front. It is not only Americans who may feel that it is one thing for a colonial power to relinquish its rights in favour of a native people, but

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quite another to relinquish them in favour of a new form of imperialism.

All of this is only another way of saying that the attitude of "the West", and especially of the United States, is no longer actuated by colonial or, to any great extent, by commercial motives, but rather by considerations of security in the cold war, and by fear of the war turning hot in some fresh area as it did in Korea. It is in fact in the security sphere that the most baffling and immediate problems for the West arise.

UNDER the system of world security envisaged in the United Nations Charter, all member states are considered as having an interest in preventing and if necessary resisting aggression everywhere, and consequently as having certain corresponding obligations. No nation which accepts the Charter is entitled to wash its hands entirely of responsibility for events merely on the ground that these events are occurring at a great distance from its frontiers.

In practice, of course, the responsibility which a small nation can take if aggression breaks out thousands of miles away is limited and may often be negligible. The burden must, as the drafters of the Charter recognised, fall principally on the great powers. That was why the five powers, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, were given a position of special authority in the security provisions of the Charter. Had things worked out in the way that was hoped, these five powers between them would have occupied so commanding a position, both in respect of material resources and in respect of the strategic location of their territories in every continent, that no successful challenge to the peace could have been offered by any other power. On that basis the United Nations need only have performed the relatively modest function of coordinating the efforts and dispositions of the great powers under the authority of the Security Council.

Unfortunately, the situation has developed otherwise. Today Western fears of aggression are based upon the danger that aggression may be promoted by two of the great powers themselves, China and Russia. Not only has this made the coordinating task of the United Nations impossible; but, in the whole of Asia, from the Mediterranean to the China Sea, the positions of strategic strength are in the hands of the

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two powers whose intentions are suspect. Inevitably the remaining great powers have to face the question whether they must take up and maintain indefinitely in peacetime such dispositions as will enable them to counter effectively any aggressive action in that area.

At the time of the North Korean aggression, no dispositions of any kind had been made, the probability of large-scale armed operations having been somewhat too lightly discounted. Had it not been for the presence of United States forces in Japan for reasons unconnected with any fear of aggression, no effective force could have been made available in Korea in time to implement the decision of the United Nations to resist aggression. This lesson was further emphasised when the Chinese used armed force to back their claims in Tibet. This issue was in effect shelved by the United Nations without any determined attempt at investigation, simply because it was realised that the United Nations would in any case be powerless to intervene effectively in that area. If such situations were to be repeated, the whole conception of collective security and of the United Nations would be at an end.

There are many today who assert that this conception is in any case at an end. They argue that the Soviet Union has never since 1945 genuinely supported it, and that the Western powers finally turned their backs upon it by entering the North Atlantic Treaty and by announcing their intention to supplement this with a Middle East Defence Treaty, and perhaps with a Pacific Treaty in due course. The essence of these last two treaties would be the provision of peacetime facilities in Asia for the Western powers, which would enable them to carry on in changed conditions the strategic role in Asia that they played in earlier days. These arrangements, it is said, indicate that the United Nations Charter has now been rolled up and put away, while the powers revert to their age-old game of pursuing national interests by means of the balance of power.

This, however, is too great a simplification of what is occurring. It is, of course, true that the breakdown of great-power unity within the United Nations has compelled member states to look to more limited defensive treaties for their security. The security machinery of the United Nations has broken down, or rather it has never been created. At the same time, it is more than an empty phrase to say of the North Atlantic Treaty that it operates "within the framework of the United Nations Charter". It is not only that such pacts are not in conflict with

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the Charter. What is more important is that any armed action which might be taken under them would have to be justified as resistance to aggression in accordance with the Charter. Defensive treaties such as the North Atlantic Treaty are a substitute for the military machinery which the United Nations never managed to create, but they do not supersede the Charter's principles.

It is therefore not correct to say that the conception of collective peace under the United Nations is outmoded, or that the Western powers must now pursue a narrower conception of national interest. Moreover, if it were correct, it would lead to a rapid abdication of many of the remaining European responsibilities in Asia. Viewed from a narrowly French angle, for instance, the war in Indochina is certainly not a worthwhile enterprise. Even Malaya, from which the West still derives substantial economic advantages, might eventually prove too big a liability to the United Kingdom to justify continued sacrifices. It is only the need to maintain a world-wide front against aggression that prevents a Western retreat from Southeast Asia. Only this need maintains the interest of the United States in the area at all.

Once the strategic requirements of the West in Asia are put upon this basis and not upon the basis of narrower national interest, it becomes clear that the security system towards which all efforts should work is one which will depend to the maximum extent on the Asians themselves and will involve a minimum of Western intervention in peacetime.

It has already been pointed out that a number of Asian countries, of which India is the most important, have grave misgivings about entering Western-led defensive groupings, and it has been suggested that similar attitudes may develop in Japan. Yet both these countries have a vital interest in continued access to Southeast Asia for food and raw materials, and should therefore be prepared to accept primary responsibility to the United Nations and to their own peoples for the security of this area.

It is obvious that no such arrangements can be created overnight. It is as yet impossible to foresee the trend of Japanese politics that will follow the peace treaty; and India can only gradually take up the full burden implicit in her emergence as one of the great Asian powers. Yet the real interests of both countries push them in this direction. Moreover, India and Japan have the advantage over the Western powers that

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they are Asian countries, which China might well be reluctant to antagonise, and that the racial and anti-imperialist propaganda of the Communists would find in them far less vulnerable targets than they find in the old colonial powers. Moreover, they are both powers with an obvious interest in "co-existence" with Communist China, while China, on her side, may well be more willing to strike a bargain with them than with Western governments, whose interference in her affairs she has resented for half a century. An increase in the influence of these Asian countries is therefore a desirable objective, not only for strategic reasons, but as a step towards a compromise settlement by negotiation of the present conflicts in the Far East.

IT must frankly be said that the United States, which has been playing a major part in resisting aggression in the Far East during the last two years, seems largely to have forgotten the equally great need to work for the peaceful co-existence of the various powers in the area, especially China and Japan. Indeed, United States policy has appeared to be based upon the assumption of inevitable hostility between a Communist China dominated by the Soviet Union on the one hand and a Pacific island chain, including Japan, dominated by the United States on the other.

Americans are entitled to say that the Communist government in China has given them little ground for revising this assumption, and that its intervention in Korea and the treatment meted out by it to countries like Britain, which were quick to recognise the new regime, has not been such as to give promise of civilised relationships. These comments are valid as far as they go; but they do not go far. It is quite possible, for one thing, to argue that the Central People's Government might have evolved more favourably if its right to represent China internationally had been recognised from the start, as it will have to be recognised in the end. This, however, is now a barren argument, since no one can prove what might have been. More serious criticisms are that the United States has often seemed to court the hostility of Communist Asia without being prepared to face the consequences; and that, largely for domestic reasons, it has obstinately turned a blind eye to any Japanese and Chinese realities that are inconvenient. The first of these errors led to the perilous and disastrous advance to the Yalu River at the end of 1950 and to the recurring agitation in the

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United States for bombing and blockade, which would involve grave risks without even purporting to offer decisive results. The second, the ignoring of realities, is even more serious.

No other country has had such opportunities as the United States has had to know the realities of the Japanese situation. The American taxpayer, who has been paying the bills, should have no illusions about Japan's economic difficulties. Japan's military potential and her security problems must surely be an open book to American strategists. Six years of intimate association with Japan's internal politics must have revealed the possibilities and dangers for democratic development. It seems extraordinary that, armed with this knowledge, the United States should envisage a future for Japan in which there will be no recognition by the Japanese of the government which controls China, and only a minimum of trade with the Communist mainland.

It is difficult to believe that this perspective is shared by the Japanese. They face a vast area which, apart from Hong Kong and South Korea, is wholly Communist. Soviet power is now within sight of the Japanese homeland, and China has a stronger and more determined central government than ever before in this century. For Japan there can therefore be no repetition either of 1904 or of 1931. Yet access in some form to the raw materials and markets of the mainland is surely vital to her. If there is to be an iron curtain between Japan and her neighbours, not all of her efforts in Southeast Asia or elsewhere can compensate for what she will lose in China. If she has to face this prospect, her living standards are not likely to be such as to support and foster the fragile plant of democracy. She will not even be compensated for her privations by the thought that the American alliance will bring the reconquest of Manchuria, for, despite so many confusing voices, no one expects that United States policy in Asia could extend as far as that.

It is more difficult to assess realities in China, since much that has been happening there since the end of 1949 is obscure. Nevertheless, it can be asserted with confidence that the Communist regime has today no challengers; certainly Chiang Kai-shek cannot offer a serious challenge. It was always likely, and now seems certain, that for the immediate future China will be true to the Soviet alliance. Underlying clashes of interest, of which there are probably many, are unlikely to split the two countries, at least as long as they are concerned to make common cause against the United States and her allies. The present Chinese

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government, being stronger than its predecessors, will no doubt seek to expand its influence, especially in Southeast Asia. It is and will remain hostile to all forms of colonialism and will intensify the traditional Chinese dislike of foreigners. In short, Communist China may well prove a dangerous and formidable figure in Asia. No one should count either on her weakness or on her good nature. These points, stated somewhat dogmatically here, have recently been admirably argued in *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*.¹

It is a tragedy that the United States should have been led by a long succession of foreign and domestic events into a position where no American statesman can accept the plain fact that the only Chinese government is, and will continue to be, the one in Peking. The United States refusal to recognise the Communist government or to see Communist China seated in the United Nations has already contributed to the numerous difficulties confronting negotiators in the Far East ever since the Chinese intervened in the Korean war. If a truce should be concluded in Korea, United States policy must adapt itself at last to the facts, for political negotiations on matters extending beyond Korea must follow, and it is only the Peking government that can conduct them for China. Once this stage is reached and the elections in the United States are past, a new administration will surely put an end to the farce of negotiating with Mao Tse-tung with its right hand, while in the United Nations its left hand still pathetically sustains the Nationalist man of straw. This much realism the allies of the United States are entitled to insist upon.

The future of Formosa is an even more baffling issue, which it may well be necessary to face in order to make progress towards a general settlement after a cease-fire in Korea. The Formosan problem does not of course arise out of the Korean aggression. The United Nations had no part in the "quarantining" of Formosa, which is an exclusively American operation. It would not even be true to say that the United States took action in Formosa because of the Korean aggression. That was merely the occasion for a step which American strategists had long wanted to take on other grounds. Numerous recent indications that the end of the Korean war would not necessarily end present United States policy towards Formosa bear out the same interpretation.

American strategists want Formosa as part of the island chain—or

¹ See C. P. FitzGerald, "Peace or War with China?", *Pacific Affairs*, December 1951.

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at least they want to deny it to a potential enemy. American policy, therefore, is unlikely to shift to the extent of permitting Chinese Communists to take over the island so long as the tension in the Far East is maintained at its present pitch. Many students of China, however, believe that the tension can be significantly lowered only by means of a general bargain of which Formosa would form a part. Not only do all Chinese regard Formosa as Chinese territory, promised to China at Cairo and Potsdam, but the maintenance there of the emigré regime seems to them a constant threat of a foreign-backed counter-revolution.

No one can at present suggest a simple way out of this evident impasse. Possibilities of settlement can emerge only in the context of many other developments. A way should, however, be found, once a truce in Korea has been reached, to remove the threat of counter-revolution represented by the presence in Formosa of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Recognition of it as the government of China should be withdrawn; that done, the claim to administer Formosa would automatically fall. The first step in tackling the Formosan problem, awkward as it must be for Americans, is the only way to put an end to an unreal situation which discredits Western policy in the whole of Asia.

DESPITE the controversy which has centered on Formosa, the situation in Southeast Asia is more important, more dangerous and more immediate. It is more important because this is an area of great economic value as a source of food for South and East Asian countries, as a source of raw materials for industrial use, and as a source of dollars for the sterling area. It is more dangerous because large-scale fighting is in actual progress, and neither in Indochina nor in Malaya is any end in sight. It is more immediate because France's allies, especially the United States, have to decide here and now whether support is to be offered to France as an inducement to her to continue a struggle which drains her strength and jeopardises her security at home.

In Indochina a heavy penalty is being paid for the failure to settle the nationalist problem before the Communists gained control of China. Agreement with Ho Chi-minh soon after the war could almost certainly have been bought by concessions no greater than have now been made to Bao Dai. Indochinese xenophobia and anti-imperialist feelings would then have provided a shield against Chinese expansion instead of being used by the Vietminh as a sword against the French.

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Now, with Chinese Communism at its back, the Vietminh can face with optimism a long struggle in which, even if it cannot gain a victory, it is unlikely to suffer defeat. In recent months American and British statesmen have made speeches which suggest that they fear armed Chinese aggression in Indochina following a Korean truce, and they have uttered warnings that any such action would entail grave consequences. A somewhat different note has been occasionally heard from the French, who have shown interest in the possibilities of a truce.

No one can quarrel with the warnings given to China that open aggression will no more be tolerated in Southeast Asia than it was in Korea. Yet it is hard to believe that China will choose so dangerous a course, when she must feel that subtler methods will, with a little patience, bring her the same results. The native Vietminh movement is a going concern, and disposes of plenty of men and ability. Its will to continue the struggle is likely to outlast that of the French, who have not even got the prospect of eventual restoration of French rule in the area to stiffen their resolution. So far neither the administrative ability nor the military strength of the French-sponsored government of Vietnam shows promise of developing to a point where it could hold its own unaided against pressure from the north.

In this gloomy situation the only courses that seem to offer any prospect of stability are either a great increase of Western military aid to the French, which would not be much good without ground troops, or a political settlement. It is unlikely that the first will be forthcoming, and it would in any case cause political complications; the second will be hard to obtain but is perhaps not impossible. Just as the Korean conflict can be halted only by acceptance of partition of the country, so in Indochina the acknowledgement of Vietminh control of a large area of the north might produce a relatively bloodless breathing-space. A final settlement could not be reached now, any more than it can in Korea, but it would already be a great gain if the conflict could again revert from hot war to cold. More permanent stabilisation could proceed only *pari passu* with the settling down of the relations of all of the powers in the Far East.

In Malaya the situation, though tactically different, has this in common with the Indochinese dilemma, that settlement can be envisaged only in a context which permits the peaceful co-existence of Communist China with her eastern neighbours. Though the rebel forces in Malaya,

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unlike the Vietminh, are not a national army but a small determined band of Chinese Communist guerrillas, nevertheless the wild nature of the country and the composition of the population may well enable them to disturb the peace for an indefinite period. On the other hand, a directive from Moscow or Peking could probably call them off tomorrow. The fact is that, all over Southeast Asia, and especially in Malaya, the Chinese populations are so large, and have so far shown so little readiness to oppose the government of China, whether it be Communist or not, that nothing short of some kind of political settlement with China can bring the present emergencies to an end.

How such a settlement can be approached will appear only after negotiations start following a Korean truce. There is no reason to expect the Chinese to be accommodating. They have many cards in their hands and are probably in no hurry. It was suggested earlier in this article that both India and Japan should be enlisted in the attempt at settlement. It would be quite unrealistic to think that the Western powers by themselves can today negotiate with the Soviet Union and China a permanent pacification of the Far East. What is needed is that the key position of the Central People's Government should be recognised by France, Japan and the United States, as it already is by Britain and India, and that a new and more realistic settlement of all outstanding questions should be attempted, in which Asian views would have greater weight than in the past. Though the immediate prospects for such a settlement may not seem bright, at least they give better hope than a purely military approach, which offers only indefinite and inconclusive war in Southeast Asia, the fruitless draining of Western strength, and, for Japan, the danger of economic disaster or permanent dependence on United States aid.

AMID our preoccupations with the present expansionist trends in China, we must continue to keep firmly in our minds the fundamentals of the Asian situation as summarised in the quotation from Mr. Nehru at the beginning of this article. Of these fundamentals, the desire to get rid of economic backwardness is the only one likely to influence Asian policy most persistently in the coming years, for it lies at the root of the problem of freedom and the ending of Asian inferiority. China cannot escape from this reality any more than other nations. If the West can offer her help in this field, at any rate by way of increasing

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trade, China is unlikely to reject it, provided it is not made a means of political pressure upon her. Such cooperation might in the long run, and of course only in the long run, be a solvent of present antagonisms. Not only might it lead to a softening of the asperities of revolutionary rule in the Communist countries, but it should promote rising living standards and full employment in non-Communist countries and increasing contacts between the two groups.

Similar ideas have been at the back of such postwar projects as the United Nations plans for technical assistance and economic development in Asia, and are in line with the Colombo Plan and Point Four. So far these plans have scarcely gone beyond the paper stage. In the near future they must begin to take concrete form. They cannot go forward on an adequate scale without the full participation of the United States, which has already made vast contributions in many parts of the world.

Today those contributions tend to be too closely tied to the great military defensive effort in which the United States is engaged. If economic aid is to contribute not simply to the military strength of the non-Communist world, but to a lessening of the tension between the two groups of powers, it must be put upon a different basis and be divorced from strategic planning. Asian countries are already showing that they would sooner forego aid than accept it with strategic strings attached.

It is hard for the giving country to refrain from tying the aid it gives to the immediate objectives of national policy. Yet, in the long term, this is the only way in which economic aid can contribute to the peace of the world. It was in this way that United Nations economic machinery was meant to be used, and is being used on a small scale. The machinery must be developed and enlarged. How far Communist countries will be willing to use it, only time will show. If they stand to benefit, they will probably not indefinitely remain aloof, but even if they do, years of constructive work lie ahead in other lands.

It is upon these principles that the relationship between the West and Asia must develop. No alternative offers to Asia release from the limitations of her past, or to the West the prospect of peace.

London, May 1952

Indian Democracy and the General Election

Richard Leonard Park

THE recent general election in India resulted in victory for the Congress Party and its leader, Prime Minister Nehru. Congress Party ministries have been formed both in the Center and in all of the states other than PEPSU (Patiala, East Punjab States Union).¹ In this sense the election was a political act which provided the people of India with representative institutions charged with constitutional functions in the promotion of responsible government. The general election was also a stage in the fulfilment of the democratic ideal outlined in the Constitution of the Republic. Evaluation of the formal process and of its statistical consequences can be made on the basis of the record. To assess the spirit of the election, or to make generalizations concerning the present status of political structure in India as it was reflected in the polling, is a much more difficult task.

There is, perhaps, no other country in the world whose internal politics is so complex and so little understood as India's. No handbook exists which elucidates current lines of political opinion; no textbook fills in the historical and analytical background; no chart or outline can be found to simplify what, in fact, is a maze of local, regional and ideological points of view gathered for purposes of elections and patronage into political parties, cliques within parties, and independent fronts. Furthermore, India's political party structure is in the process of change, not having adjusted as yet to relatively definite party programs which make a choice between parties meaningful for both the electorate and the candidates. Characteristic phenomena of the first Indian general election have been the shifts from party to party of various candidates, the large number of independents running for office, and the post-election accession of small-party members to the fold of the successful Congress Party. All of these indicate an immature political party pattern which further experience in elections may render more stable.

¹ The original post-election ministry of the Congress Party in PEPSU fell on a vote of confidence on April 18, 1952, and was replaced by a coalition ministry consisting of ex-Akalis (Sikh-rights Party), ex-Congressmen, a few Communists, and independents.

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The unique value of the general election for the political analyst lay in the fact that for a few months some semblance of order and party discipline was superimposed upon the Indian political community, thus opening the way for the kind of investigation which could begin to clear away the cobwebs of confusion that have obscured insights into the operative forces of Indian politics. If the Republic is a young institution, its political traditions and values, provincial prejudices, historical antagonisms and ideological conflicts among groups are as old and as thoroughly ingrained as they are in any country. Whether the election constitutes proof of India's growing democratic tendencies or, alternatively, gives evidence of the inapplicability of parliamentary democracy to Indian conditions is the question at issue. One will accept or present simplified judgments concerning the Indian general election at the expense of intellectual integrity, or out of sheer ignorance.

From a direct reading of election results and from field reports of electioneering and polling activities, one may reach conclusions regarding the practical outcome of the election. All of the paraphernalia of democratic elections were to be found, not excluding the carnival-like spectacles of mass political meetings, slogans and symbols plastered or stencilled on walls, and a politically-charged atmosphere of debate on the streets and in the homes. The Constitution and appropriate Parliamentary Acts outlined the legitimate goals and methods for choosing representatives for public office. An Election Commission, independent of the party in power, was responsible for the conduct of elections, assuring the maintenance of order, providing polling facilities and pursuing election abuses for investigation and subsequent legal action. Political parties entered the field as the unofficial, political channels through which an endless variety of individual political opinions could be grouped into a manageable and relatively differentiated series of party choices. Independent candidates, representing persons who could not reconcile their political opinions with the compromise platforms of any political party, contested in large numbers.

Within this structure of organized, legitimate politics, the first general election in independent India's history was begun in the autumn of 1951. Several months were required for electioneering and polling because of an immense electorate, consisting of 176 million citizens eligible to vote on the basis of adult suffrage, and because of considerable variance in climatic conditions and geographical location in a coun-

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try of desert, jungle and remote mountain constituencies. Polling booths were provided for every thousand or so voters, complete with election officials and guards, safe ballot boxes, screens and voting instructions.

The election process was completed in May 1952 after the elevation of President Rajendra Prasad and Vice-President Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan to the highest formal offices in the land. In that month, the new Parliament met in New Delhi with the familiar figure of Jawaharlal Nehru in the Prime Minister's seat on the Treasury Bench, with a Congress Party in absolute majority to assure the Government's stability, but with new faces in the opposition, twenty-seven of them being Communists, all primed to render the debate more than academic in its interest. At the same time, the assemblies and legislative councils in all of the states other than PEPSU were meeting under Congress Party ministerships. It would appear that the Congress Party victory was all but complete.

Searching the statistics of election results, however, one finds that the Congress won the election on a minority vote, forty-five per cent of the total vote among the sixty per cent of the electorate that voted. Independents and other parties, combined, polled more votes than the victorious party. But no other party came close to the percentile total obtained by the Congress. The Socialists, for example, polled about eleven million votes, but this was the equivalent of only ten per cent of the poll and was a scattered vote among 255 Parliamentary constituencies. With so many candidates standing, the Socialists were bound to obtain a large number of votes. Whereas there were many who voted Socialist, only twelve Socialists were elected to the central lower house, the House of the People. Contesting 1,793 seats for the state assemblies, the Socialists won only 126. The Communists, about whom so much has been said in reports on this election, polled only five per cent of the total votes cast and won about five per cent of the seats. Yet they won twenty-seven seats in the House of the People from the seventy constituencies in which they fought, a significant fact since it shows that the Communists concentrated their attention on areas in which they believed they enjoyed a reasonable chance of success. In addition, the Communists won sizable blocs of assembly seats in the South Indian states of Madras, Travancore-Cochin and Hyderabad, thus assuring vocal and vigorous oppositions in states where Congress ministries hold power with small margins of control. The large number of other parties

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and independents contesting indirectly assisted the Congress in its success. The anti-Congress vote was split, and the Congress, with forty-five per cent of the votes, gained about seventy-five per cent of the seats.

Major political trends can be deduced in general terms from the information known about the election results. It is clear that the Congress Party still holds a dominant position of political strength in the country. This strength is partly the consequence of the Gandhian (Congress) tradition in the independence movement, partly concrete evidence of a powerful party machine organized down to the village level, and partly the result of inspiring leadership by Nehru, the personal symbol of India's new position of importance in world politics. If the polling figures are good evidence, the Socialist Party holds some support in the countryside but is unable at this stage to garner sufficient votes in given constituencies to win many seats. The Communist movement, far more difficult to analyze, has made an impressive start in this election, particularly by gaining seats in the Madras, Travancore-Cochin and Hyderabad assemblies, but also by demonstrating a following in other parts of India, including West Bengal and the isolated, Pakistan-surrounded state of Tripura.

None of the small parties which were formed from among disgruntled former Congress Party members to contest the election on special issues did very well. The strongest of them, J. B. Kripalani's Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (Farmer, Labor, People's Party), succeeded in a limited degree only, gaining particularly in the Andhra area of Madras, where it backed the Telugu-speaking peoples in their aspirations for a state separate from Tamil-speaking South Madras and where the Congress took a negative stand. It may last for a few years as an element in opposition, but only as a weak third party, of no real danger to the Congress.

The parties termed "communal" by Nehru, i.e., parties which base their programs primarily on religious-value grounds, did very poorly indeed, except in some of the more politically backward and conservative areas of Rajasthan and Orissa. In Rajasthan, the state most influenced by the Princes and their landed-interest friends, three "communal" Hindu parties (Ramrajya Parishad, Hindu Mahasabha, and Bharatiya Jan Sangh), together with some similarly-minded independents, won a large minority bloc of seats in the Assembly. In Orissa, the Ganatantra Parishad, again backed by small Princes and land-

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owners, captured a sufficient number of Assembly seats to make the Congress' task of forming a stable ministry difficult. The conservative, Hindu successes in Rajasthan and Orissa indicate that the "communal issue" is not yet dead in India. They also show the influence still held by the Princes in their own localities.

The large number of parties participating in the several states' elections does not alter the important fact that there was no second major party to challenge the Congress seriously in the battle for majority control of the ministries, central and state. This, more than any other reason, explains the general victory of the Congress throughout the country. Belated attempts by numerous small parties to form coalitions around Socialist, Communist or Hindu-conservative leadership proved ineffective as obstacles to the Congress sweep. Key states, such as Bombay, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Assam, West Bengal and East Punjab, where opposition parties were expected to offer a fight for political leadership, are controlled by large, absolute majorities of Congress representatives which were won without much difficulty. In Madras, the "upset" state in the election, the Congress gained less than a working majority. On the basis of its possession of the largest single bloc in the Assembly, and with the help of independents and small-party members in coalition, the Congress has nevertheless formed a ministry there under the leadership of former Governor-General, and latterly Home Minister, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, brought out of retirement to head the Madras Government by nomination to the Madras Legislative Council. Communists in Madras form a fairly large group in a coalition recently established to challenge the hold of the Congress in Madras. More than any other state, Madras poses the question mark of Indian politics on the Communist issue. Rajagopalachari, aided by the Congress machine, maintains a precarious balance in his party's favor in the state which is now a chief target for the Communists' capture.

FOR outsiders, as well as for the people of India, the indications of growing Communist strength in the country was one of the dramatic results of the election. The Communist Party of India (CPI)² was able to elect twenty-seven members to Parliament and some 180 to the vari-

² In Hyderabad the Communist Party of India was banned during the election, but the Communists formed another party, the People's Democratic Front, for purposes of contesting the election.

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ous state assemblies. These successes were modest in comparison with those of the Congress. When, however, one considers the powerful influence of Nehru and the superior size of the Congress Party's machine throughout India, it is necessary to conclude that the achievement of the CPI was significant. Furthermore, there is little reason to believe that the CPI will not strengthen its position in future elections.

Underlying party politics in India are conditions of poverty, famine, administrative inefficiency and corruption, which may easily be manipulated as issues in the political struggle for power. Few deny the existence of such conditions. Party differences lie in the direction of the steps proposed to improve this state of affairs and in the priority to be accorded various stages of improvement. The CPI bids for power on the basis of a program which, it promises, would distribute lands rapidly and without compensation of landlords, sever connections with the Commonwealth and the "West", enter into closer alliance with Peking and Moscow, and concentrate on liberating the "downtrodden masses of India from the capitalist oppression fostered by the Congress Party". The Socialist Party's program of "democratic socialism" differs from that of the Congress only in respect of the priorities to be given economic legislation, the rate of nationalization of basic industries, and the extent to which the citizens can be associated cooperatively with the government in the betterment of their own livelihood. After listening to the various promises, a plurality of the voters chose to return to office Congress Party candidates with whom the electorate was familiar and who seemed to offer the most practical program for improving conditions in India. On the other hand, the record shows that, even though it was sufficient to capture the general elections, the strength of the Congress Party is declining. Unless appreciable economic and social improvement is noted in the five years before the next general election, scheduled for 1956-57, it may be assumed that the Congress will continue to lose favor and that parties such as the Socialist and the Communist will assume greater prominence.

It is this trend of political opinion which is most difficult to assess after an election in which the Congress appears to have succeeded so strikingly. In India, a land of villages and small towns, the citizen has less direct interest in party politics than in the administration that deals with local problems. The party in power has a distinct advantage over all other contenders if the routines of local administration are

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reasonably efficient and impartial. The residue of affection for Gandhi's Congress Party, together with the general popularity of Nehru, gives the Congress a considerable advantage in winning the rural and town vote, even if local administration is less than perfect. But if local administrative machinery should become indifferent to the immediate needs of its clientele, and if the party in power should appear to be unable or unwilling to reorganize local government to meet the citizens' needs, the Congress Party would be certain to lose support in the countryside. Other parties, promising more while organizing the peasants' discontents, would stand to gain. It need hardly be added that this is the Communists' tactic, successfully followed to date in the Telengana region of Hyderabad, in the Andhra area of Madras, in parts of West Bengal and in the small state of Tripura. Administration rather than party politics is the stabilizing element in the Indian political community. Liberal, vigorous legislation by Congress ministries, in the absence of an able administration to bring the enacted benefits to the wide village public, can result only in disaster for the Congress and in the rapid rise of the CPI.

In this connection, it is important to note that the Communist movement in India is middle-class oriented and primarily urban in leadership. If the conservative influence of rural and town Congress supporters is lost through a transfer of their backing to the high promises of the CPI, there can be no hope for sufficient voices of moderation being found in the cities. Hence it is understandable that the CPI should turn to rural India for support following some rural successes in the recent election. The urban proletariat can be depended on to follow, once the peasantry has been captured; the urban Communist intelligentsia will speak for either group at any time.

Political opinion in India is capable of rapid change. Dissatisfaction with existing conditions may reach a point at which appeals to the traditional in politics—in this case the Congress Party—will exert less attraction than promises of new paths to speedy prosperity. Whether such a shift will occur, and what steps can be taken to avert it, are the very questions with which the government is struggling today. Indications of political change, perceptible in the election results, have been noted by all of the major parties. The Congress, as the party in power, is in a position to benefit from these warning signals, and the prospects of democracy in India will depend upon its response to them.

Indian Democracy and the General Election

The foregoing remarks should not be allowed to obscure the great achievements registered in this first general election. Thus, the independent Election Commission, supported by the party in power, conducted a fair and free election under most difficult conditions; sixty per cent of the eligible voters went to the polls with confidence in the procedural honesty of the election machinery; from a technical standpoint, the election was fairly administered and well adapted to the special requirements of the electorate. For this record the Election Commission, the government and the vast bulk of party politicians deserve much credit.

SOME observers, however, are inclined to doubt whether elections of the parliamentary type have real significance in India, and in effect question Indian democracy itself. They point out that in the recent election most of the electorate was illiterate, no major second party challenged the Congress, and the average citizen had little share in choosing the party candidates or in formulating the party platforms. Some even assert that the social structure of India is basically anti-democratic, that personalities rather than issues dominate the electioneering process, and that a benevolent dictatorship rather than the complexities of representative government would best serve the psychological needs of the people. Such critics can adduce an abundance of evidence to support their contentions. If the measure of democracy in regard to elections for representative institutions requires a large core of literate and moderately well-educated voters to assure a considered, mature and satisfactory vote, then India, which is more than eighty per cent illiterate, does not qualify. If illiteracy is equated with political ignorance, then India is not a democracy and the election was not a democratic election.

The critics' indictment notes that the majority of the candidates of all parties were chosen to stand in given constituencies on caste or communal grounds, and that one of the first questions ordinarily asked of a candidate touring a Hindu-majority constituency concerned his caste membership: where the caste of a candidate and that of the majority of the constituency were the same, he usually won; where they differed, in most cases he lost. Both Congressmen and Communists, these critics argue, used the category of caste as the major determinant in selecting their rosters of candidates. With few exceptions, Indian

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Muslims voted for the Congress, not because they favored it on political issues, but because they believed that the welfare of their community would be best protected by Prime Minister Nehru and the Congress Party. Muslim areas known to be Socialist-inclined voted for the Congress, in all likelihood because of fear of communal oppression of the Muslim minority, and not because of conviction concerning the political program of the Congress.

The net impression conveyed by these strictures is one of voters in vast numbers going to the polls in ignorance of the issues and in support of personalities rather than of programs, and thus being utterly incapable of any rational judgment. Yet, if democracy is regarded as a process rather than as a status, most of these criticisms become irrelevant. India is a newly-independent country, with a huge, illiterate population, an under-developed economy, and social problems of staggering magnitude. The building of a free, democratic society requires time and experience—in India as elsewhere. In the Indian case, the problems to be met in approaching this goal are qualitatively greater than for most Western countries, where generations of struggle have preceded the present, imperfect state of democratic development. To apply the dicta of democracy regarded as a status, and this in the Western style, is to distort the history and genius of democratic evolution.

The democratic process provides, first, for a legal framework of institutions designed to foster a free and responsive community, and, secondly, for the direction of these institutions towards the building of a democratic society. In this view, both the perfection of the formal order and the degree of group and individual development are conceived as being in motion and hence not susceptible to final judgment on the basis of their status at any given moment. The trend of affairs, rather than the state of affairs, supplies the criterion for judgment.

Applied to India and the recent general election, this standard suggests certain hopeful conclusions. First, few will deny the excellence of India's formal constitutional order: many liberal Western parliamentary traditions have been adapted to local conditions in the Constitution; in addition, certain specifically Indian institutions have been drawn upon to reflect the multiplicity of local and regional differences in political tradition that characterize village India and its centuries-old experience with local government. From the formal point of view, the Constitution, though young and subject to future corrections, compares

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favorably with any genuinely democratic structure of government in the world. As for implementation of the formal constitutional order, the general election itself demonstrates a serious intent to fulfil the spirit as well as the letter of the Constitution. Beyond the confines of the election process, gradual improvement of economic and social conditions throughout the country, framed in legislation and administered for the common good, should strengthen popular faith in the efficacy of democratic institutions and methods as opposed to their totalitarian counterparts.

Viewed in this perspective, the first general election would seem to signal a trend towards the democratic goal. Depending upon the efforts of the administration to bridge the gap between an admirable constitutional ideal and intolerable social conditions, the next five years may be expected either to accelerate this movement in the direction of democratic government or to herald its collapse.

Delhi, May 1952

NOTES AND COMMENT

Democracy and Nationalism in Asia

UNITED Nations military intervention in Korea may succeed in restoring the *status quo* in that country, but it has not prevented the Communists from attacking on many other fronts all over the continent of Asia. Nothing very much worse could have happened if the Communists had had a walk-over in Korea. For the very limited gain of stopping them there, the United States has paid very heavily; and the Koreans have been the worst sufferers. The balance sheet of the Korean war is definitely unfavourable to the democratic world. On the other hand, the Russians have gained strategically, and morally, insofar as the Korean war has inflamed Asia against "Western imperialism". The festering sore of Indochina is straining the financial and military resources of contemporary France to the breaking point. In Malaya the British are compelled to wage a minor war which has seriously depleted the supply of rubber—a vitally important strategic material. The Middle East Command, which is intended to forestall communist aggression in the Near East, will necessarily prejudice preparations for the defence of Europe.

The demonstrated impossibility of defeating Communism on the battle-fronts in Asia results from the fact that nationalism is not a democratic force. Anti-imperialism makes of it a willing ally of Communism; and a nationalist-communist alliance can command the confidence and support of practically the entire populations of Asia. Apart from the common distrust of and hatred for the white race, there is a more fundamental cause for the popularity of Communism in Asia. It is the authoritarian tradition of Oriental culture, which is closely akin to the mediaeval culture of Europe. By and large, the latter has outgrown the tradition of mediaevalism that in Asia is still very much alive. Nationalism draws its inspiration from the mediaeval cultural tradition. Religious fanaticism plays a prominent role in the nationalist movements in the Near East. A powerful current of public opinion in Pakistan demands that the new state should be governed by the Islamic theocratic *Shariat* laws. The saintly Father of the Indian Nation personified the spirit of revivalism. Notwithstanding Jawaharlal Nehru's secularism, the highest positions in the state are occupied by outspoken religious and cultural revivalists. Even the Christian and Westernised Sun Yat-sen was culturally a neo-Confucian patriarch, and the Kuomintang sought to establish a neo-Confucian paternalist state.

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The bulk of the people throughout Asia are steeped in ignorance, which keeps them wedded to mediaeval prejudices. The teleological view of life, the most outstanding feature of the mediaeval religious culture, creates an authoritarian mentality—the psychological predisposition to cultivate submission as a virtue and to accept authority as providentially ordained. With the ignorant multitude, this cultural tradition takes the form of fatalism; it makes the politically-minded minority regard dictatorship or paternalism as more desirable than democracy. And the demagogy of a wilful minority can sway the submissive masses to accept its dictatorship. The alliance between Communism and nationalism is thus cemented by a cultural tradition.

Such being the cultural background of Asian nationalism, it is a mistake to equate it with democracy. Even when it is anti-communist, it is not necessarily democratic. Then it tends towards fascist dictatorship. The advocates of genuine democratic freedom for the Chinese people should have little reason to prefer Kuomintang dictatorship to Communist dictatorship. Only the blindness of international power politics can look upon the Iranian landlords or the Arabian emirs or the Egyptian pashas as advocates of democratic freedom. A sufficiently high price may lure them into the Western camp. But even then, at home, they will establish *their* dictatorship as against Communist dictatorship. National freedom means freedom for them to rule autocratically, perhaps behind a formally democratic façade, whenever convenient.

THE prospects of democracy should not be overrated even in India and Pakistan, where the influence of Western liberalism is still far too weak as against the cultural tradition of nationalism. Indeed, the mistake of equating nationalism with democracy has been more grievous in these countries than in others that are culturally more backward. In the latter there may not have been any choice. To withhold support from the nationalist movement because it was socially and culturally reactionary would have been to condone colonialism. It was a dilemma for the Western liberals, although objective historians cannot dismiss the doctrine of the White Man's Burden of a civilising mission as an apology for imperialism.

In India, however, there was a choice. The early nationalist movement was inspired by Western liberalism. The "denationalising" influence of outlandish ideas—rationalism, political liberalism and social reformism—provoked religious and cultural revivalism, which affected the movement for national liberation. Nevertheless, until the advent of Gandhi, on the morrow of the first world war, liberalism dominated Indian nationalist politics. Under Gandhi, nationalism became a mass movement, because he personified the mediaeval cultural tradition. The British rulers reacted very timidly to

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the new development; and their timidity undermined the position of the liberal politicians. The grudgingly-granted Montford Reforms were so very inadequate that they discredited the liberal politicians who tried to work the new Constitution in a spirit of gradualism. The utter inadequacy of the reforms enabled Gandhi to wrest the leadership of the nationalist movement from the liberals and to develop a mass nationalist movement with a religious, culturally revivalist outlook.

The defeat of liberalism in Indian nationalist politics prepared the ground for the rise of the Muslim League and led to the communal differentiation of the nationalist movement and ultimately to the partition of the country. Jinnah had grown up in an atmosphere of liberal nationalism. He became a fanatical communalist when, under Gandhist leadership, Indian nationalism assumed the complexion of Hindu religious and cultural revivalism.

When, under Gandhi, nationalism became a mass movement, the numerical conception of democracy induced the British rulers to strengthen revivalist nationalism by concessions which they would not make to the liberals. When an objective history of contemporary India comes to be written, the world will be staggered to learn to what extent the British liberals, and particularly the Labour Party, are responsible for the defeat of liberalism in this unfortunate country. The defeat of liberalism prejudiced the chances of democracy.

Those who believe that Nehru represents Western liberalism, and that therefore under him independent India will move towards democratic freedom, ought to read his autobiography. He ridicules the ineffective gradualism of his liberal predecessors and denounces them as puppets of British imperialism. It is very significant that Nehru rose to his present position as the spiritual son and the heir-designate of the prophet of culturally revivalist nationalism.

In China also, nationalism, having won the patronage of Western liberalism, rose on the ruins of the Reform Movement, which had been inspired by modern rationalist thought. Kang Wu-wei and Liang Chi-chao raised the standard of revolt against the Confucian feudal-patriarchal cultural tradition. Sun Yat-sen ridiculed them as pedantic intellectuals obsessed with outlandish ideas.

In India as well as in China, democracy would have had a better chance if the numerical conception of democracy had not misled Western liberalism to support culturally reactionary nationalism. Ever since Chiang Kai-shek gave the Chinese masses a blood-bath in the late 1920s, liberal democratic opinion has opposed the Kuomintang. While the Western powers recognised the Kuomintang terrorist regime simply because it was in the saddle, the Communists gained the sympathy and support of the embittered and frustrated liberal democrats. During the Pacific war, when Chiang Kai-shek could not

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have carried on without the substantial backing of the Western powers, mainly the United States, he could have been compelled to democratise his regime. If he had gone over to the Japanese, as in such circumstances he most probably would have done, liberal democrats could with the support of the Western powers have established an alternative government which would have been more efficient than the corrupt Kuomintang regime. The tragic policy of glorifying Chiang Kai-shek as a great leader of world democracy drove the incipient liberals and democrats in China into the camp of Communism.

During the war, the British rulers had an opportunity to discharge their much-advertised responsibility for placing India on the road to democratic freedom. It became evident that colonial nationalism and international fascism were birds of a feather. Nationalist India sympathised openly with the German-Japanese fascist axis, and refused to help the democratic powers in the darkest days of contemporary history. Yet, as soon as the war was over, British liberalism relinquished its power in India to the National Congress, which, on the pretext of anti-imperialism, had connived with international fascism. The Congress had refused to assume responsibility for defending India even when the Japanese invaders were bombing Calcutta. If, in that crisis, Indian anti-fascists had been entrusted with responsibility and the requisite power, they could have given the country democratic leadership and have taken over formally from the British when the latter had to leave India after the war. But in that crisis British liberalism was guided by the false notion that whoever could incite the mob by appealing to its base sentiments were the true representatives of the people. The quantitative conception of democracy confounded it with demagogy.

Thus betrayed by Western liberalism, advocates of democratic freedom, as distinct from national independence, in India as in China, either yielded to the temptation to climb upon the bandwagon of successful totalitarian nationalism or succumbed to the siren call of Communism. If the Western powers are to play their cards properly, they must rectify the mistake of equating nationalism with democracy. Instead of supporting established nationalist regimes as bastions against Communism, even at the risk of encouraging their authoritarian predisposition and dictatorial tendencies, the Western powers can still help in crystallising the disheartened democratic forces. A review of the historical relationship between liberalism and nationalism will serve to demonstrate the urgency of the need for this reorientation.

ORIGINALLY liberalism was cosmopolitan. It believed in a common human heritage. The "civilising mission of the white man" was a corollary to that

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belief. Greece civilised the ancient world; Rome carried on the work; Christianity brought law and morality to the barbarians of Central and Western Europe; finally, the conquering army of Napoleon carried the light of a rationalist and democratic culture to dispel the twilight of mediaevalism in Germany. Modern nationalism was born in reaction to that last stage of the propagation of a cosmopolitan culture. Nevertheless, it enjoyed the patronage of liberalism. Fichte, who has gone down in history as a liberal philosopher, was the evangelist of modern nationalism.

Inheriting the tradition of nineteenth-century liberalism, all brands of leftism of the twentieth century patronised nationalism. In the nineteenth century, European nationalism represented a revolt against the Hapsburg and Romanov monarchies. Therefore, liberalism equated it with democracy. The experience was disappointing; triumphant nationalism became reactionary at home and chauvinistic internationally. In consonance with the Wilsonian liberal doctrine of the self-determination of subject nationalities, the Hapsburg Empire was broken up into a number of independent national states. The experience proved that liberalism had been backing the wrong horse. As against a Czechoslovakia of Masaryk and Beneš, there were Pilsudsky's Poland, Horthy's Hungary and the crazy quilt of the Balkans, where Serbians tyrannised Croats, Bulgarians oppressed Macedonians, and the latter tried to terrorise all and sundry. In Italy, Mussolini personified the nationalism preached by Mazzini, and Hitler's National-Socialism claimed to draw inspiration not only from Fichte's "Address to the People" but also from Herder's conception of the *Volksgeist*.

But, disregarding that bitter experience and irony of history, the revolutionary Left in Europe vied with the reformist liberals in patronising colonial nationalism. It had miscarried in Europe; in the more backward social and cultural circumstances of Asia, nationalism would be a democratic, progressive and even revolutionary force! Judged by their professions, Socialists and Communists should have been more cosmopolitan. On the contrary, they happened to be the most fanatical supporters of colonial nationalism. In Europe, nationalism had proved to be a reactionary cult; but in the colonial countries, as anti-imperialism, it was a liberating force. The devil of imperialism, however, was discovered neither by the democrats nor by the liberals. It was a Marxist discovery. To support colonial nationalism as a revolutionary force was a part of the Leninist strategy of world revolution. It is doubtful if Marx himself would have approved of his more fanatical follower condemning imperialism as the evil genius of the twentieth century. This aspect of Leninism does not logically follow from the original gospel. It may be recollected that Marx had recognised the historically revolutionary significance of the British conquest of India. Therefore, he would

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not have agreed with Lenin about the revolutionary role of anti-imperialist nationalism.

However, the Leninist denunciation of imperialism as the devil of the drama of the twentieth century, and the Communists' championing of the liberation of subject peoples, compelled Socialists as well as liberals to patronise colonial nationalism. During the period between the two world wars, nationalism in Europe developed into fascism. A distinction was, therefore, made between nationalism in Europe and in the colonial countries—the latter being regarded as a progressive democratic movement—with the analogy that originally nationalism in Europe had played a similar role. It was forgotten that Mussolini and Hitler were spiritual descendants of Rousseau, Fichte and Mazzini. On the assumption that nationalism in the colonial countries was a progressive and democratic force, there was no reason to believe that it would not develop there as it had developed earlier in Europe.

As a matter of fact, from the very beginning colonial nationalism was not progressive but revivalist; its hypothetical democratic character was deduced from the fact that it was anti-imperialist. Another highly objectionable result of the same fact was simply ignored: among the vast bulk of the colonial peoples, anti-imperialism was hatred for the white man; on the part of the nationalist middle class, it meant rejection of everything that the white man represented, namely, modern civilisation, a rationalist view of life, and democratic culture. To have equated anti-imperialist nationalism with the spirit of progress and the urge for democratic freedom was obviously wrong.

Asian nationalism is an unmixed evil. It has not got the saving grace of a cultural and idealist origin, as early European nationalism had. The cultural cosmopolitanism of Herder degenerated into the chauvinism of Hitler because Fichte had introduced the passion of race hatred into German nationalism. Asian nationalism originated in that passion, which continues to be its content even after the disappearance of foreign rule. Yet, the passionate advocacy of anti-French German nationalism made Fichte the philosopher of fascism. By glorifying anti-white animus as Asian nationalism, Nehru may well go down in history as the herald of an equally rank reaction.

Pragmatic Western liberals may not be impressed by Goethe's denunciation of nationalism as a passion of culturally backward people. But they should listen to the wisdom of Lord Acton, who wrote: "Nationalism does not aim at either liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the State. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin."

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To outline a detailed programme for the promotion of democracy in Asia is outside the purview of an analysis of nationalism; yet, a few hints may be helpful. The prerequisite for the triumph of democracy in Asia is to lay an intellectual and cultural foundation for it. A modern industrial economy will not necessarily help in the establishment of a democratic society. On the contrary, in the prevailing social and cultural atmosphere, it may tip the scales to the wrong side. Not only are the masses culturally backward and politically illiterate, and therefore possessed of an authoritarian mentality, but an appreciation of democratic freedom is very largely absent even among the educated middle class, which is the most active and influential factor in public life. The under-developed countries of Asia, therefore, need democratic ideas as well as economic aid. Nor can democratic institutions be imposed from above, because, given the predisposition to accept authority, and in the absence of a democratic tradition, parties and politicians tend to be authoritarian. Under these social and cultural conditions, democratic institutions cannot be stable unless they are built up from the bottom. For that purpose, the people must be inspired with the spirit of revolt against tradition, of self-confidence and self-reliance. The rise of democracy in Asia must be preceded by an intellectual movement of the nature of the Enlightenment of eighteenth-century France. It is easy to see how Western liberalism can help in the development of such a movement.

This may appear to be a long-term programme. In a way, it is. But let us not forget how long it took Europe to emerge from the twilight of mediævalism and to establish modern democratic society. Moreover, all hasty attempts to build Asian bulwarks against Communism will defeat their purpose. They are more likely to aid in the establishment of a different type of dictatorship rather than of democracy. Only a democracy built from the bottom up by a self-confident and self-reliant people can defend itself against attack from either side.

A perspective of economic security, political liberty and social justice will inspire the people to resist the demagogic appeal of Communism. The people are losing confidence in the established nationalist governments and parties. In the resulting psychological atmosphere of despair of the masses and cynicism of the intellectuals, the cult of a strong man and a strong government can thrive as easily as the Communist call for an elemental mass revolt can evoke a response. Fostering the spirit of self-confidence and self-reliance on the part of the people will constitute the only effective resistance. Activities calculated to promote the cultivation and spread of this spirit will lay the foundation for a stable, democratic society.

Dehra Dun, May 1952

M. N. Roy

The Ethics of the New Japan

THE Imperial Rescript on Education was probably the most widely known document of prewar Japan. With its stress on those of the Confucian virtues—loyalty and filial piety—which the Japanese have traditionally chosen to emphasise, and on the infallibility of the Emperor as the source of all virtue, it provided a moral justification for the existing authoritarian social and political structure. Read on important school occasions in an atmosphere of great solemnity which gave it a scriptural sanctity, it was used, together with the ethics course¹, in the school curriculum, as a means of fostering the desired moral and political attitudes among the people. Indeed, after the initial heyday of utilitarianism in the 1870s, the moral training afforded by these means was generally held by Japanese educators and politicians alike to be the most important function of the national education system.

At the end of the war the ethics course was removed from the curriculum,² but the Imperial Rescript, though discreetly shut away in school safes and no longer read on ceremonial occasions, remained officially in force while the Occupation tried to reach a decision concerning the relative merits of having the Emperor issue a new, democratic rescript, abolishing the old one outright, or leaving it as it was.³ Japanese opinion was divided on the matter. In 1946 the Japanese Education Reform Council voted in favour of a proposal that the old Rescript should be replaced by something more in keeping with the spirit of the times, but the proposal was not carried into effect. At that time the present Minister of Education, Teiyu Amano, voted against the proposal and in favour of outright abolition of the Rescript.

Eventually, in June 1948, the Rescript was rescinded by a resolution of both Houses of the Diet, and although the Education Reform Council and other bodies have occasionally discussed the question of a substitute, none has been issued. Meanwhile, to replace the old ethics course, a social-studies course has been introduced into the primary and secondary curricula on lines recommended by the American Educational Mission, covering the ground of the old history and geography courses as well as elementary economics and civics. At least a partial object of the decentralisation of the educational system was to prevent any future use of the schools as a centrally-controlled vehicle of nationalist propaganda.

During the last year or two there has been an increasing demand for the restoration of specific moral instruction to the curriculum and for the formulation of a substitute for the old Rescript. Broadly speaking, three arguments

¹ See Robert King Hall, *Shushin: The Ethics of a Defeated Nation*, New York, 1949.

² An interesting description of the circumstances surrounding the abolition of the ethics course is given in Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-16.

³ See Robert King Hall, *Education for a New Japan*, New York, 1949, pp. 166-7.

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have been used. First, there is the general argument that any national system of education should concern itself with moral instruction and that this is particularly so in Japan, where the moral implications of religious institutions are so slight. Further, it is argued, national unity and the smooth working of any political system require that everyone subscribe to certain basic moral assumptions. In Western society this is provided by the Christian tradition and the universal subscription to certain Christian ideals. In prewar Japan it was provided by the Imperial Rescript, which formed the "moral prop" of the nation (an oft-used phrase). The disappearance of the Rescript has left a vacuum which must be filled by a new formulation of a system in harmony both with those elements in Japan's tradition that need to be preserved and with the new democratic institutions of the postwar period.

Second, there is the specific argument that Japanese society is entering a period of moral degeneration characterised by the "*après-guerre* spirit", the "misinterpretation of democracy", or "the confusion of liberty with license". The symptoms are the decline in general standards of honesty, the increase in crime and juvenile delinquency, gambling, street-walking, the revolt of the young against their parents, drug-taking, suicide, adolescent sex-crimes and messianic cults—of which the sensationalism of the Japanese press provides a constant supply of examples. The only way to stop the rot, it is suggested, is to restore moral instruction to the schools and, since these post-war phenomena are generally associated with the postwar ideology of democracy and freedom, the implication is that this moral instruction should take the form of a return to traditional Japanese values.

Third, there is the argument that the defeat has destroyed the pride of the mass of the people in their own country and that it is necessary to do something to restore a sense of patriotism. Often the qualification is added that a new definition of patriotism is required to distinguish it from a spirit of aggressive nationalism. The government has shown its concern with this question. In 1950 the Minister of Education made statements encouraging the singing of the national anthem and the flying of the Rising Sun on occasions of national importance. The monthly journals in that year were filled with articles concerning the "new patriotism" and its relation to the old patriotism, to nationalism and to national sovereignty. The discussions seem to have entered a new phase with the creation of the Auxiliary Police Reserve in August 1950, when right-wingers pointed out with concern, and left-wing writers with malice, that there was little value in an army which lacked a firm ideological basis to provide a fighting morale. In that month the Prime Minister summoned a meeting of the Bunkyo-shingikai (Culture Study Group), which he had established in the previous year to advise him on educational matters. This group comprised a small number of men of

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the type usually described in Japan as "old liberalists":⁴ Nosei Abe, former Minister of Education and President of the Gakushuin University; Seiichiro Takahashi, former Minister of Education and Curator of the National Museum; Shinzo Koizumi, former President of Keio University; Tsunego Baba, former editor of *Yomiuri*; and Tetsuro Watsuji, emeritus professor of philosophy at Tokyo University. The meeting was called to study the question of the government affording the people leadership on the problem of patriotism, and a government announcement was foreshadowed for early September. Owing, apparently, to disagreement within the group over the policy to be pursued, and to opposition from outside to the whole idea of the government taking any action in this matter, the announcement was never made.

Opposition to the demand for a new formulation of a national ethic and for a reintroduction of moral instruction in schools has been strong in educational circles and has been concerned largely with noting the danger that such developments might again be used for nationalistic purposes. It has been an underlying premise of these arguments that, despite the decentralisation of educational control, advice from the Ministry still tends to carry as much weight with the local authorities as did the directives of prewar days. It has been argued that any prescription of private morality as by the rulers for the ruled is contrary to the spirit of democracy and that the ideals toward which the Japanese people must strive have been sufficiently formulated in the new Constitution. It is denied that rationally-held, explicit moral codes are in any society a chief determinant of behaviour, or that the Imperial Rescript ever acted, in fact, as the "moral prop" of the nation. It is held that the best means of moral and civic training lies in the day-to-day contact between teacher and pupil, helped by such devices within the school as the "Home Room" hour for the discussion of personal problems, and organisations for student self-government.

Rumours that the government was about to reintroduce a new ethics course grew until, on February 8, 1951, the Minister of Education announced that the government had decided against such a step and that its policy was to encourage the carrying on of moral training throughout the school activities. The government would, he said, issue a teacher's guide to moral training within the framework of the existing curriculum. Such a document was later drafted by a special committee established by the Ministry and seems to have gained wide acceptance.

⁴ A rather difficult category to define. The term seems to be used to denote a group of writers, bureaucrats and elder statesmen in the aristocratic rather than the popular tradition who were opposed, for a variety of reasons, to the militarists' policy in the 1930s. Perhaps the only unifying characteristic of this group is that its members believed, in the 'thirties, in the desirability of civilian control over the military.

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THE question of specific moral instruction in schools was thus disposed of for the time being, but the question of a substitute for the Imperial Rescript remained. In September 1951, the Minister of Education told reporters that he was preparing a draft, for official publication and distribution to schools, of "his personal views as Minister". The anti-Rescript group thereupon began sharpening its swords.⁶ On November 17, *Yomiuri* published what purported to be a copy of this draft, entitled "An Outline of Ethical Practice for the Japanese People". This draft was reportedly being circulated among the Culture Study Group and Ministry of Education officials, and was to be published on the day of the promulgation of the Peace Treaty.⁷

Opposition, however, proved so strong that ten days later the Minister announced his decision not to proceed with publication of the document, which is, therefore, now of only historical interest. Nevertheless, a translation of it, together with a summary of the reactions which it provoked, may provide a useful indication of recent trends in political and educational thinking in Japan. Since, in a document of this sort, translation cannot always catch the emotional overtones of some of the terms employed, an attempt has been made in footnotes to indicate certain of the associations of key words which have a long history in Japanese thought.

AN OUTLINE OF ETHICAL PRACTICE FOR THE JAPANESE PEOPLE⁷

Preamble

In order that Japan may become a sovereign and independent nation,⁸ it is

⁶ See, for example, an article by Kenzo Nakajima and others in *Bungei Shunju*, December 1951.

⁷ The authenticity of the "leak" was later confirmed by the Minister.

The Minister, Teiyu Amano, was until recently a popular headmaster of the First High School in Tokyo, a school with a traditionally liberal, if not radical, bias. He would come into the category of "old liberalist" and was formerly best known as a Kantian philosopher. He has written many works on philosophy and ethics, including some recent popular ethical treatises. He is not a member of the Liberal Party, and first entered politics at the time of his appointment in May 1950.

⁸ *Kokumin jissen yoryo*: literally, "outline for putting into practice by the people". The Minister later explained as the reason for his choice of the title that he wished to stress that it was not, like the old Rescript, something only to be memorised and to bear no relation to conduct. He confessed that he did not much like the title, but all of the other suitable titles he could think of he had already used for his own books. (*Shukan Asahi*, December 16, 1951.)

⁹ *Kokka*: In ordinary Japanese no distinction is made between the nation as a group of people and the state as an institution of government; both are rendered by the word *kokka*. Perhaps this usage is a reflection of the German metaphysical theories of the State which have been dominant in Japan since the Meiji period, when this term came into common use. The ambiguity of the term becomes important in such phrases as "the individual should give his devoted service to the *kokka*". In this translation "state" has been generally used, but "nation" where the context seems to demand it.

Two other words can sometimes be translated "nation", though neither is systematically used in contradistinction to *kokka* as the State. They are *kokumin*, the word employed in the title, which, however, corresponds more closely to the "people" as opposed to the government; and *minzoku* (not used in this document), which has the basic meaning "race" and, with its implied stress on the biological uniqueness of the Japanese people, a high emotional content.

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a fundamental necessity that the people should first awaken to the spirit of sovereignty and independence. This spirit can be realised only if the people firmly establishes its moral principles and energetically devotes itself to its task on a basis of morality.⁹

But what is this "spirit of morality"? It means being aware of the dignity of one's own personality¹⁰ and letting nothing interfere with that awareness. It means living in a spirit of harmony¹¹ which, as well as one's own individual dignity, respects also the personality of others. Nations, too, must seek harmony, rather than being concerned solely with their own interests, and must recognise also the interests of other nations. In order that individuals may live in a spirit of justice and impartiality, the nation also must proceed with justice and impartiality. For the individual, justice and impartiality consist in giving his devoted service to the nation, and, conversely, for the nation, justice and impartiality consist in considering the interests of individuals, in giving its devoted service to the cause of mankind. To be aware of the dignity of one's own personality and at the same time to respect others is to give due importance to harmony. This is what morality is.

The spirit of justice and impartiality and of harmony is the foundation of morality and the fundamental spirit uniting the individual, the nation and mankind. Let us make sure that this spirit is kept vividly alive among our people.

Section I. The Individual

1. The dignity of the individual personality. Inasmuch as we are human beings, we cannot but recognise the dignity of the individual personality.
2. Freedom. The true essence of man lies in the fact that he is free. True freedom lies in not being the slave of instinctive animal self-indulgence or impulsive desires.
3. Righteousness. In all circumstances unrighteousness and lack of faith must be avoided. He who is ever righteous is the light of the world.
4. Responsibility. We must always bear responsibility, both to ourselves and to others. Without responsibility there can be no freedom.
5. Thought. In order to speak righteously one must think deeply. Deep thinking is different from wavering indecision.
6. Love. Consideration of the welfare of others with warmth in one's heart is the means of living a really human life.

⁹ *Dogi*: Three terms are used for "morality" or "morals": *dogi*, which is used throughout the Preamble and again in the final section, has traditional Confucian associations; *dotoku*, which is used twice at the end, is a more common word and has largely lost its Confucian associations, owing to its use as a translation of "morality" in Western philosophical writings; *rinri*, which occurs once, in the title of Section IV, 7, corresponds fairly exactly to "ethics" as a consistent, philosophically-derived moral system.

¹⁰ *Jiko no jinkaku no songen ni mezameru*: The meaning of this is extremely obscure—literally, "awaken to the dignity of one's own character". *Jinkaku* is normally used in the sense of "character" as in "a man of character". This passage seems to be an obfuscation of the idea expressed in the Constitution: "everyone shall be respected as an individual".

¹¹ *Wa*: This, as an independent word, is generally used in Confucian contexts—e.g., *fuju no wa*, the Confucian ideal of marital harmony.

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7. Purity. It is important to be receptive to all that is wholesome. Let us keep pure hearts in pure bodies.

8. Endurance. We must always bear fortitude in our hearts. It is easy for men in adversity to fall into reckless despair, but the way of man lies in bearing up against adversity and in continuing to observe the principles of right conduct without banishing love from his heart.

9. Wisdom. We must try to obtain profound wisdom. Those whose wisdom is rich and profound are able to live their lives profoundly.

Section II. The Family

1. Husband and wife. Marriage is a beautiful moral relationship¹² which springs from the nature of man. Husbands must love their wives, and wives respect and love their husbands. It is easy to tire of marital love, but fidelity and respect can conquer this condition and bring the love of husband and wife to fulfillment.

2. Parents and children. Just as parents love and care for their children, so should children show dutiful regard for their parents. In order that they may give place to their children and allow them to create the succeeding age, parents have the responsibility for ensuring healthy growth for their budding lives. And since creation is impossible except on the basis of tradition, respect and love for parents is the happy duty¹³ of the child.

3. Brothers and sisters. Brothers and sisters should love and cooperate with one another. Affection between brothers and sisters is the basic pattern for just human relations in a just society.

4. Discipline. It is in the family that the education of the child is most directly achieved. Each child must be trained to fulfil his function in the family. Peace and order in the family depend on each member of it playing his part in full love and sincerity.¹⁴

5. Relations between families. Each family should strive to maintain peaceful relationships with other families and should not think solely of its own profit. Only in this way is a good society possible.

Section III. Society

1. Public opinion. We are social beings. In order to create a good society, we must listen with respect to the opinions of others. To pay due attention to the opinions of others is not to be ready to follow any lead. Good public opinion can be created only if all maintain a spirit of integrity and possess powers of criticism.

2. Common sense. In order that society may progress, we must be prepared to abandon meaningless old customs and to live always anew. But this must not

¹² *Jimin-kankei*: *Jimin* is the Confucian term for the five basic moral relationships (master-servant, parent-child, husband-wife, elder brother-younger brother, friend and friend) and has practically no use outside of these contexts.

¹³ *Gōwa*: This is a very solemn word, by contrast to which the "responsibility" (*sekinin*) laid on the parent is rather less onerous.

¹⁴ *Makoto*: The central concept of Shinto ethics as elaborated by Kamo no Mabuchi in the eighteenth century. For an exposition of *makoto* as the core of the national spirit, see Robert King Hall, *Kokutai no Hongi*, Cambridge, Mass., 1949, pp. 100-102.

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lead to the superficiality which is ever following the fashion of the moment. We must always judge with a healthy common sense, that we may contribute to the development of society.

3. Public spirit. The preservation of social order is the foundation of daily life.

4. Mutual aid. We must help one another with loving hearts. It is by mutual help among its members that society is bound into one.

5. The common welfare. We must work for the common welfare and not act in the interests of party or faction. When there is a conflict of interests, a solution must be sought in a spirit of harmony, with regard for the well-being of society as a whole. Struggles between conflicting interests must never be pushed so far that they involve the destruction of society itself.

6. Culture. A good society seeks the creation of a good culture. When a society forgets culture, it reverts to primitive barbarism. But if culture is thought of solely in its pleasure-giving aspect, society will fall into decadence.

Section IV. The State

1. The State. We must strive to preserve the independence and continuity of a firmly-founded State and to create a high level of culture. As a people we were all born in the same land, live our lives in the same land, share a common history, speak a common language. The State is the parent body of the individual; without the State there would be no individuals. It is wrong for the State to think of individuals solely as means to an end, and it is wrong for individuals to think of the State solely as a means to an end. The two are in a close and indivisible relationship.

2. Tradition and creation. This State has its own traditions, and if we are to create a new age, we must be firmly rooted in these traditions. Creation can take place only on the basis of tradition, and tradition can come alive only through creation.

3. The national culture. Each nation must create its own individual culture. When it has created a truly individual culture, then, and then only, can it create world culture also.

4. Patriotism. The fortunes¹⁵ of a country depend on the patriotism of its people. We are responsible for taking over the State from our forefathers and passing it on to our descendants. To create a good State is to make a contribution to the world. True patriotism is the same as love for humanity.

5. Politics. Politics must not be conducted in the interests of party or faction or class.¹⁶ When a clash of interests arises between class or party, a solution must be sought by mutual exchange of opinion, with full regard for the interests of the nation as a whole.

6. The Emperor. We possess an Emperor who is a symbol of the State, wherein lies the peculiar nature of our national polity.¹⁷ It is a special characteristic of

¹⁵ *Kobo*: "Rise or fall", with primarily military associations.

¹⁶ *Mibun*: This, rather than "class" means something more akin to "place", "status", "station" (to which it has pleased God, etc.). It is the word traditionally used for class status in the feudal period and largely retains those associations.

¹⁷ *Kokutai*: A central concept of the prewar nationalistic metaphysics. Some of the properties of *kokutai* (variously translated "national ethos", "national entity", "national polity", "structure of the State", etc.) are that the position of the Emperor is of central importance to it, that it is

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our country that there has always been an Emperor throughout its long history. The position of the Emperor partakes of the nature of a moral focus as the symbol of the State.

7. The ethics of the State. Morality is the lifeblood of the State. The State, in essence, is founded more deeply on its moral than on its political or economic character. The Emperor possesses an objective moral quality. Thus the position of the Emperor symbolises the fundamental character of the State.

BEFORE considering the reactions provoked by the publication of the "Outline", it may be of interest to add certain remarks concerning the document itself.

First of all, the document differs in many respects from anything which would have issued from the Ministry of Education before the war. Albeit in the vaguest terms, the individual is given his place in society and his duties are no longer summarised in terms of loyalty and filial piety or of correct behaviour in the traditional five human relationships of Confucianism. Stress is laid on the importance of international harmony and, in line with the "We, the Japanese people . . ." with which the new Constitution begins, "we" figures largely in these precepts in an attempt to give them the air of a communal affirmation of faith rather than of a codex legislated by rulers for the ruled. (The tone of the Preamble, however, is not without the traditional flavour.)

The document makes much use of vague terms. There is no indication, for instance, of what constitutes a good society in political or economic terms. A good culture is even less well defined, except that it lies somewhere between barbarism and decadence. What acts constitute "unrighteousness" or "self-indulgence" or "respect"? Many of the precepts are of the nature more of slogans designed to attach positive emotional colour to certain words and phrases than of meaningful propositions or precise imperatives. The potentialities of such vagueness are, of course, obvious. Practically anything could be made of a document like this if it were used as teaching material in schools. Its purport would depend entirely on the type of illustrations which teachers gave of the virtues and concepts involved.

An attempt is made in some passages to bolster certain elements of the traditional structure of Japanese society against the threats of Western individualism and egalitarianism. The family is still the intermediate link between the individual and the State. Society is a collection not of individuals but of families. Husbands are not required to respect their wives, but only to love them. The phrase translated "give place to their children" (II,2) immediately suggests to a Japanese the transfer of the headship of a family from father to son, and thus implies the traditional Japanese "continuing

sacrosanct and valid for all time, and that only Japan has it. See Hall, *Kokurui no Hongi*, cited, *passim*.

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family" type of structure. The basic pattern for social relationships is the relation between brothers and sisters—always a traditional theme of Japanese society.¹⁸ Though, at first sight, it may seem to be a principle of universalistic ethics, the type of relationships which it suggests to the ordinary Japanese is not that motivated by universally diffused human kindness, nor is it the specific contractual relationship between equals typical of modern capitalist society. It is, rather, a through-thick-and-thin relationship of mutual indebtedness which knits together those bound by links of common interest or emotional identification against the outside world; it is sort of an in-group morality. Moreover, since age is still important as a criterion of status in Japanese society, the general notion of brother-and-sisterhood implies a relationship not between equals but between an (elder) superior and a (younger) inferior.

Another dominant theme is the emphasis on self-restraint and endurance. This is perhaps inevitable in view of the fact that the "Outline" is partly a result of a demand for something to check the decline in moral standards as evidenced in the crime, gambling, vice and lavish spending which is so deplored in Japan today. One would not wish to doubt the sincerity of the Minister's motives, but it is not, perhaps, irrelevant to recall that the army used a similar moralistic appeal—for all decent Japanese to rally to the defence of traditional values against the decadence of urban bourgeois society—as a means of gaining popular support, particularly in the rural areas, when seeking control in the late 1920s and the 1930s. Particularly noticeable is the fact that freedom, in this scheme of things, is given no positive value and is characterised entirely in terms of restraint. One is reminded of the Hegelian idea of freedom as the right to obey the laws of the State; and that the similarity is not coincidental is suggested not only by the Minister's own personal background but also by the political philosophy which seems to underlie the whole document.

This, indeed, is its most disturbing aspect. In the section devoted to society, honourable mention is given to some of the notions which have figured largely in postwar democratisation propaganda—public opinion, the common good, etc.—but it is not clear how society is related to the State. It is clear, however, what the State is in Mr. Amano's scheme of things. It is a metaphysical entity which transcends the individual; it "considers" the interest of individuals, and is capable of "thinking" of individuals as tools. True, it is as wrong for the State to use individuals as means to an end as it is for individuals to use the State as a means to an end, but the statement "without the State there are no individuals" has no reciprocal. The opposi-

¹⁸ A useful short account of some of its consequences is given in T. Kawashima, *Nihon-shakai no kanokuteki kosei* (The Familial Structure of Japanese Society), Tokyo, 1948.

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tion of "party and factional" interests to the interests of the whole, given this conception of the State and without any further definition of the interests of the whole in terms of the interests of the constituent individuals, leaves the door open to totalitarianism. The State is essentially moral in character rather than an organ for the resolution of conflicting political and economic interests, and it is this moral character which the Emperor symbolises. What this means is anybody's guess, but would it be unfair to suppose that this political philosophy could be used only too easily to create a situation exactly similar to that of prewar Japan, when a dominant group could suppress "party and factional" movements for social reform by appeal to a higher morality—the duty of loyalty to the Emperor? The higher morality in its new form would be the principle of morality itself, as exemplified in the transcendent State, as symbolised by the Emperor. It is also to be noted in this section that the claim to racial uniqueness as exemplified by the continuity of the Imperial family is back again, though a shadow of its former self.

THE "Outline" received a hostile press. On November 18, 1951, the day after its publication of what it claimed was a copy of the draft "Outline", *Yomiuri*¹⁹ assumed a derisive tone. The document, it declared, recalled the seventeen-point moral code of Shotoku-Taishi issued in 604, and the resemblance was made even more striking by the attempt to bolster up the Emperor system. Would it not have been easier to issue Shotoku-Taishi's code as it stood? The newspaper objected to the "musts" and "oughts", and suggested that, if the Minister of Education really thought that the State was moral in character, he should start by trying to infuse a little morality into the corrupt political life which went on around him.

On the following day *Yomiuri* drove the attack home with a leader entitled "The Amano Outline: A Declaration of War on Democratisation". It was not surprising, the writer asserted, to find in the work of a Kantian scholar many traces of German idealist philosophy, but the general form of the document, with its progression from the individual, through the family, to the State, reminded one most of all of the Confucian "Greater Learning", while the final paragraphs were the very embodiment of the Confucian doctrine of the ruler and the State founded in morality, a doctrine which "for millenia in China and for centuries in Japan has been a powerful instrument of popular oppression for the very reason that it bears no relation whatever

¹⁹ The particular virulence of *Yomiuri*, which has recently tended to the extreme right wing, is an illustration of the vagaries of newspaper politics in Japan. The background of the "leak" and the policy of *Yomiuri* should make an interesting story in view of the fact that Tsunego Baba, a former editor and still, apparently, a powerful influence in *Yomiuri*, is a member of the Culture Study Group. One cannot avoid the suspicion that personalities may be involved as much as principles.

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to actualities". The attack concentrated on the position given to the Emperor, and concluded: "Here we are presented with what is, in fact, no more than a postwar edition of the Rescript on Education. If this revival of an anachronistic ideology, which in the past was fully exploited as a means of oppression at home and of aggression against our neighbours abroad, is not a declaration of war on democracy, what is it?" The leader also contained the following passage, all the more noteworthy for its appearance in the right-wing *Yomiuri*: "What has this *a priori* idealism, for ever in pursuit of abstract concepts, to contribute to 'the practice' of living today, at a time when, in hand with the democratisation of education, the emphasis of school education is being placed on understanding and adapting to society as it exists, and when social security has long ceased to be a mere idea and has become a 'practical' problem?"

The position accorded the Emperor was again the chief point of criticism made by *Asahi* on November 18. There would be no objection, it wrote, if the Emperor were to be made the centre of the people's affections, but, "whatever paragons we get as Emperors", to attribute to them an "objective moral quality" is hardly a plausible idea and makes possible the misuse of the Emperor's position by ambitious politicians. The Emperor of this "outline" and the Emperor of the Imperial Rescript on Education are not essentially very different. Apart from that, *Asahi* found the document "as innocuous as distilled water—and as insipid". The objection was to the linking of morality with the Emperor and to the idea of its being issued "as from the Heavens above" in the name of a Minister. No one doubted the Minister's sincerity, but if he thought that these things needed saying, he should publish a pamphlet at his own expense.

In response to questions in the Upper House, the Minister confirmed that it was his intention to issue such a document as representing "his private view as Minister", and reiterated his view that the Emperor was the "moral focus" of the nation. As a result of opposition both in the Diet and among the public, the Education Committee of the Upper House on November 26 summoned nine witnesses to comment on (a) the document as issued in *Yomiuri*, and particularly the passages relating to the Emperor; (b) the propriety of its being issued as a personal statement by the Minister of Education; and (c) the moral state of the nation and the whole question of the necessity for such a measure. The witnesses included the Librarian of the National Diet Library and former Minister of Education, two head-teachers, three professors of Tokyo University, the president of an insurance company, and two representatives of educational bodies.²⁰ On the next day the Minister

²⁰ Only the president of the insurance company, Ichiro Yano, expressed sympathy with the views in question, and even he thought that the "Outline" would not be most effective if pub-

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told reporters that, in view of the opposition which had been aroused, he would like to "go back to the beginning and start thinking all over again" about the content and the timing and method of publication of the document. If public opinion proved to be against it, he would be prepared to abandon the plan altogether. He wanted more time to consider the matter.²¹

Writing in *Shukan Asahi* on December 16, the Minister reiterated this decision and explained his motives in preparing the outline. He recalled that he had himself repeatedly opposed the creation of a substitute for the Rescript on Education because he objected in principle to the authoritarian legislation of private morality, and because he did not believe that memorised moral precepts had any effect on conduct. It was only after he had become Minister and had left the study for the world of politics that he had become aware of the widespread concern about moral standards and of the extent to which the discrediting of certain traditional values had, for some people, destroyed the validity of all traditional values. He had become convinced of the need for something, not to be learned by heart as the old Rescript had been, but for people to stop and think about and refer to in moments of crisis. It had been far from his intention to give orders to the people; he had merely thought that people would find his "Outline" useful in filling a felt need. However, he was prepared to bow to public opinion. He also ex-

lished as planned. "Some people might think it totalitarian, and then it would have the opposite effect to that intended." It would be better published privately, he said. (*Asahi*, evening edition, November 26, 1951.)

Both of the head-teachers were opposed in principle to the publication of such a document. Akira Noguchi, president of the Secondary School Headmasters' Association and a member of the drafting committee of the Ministry of Education's "Teacher's Handbook on Moral Training", said that the policy of moral training in schools as conceived in the "Handbook" was based on the creation of positive independent individuals who were capable of evolving their own morality and of making their own contribution to a democratic society. The Minister of Education wished to create a mould into which everyone should be forced to fit. (*Ibid.*)

All of the witnesses except Yano objected to the Emperor's position as the moral focus of the State. Noguchi called it "the first step towards deification of the Emperor". (*Ibid.*) Tokujiro Kanamori, Librarian of the National Diet Library, was reported as having said: "According to the Constitution, the Emperor exercises only those powers which are invested in him by the will of the people; according to this, the Emperor is the embodiment of morality whom the people have only to revere, or his pronouncements are invested with a moral authority which the people have only to obey. Empirically speaking, it does seem that the Emperor is the centre of the affections of the vast majority of the people of this country. But this is a fact; it is not a norm." He objected also to the statement that the State is the parent body of the individual as tending to deny "the essential existence of the individual". (*Mainichi*, evening edition, November 26, 1951.)

Mataichi Kido, professor of journalism at Tokyo University, said that the basic problem of morality was political. Until there is political and economic stability, there can be no improvement in moral standards, and a moral code in the form of imperatives would have no effect whatsoever. (*Asahi*, evening edition, November 26, 1951.)

Several of the witnesses found the last two paragraphs incomprehensible, and all protested against the proposal that the document should be published as the personal view of the Minister of Education and yet be issued through government channels.

²¹ *Asahi*, evening edition, November 27, 1951.

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plained the passage which he had affirmed in the Upper House, concerning the Emperor as the moral focus of the nation. He apologised for not having made himself clear. What he had meant was that the Emperor was not a centre of power nor an object of worship; he was the object of affection. Now, affection was not political, not religious, not economic, not cultural; the only thing it could be was moral. It was in that sense that he had used the term: he meant a "moral focus" and not a "focus of morality".

With the Minister's conciliatory withdrawal, a truce has been called in what one writer called "the moral battle of Showa", but the issue is not dead. A leading article in *Tokyo Shimbun* on November 30, while applauding the Minister's respect for public opinion, reaffirmed the need for something to halt the decline in moral standards and to restore a sense of patriotism (appropriate quotation here from Rudyard Kipling²²), and suggested the formation of a committee to consider the drafting of some sort of moral code, perhaps on the basis of that already drafted by the Minister. If such a document could be produced in consultation with a wide range of responsible opinion, there would be no objection to its publication even in the face of opposition. There was no reason for taking into account "the sort of opposition which tends to come on these occasions from certain groups who wish thereby to get themselves labelled progressives". It would be well to bear in mind also that, at the same time as he was under fire from the left for his "Outline", Amano was being severely criticised also by right-wing politicians for his failure to make heads roll after the demonstration against the Emperor by students of Kyoto University. There were proposals, to which he showed himself sympathetic, that the Minister of Education should be given powers of control over the appointment of university presidents.

In view, however, of the publicity given to the tendency of the present Japanese government to "put everything in reverse", one would prefer the emphasis of this report to lie on the opposition to the "Outline" and its success. The controversy is, at least, an illustration of the fact that there can be no simple answer to the question: has democracy taken root in Japan? There is no indication in the Japanese press of what part, if any, the Occupation played in the affair; but, given the general climate of opinion in Japan today, there is no reason for doubting the sincerity of the opponents of anything which smacks of a return to "the old Japan". Whether they will hold their own or be overwhelmed by the march of events, only the future can decide.

London, April 1952

R. P. DORE

²² It is a common feature of discussions concerning the value of tradition, royalty, patriotism, or ceremonial in Japan for an advocate of anything which might be construed as "anti-democratic" to point to an English example and thus to show that he is really on the side of the angels.

Problems of Economic Development in the Philippines

DESPITE widespread physical destruction and economic disruption caused by the Pacific war, the Philippines occupied a uniquely favorable position in the Far East at the time it gained its independence in 1946. For one thing, the country had abundant dollar resources and a stable currency which permitted unrestricted imports. For another, it possessed extensive material resources on which to base a sound economy. Of equal importance was the availability of an experienced administrative class as well as a rapidly increasing number of skilled technicians in many fields. A further favorable factor was American goodwill, which could be counted upon for assistance and encouragement of various kinds. On the other hand, the new government had to cope both with multitudinous problems of social dislocation and with equally pressing economic rehabilitation and development needs. The existence of extensive dollar credits and natural resources did not guarantee the establishment of a sound and balanced economy.

In fact, in the immediate postwar years government finance and domestic production suffered from the combination of an unrestricted import policy and a lack of constructive economic planning which left the country almost wholly dependent upon external agencies for its existence. In September 1946, therefore, the Philippines and the United States established a commission¹ to consider such interrelated matters as taxation, budgets, public debt, currency and banking reforms, trade, reconstruction and economic development. In the years since, numerous plans and recommendations have been prepared,² yet in spite of them and the disbursement of more than two billion dollars in the Philippines by United States government agencies,³ the national economy has shown no basic improvement. Indeed, as is noted below, in relation to the growing demands upon it, the basic structure of the economy has become weaker and will probably continue to do so.

¹ The *Report and Recommendations* of this Joint Philippine-American Finance Commission was issued in July 1947, together with a report by Thomas Hibben, *Philippine Economic Development: A Technical Memorandum*. These documents are discussed in Shirley Jenkins, "Financial and Economic Planning in the Philippines", *Pacific Affairs*, March 1948.

² These include: *Proposed Program for Industrial Rehabilitation and Development of the Republic of the Philippines*, prepared by the technical staff of the National Development Company under the supervision of the H. E. Beyster Corporation (Manila, 1947); *Report of Hon. Miguel Cuaderno Sr., Secretary of Finance to His Excellency Elpidio Quirino, President of the Philippines* (Manila, 1948); *Philippine Agricultural and Industrial Program, Revised 1950* (Manila, 1951); and *Report to the President of the United States by the Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines* (Washington, D.C., 1950).

³ United States government expenditures in the Philippines between September 1945 and June 30, 1951, amounted to \$2,056 million, of which \$864 million was in the form of outright grants and relief.

Economic Development in the Philippines

The Philippine economy has undergone no significant structural change since before the war. Copra has replaced sugar as the leading export crop, and the tremendous United States government disbursements have had an important impact on the national scene; but cash crops remain the basis of the productive system, and dependence on a "colonial" type of foreign trade persists. Yet, if the traditional economic structure has survived a war and a transfer of government, changes have been occurring in the character of the society which that system is expected to support. These changes, spanning the past half-century, are such that, even if the existing type of economy were to achieve its maximum potential, it could not meet the needs of the country.

One change that is too often ignored is quantitative: the population, which is increasing by some half-million persons each year,⁴ is three times larger than it was at the turn of the century. Another change is qualitative: the standard of living⁵ of the average Filipino has risen enormously for many reasons, among which must be included the increasing general literacy, on which American-style mass advertising has capitalized; contacts with American "gadget" culture through schoolteachers, military personnel and overseas travelers; the impact of movies, which represent not only an item of expenditure in the family budget but also a means of creating new interests and objectives; the phenomenal rise in the number of "higher education" institutional graduates with a "professional" level of expectations; the increasing knowledge of the gap between "what could be" and "what is" characteristic of Philippine economic life; and the conspicuous consumption practiced by many affluent Filipinos. These changes naturally demand the provision of an ever larger volume of goods and services. Moreover, the long-established emphasis on production of export crops and the neglect of production for domestic needs have created a situation in which the bulk of consumer requirements for most of the articles that are firmly fixed in the Philippine standard of living must be purchased abroad.

⁴ Estimates of the current annual population increment average approximately 2.4 per cent.

⁵ One must distinguish between "standard of living" and "plane of living", since many Filipinos have raised their "standard" but not their "plane"—an important factor in the increasing social unrest.

("The plane or content of living is a reality experienced by an individual or group . . . made up of a complex combination of consumption, working conditions, possessions, freedoms, and 'atmosphere', and the balance or harmony among them in relation to needs and felt wants. . . . The standard of living . . . is the plane or content of living which an individual or group earnestly seeks and strives to attain, to maintain if attained, to preserve if threatened, and to regain if lost. It is likewise made up of components urgently wanted and worked for, not of dreams or visions, but in various respects it is typically ampler than the current plane of living." Joseph S. Davis, "Standards and Contents of Living", *The American Economic Review*, March 1945, pp. 7, 10.)

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In the past, government policy and, in slightly lesser degree, unofficial plans for economic development have proposed to meet the problem by means of an expansion of export crops in order to earn more foreign exchange. This approach, however, ignores what has become a crucial factor, namely, the large and increasing amount of unemployment and underemployment in the country. Significant expansion in the production of crops both for export and for domestic consumption is possible, but it is doubtful whether agriculture, even after expansion, can absorb the increasing numbers of Filipinos who seek productive employment. Greater output will result from improved cultivation techniques, mechanization, better management and sounder marketing procedures, yet that the land cannot absorb much more man power is clear from the following figures.

The total land area of the Philippines is 29.6 million hectares, of which approximately 11 million hectares must remain under forest for reasons of conservation. Of the balance, approximately 4.6 million hectares are needed for residential sites, communication routes and other non-agricultural uses. Since much of the remaining 14 million hectares is "worn out" or otherwise unsuitable for cultivation, the potentially productive agricultural area totals between nine and ten million hectares. In 1951, about five million hectares of this total were cropped. Thus, four to five million hectares remain to be brought under cultivation.

The population of the Philippines is approximately twenty-one million. On the assumption that it comprises thirty-five per cent of the population, the total labor force numbers some 7,350,000 persons.⁶ If this total were apportioned to the land now under cultivation, each laborer would farm slightly more than two-thirds of a hectare. If all of the potentially productive agricultural land were distributed evenly among the present number of persons in the labor market (which is increasing by about 150,000 per year), each laborer would have less than 1½ hectares. Yet most agricultural experts agree that the average Filipino farmer can work three hectares of rice land (the most labor-consuming of all agricultural occupations in the Philippines), using only a carabao and primitive cultivation methods, and that he must have more land than he does now if he is to better his livelihood.⁷

⁶ This estimate, a conservative one, excludes most young children and many housewives who contribute a large amount of work, especially in the rice-producing areas.

⁷ The 1939 Census indicated that more than half of the farms were smaller than two hectares. In the crowded provinces of Central Luzon the percentage of small farms is much higher. Not only is a farm of less than three hectares unable to provide more than a bare subsistence for the average household; it also fails to make full use of a rice farmer's time even during the rice-growing season. Since rice requires more labor than any other important Philippine crop, an increase in the size of the average holding not only is necessary to improve the farmers' livelihood but moreover is possible without any change in the present primitive methods of cultivation. Utilization of the farmer's ability to manage more land—an absolute necessity if he is not to exist at a marginal level—will reduce correspondingly the number of laborers needed to work the land.

Economic Development in the Philippines

Since approximately half of all agricultural laborers are engaged in rice farming, the following figures are of interest. Pelzer has estimated⁸ that, with present primitive methods, wet-rice cultivation requires approximately 300 man-hours per hectare. Now, on the assumption that all Filipino workers engage in this most labor-consuming of agricultural pursuits and that farming is wholly unmechanized, in order to cultivate the land currently under crops each laborer would have to work less than twenty-eight eight-hour days per year. In fact, of course, much agricultural land is devoted to crops (e.g., coconuts) that require far less labor than rice does. Moreover, a small but growing area is farmed mechanically, and a single laborer equipped with proper machinery can easily cultivate more than fifty hectares of upland rice,⁹ as has been demonstrated in parts of Mindanao. The sugar industry also is becoming increasingly mechanized. Thus it appears that new employment opportunities in agriculture—even if all of the arable land is brought under cultivation—are practically nonexistent. Consequently, the recommended expansion in production of agricultural commodities cannot solve the pressing problems of unemployment and under-employment that become more acute with each year.

ALL plans for Philippine economic development recognize the need for greater production on both the individual and the national level. Reliance on agricultural land continues to shape economic action and most economic thinking. Even the latest program undertaken jointly by the Philippines and the United States with the assistance of Mutual Security Agency funds has been predominantly agricultural in scope, and public statements have made clear that the program will emphasize mainly agriculture. Doubtless, agricultural productivity can be greatly augmented through employment of more efficient methods and cultivation of land not now in use. It is equally clear that the country will stand to gain from becoming self-sufficient in a food staple such as rice. However, certain crucial questions remain. For instance, what new opportunities will be created to attract and absorb the large, increasing numbers of those who cannot share in the agricultural improvement program? What economic benefits will result from improved efficiency in output if this reduces employment opportunities on the land without providing others elsewhere?

The only sound major alternative labour outlet lies in industrialization. A cursory reading of Philippine newspapers and of certain government publications may convey an impression that industrialization is progressing satisfactorily, if not spectacularly, but the hard facts do not warrant optimism.

⁸ Karl J. Pelzer, *Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics*, p. 96.

⁹ Most of the land remaining to be cultivated is suitable only for upland rice.

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The volume of goods manufactured was less in 1950 than in 1940;¹⁰ the incomplete figures thus far published for 1951 reveal no significant increases. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, in the absence of reliable statistics for purposes of comparison, that industrial employment opportunities are no more numerous today than they were in 1940.¹¹

The fact that sound industrialization appears to offer the only possible solution to the basic economic difficulties of the country is not widely accepted. Most discussions of Philippine economic development contain some or all of the following reasoning: (1) The Philippines is basically an agricultural country and will always remain so because there is plenty of land; (2) The climate is tropical and not conducive to industrialization; (3) Even if industrialization were desirable, it would be impossible without extensive foreign capital, which is not at present available.

The statement that plenty of land exists for further exploitation has been shown to be erroneous. All of the land suitable for agriculture could be cultivated by less than half the present labor force and exclusively with primitive methods—and even this reduced force would be far from fully employed. The second statement—that the Philippines lies in the tropics—is undeniable, but that climate need not bar industrialization appears from contemporary developments in, for example, India, Puerto Rico and Brazil. Experience demonstrates that Filipino efficiency in properly-managed industrial activi-

¹⁰ Central Bank of the Philippines, *Second Annual Report, 1950*, Chart III, p. 14 (facing).

¹¹ PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT IN REPORTING NON-AGRICULTURAL ESTABLISHMENTS,
BY INDUSTRY DIVISION, 1949-1951

Industry Division	Number of Reporting Establishments	Percentage Increase or (-) Decrease in Employment	
		1950 vs. 1949	1951 vs. 1950
Mining and quarrying	14	20.2	19.2
Manufacturing	302	-2.1	1.0
Transportation and communications	68	-0.9	-4.9
Commerce	172	-6.6	-3.1
Construction	15	-30.3	-37.0
Personal services	54	-1.5	2.9
Recreational services	35	-1.0	-5.8
Government	74	2.8	5.6
Total	734	-0.5	1.3

Source: Central Bank of the Philippines.

These are the only available statistics, and there is no certainty that they represent a valid cross-section of the non-agricultural economy. Nor is there any way of comparing non-agricultural employment accurately in the absence of acceptable statistics for both periods. If, however, physical productivity is taken as a rough indicator of industrial employment, clearly no significant increase in employment opportunities has occurred despite the increase in population.

Economic Development in the Philippines

ties can stand comparison with that of people in any other part of the world. The combination of abundant "cheap labor" and inadequate training has, to be sure, encouraged inefficiency in numerous enterprises, but "cheap labor" is usually inefficient and in the long run more expensive wherever employed. The Philippines constitutes no exception. The third statement—that the Philippines cannot be industrialized without vast amounts of foreign capital—perpetuates what is perhaps the most persistent myth in current economic thinking. The example of Japanese industrialization suggests that large-scale external financing is not essential. To be sure, the Philippines, with its desire to maintain strong democratic institutions, need not follow the Japanese pattern in all particulars, but it is noteworthy that many of the general methods employed by Japan are adaptable to the present situation in the Philippines.

The Philippine gross national product in 1951 (including United States government disbursements) has been estimated at slightly more than five billion pesos,¹² which represented an average per-capita income of about 250 pesos. This extremely low level of income is not, however, indicative of the magnitude of "savings" that can be directed into desirable channels of capital investment. A very small segment of Philippine society receives a share of the national income that is wholly disproportionate to its numerical size.¹³ It is reasonable to assume that approximately one-fifth of the national income could be extracted annually for use in a development program—if a serious effort were made to do so. Domestic capital formation at this rate would more than suffice to finance an ambitious program that would place the necessary emphasis on industrial expansion. However, the direction of savings into proper fields of development would require drastic changes in the economic and social structure of the country, and would entail new economic techniques which, while not inconsistent with democratic procedures, would undoubtedly prove unpopular among powerful groups.

Domestic capital formation for such development could be greatly augmented in several ways. One device would be to reduce the enormous amount of basically unproductive investment that now prevails by regulating commodity speculation, "buy and sell" operations, urban real estate and traditional commercial activities to prevent their monopolizing the bulk of invest-

¹² This figure (5.1 billion pesos) appears in the *Third Annual Report of the Central Bank of the Philippines*, to be published in May 1952.

¹³ "Savings in Southeast Asian countries actually tend to be somewhat higher than might be inferred from their low income levels, because of the wide disparities in income distribution. In the Philippines, where disparities in individual income are probably as wide as anywhere in the world, the Bell Mission estimated that gross savings have constituted about 20 per cent of the gross national product annually from 1946 to 1949." (Charles Wolf, Jr., "Political Effects of Economic Development", *Far Eastern Survey*, May 2, 1951.)

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ment resources. Another would be to channel much of the existing hoards of currency, precious stones and foreign exchange into an investment pool. There is no way of accurately estimating how much money is hidden in bamboo banks, in the ground or in some other "safe" place, but the propensity of many wealthy Filipinos, particularly in the provinces, to hide away large sums, as well as the fact that a substantial number of high-denomination bills (which rarely, if ever, circulate) are held by individuals, indicates that hoarding is prevalent. The extensive foreign-exchange holdings of many individuals could be of great assistance in achieving the desired level of capital formation.

Still another way of harnessing domestic capital to economic development would be to reduce over-all consumption in proportion to production. Since the population is increasing rapidly and many Filipinos exist at a bare subsistence level, a decrease in consumption can hardly be imposed upon the great majority of the people without exacerbating social and political unrest. Any such decreases, therefore, will have to occur primarily among the upper levels of conspicuous consumption. In any case, it should be possible to produce within the country various basic consumer goods that are customarily imported in quantity.¹⁴ Perhaps the least appreciated method of domestic capital formation is utilization of the vast reservoir of unemployed and underemployed man power for productive ends. The problems involved are complex and varied, but tremendous possibilities exist.¹⁵

THE preceding discussion has attempted to show (1) that the Philippine economy, despite an extensive development potential and an imperative need for changes in the existing structure, has not undergone the necessary re-orientation; (2) that increased agricultural output, while both necessary and desirable, cannot solve the basic economic problem of unemployment and under-employment; (3) that the only possible solution lies in rapid industrialization designed to absorb the increasing numbers of those who can find no productive place in the economy; and (4) that the resources of the country are adequate for such a program.

¹⁴ Almost certainly present food imports, for example, could be greatly reduced in a short time if an energetic and popular program of food production were instituted. During the period of Japanese occupation of the Islands, the people adapted themselves ingeniously and successfully to the sudden stoppage of most foreign food supplies. Despite major disruption of all phases of the national life, they not only undertook to feed themselves but also had to supply many Japanese military and civilian personnel.

¹⁵ Japan financed much of its industrialization program with money that was merely rolled off the printing presses. Although several brief inflationary crises ensued, the long-run increase in goods and services created by the capital goods thus financed produced an economic situation which, viewed in an over-all sense, was reasonably sound. Some of the early Meiji currency issues were backed only by the productive potential of those who were unemployed or underemployed.

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Why, then, has industrial development been so laggard? A lack of awareness of the root problems affords a partial answer. Also, of course, the established economic interests have opposed any change in the existing pattern for fear of losing their dominant position. Other possible reasons are embodied in aspects of Filipino culture—for instance, the lack of a tradition of long-range investment by private individuals, the extremely limited use of corporate organization, the acute land-mindedness, the strong familial ties that impose heavy responsibilities toward the kinship group and inhibit the development of economic individualism. Perhaps the most general reason is the lack of a sense of national unity. No comprehensive economic development program can succeed in the absence of a strong feeling of unity based on awareness of a common participation in the undertaking. Unless the average Filipino perceives not only the part that he must play but also a personal stake in its success, he cannot be expected to regard any such program with enthusiasm. On their part, the commercial and landowning classes will be unwilling to exchange their established, profitable economic activities for the unknown unless they consider their obligation to the nation to be as great as that to themselves, their family or their kinship group.

In the "non-economic" sense, survival of the traditional economic pattern has been dependent largely on the operation of the Filipino family system. When a man is out of work, for example, he can usually fall back on his family, which will do its best to support him and his dependents if necessary. When the amount of money in circulation is relatively large, this burden may be bearable; many families, however, are finding it an increasing strain.

Higher education, too, has removed many individuals from active participation in the labor market, thereby lessening pressure as far as employment is concerned. This removal has been only temporary, however; the full impact of the numerous postwar college graduates in search of jobs will be felt shortly. Many of these individuals have raised their expectancies, or "standards of living", and their demands for suitable work will become more pressing.

Finally, it is a paradoxical but incontestable fact that greatly increased pressure on the existing economic order for the provision of employment opportunities has been avoided only because large numbers of soldiers, civilian guards, temporary police, private bodyguards and watchmen, as well as the dissidents themselves, have found "employment" either in repressing or in fomenting organized social unrest. If a large segment of these non-producers were suddenly released from their present activities, the effect of their quest for alternative, productive employment would be extremely serious.

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Despite United States Mutual Security Agency aid¹⁶ and the optimism recently expressed in government and business circles, it is impossible to blink the fact that an economic crisis is rapidly overtaking the Philippines. In late years the country has managed to survive economically because of several transient external factors. Neither the United States government disbursements nor the greatly inflated prices for export commodities, particularly copra, which have provided the main supports for the economy, offer a solid permanent foundation. In fact, greatly reduced United States government disbursements may be anticipated, even if proposed Mutual Security Agency dollar credits should materialize at anticipated levels.¹⁷ As for export-commodity prices, after a spurt caused by stockpiling in connection with the Korean war, they have fallen far below the "boom" highs.¹⁸ Present indica-

¹⁶ Mutual Security Agency activities in the Philippines still use the former Economic Cooperation Administration symbols—but the letters ECA are now interpreted to stand for "Economic Cooperation with Asia."

17 FOREIGN RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS, 1950-1951 (In million dollars)

	1950 ^a	1951 ^b
Receipts		
Merchandise exports	315.3	363.15
Gold	2.0	3.30
U. S. government expenditures	207.6	99.85
Other foreign government expenditures	1.6	1.81
Invisibles	50.0	96.68
Total	576.5	564.79
Disbursements		
Merchandise imports	390.6	469.93
Government expenditures	18.5	14.35
Invisibles	71.7	130.21
Total	480.8	614.49
Surplus or *deficit	95.7	*49.70

^aExports and imports—C.I.F. value.

^bExports and imports—F.O.B. value.

Source: Central Bank of the Philippines.

18 AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES OF COPRA, SUGAR AND ABACA, 1950-1952 (In pesos)

	Dried Copra (100 kilos)	Centrifugal Sugar (picul)	Unprocessed Abaca (picul)
1950			
January	35.25	17.00	53.71
April	39.00	17.05	52.63
July	34.00	17.64	48.88
October	35.38	17.12	53.85

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tions suggest that the earning power of Philippine exports in 1952 will be considerably less than in 1951; as a result of this deterioration as well as of other domestic and world economic factors, the prospect of closing the export-import trade gap is very poor.

The handwriting is on the wall. The Philippines must either revamp the existing economic pattern of investment, production and consumption or face the likelihood of a general economic collapse. The situation is grave. Dollar reserves have dropped steadily since early in 1951, and are now at a dangerously low level.¹⁰ Production remains little changed. And the problem of the key man in the Philippines—the man who finds it increasingly difficult to secure a productive place in society—grows with each passing day.

Manila, April 1952

THOMAS R. McHALE

(table continued from preceding page)

1951			
January	43.27	16.07	68.29
April	43.66	15.16	72.35
July	27.98	16.83	62.03
October	33.11	16.60	52.52
November	29.46	16.43	50.59
December	28.32	16.02	49.34
1952			
January	26.36	13.21	50.42
February	24.06	13.06	53.02
March	19.68	13.76	48.74

Source: Bureau of Commerce.

¹⁰INTERNATIONAL RESERVE OF THE CENTRAL BANK AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS
OF OTHER BANKS, 1951-1952
(In million dollars)

End of Period	International Reserve of the Central Bank	Foreign Exchange Holdings of Other Banks	Total
1951			
January	280.97	76.15	357.12
April	299.56	91.69	391.25
July	264.71	103.44	368.15
October	252.17	69.75	321.92
November	245.53	68.17	313.70
December	244.42	59.45	303.87
1952			
January	242.63	44.00	286.63
February*	238.53	49.91	288.44

*Most of the sugar output is exported in the second and third months of the year.

Source: Central Bank of the Philippines.

The Indonesian Federal Problem Reconsidered

THE term "colonial" implies no more than the existence of a special relationship between a motherland and its colony, in which the former bears the ultimate responsibility and makes the major decisions. This term does not in itself involve a judgment of the merits or defects of colonial administration. The latter may be efficient and impartial, but it remains a system in which ultimate responsibility for the colony lies abroad.

In opposition to this system, colonial nationalism, drawing much of its inspiration from Western political concepts, strives for a government composed of native leaders. Yet, while seeking to adapt Western concepts to local use, nationalistic propaganda cannot confine itself to political theory, since a purely rational and intellectual appeal is inadequate to enlist mass support. There is, in consequence, need in addition for propaganda against the colonial administration as such, depicting the execution of practical colonial policy in sombre hues and conveying the impression that the mere transference of sovereignty will almost automatically remove all of the difficulties of everyday life. However understandable the use of such propaganda may be, it is misleading. Colonial practice is not always so bad as it is often painted for propaganda purposes; its standards and efficiency can be high, although it does of course remain "colonial". On the other hand, the mere achievement of national independence does not necessarily signal the imminence of utopia. Many local problems, having no direct relation to colonial government, remain to be solved after national independence has been won. In some instances the newly independent countries may derive some benefit from drawing on the experience of the former, colonial administrations.

In the case of Indonesia, a major constitutional and administrative problem confronting the present government concerns the proper relationship between central and local authority. Indonesian society is heterogeneous, and the country contains many sub-races of Indonesian stock, each with its own language, customs, social structure and, in certain cases, religion. Therefore, present-day administrative difficulties cannot be understood without consideration of the regional structural differences and their administrative implications. To be sure, the former centralized colonial government and its concomitants, such as Western education and improved means of communication, permitted widening contacts among previously isolated regions, which in turn fostered a sense of geographical unity. This sense was characteristic especially of Western-educated intellectuals, whose direct contacts with Western modes of thought and action tended to loosen their ties with par-

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ticular communities and to stress the desirability of a new, common outlook. They were the first to become "nationally conscious". Moreover, their acquaintance with Western political concepts made them eager to apply these to Indonesia, while taking for granted the political unity only recently created by the colonial government. When, in the course of attempts to exercise the right of self-determination, they found the colonial government standing in their way, their national consciousness evolved into nationalism.

The masses are less affected by national consciousness than the elite, whom they follow at a distance. Especially where a native tradition and a specific social structure exist, local or regional characteristics remain a strong force; in such regions a sense of distinctiveness and of opposition to interference from outside remain to be reckoned with. These sentiments reflect more than a local chauvinism; they flow from a communal tradition which retains demonstrable utility and value for the masses. This co-existence of true national consciousness among some of the elite and of local consciousness among the rural masses has an important bearing on attempts to attack the problem of central-local relations in the field of government.

Federalism as a form of government may be out of date in Indonesia, but the idea underlying it must be taken into account. In the past this factor was ignored in many countries which, under the impetus of rationalism, moved rapidly toward the establishment of strong unitary governments. In our day in some of these countries a reaction has set in. Thus, in Russia and Italy, where somewhat comparable situations existed, experiments in centralism have been followed by a return, in theory at least, to federalist principles. It is not surprising, therefore, that in Indonesia, where two years ago the federal structure was replaced by a unitary one, the voices of advocates of far-reaching regional autonomy are becoming louder.¹ The composition of the country, with its different levels of civilisation, its many languages, its several religions and varying social and political structures, obviously requires decentralisation. The bases for autonomous local government need not be invented; they are conspicuously present.

At this point the writer wishes to express disagreement with a recent PACIFIC AFFAIRS contributor who, in arguing for decentralisation, came to the conclusion that "except at the village level, there is no autonomous basis for

¹ On January 22 and 23, 1952, the newspaper *Berita Indonesia*, a consistent champion since 1946 of the Sukarno government in Djokjakarta, reported a "cry of distress" on the part of those whom it had interviewed on the subject of central-local administrative relations. In the interest of stability the newspaper urged that autonomy be granted to the different parts of Indonesia. Similar opinions have recently been expressed by the Vice-chairman of the Information Section of Parliament after a visit to North Sumatra, and by the Governor of North Sumatra.

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government".³ This statement may be correct to a certain extent for Java, where, except in the four self-governing territories in Central Java, the village has been the main administrative unit.⁴ But it is definitely incorrect in respect of the rest of the archipelago, where a wide variety of native communities, particularly self-governing territories (native states), exists. Since it was upon these communities that the Dutch, drawing on long experience and a profound knowledge of the country, partly based their federalist endeavors, there is some point in examining the merits and defects of their policy. For, although any proposal for reconsideration of the Dutch programme is politically most unpopular, it need not be barred from consideration by students of the Indonesian administrative system.

Mr. Finkelstein is quite right in declaring that "any reconsideration of the existing structure will be flavoured by the emotional commitments to unitarianism and by vivid memories of Dutch attempts to use federalism as a political weapon".⁵ Once federalism had been employed as a political weapon, the differences between the federalists and the unitarians found expression in political terms, thus precluding an objective consideration of the *intrinsic values of federalism and unitarianism*. The dividing line between the two camps came to coincide with the prewar division between supporters and opponents of cooperation with the Dutch. This political alignment did violence to the constitutional development of Indonesia, for it marshaled popular prejudice against any political structure that might recognise the concepts underlying federalism. For political reasons, therefore, the entire Dutch-sponsored system was uprooted after the transfer of sovereignty—with no consideration being accorded its possible inherent merits.

Dutch-sponsored federalism was based mainly on existing local communities, and particularly on the native states. Some of the latter were comparable, in terms of area and political importance, to the Princely States of India; others were much smaller. Since none was large enough to form a separate entity within the federation, each *negara* (constituent state of the federation) comprised several autonomous parts, most of which were federations of native states.⁶ In the first *negara* (East Indonesia), for example, at the top in Makassar was the *negara* central government, which was responsible to an elected parliament. The *negara* was divided into thirteen autonomous parts, called *daerahs*, each of which was a federation of native states or

³ Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "The Indonesian Federal Problem", *Pacific Affairs*, September 1951, p. 288.

⁴ This is not to deny the existence of distinct local traditions in Java. Moreover, for purposes of strictly administrative decentralisation, use can be made of existing units, such as the regencies.

⁵ *Loc. cit.*

⁶ In regions in which native states did not exist, autonomy similar to that enjoyed by such states was granted to territories which had theretofore been governed directly by the colonial administration. Most of these so-called neo-self-governing territories were organic units according to Indonesian *adat* (customary) law, but of lower rank than the native states.

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neo-self-governing territories. The *negara* was in principle a sovereign state, although certain specific government functions, such as defence, foreign relations and higher education, were reserved to the federal government in Djakarta. The United States of Indonesia was in effect "a sovereign nation of many sovereign *negaras*".

Mr. Finkelstein's conclusions, that "such decentralization of administration as exists flows outward from Djakarta" and that "Local representative institutions, provincial and municipal councils, exist because they have been authorized by the central government",⁶ hold good for the present situation, in which the Djakarta central government, having established a unitary state, can do no more than grant a certain measure of administrative autonomy to local institutions—a marked departure from the system sponsored by the Dutch federal plan. However, the organic entities that were the mainstays of the former *negaras*—the autonomous local communities, including the native states—still exist. Moreover, they are of native, not Dutch, origin.⁷

⁶ *Loc. cit.*

⁷ The native states, originally sovereign and independent, were governed by *radjahs* (princes) or sultans. Since the Dutch East India Company was primarily interested in trading rather than in empire building, its contacts with the local populations were restricted to those of a business nature. In other words, interference in native affairs occurred for special reasons and in regions where the Company had settlements, especially along the northern coast of Java and in the Moluccas. In most of the archipelago, where there was no such contact whatever, native society was unaffected by Western actions or ideas. After the restoration of Dutch authority at the end of the Napoleonic wars, however, there was a definite change in attitude: the Dutch government now became interested in empire building. At the beginning of the present century, the entire archipelago came under the authority of the central government in Batavia, and the jurisdiction of the Dutch civil service was extended to include the native communities. These were left intact as far as possible; in dealing with them, the Dutch employed native princes and headmen as intermediaries.

In his capacity as deputy of the Queen, the Governor-General signed agreements with the rulers of the native states which governed relations between their territories and the Dutch government. These agreements originally reflected the principle of non-interference in internal administration, but early in the twentieth century a new type of contract, the "Short Declaration", was introduced; in this the native rulers acknowledged the Dutch Queen as their sovereign, agreed to refrain from contact with foreign powers, and undertook to obey all Dutch regulations within their territories. These new contracts permitted direct Dutch intervention in the internal affairs of these native communities for the sake of modern, efficient government. The status of the native states was left intact in principle, and in 1919 the central government voluntarily restricted the scope of its activities by introducing the "*Zelfbestuursregelen*" (rules regulating the authority of native rulers), which restored considerable administrative authority to the princes. Nevertheless, the Dutch civil service continued to function in the native territories and its officials wielded more authority than is usually accorded "advisers". Yet, in the interest of perpetuating the idea of local autonomy, the system protected the personal authority of the rulers.

A few data will suffice to illustrate the present position of the native states, which are recognised in the Indonesian Constitution. Numbering 278, they have a population of about 17 million. There are only four such states in Java, but they are of great historical and contemporary importance; their populations total about five million. In the other islands, 274 self-governing territories embrace 62 per cent of the total area and some 60 per cent of the population. The two largest states, both in Java, have more than one million inhabitants each; 27 others have between 100,000 and one million; the remainder are smaller.

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The native states were traditionally organised on autocratic and hierarchical lines, but after the Pacific war, when a more democratic system was called for, the rulers' powers were restricted by the introduction of elected representative councils to which they became responsible. If the new Indonesia were disposed to make use of these communities after their inner structures had been modernised, it would not need to reconstitute them as parts of a new federal government. Another possibility would involve decentralisation within the present unitary state, entailing the extension of broad autonomy to communities whose historical tradition qualifies them for it. Those native communities that lack the flexibility needed for adaptation to the new circumstances will be unlikely to survive, but it would be doubtful wisdom to eliminate at the same time those which, given an opportunity, might demonstrate sufficient flexibility.

It was noted earlier that the masses are still more local- than national-conscious. Until national loyalties have been sufficiently developed—a time-consuming process—the importance of local communities as a mass stabilising factor will lie in their provision of a familiar base and of a cohesive force created by a sense of common association and kinship. Even though, when viewed from a Western standpoint, these traditional communities may appear outmoded and fail to provide a political base for intellectuals, semi-intellectuals and urban populations, they nevertheless fill a need of the rural masses. And, especially in a transitional period, this is not unimportant in a society whose Western-educated elite and rural masses are still poles apart.

Thus raises a final question, which is of major significance for many Asian countries. Can the traditional communities be modernised through evolution rather than through revolution? And, if revolution is the only method, what will be its price? Assuming that new, Western-style institutions can be established, will they have the authority and cohesive force needed for stability, and will they afford a sense of kinship instead of mere membership? Of course, foreign cultures and civilisations can provide a stimulus for change in Asia, and can point the way to the goal; but slavish imitation of them will have to be avoided. The new social and political institutions must be firmly rooted in the native soil.

Imitation of Western institutions is sometimes regarded as constituting proof of a modern outlook. In reality, however, mere imitation may reveal contempt for the intrinsic values of the Oriental way of life and for its potentialities for progress and development along Oriental lines. If the mere acceptance of Western standards is viewed as the main desideratum under all circumstances and among all peoples, it may be argued that this concept expresses the old Western sense of superiority in a new guise.

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None of the foregoing remarks is intended to deny the need for change. The problem is not alone one of change, however, but also one of tempo and direction. The ability of certain Indonesian princes, such as the Sultan of Djokja and the Anak Agung of Bali (both native rulers and former cabinet ministers),⁸ to blend the new and the old in their attitudes and actions offers hope for constructive developments in the future. In any case, those who believe that most present-day Asian problems require revolutionary solutions might well pause to consider the suggestion that "in making an estimate of the benefits to be gained from changes in social and economic conditions, the cost of the methods should be brought into the bookkeeping".⁹ Such an accounting might demonstrate—to quote Brogan again—"that you can have too much of a good thing, even of the strong remedy for the ills of a body politic, revolution".

The Hague, April 1952

L. G. M. JAQUET

⁸ The Sultan of Djokja has been appointed Defence Minister in the new Wilopo cabinet. Anak Agung Gde Agung is now Ambassador in Brussels.

⁹ D. W. Brogan, *The Price of Revolution*, London, 1951.

REVIEW ARTICLE

Social Processes in the Pacific Islands

IN August 1951, a group of men and women from universities on both sides of the Pacific, social scientists who have taken the Pacific as their main field of study, assembled at Canberra as guests of the Australian National University to meet with members of that University's Research Schools of Pacific Studies and Social Sciences, and with area specialists whose years have been spent in close contact with social problems among Pacific island peoples. The occasion was the Jubilee Seminar; the theme was Social Processes in the Pacific; and a Report of the Proceedings has recently been published.¹ The Report states that the Conference was not primarily for the presentation of papers on original work, or for the discussion or formulation of research plans as such. It was designed to discuss and define problems of social processes in the Pacific, and to formulate hypotheses for further research.

Social processes were defined by one of the speakers as changes within a society, or processes of adaptation to changing environment. Such processes have, of course, been going on over the centuries; but in most parts of the Pacific they were accelerated, and new factors introduced, when, by the accident of European discovery, islanders still in a neolithic stage of development were precipitated into the nineteenth century; and in parts of Melanesia and Micronesia they gained greatly increased momentum as a result of the recent Pacific war.

In order to appreciate the complexity of the problems confronting this Conference, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the true character of the Pacific islands and their peoples, however well known these things may be. From east to west, the islands extend through upwards of 120 degrees of longitude, or more than one-third the circumference of the earth. They range in size from New Guinea, which is many times larger than all of the other island groups added together, to coral islands whose extent is no more than a few acres. They provide a variety of physical and economic environments, ranging from lofty highlands to vast swamps and forest lowlands, from high volcanic islands to the low causeways of sand and coral that make up the atolls. The island peoples are equally diverse. They fall into at least three major ethnological groups; but there are numberless minor groups, and there is considerable overlapping and interpenetration. Their

¹ The Australian National University Jubilee Seminar, *Social Processes in the Pacific*, Canberra, 1951, 39 pp., mimeo.

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social organisation varies widely. Even at the time of European intrusion, the Polynesian had developed a highly complex social structure; and the Fijian, despite his early reputation, had progressed far beyond the savage state, his social life and polity being as advanced as any in the Pacific. At the other end of the scale, the two to three million people of Melanesia still include elements which lack any social cohesion extending beyond the hamlet or village, while these are wedged in between other groups of widely different culture. Finally, it may be noted that New Guinea, as the principal component of Melanesia, constitutes a problem apart, of a scale and complexity far exceeding those of other island groups.

The Conference was early reminded of this lack of homogeneity. Margaret Mead, in her opening paper on "The Changing Structure of the Family and Higher Kin Units", said, "In a field the size of the Pacific, and when dealing with such a subject, it is difficult to find uniformities to talk about." That was a sufficient warning of the difficulties that lay ahead; nevertheless, the theorist will have his generalisations. Thus, when one speaker asked whether missions used their schools to break up the native social structure, an area specialist objected—reasonably enough—to such a generalisation, stating that there are no "missions" pure and simple. The chairman of the session, however, thought it a defeatist view to argue that anthropologists cannot generalise, while another speaker urged that such generalisations are not laws, but hypotheses to be tested. By the terms of its constitution, the Conference was required to deliberate mainly on the plane of abstraction and theory, with all of the limitations that such a plan imposes. To lesser mortals, it seems unfortunate that so impressive a gathering should have been so fettered.

THE five papers read at the Conference as a basis for discussion were integrated by the common theme of Change, and the angles from which this theme was approached are sufficiently indicated by the titles.² Despite the abstract treatment implicit in the terms of reference, the authors of these papers did not hesitate to use concrete examples to support their theories; and the area specialists added a useful touch of realism to the spirited discussions that ensued.

There were, of course, attempts to isolate normal evolutionary changes from those resulting from the external contacts of the past two hundred years. Dr. Mead drew attention to the weakness of such attempts when she

² J. W. Davidson, "The Changing Political Role of Pacific Islands Peoples"; A. P. Elkin, "Social Processes in the Pacific"; Margaret Mead, "The Changing Structure of the Family and Higher Kin Units"; A. Grenfell Price, "Geopolitical Transformation of the Pacific and Its Present Significance"; W. E. H. Stanner, "The Economic Development of Pacific Peasant Peoples against Their Social Background."

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said: "Future work in the Research School will involve the study of individual cultures under contact conditions; we can no longer simply confine ourselves to reconstructing the past." Such a warning is needed. In this modern world, it may well be doubted if the social and cultural continuum of the theorist can, in fact, exist, at any rate in the Pacific. We cannot regard the island peoples as museum or laboratory specimens; they are living men and women, with many and increasing contacts with the world beyond their horizons. Once the existence of the islands became known, they were invaded by a thin succession of adventurers and traders, missionaries and planters, administrators and doctors, teachers and tourists; in certain areas the trickle has assumed the dimensions of a flood; in others the past hundred years have seen the introduction of powerful immigrant groups, which in Fiji now outnumber the indigenous people. A sympathetic administration may to some extent control these external influences and mitigate their psychological and social effects; but in most cases administrators were late arrivals who came onto the scene when such influences were already long and irrevocably in operation. Thus, however much we may regret it, the island peoples must follow the path that other peoples have followed, assimilating and adapting, and adjusting their ways of life and thought to changing conditions.

The obvious difficulty is the speed at which change is taking place. Social processes which elsewhere have been spread over a thousand years are being compressed into a brief century. Movements such as the "tuka" cults of Fiji and the "cargo" and "marching rule" cults of Melanesia are evidence of the bewilderment and psychological disturbance that are resulting. Clearly, understanding and guidance are needed, urgently and at the highest level. It is here that the value of such a conference as that under discussion is most apparent. It is a hopeful sign that some of the keenest and best-informed minds from our universities and administrative services are enabled to come together in order to consider ways in which the island folk can be helped to make the necessary adjustments to their changing environment, and ways in which the effects of those adjustments may be cushioned.

FROM the wealth of material available in the Report it is invidious to select some papers for comment and not others; yet the limits of space require that this be done. In an arresting and challenging contribution, Dr. Stanner discussed the disabilities of the colonial type of economy. He put forward eighteen "penal handicaps" under which such an economy labours, and asked, "Why development?" After a critical analysis of convincing force and clarity, he leaves the reader in doubt about what can or should be done to benefit island peoples and raise their standard of living. As another speaker put it, Dr. Stanner made a devastating commentary on the difficulties, the eighteen

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demons, awaiting the planner in the Pacific. Yet the existence of difficulties, however formidable, is no sound reason for rejecting planning; indeed, if planning by experts is not adopted, exploitation by ruthless commercialism will release even more devils.

In the discussion on Dr. Price's paper, the present situation in Asia figured largely, with Communism as a spectre in the background. Dr. Mead intervened to pose a provocative question: "Are we to think of these [Pacific] peoples as groups or as individuals? If we deal with them as a group of a single culture, [and] teach them concepts of nationalism, we make them easy game for Communist propaganda. Rather should we not deal with them as individuals with rights of citizenship equal to those of all members of the metropolitan power within whose orbit they now live?"

Dr. Davidson's paper began with a preliminary analysis leading up to the statement of general propositions. To illustrate these, he cited at some length the example of Western Samoa, giving a lucid and interesting account of the historical background and present achievement of political developments in that territory. The paper gave rise to lively discussion, some of Dr. Davidson's propositions receiving strong support, others drawing fire from friendly critics. While some at least of the criticism was of a purely academic character, there are doubtless many who would agree with S. F. Nadel, who pointed out that Western Samoa is an unhappy choice for an example, because it is in important respects unique. "The grafting of the new system on to the indigenous system is not always so successful as it has been in Samoa. At the one extreme are societies which have no structure that can be utilised in the present situation, and at the other extreme are societies with a complex system of government, suitable for their own needs, but not of a kind that can readily be adapted to fit in with the Western system."

Research at the high level represented at this Conference necessarily demands a terminology of its own, and, to the layman, parts of the Report make heavy reading. Expressions such as "the principle of economic reciprocity patterned upon affinal exchanges" and "the re-elucidation of the totality of islands society and culture" may no doubt be understood by the uninitiated; but when a high authority talks of "using kinship models without verbalisation", one must protest that the social theorist should seek more aid from the philologist.

Suva, April 1952

R. A. DERRICK

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THE STATE OF ASIA. A Contemporary Survey. By Lawrence K. Rosinger and Associates. New York: Knopf, under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. 1951. 522 pp. \$6.

In comparison to standard histories of Europe or the United States, modern accounts of the Asian scene have had short leases of life. Is it possible to mention a Western book on Asia, published more than a decade ago, which one could seriously recommend as a background for present-day political, economic or social studies? (J. S. Furnivall's *Netherlands India* comes to mind as an exception.) Asia has changed so rapidly and so completely in recent years that the whole area must be considered anew. Since the end of the first world war, when new Asian nations began to emerge, several of them have been dealt with in books whose writers have been fearful of becoming out of date almost before publication, or of adopting an attitude that would betray obsolete conceptions or lack of sympathy with the country under consideration.

In *The State of Asia*, Mr. Rosinger has enlisted the assistance of a dozen other American experts in an attempt to take stock afresh of the vast area known as "Asia and the Far East". It is a sign of the times that the task of "interpreting" this area should have been given to a team rather than to an individual. In concise and competent essays, Owen and Eleanor Lattimore discuss Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet; Shannon McCune deals with Korea; Miriam S. Farley, the Korean crisis and the United Nations; John M. Maki, Japan; Ellen Hammer, Indochina; Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Malaya and Thailand; S. B. Thomas, Burma; Shirley Jenkins, the Philippines; Paul M. Kattenburg, Indonesia; and Holden Furber, Pakistan.

Mr. Rosinger is responsible not only for the over-all planning of the volume, but for surveys of the two great lodestars of Asian politics, India and China. His account of modern China clarifies much that was obscure, and he avoids the uncompromising partisanship which might have been induced by the circumstances of the Korean war; while his treatment of India brings out the issues by which the Congress will stand or fall. In addition, he has undertaken the main task of the book, which is to attempt to interpret the momentous happenings of the last few years to the American public. In this last endeavour, he has acted with sober discretion, though not without uttering some grave warnings. He points out, for example, that "American influence in Asia could hardly be maintained against a critical Asian public opinion", and he states that what is required is "action revealing an unflinching sensitivity to the Asian desire for far-reaching political, social and economic changes and a keen awareness of the limitations on a military

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interpretation of the Eastern scene". It is noteworthy that a spirit of moderation, large-mindedness and historical perspective in approaching Asia is frequently found in those with intimate knowledge of that area and its affairs, and the opposite, only too commonly, in those altogether lacking such an advantage.

Cambridge, England, March 1952

VICTOR PURCELL

ASIA AND THE WEST. By Maurice Zinkin. London: Chatto & Windus, under the auspices of the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations; distributed in the United States by the Institute of Pacific Relations. 1951. xii, 300 pp. \$3.50.

THIS is a vividly written book which makes a useful contribution to the understanding of a much described area. Mr. Zinkin paints with bold strokes so that at the end the pattern of problems in Monsoon Asia as he sees them stand out clearly—and starkly. In essence the volume is a piece of extended pamphleteering, an essay in persuasion. Its apparent purpose is to impress Western readers with the gravity of the situation in the Far East and with the responsibility of the West to give such assistance as will resolve the conflict between communism and democracy in favour of the latter. In short, it does not set out as a scholarly appraisal, but as an appeal to do something about the situation. This is not said in criticism; for there is need for this kind of writing at a time when a good many people in a goodly number of countries are asking why they should be taxed to provide more food and clothing for the Indian ryot, or his peasant equivalent in other countries in the area, only to have more of his children survive. Incidentally, the author has little to say on how the population dilemma is to be resolved, although he draws the usual gloomy picture of the effect of overpopulation. Possibly he considers that industrialisation and improvements in agriculture, supported by Western capital and technical assistance, will increase productive capacity more rapidly than the population will increase. This, however, is a dubious hope, not supported by the general tenor of the author's argument. The reviewer would have welcomed a fuller exposition of what is perhaps the most bothersome problem of all, from one who appears to have an intimate personal knowledge of peasant communities. What, for example, is the appropriate population policy for India, and how could it be sold to the ryot?

The themes running through the book are the disturbing effects of the impact of the West on the East—including that of the war which the conflict among industrialised countries let loose over Asia—and the responsibilities which the Western democracies should assume in their own interests as well as those of Monsoon Asia. The policy of the United States, as the

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leader of the West in the cold war, comes in for some criticism which will not please conservative elements in that country but is on lines common among critics of this policy in other countries. Whether countries in South-east Asia go communist will depend a great deal on whether they succeed as well as Communist China in raising living standards. From this point of view, the Indian subcontinent is a key area, and there is a sense in which the future of Asia depends on the relative success of India and China in achieving this objective. The author considers that United States policy has failed lamentably in its support of the Nationalist regime under Chiang Kai-shek and that the proper line is to support Monsoon Asia in strengthening its defences and in raising living standards by financial and technical assistance. This would at the same time reduce, but not close, the dollar gap by increasing exports or reducing imports of a number of countries.

While the author covers familiar ground in describing economic, social and political conditions in Southeast Asian countries, his apt selection of material brings out certain of the issues more strikingly than do other volumes with which the reviewer is familiar, first in his discussion of the area as a whole, and then in his examination of conditions in separate countries. Moreover, he shows on occasion a challenging penetration of judgment. The sweep is so extensive that specialists in particular countries or particular problems could very likely point to inaccuracies, and the exposition is not entirely free from ambiguity. For example, the impact of the West is regarded as a "second main cause of pauperisation of the East", the first being overpopulation. The exposition of this thesis does not carry complete conviction.

The author brings out clearly the disruptive effects of the Western impact on social and economic organisation and relationships, but one suspects that the basic conditions of village life and the attitudes of the peasants are much less changed than might be deduced from his account. This is a matter which needs more clarification; for not only do such conditions and attitudes create difficult obstacles to economic development, but also they are likely to be further disrupted by such development. The significant point is, however, that innovations introduced from the West not simply through trade and technology, but also in economic and political ideas, have started a process which is not likely to be stopped. On the contrary, there are in the offing even stronger innovations through international finance and technical assistance. While the prospect of improvements in living standards is a necessary condition for political stability, it by no means follows that satisfaction of this condition will prevent social and political unrest. If it is associated with a further weakening of social sanctions, including religious beliefs, something satisfying must be put in their place. Communist ideology, Mr. Zinkin points out, provides a ready-made religion which may be accepted in substitution. The West has nothing comparable to offer, except material

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and technical aid and the idea of participation of the people in government, and neither of these has the elements of a proselyting religion. It is a not unreasonable condition of economic and technical aid that they be associated with social reform, if only because otherwise they are very likely to be wasted; but it is another matter to assume—as certain technicians and politicians sometimes tend to do in all sincerity—that the Western way of life, especially the American way of life, and its particular forms of democratic expression, are consistent with the requirements of the East. Moreover, as more than one Eastern writer has noted, if United States aid is too overtly related to the cold war, and especially if support is given to reactionary elements in the apparent interests of political stability, this may well defeat itself both because the necessary social reforms are not undertaken and because it engenders suspicion and resentment among Asian peoples, or at least among liberal forces.

Many of these dilemmas and issues are explicitly raised by Mr. Zinkin or are implicit in his approach, but warrant more consideration than he has been able to give. Indeed, his positive suggestions for economic development are less penetrating than his interpretations of current conditions. In part this may arise from the level of exposition, which is directed to the intelligent lay audience rather than the specialist. It is true that the author brings out the main elements in a development programme: more capital, better techniques, reform of land tenures, improvements in credit to agriculture, and similar approaches; but there is nothing new in his analysis and his observations do not go very deep. For example, conditions determining the absorptive capacity for capital imports and technical assistance, the appropriate methods of accumulating and directing domestic savings, the appropriate types of extension for agriculture, forms of administration and methods of training technicians and administrators to bridge effectively the gap between government and people, are not discussed or are touched upon but lightly. The examination of conditions which should determine priorities in investment—a major problem leading into many others—is, to say the least, inadequate.

It is perhaps unavoidable that an essay in persuasion should suffer from such inadequacies; but in emphasising them rather than systematically analysing its positive contributions to the understanding of Asian problems, this reviewer has done less than justice to the book. Not the least of Mr. Zinkin's qualifications as an author is that he succeeds in bringing together a great deal of material in a form and style which are eminently readable. His independence of judgment on many matters and the angle from which he observes many well-known problems will repay attention by the Far Eastern specialist as well as by the "intelligent layman".

Wellington, April 1952

H. BELSHAW

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THE SOCIOLOGY OF COLONIES. By René Maunier. Translated and edited by E. O. Lorimer. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949. 2 vols. 418, 364 pp. 3/3/-.

THE title of Professor Maunier's work needs some explanation for English readers, and the explanation is best supplied by a statement of the contents of the three Parts in which it was originally issued. It was based on a course of lectures delivered over a number of years to students of colonial sciences at the University of Paris. Part I was issued in 1932 and dealt with some of the more formal aspects of the extension of colonial rule (using that term in its widest possible sense) and with the phenomena arising from race contacts. Part II followed in 1936 and dealt with the "mental and spiritual reactions" on the part both of the rulers and of the ruled which are the result of colonial rule. These are discussed under the heads of Imperialism, of Partnership, and of Emancipation.

Part III was issued in 1941 and deals with the application to colonial areas of the principles of European law and the consequential modification of the indigenous systems of law or of custom having the force of law. The work concludes with an Epilogue in which Professor Maunier has expressed his own philosophy of colonial science. If it is to be an adequate guide to action, its study must be purely objective. It should, in short, follow the "positive" method presented by Auguste Comte, and must therefore proceed not on theory but on the collation and comparison of fact. Its objective must be to ensure that the colonial peoples will accept the policy of the colonial government and collaborate in carrying it into effect. "The ideal is to pass from domination to partnership, to amplify the social ties between rulers and ruled, and to proceed from power to harmony."

No one can afford to overlook the value of a study of race contacts as a guide to colonial policy. The necessity for its pursuit is not diminished by the fact that we have reached a phase when so many of the colonial peoples have either acquired or seem about to acquire a status of independence—a phase the imminence of which seems to have escaped Professor Maunier. There is, however, a fundamental difficulty which besets those who approach the study of race contacts primarily on the basis of the material afforded by experiences of colonial rule. It lies in the necessity for distinguishing the effects of colonial rule from those due to contact with European modes of life and thought as diffused by agencies which are independent of the colonial administration. How far, for example, is the growth of an individualised system of land tenure in Africa, in place of the indigenous system of "collective" tenure, due to the enactment of a colonial land law, or how far is it an automatic reaction to the substitution of marketable crops for a system of subsistence cultivation? How far is the change in the Hindu attitude to the caste system due to the application of a British regime of law, and how far to changes in the economic life of the people, including the introduction of

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industrialised labour? These are only random examples, but they might be multiplied indefinitely. The fact is that, if a study of race contacts is to be a guide to policy, then either it should be wide enough to include the whole field of race relations or it should be strictly confined to a study of the influence exercised by colonial policy on the relations between the administration and the peoples under its jurisdiction.

Professor Maunier's work suffers from a failure to make this distinction. No one can fail to admire the catholic character of his studies and the great wealth of illustration which they have enabled him to command. But the very extent of his material has led him to be unduly discursive and to refer widely to phenomena for which colonial policy as such is in no sense responsible.

Again, though he himself has indicated the need for the use of the comparative method, his basis of comparison is unduly limited. Thus, while he includes British India in the colonial field, he shows an unfortunate lack of knowledge of the system of government and of the basic facts of the Indian social system. There is little more than a chance reference to Indonesia, though the population of what was until lately the Netherlands East Indies equalled that of all of the colonies of France. The only reference to the colonial empire of Portugal is a mention of the cupidity shown by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. Practically the only reference to the system of indirect rule which has been so widely practiced by the British in Africa is the statement that it was sponsored by Lord Lugard.

One is not entitled to complain that Professor Maunier has what his translator (who has proved to be a most admirable editor) admits to be an anti-British bias. But it is unfortunate that this has led him into mistakes which are all the more regrettable because they were offered as doctrine to French colonial students. There is, for example, the fantastic legend of the Oxford cycle of coloured students (p. 73), or the alleged disappearance of the Maori race in New Zealand (p. 79), or the now discredited story of the cause of the Indian Mutiny (p. 376). It is characteristic that this last story is accompanied by the extraordinary explanation that the Hindu objection to the use of cow grease lay in the fact that in India the cow is so impure that mere contact with it contaminates! (pp. 437, 473).

On the other hand, Professor Maunier has a real contribution to make when he deals with matters of which he has a first-hand knowledge, such as, for instance, the effect of the application of French law within the French colonial system. There is, it is true, an over-emphasis on the part played by the French in introducing to colonial jurisprudence the concept of the individual as a legal entity, but that may be readily pardoned in view of the value of his other comments.

London, February 1952

HAILEY

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THE REDS TAKE A CITY. The Communist Occupation of Seoul, with Eyewitness Accounts. By John W. Riley, Jr., and Wilbur Schramm. Narratives translated by Hugh Heung-wu Cynn. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 1951. 210 pp., illus. \$2.75.

ONE should not expect to find in this book a detailed record of the Communists' short-lived occupation of Seoul or an analysis of their plans for this intended "North-South" capital. Nor does it afford a comprehensive picture of the pressures exerted on the lower-class workers, farmers and other elements upon which beat an incessant barrage of propaganda. On the other hand, it does convey an interesting impression of the plight of the intellectuals, bureaucrats and others whose status attracted the Communists' attention. The pattern of suffering among the fleeing upper-class elements was quite different from that which the authors describe as having been the general effect of the North Koreans' occupation policy. For, at the same time that potentially hostile groups and individuals were being imprisoned or liquidated, a vast propaganda program (incorporating certain reforms long promised by the Rhee government) was set in motion among an immature population whose receptivity depended largely on the extent to which practical reforms supplemented the propaganda diet. The relative success of North Korean propaganda was due to its ability to meet the needs and desires of the masses; unsophisticated and excluding the more sophisticated circles from its appeal, it was cleverly designed for mass consumption.

Although it is obviously difficult to assess an occupation pattern that was restricted to only three months, the authors might well have contrasted the blueprint of the Communist occupation of Seoul with the regime existing in the North. The fact that the Ministry of the Interior was responsible for internal security and for "re-education" and indoctrination activities would surprise no one familiar with the Northern model. It is regrettable also that the book touches only in passing on the peculiar history of the Democratic People's Republic in North Korea; the role of Communism in Korea resulting from the depressing effect on indigenous leadership exerted by the long Japanese occupation; and the needs and objectives of Communism in North-east Asia.

The most interesting part of the book is its discussion of North Korean psychological warfare. The "democratic people's governments" apparently have adopted the Sorelian "myth-propaganda". The myth, welding a people and arousing "their most profound sentiments and . . . energies toward the solution of the real problems which the group faces in its actual environment", is seemingly as successful in forming a climate of opinion in Korea as it was in Germany. The need for concentrating on replacing "myth-propaganda" with tangible democratic achievements—particularly in the

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Middle and Far East—could be documented by those who have observed the Communist *Zeitgeist* in its unfolding.

Mannheim, January 1952

WILBERT B. DUBIN

MY FORTY YEAR FIGHT FOR KOREA. By Louise Yim, assisted by Emanuel H. Demby. New York: Wyn. 1951. 313 pp. \$3.50.

IN collaboration with her legal adviser at the United Nations, Miss Yim has written a dramatic and revealing account of her life as a rebel. Determined early in childhood to "make my father respect me as much as he did any of his sons", she achieved her objective, allowing nothing to stand in her way. First an education was her goal, then a political career as an underground worker, then business success in the United States, followed by the founding and support of a women's training school in Korea. Finally her ambition was fulfilled when she became an official of the Republic of Korea. Miss Yim stresses the importance of her role during the postwar occupation of Korea and in the presentation of the Korean case to the United Nations in 1946. After the Korean elections and the establishment of Syngman Rhee as President, she became Minister of Commerce and Industry, only to be relieved of her post after ten months when an investigating committee charged her with having extorted money from businessmen. Miss Yim's explanation of this incident is that she had established a fund for reforestation purposes which was to have been a birthday present to President Rhee, and that her actions had been misinterpreted. She was re-elected to the National Assembly in May 1950; in the following month, three days before the outbreak of hostilities, she left Korea.

Miss Yim writes most convincingly when describing her experiences under the Japanese regime; here her reporting is lucid and straightforward. In outlining the political views and activities of her countrymen in later years, she tends to be gossipy and confusing. Moreover, her factual statements are often faulty: one sentence on the first page contains three errors regarding Korean history and geography. Yet the weaknesses of the book do not affect the personal achievements of a remarkable woman possessing great courage and perseverance.

Washington, D.C., February 1952

EVELYN B. McCUNE

THE KOREAN MINORITY IN JAPAN, 1904-1950. By Edward W. Wagner. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. 1951. 108 pp., mimeo. \$1.50.

It is unfortunate that no attempt has been made in Japan, before or since the last war, to devote serious study to the question of the Korean minority in Japan. This neglect is the more surprising because the problem

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has become increasingly grave, particularly since the end of the war, in its domestic aspects and in its effect not only on relations between Japan and Korea but also on the interests of other countries desirous of preserving peace in East Asia.

Mr. Wagner's objective pioneer study should help to clarify the problem, which, as he notes, is "a significant factor in the recent history of this region". Beginning with a brief description of Korean migration to Japan from its inception, he traces its later history, stressing particularly the postwar period, during which the matter has assumed an extremely complicated aspect as a result of the independence of Korea and the chaotic conditions which prevailed in Japan after the surrender.

Despite its acute and sometimes explosive character, the situation has thus far been kept within bounds through the intervention of the Occupation authorities. The problem, therefore, remains to be solved by the Japanese government, for better or for worse, after the Occupation has ended. Mr. Wagner's study contains material which should be of value when the time comes to tackle this delicate and important task. One cannot but endorse his view that "only by a judicious combination of the approaches of assimilation and induced repatriation [can] something constructive be accomplished".

Tokyo, March 1952

NAOSAKU UCHIDA

OVER A BAMBOO FENCE. By Margery Finn Brown. New York: Morrow. 1951. 239 pp. \$3.50.

KAKEMONO. By Honor Tracy. London: Methuen; 1950; 12/6. New York: Coward-McCann; 1951; \$3. 205 pp.

NEITHER Mrs. Brown, a colonel's wife who tried to maintain an American home among Japanese neighbors in Tokyo and Kyoto, nor Miss Tracy, a British correspondent living in the exotic atmosphere of the Tokyo Press Club, has high praise for the administration of the Occupation of Japan. Both of them liked their Japanese friends, Mrs. Brown because her neighbors were human beings with the attitudes and emotions of ordinary folk, and Miss Tracy because they supplied her with evidence that the Occupation was less than a brilliant success. In loyal army fashion, Mrs. Brown checks whatever desire she might have had to trace Occupation shortcomings to stupidity in the higher echelons, but Miss Tracy, writing with acid on the point of her scalpel-like pen, spares no one in authority. Each of them overcame the barriers against undue fraternizing with the Japanese, and each was able, they aver, to elicit frank and mordant criticism of Occupation policies from a Japanese populace strictly enjoined not to criticize. In this respect, Miss Tracy was particularly fortunate since politicians whom the reviewer knew well apparently talked far more

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frankly to her than to anyone else. The confidences imparted to Mrs. Brown by her Japanese acquaintances were largely what she terms "girl talk". Miss Tracy holds that Occupation policy failed to achieve lasting success because it was administered, if not indeed formulated, by untrained executives who knew little and cared less about the backgrounds, needs, potentialities and desires of the Japanese. Mrs. Brown finds more to praise, though she carefully conceals the names of those whom she admires.

Despite their bias concerning the Occupation, and notwithstanding certain minor shortcomings, these are good books, well written and rich in sharp observations and shrewd judgments. At their best, when they stray from political and international affairs, they offer many pleasant vignettes of Japanese art and culture, scenery and customs. Miss Tracy writes better on such themes than when she treats of her pet obsession, the military police. Mrs. Brown writes with more gusto and effectiveness when she reports her "girl talk"—an understatement, surely—than when she castigates drunken Occupational personnel. Both books are to be recommended, if only because they throw at least some light on a much-neglected problem, namely, the impact of the Occupation upon its own staff instead of upon the people of Japan. In this respect, Mrs. Brown deserves particular commendation.

Philadelphia, January 1952 HARRY EMERSON WILDES

ECONOMIC SURVEY OF JAPAN (1950-51). *By the Economic Stabilization Board, Japanese Government. Tokyo. 1951. 257 pp.*

IN contrast to the annual surveys of preceding years, this is a refreshingly realistic and admirably competent analysis of Japanese economic trends. Apparently its authors spent considerable time with Mr. Joseph Dodge, for many of the summary passages in the volume read very much like paraphrases of portions of his speeches and memoranda.

The Dodge stabilization program went into effect early in 1949. In the course of the ensuing year the previous inflationary spiral was checked, and from April 1949 to April 1950 wholesale prices rose only 22 points (from 206 to 228 on a 1934-36 base of 1). After the outbreak of the Korean war, however, the story was quite different. In the year June 1950-1951, the index rose 120 points, or 60 per cent for wholesale prices and 95 per cent for export prices. Writing in mid-1951, the Economic Stabilization Board recognized that Japan was in danger of pricing itself out of world markets, and, noting the hazards of such a development in view of Japan's crucial dependence upon foreign trade for economic survival, called for renewed efforts to halt the inflation. Its recommendations were partially heeded, additional steps were taken, and the price spiral leveled off during the last half of 1951.

The Board holds that the post-Korean improvement was due very largely to temporary factors, that the achievement of economic self-support still lies

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far ahead, and that rational utilization of the very limited resources available requires control of inflation, reduction of costs, channeling of funds on priority basis to essential industry, and maximization of exports. The Board's economists are to be congratulated on a first-rate survey.

New York, April 1952

JEROME B. COHEN

THROUGH EASTERN EYES. By H. van Straelen, with an Introduction by Fulton J. Sheen. Loveland, Ohio: Grailville. 1951. xiii, 162 pp. illus. \$3.50.

NIGHT CAME TO JAPAN. By Eric W. Gosden, with a Foreword by Bishop J. C. Mann. London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott. 1951. 153 pp., illus. 4/6.

HERE are two little books, each written for popular consumption the one dealing with Catholic, the other with Protestant missions. The first places special emphasis on Japan but is not concerned with it exclusively and the second is devoted entirely to that country. Although the first bears an official imprimatur, neither is fully representative of that branch of Christianity from which it emerges, but each is an excellent example of particular but somewhat differing trends.

Through Eastern Eyes is by a devoted, highly-trained, enthusiastic charming priest of the Society of the Divine Word, a member of the faculty of the Catholic University of Nagoya. It was given as a series of lectures to what the author calls "young lay apostles" at a Catholic center in Ohio. It puts in readable, persuasive form convictions about missionary methods for which the author has long been well known. He holds that the purpose of missions is to see that the Church takes root. If this is to be achieved, he goes on to say, the Church must adapt itself to the culture in which it functions. It must develop a native clergy. It must also welcome the development of an indigenous art and architecture in accordance with the cultural heritage of each people. The missionary must seek to understand the mind of those to whom he goes and to communicate the Christian message with such comprehension of the methods of thinking of his hearer that they will understand it. He must be moved not by pity but by sympathy, and must welcome whatever in other religions seems to him to have point of contact with his own. The book is illustrated with examples of Catholic painting, sculpture and architecture which vividly portray what it is advocating.

Thus far Father van Straelen is presenting what in general is propounded by the highest authorities in the Roman Catholic Church. He is going beyond what would be generally accepted when he advocates liturgy in the native tongue and in forms congenial and not offensive to the Oriental

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It is highly doubtful whether there is such an entity as the Oriental mind, as Father van Straelen seems to assume. The one characteristic which "Orientals" have in common is that they are not "Occidentals". Within the Occident, in spite of great variations, there is a common Christian-Greek heritage. No such comprehensive background is to be found among "Orientals". They differ quite as much among themselves in culture and attitudes as they do from the "Occident". This stricture, however, does not invalidate the methods of which Father van Straelen is a proponent.

Night Came to Japan is delightfully written by a member of the Japan Evangelistic Band. The methods employed by that fellowship are not those of the majority of Protestant missionaries. They are the expression of a warm-hearted, theologically conservative, "fundamentalist" constituency. The book recounts the personal experiences of the author, himself a missionary of that band, in the days immediately before the tightening of the situation in the 1930s, then the increasing strain and the missionary exodus from Japan in the months before Pearl Harbor, and the return under the Occupation. It makes much of the opportunities for missionaries in Japan in the postwar years. While not representative of the Protestant mission boards which have been chiefly responsible for the introduction and development of Protestant Christianity in Japan, the book is fairly typical of groups which have flooded into the country since the end of the war and now constitute about half of the Protestant missionaries in that land.

New Haven, January 1952

KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE

JAPAN IN WORLD HISTORY. By Sir George Sansom. *New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. 1951. 94 pp. \$2.*

IN a series of lectures delivered in Tokyo in 1950 and now published in book form, Sir George Sansom considers the areas and types of research in which Western scholars can make significant contributions to the study of Japanese history. By way of introduction he admits that "foreigners" are seriously handicapped and that they can never hope to achieve the depth of knowledge expected of Japanese scholars. But because of the tenseness of international relations and the need for a more complete record of human behavior, he insists that the West has to learn more about the East and that Occidental historians of Japan, therefore, have an important function to perform. These lectures offer views and suggestions about Japanese history which are of real help and inspiration to those working in that field.

At first Sir George develops the thesis that the historian would do well to approach the study of Japanese history not as an end in itself but as an integral part of world history. He feels that scholars in the West, because of Japan's insular position and her pre-Perry policy of isolation, have been in-

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clined to overstate the theory of isolated historical development. But the reader is reminded that the Europeans of the sixteenth century had quite a restricted view of the world and that as early as 1500 Japanese seamen had made voyages comparable in distance to those undertaken by sixteenth-century English navigators. While agreeing that until modern times there was "no march of interrelated events", Sir George insists that it is proper to consider "Japan in world history", since the "national history of Japan is an important part of the history of the aggregate of human societies". In studying Japan in its world context the Western scholar, it is pointed out, has certain advantages: he has greater familiarity with another culture and is more likely to achieve a higher level of objectivity.

The remainder of the lectures is devoted to a discussion of problems which the author believes can be approached most profitably by a comparative method—the type of research in which the Western scholar can best utilize his advantages. The relationship between feudalism and agrarian discontent, the influence of Japanese minds and Japanese sentiment upon Buddhist thought and doctrine, the use of art as a means of obtaining a better understanding of the evolution of Japanese culture, the weakness of the "Liberal tradition", and the growth of nationalism are subjects which the author discusses in order to show how a better insight can be gained from studying Japanese history in correlation to world history. In each case it is made clear that traditional interpretations need to be re-examined and that here is an area where further research, of the comparative type, would be most rewarding.

The thesis of the book is so sound, and so convincingly presented, that it certainly will influence the thinking of many students of Japanese history and undoubtedly will lead many to undertake studies which should yield results of far greater significance and validity than heretofore.

Berkeley, California, May 1952

DELMER M. BROWN

BRAIN-WASHING IN RED CHINA. The Calculated Destruction of Men's Minds. By *Edward Hunter*. New York: *Vanguard*. 1951. 311 pp. \$3.50.

WHAT is happening behind the bamboo curtain in China? Many Westerners who have had first-hand experience of the Communist regime have not written their stories for fear of reprisals against Chinese friends, thus leaving a clear field for pro-Communist writers. Mr. Hunter has tried to fill the gap by interviewing in Hong Kong Chinese who had left the mainland, and by recording verbatim their experiences. He seeks to lay bare the Communist methods of indoctrination and propaganda in order to reveal the process of thought-changing or brain-washing by which millions of non-

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Communists are led to support the regime. A student from the North China People's Revolutionary University describes the short, intensive course given to eradicate the evil influence of the old educational system and to prepare students for work under the Communist government; a former journalist on an American newspaper in Shanghai shows how those who have been corrupted by Western influence are reformed to rid their minds of their imperialist poisons; a schoolteacher from Hanyang gives an account of the changes in the ordinary school curriculum. Communist propaganda cartoons, school textbooks and plays are described in detail to show how they are used as part of the hate-America campaign, and an account of Communist methods in Malaya and Indochina is given to show that there is one All-Asian War.

The description of life in the revolutionary colleges, with its pressure on the mind, is perfectly true and is confirmed by the reviewer's experience. The long lectures by leading Communist theoreticians lasting from four to seven hours, the group life with its complete denial of privacy, the constant examination of the views and attitudes of each student, the writing of one's life history and development of thought, all produce the inevitable result. At first, many students resist this pressure, but it is a wearing-down process, and in the end the only alternatives are complete acceptance, suicide or escape from the country. There is no place in the new China for those who refuse to conform. Because it is a gradual process, it seems to the people concerned to have been achieved by voluntary methods, but its results are striking. Some of the reviewer's former colleagues have been led by this painful process to denounce their closest and dearest friends. It is indeed a struggle, as the Communists call it, but when complete acceptance comes it brings a feeling of release which can be compared only to the religious experience of conversion. Mr. Hunter describes it as perverted evangelism and quack psychiatry. Most of the persons interviewed by the author were able to accept this indoctrination but finally broke away when they were ordered to renounce their families.

The picture given is true as far as it goes, but suffers from the great handicap of having been written from the outside and at second-hand, and therefore cannot convey the real atmosphere of life in China. It presents only the point of view of those who have resisted the tyranny and broken away from it, but it is also true that many have found a new way of life and a purpose they had never known before, that new energies and enthusiasms have been released and a new conception of service of the people given. Hong Kong is an unsatisfactory listening-post for knowledge of the new China.

The book is superficial because no attempt is made to reach a deeper level by examining the very real attractions of Communist propaganda or by relating it to its historical setting. The account of the perversion of history-

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teaching to arouse hatred against foreigners ignores the fact that Kuomintang textbooks, especially *China's Destiny* under the imprint of Chiang Kai-shek, did the same. The author is less than fair to Hong Kong when he suggests that Communist literature is allowed a clear field; in fact, some of the Chinese newspapers there are bitterly and bravely anti-Communist. In his anger at the portrayal of the United States as a warmonger, he completely fails to understand the Chinese point of view. The conclusion of the book is that this system of indoctrination is aggression of the worst sort and must be stopped. How? Is this a demand for war against China? The author does not say what should or could be done about it. There are a number of misprints in the book, including several important Chinese names.

London, March 1952

L. CONSTANTINE

LOW COST HOUSING IN SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA. *Department of Social Affairs, United Nations. General, ST/SOA/3 Rev. 1. 1951. 211 pp., mimeo.*

This is the report of a Mission on Tropical Housing which made a study in late 1950 of housing conditions in India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. Although the Mission did not visit the Philippines, a Filipino member has contributed a chapter on conditions there. An invitation to visit Burma was received after the Mission had completed its work.

The report is broader in scope than its title indicates, since the Mission interpreted "housing" as including such problems as community development and home environment as well as town and regional planning. "Within this framework, attention was focussed on the living conditions of the lower income families, because these were found to be the most urgent and most difficult concern of the Governments in all the countries and Territories visited." The report challenges the common assumptions that slums and housing shortages exist only in cities and that the average village family is content with what it has. Many villages in Southeast Asia are slums whose inhabitants live in grossly substandard houses and unhealthy environments. The Mission proposes that villagers be given education in home and village improvements, that public agencies be developed to assist the people, and that trained personnel be provided to offer simple technical advice.

Although, in view of the short time allowed for the survey, parts of the report are inevitably superficial, the document as a whole contains not only recent technical data on Southeast Asian housing problems but also much valuable information on other rural matters and postwar developments in the fields of economy, government and social reform. It is a useful addition to the meager existing literature on the subject explored.

Santa Ana, California, April 1952

DONN V. HART

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LAMET HILL TRIBES IN FRENCH INDOCHINA. By *Karl Gustav Izikowitz*. Göteborg: *Etnografiska Museet*. 1951. 375 pp., illus. Kr.20.

THIS preparatory survey of the obscure Lamets of North Indochina was intended to form part of a wider study of the relationship between irrigation and society in Monsoon Asia, but the author was able to make only a brief investigation in the field before the war. His survey was made difficult by the secretiveness of the tribe concerning their tribal rites, especially that associated with the ancestor cult, and then was interrupted by lack of funds.

Indochina, an area of ethnic and linguistic complexity, remains a very rich field for the first-hand study of primitive social groups. In the little province of Haut-Mékong alone, there are more than a score of different tribes, each with its own distinct culture and its own language which is often incomprehensible to its neighbours. In a neglected field any scientific study becomes a matter of importance; in Indochina it is now also a matter of urgency because of the levelling influences of a new economy pressing in from the north.

The interest of the Lamets within the context of Izikowitz's investigation lies in the fact that irrigational devices do not form the basis of their agriculture. They employ the extremely primitive method known in Indochina as *ray*, once a widespread means of cultivation, though most agricultural communities have long abandoned it. Thirty or more terms for a parallel process survive in languages in other parts of the world. One of the English equivalents is "slash and burn", which correctly describes the method—clearing a forest area, burning the trees and then sowing in the cleared ground. The origins of this crude method of preparing the ground for the seed have been accounted for best by Carl Sauer, though numerous students have worked towards the same theory. According to Sauer, the oldest agricultural operations were carried out, not in the open plains, which would be covered with grass and impossible to work with primitive implements, but in forests, lacking undergrowth and easily cleared by the simple expedient of burning. It is a disastrous method, for the earth is ruined and the topsoil denuded, and the cultivator, after harvesting his first crop, has to shift to new areas. To the Lamets, who have large fields to move into and who do not return to the same sites for ten years or more, this wasteful method presents no great problem, but it has played havoc with the economy of many less fortunately situated tribes, including the Meo and Yao, whom this system has brought to the brink of ruin.

Izikowitz's chapters on the social organisation of the Lamets and on the annual cycle of labour are full of interesting material; he has carefully and systematically investigated the house-group and extended family system. One is reminded of the need for a comprehensive study of the "house" in Indo-

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chinese primitive societies, relating it to the house-systems in contiguous areas and to the larger components in the south. It was perhaps a mistake to have eliminated the comparative points of view set forth in Izikowitz's earlier papers, even though it might not have been possible to draw many conclusions from them. The need for relating such a study, even in its broad outlines, to the work of investigators in similar communities elsewhere is apparent.

Izikowitz's thorough and competent description of one piece in a slowly disintegrating jigsaw puzzle of primitive peoples will be a source-book for material on this obscure tribe. Students will welcome his clear and objective study of a region which may soon become inaccessible to anthropologists for more reasons than the presence of head-hunters.

Saigon, March 1952

GEORGE B. WALKER

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN SIAM. By W. D. Reeve. London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, in cooperation with the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. 1951. 93 pp. \$2.

THIS is a doubly valuable work. Not only is it useful to the student of Southeast Asian affairs, but it contains much analysis that can be extremely helpful to those neighbours of Siam which have recently won their independence and perhaps need other than their ex-colonial patterns to study and in part adapt to their own uses. The book is more than its title might suggest. It does, indeed, give a lucid account of past and present public administration in Siam, but it conveys also something of the *flavour* of Siam; for Mr. Reeve describes the people, their characteristic make-up, their background, and their perhaps unique charm, and his bias in favour of the country is admirably balanced and controlled throughout. To write a review of such a book is easy; to criticise it is less so, for who, save the very few experts, ever manages to learn as much about Siamese mechanisms as the government Foreign Advisers do? As becomes a recently retired Adviser, Mr. Reeve is exceedingly polite in his writing: he has chosen to exercise restraint on several matters, but this he probably did simply out of good manners and because Siam is a country in which rudeness gets one nowhere. The two groups which he lets off most lightly are the leading politicians and the Chinese merchants; under these headings the reader may be left in some doubt.

The reasons for the present corruption in Siam are correctly stated. As Mr. Reeve notes, what has become a habit is not quickly or easily eradicated, even when economic conditions improve. In all of the postwar regimes save the last short-lived one of Nai Khuang Aphaiwongse, the worst corruption was to be found at the highest level. A cabinet minister's salary, just as a junior clerk's, was totally inadequate—equivalent to one-tenth of what an

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American bachelor thought necessary for living expenses in Bangkok. Nobody can seriously blame the petty official for accepting a fifty-tical bribe to expedite some minor application; but what of the responsible political leaders of the country when they make vast sums on official rice allocations and on opium from the north? The danger has been one of moral deterioration; and though the 1946 Formal Agreement may have been a major factor, an even more fundamental cause of the amorality of this corruption was the advent of the Japanese and the consequent Siamese sport of cheating the foreign invader. (Since Mr. Reeve's book was written, the government has announced its intention of raising all officials' salaries by 200 to 300 per cent. The major question, of course, will be the impact of this action on the price of consumer goods and on the cost-of-living index.) Yet, when this corruption and the frequency of coups d'état and Government changes are analysed, it will be found that the corruption has little effect on the livelihood of the overwhelming majority of the people, the peasants, and that the ordinary Siamese know nothing of political changes of regime, care less, expect nothing from their politicians in any case, and comfortably carry on their traditional ways of life. Only once, in 1947, did the rice smuggling into Malaya reach such proportions that the inhabitants of the southern provinces—in the tin-mining areas—felt the effect of their rice allocations going astray. When Mr. Reeve writes of the middlemen to whom the improvident peasants mortgage their rice crops or fields, and of the merchants who control the milling and export of rice, he is for the most part referring to Chinese, not Siamese.

The reviewer questions one of Mr. Reeve's conclusions—that both materially and culturally Siam has developed amazingly during the present century. If this means that Siam's cultural development has been amazingly successful, and not just amazing, the reviewer disagrees vehemently. Far too much of Siam's own culture has been allowed to degenerate and decay in face of the cinema; Bangkok is on the same road as Manila. Why, the theatre of the Fine Arts Department has been unable since the war to produce dances or plays in the rainy season because the government has not seen fit to allocate the small amount of money necessary to repair the National Theatre's ramshackle roof!

The one big question which the book raises, and which Mr. Reeve and all who live in Southeast Asia are conscious of, is never answered. The question is this: Does the West set such store by the word—dare one say "catch-cry"?—democracy that, somewhat arrogantly, it imagines it to be a universal panacea? An American is distressed by the signs of subservient "feudalism" which he sees in Siam; it makes him more democratic than ever and sometimes angry, too. But, as Mr. Reeve notes, the most dangerous type of politician in Siam is the impractical, theoretical (and Western-educated) reformer.

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Furthermore, since a somewhat "feudal" structure of society is easier to administer and operate, it perhaps gives the submissive people advantages which a more democratic but less efficient administration would wish, but be unable, to give them. To one who believes in a healthy independence of spirit in all individuals, this possibility is profoundly depressing; but it is even sadder when one is forced to admit that the old "feudal" conception not only works better but is still acceptable to the people themselves. And it would require arrogance to predict that a generation of modern education, were it possible, would necessarily result in an improvement of the ordinary peasant's lot.

Den Pasar, Bali, April 1952

JOHN COAST

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN CEYLON. By Sir Charles Collins. London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, in cooperation with the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. 1951. 162 pp. 15s.; \$3.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN CEYLON (1931-1946). By I. D. S. Weerawardana. Colombo: Ceylon Economic Research Association. 1951. 207 pp. Rs.8.

SIR Charles Collins, for thirty-eight years a member of the Ceylon Civil Service, has written a critical and fairly detailed study of administration from the British conquest of the island in 1795 to the present day, when policy and personnel alike are Ceylonese. Interwoven with it are sections on the constitutional history of Ceylon from the establishment of Crown Colony government to the attainment of Dominion status. The author is excellent in dealing with the nineteenth century, but his treatment of the last thirty years tends to restrict itself to an outline of government, with little reference to how it operates in practice.

The account is valuable and enlightening, or ought to be if proper attention is paid to its lessons. Thus, Ceylon learned 120 years ago that one gets what one pays for, and that inadequate pay, poor prospects of promotion and no pensions produce mediocre and indifferent officials. The crucial importance of finance is implicit in many of the chapters. At the beginning of the British period, the typical taxpayer was a subsistence farmer from whom it was impossible to obtain sufficient revenue to pay for even the basic fundamentals of administration, police and law courts. After a chronic deficit had long frustrated efforts to develop irrigation, education and medical services, a solution was found in the form of British investment in coffee, tea and rubber plantations, which provided a source of taxable wealth, converted the deficit into a mounting surplus, and financed steadily expanding social services. These developments, and particularly the extension of the school system, ultimately produced an English-educated class which sought the abolition of British control and the establishment of self-government.

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Dr. Weerawardana provides a detailed and careful study of the operation of the Donoughmore Constitution from its establishment to its replacement by a parliamentary democracy. This was a not very successful attempt to satisfy democratic demands in a country which had politicians but not political parties. Basing his account on interviews with political leaders and officials as well as on a thorough study of the documentary material, the author analyses the various elements in the government; his treatment is exhaustive and emphasises the actual workings of the government and not the constitutional machinery.

Dr. Weerawardana is impartial and clear-sighted, as, for example, in his assessment of the strength of the democratic movement, whose driving force has been supplied by a small minority of Western-educated business and professional men and landowners: "Their demand was for freedom to give the government jobs to the growing middle class—a middle class risen from and closely connected with the landed and plantation interests; a freedom to work for some degree of Ceylonisation of the commercial establishments, for the same reason." The large majority of the voters were "a stolid, apathetic, largely illiterate mass of peasants . . . brought up in a tradition of obedience to an aristocratic upper caste." Owing to this attitude and to the lack of political parties, at election time "the policy favoured by the candidate, if he has any, is almost irrelevant. Even if he does not appeal to the prejudices of the more illiterate of the electorate, he is elected almost entirely on his personal prestige, his family influence, or the liberality of his charity." Altogether, this is a most useful study in a field of which there is too little exact knowledge—the performance of Western-style democracies in Asia.

Minneapolis, April 1952

LENNOX A. MILLS

INDIA SINCE PARTITION. By *Andrew Mellor*. London: Turnstile Press; New York: Praeger. 1951. 148 pp. 7/6; \$2.50.

INDIA IN THE NEW ERA. By *T. Walter Wallbank*. Chicago: Scott, Foresman. 1951. 204 pp., illus. n.p.

THESE two books seek to explain the problems of India since independence, and cover much the same ground. Mr. Mellor, the special correspondent in India of the London *Daily Herald* during the transfer of power, was an eyewitness of many of the events which he describes. Professor Wallbank, who has made a comprehensive study of Indian history, undertook an extensive tour of the country before writing his book.

Mr. Mellor sketches the background of the Partition of the subcontinent and of the transfer of power, and discusses at some length the part played by Lord Mountbatten in connection with these momentous changes. He describes the communal riots and mass migrations that attended the achievement of independence, and pays tribute to the work of Mahatma Gandhi

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in seeking to assuage communal strife. He deals next with the achievement of the central government in effecting the integration and democratisation of the Native States, a process comparable in magnitude to the unification movements in nineteenth-century Germany and Italy. After outlining the country's new democratic constitution and its present economic situation, Mr. Mellor refers to the problems of domestic and foreign policy confronting India today. Despite its brevity, his survey is extraordinarily informative. Moreover, its accuracy and objectivity make it an excellent guide to an understanding of India and of the policies of Indian statesmen since independence.

Professor's Wallbank's more comprehensive study attempts to explain not merely the contemporary scene in India, but India itself. The author has achieved a remarkable measure of success; the picture of India that emerges is, in the main, a true one. A statement of the essential facts of Indian life and a bird's-eye view of the political and cultural history of India from the earliest times introduce an analysis of the rise and fulfilment of Indian nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The final chapters of the book deal with Partition, the achievement of independence, and the many problems that face India today. Among these, the assurance of a livelihood for an ever-growing population, the establishment of a stable parliamentary system of government, the modernising of the country's economy, and the problem of Indo-Pakistan relations are rightly singled out as the most pressing.

Professor Wallbank sets the problem of India in its Asian background, and emphasises the fact that among the nations in ferment in Asia, India and Pakistan are relatively the most stable. The conclusion which clearly flows from the data presented is that these new states are "the logical units around which may be built a new and stable and, it is hoped, a prosperous Asia which may stand as a buttress against the spread of Russian Communism". He is not quite correct in his interpretation of Hinduism, nor completely unbiassed in his account of events since independence. Nevertheless, his study is a valuable contribution to an understanding of the new India and its problems.

Waltair, March 1952

N. SRINIVASAN

THE CHILDREN OF HARI. A Study of the Nimar Balahis in the Central Provinces of India. By *Stephen Fuchs*. New York: Praeger. 1951. xviii, 463 pp., illus. \$7.50.

This volume by Father Fuchs constitutes one of the *Wiener Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte und Linguistik* and is published under the auspices of the Institute of Ethnology at the University of Vienna, but it may

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be well to make clear at the outset that this detailed account of an Indian society of untouchables is not coloured unduly by the theoretical bias which has come to be associated with the Vienna school. On the contrary, it is a most detailed and painstaking factual account of a Hindu caste, albeit one outside the pale of Hindu society, as observed in a limited geographical area, covering the history and traditions of the caste, its racial classification, its structure, internal regulation and social life, the life history of the individual from birth to burial, its religion and superstitions, its material culture and occupations. Finally the future of the caste is briefly discussed. Professor Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf contributes a foreword.

The Balahi are a subdivision of the great Kori caste, which, as a whole and including the Balahi, Balai and Jolaha groups, is the most numerous of all of the castes of weavers in India. Though weaving is their traditional occupation, it is by no means exclusively followed; very many of the Balahi caste are agriculturalists, and they, or at any rate their close relatives the Kori, were at one time famous for the construction of magnificent tanks. Their social status is extremely low and they are intimately linked with the Chamar, whose status is, if possible, lower; but it seems probable that at one time or another both of these exterior castes, though now much mixed in blood, represented independent peoples, possibly of Kol and Munda affinities, whose status declined as a result of conquest and Hinduisation.

Father Fuchs's introductory chapters on the geographical and historical background, and the physical affinities of the Balahi to other castes, have been well done, as have the sections on the life history of the individual, religion and magic, and material culture. In the discussion of the sociology of the Balahi, a list of the terms of relationship, with some account of their use and significance, and a proper table of family descent to show the degrees within which marriage is permitted, would have been a valuable addition. The author's written account, as far as it goes, is contradictory: he states on the one hand that the "prohibited degrees of kindred are consanguinity which extends to members of the same clan and the clan of one's mother" and "cognate and agnate relationship till the fourth degree" (p. 65) and on the other that "blood relationship up to the fifth degree and affinity to the third degree inclusively make a marriage unlawful" (p. 128). Apparently, however, any marriage within the clan—that is, with any agnate at all—is prohibited and regarded as incest (p. 20), while "cognate" is an ambiguous term and includes agnate, but even if Fuchs is using it for "affine", his statements are still contradictory. His translations from Hindustani are not always accurate, and his derivation of *kapre siyai* (p. 96) is most improbable: *siyahi* (*siyai*) simply means "stain". The banyan tree is not *ficus religiosa* (p. 252), but *ficus Indica*; *religiosa* is the pipal.

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Taken as a whole, however, the volume is a valuable contribution to Indian ethnography and will become more valuable as similar accounts of other castes become available for comparison.

Presteign, Wales, April 1952

J. H. HUTTON

BUDDHISM: ITS ESSENCE AND DEVELOPMENT. By *Edward Conze*. New York: *Philosophical Library*. 1951. 212 pp. \$6.

Dr. Conze's brief outline of the whole range of Buddhist history and thought is both comprehensive and readable. After noting the significance of Buddhist thought in the history of ideas in general, the author discusses two forms of Buddhism (the monastic and the popular), many schools of earlier and later Indian Buddhism, and finally its non-Indian development in China, Tibet, Japan and Europe. In a preface, Arthur Waley writes: "To Dr. Conze the questions that Buddhism asks and answers are actual, living, questions, and he constantly brings them into relation both with history and with current actuality."

The author has, indeed, attempted to discover to what degree Buddhist thought has validity for the modern world; he shows the applicability of Buddhist doctrines to his own experience and to contemporary events. His insight is often very keen, as, for example, in the case of his conjecture about the original rigor of the monastic rules, and he evinces marked ingenuity in explaining many Buddhist practices. Several tables help to illuminate the historical development of Buddhism. Dr. Conze frequently mentions interesting statements by Buddhist and Western thinkers which have decided value for scholars. It is regrettable that he does not cite his sources; had he done so more clearly, his work would have been useful not only to general readers but to specialists as well.

On certain minor points, and especially on chronological matters, the reviewer disagrees with the author, who, for example, dates the establishment of the Sarvastivadins at 400 B.C., whereas, according to the opinion of most scholars, they came onto the scene later than the Theravadins and the Mahasanghikas, whose appearance Dr. Conze estimates at about 250 B.C. His placing of the origin of the Sautrantikas at 400 B.C. is also very doubtful.

After noting certain similarities between the doctrine of Pyrrhon and that of the Madhyamikas, and suggesting that the former may have borrowed from the latter, Dr. Conze concludes: "If it is granted that Pyrrhon owed his basic ideas to his conversion by Indians, and if his philosophy is very similar to that of the Madhyamikas, then the Madhyamika doctrines . . . must go back in their essentials to ca. 350 B.C." But this would be historically impossible. In the time of the Buddha there lived in India a sceptic philosopher named Sanjaya Belatthiputta, who was not a Buddhist and from whom Pyrrhon might have borrowed something, although this seems rather im-

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probable to the reviewer. Certainly, the Madhyamika school itself developed far later.

A work so comprehensive in scope inevitably contains minor mistakes, which need not, however, impair its value as a popular survey. Thus: "It is customary to reckon the sect of Nichiren as one of the school of Amidism." But Nichiren was the firmest antagonist of Amidism in Japan, and denounced it explicitly. In general, the book is very good in its comparisons with Western religious thought and developments.

Stanford, February 1952

HAJIME NAKAMURA

A PACIFIC BIBLIOGRAPHY. Printed Matter Relating to the Native Peoples of Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia. By C. R. H. Taylor. Wellington: The Polynesian Society. 1951. 492 pp. 42s.

ALTHOUGH Western literature dealing with the history and cultures of the Pacific Islands spans four centuries and a wide range of subjects, bibliographical guides to the area have been few and on the whole restricted in scope. The Librarian of the Alexander Turnbull Library has here brought together a selected list of publications and has classified them according to both island group and subject. The volume is of marked interest and value not only as a first-rate bibliography but also as a source of encouragement to those who believe that the comparative approach to the study of Pacific island groups has been too long neglected.

New York, March 1952

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND

JAUNES, NOIRS ET BLANCS. Trois années de guerre aux îles Salomon. By Patrick O'Reilly and Jean-Marie Sédès. Paris: Monde Nouveau. 1949. 294 pp., illus.

THIS is a straightforward popular account of the Japanese occupation of Buka and Bougainville in the Australian-administered Solomon Islands. The book is divided into three parts, the first of which describes military activity and the attitude of the Japanese towards the Europeans who remained behind. This leans heavily on Eric Feldt's *The Coastwatchers*, though there is additional material from Roman Catholic missionary sources. The third part consists of extracts from the diary of a Catholic priest who was captured and interned on New Britain.

It is the second part, dealing with the Japanese administration of the Melanesian people, that is of absorbing interest. Three topics that are dealt with here are essential to an understanding of postwar Melanesian society in those areas that were subjected to long occupation. First, there is a description of the intensive administration and exploitation of the villages, including the establishment of Japanese schools and the posting of Japanese officials to the villages to ensure adequate agricultural activity. Another sec-

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tion deals with the impact of Japanese ancestor worship upon the religious habits of the people. Finally, there is a most valuable account of the cargo cult from its appearance in the area in 1932, when it had a fanatical Christian form, to the defeat of the Japanese, by which time it had incorporated, temporarily, features of the ancestor worship and etiquette demands of the occupiers. This is a book that can be recommended.

Canberra, March 1952

C. S. BELSHAW

BOOKS RECEIVED

(The listing of a book in this section does not preclude publication of a review of it in a later issue.)

FAR EAST—GENERAL

- BLUNDER IN ASIA. By Harrison Forman. New York: Didier. 1950. 190 pp. \$3.
- FAR EAST DATA BOOK, No. 3. Division of Statistics and Reports, Economic Cooperation Administration. Washington, D. C. 1951. 104 pp.
- HONG KONG EXPORTER AND FAR EASTERN IMPORTER, 1951. Compiled by C. M. Wolosh. Hong Kong: Standard Press. 1951. 222 pp.
- JOINT-MARKS. A Possible Index of Cultural Contact between America, Oceania and the Far East. By Carl Schuster. Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen. 1951. 51 pp., illus. \$2.75.
- MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82nd Congress. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govt. Printing Office. 1951. 4 vols. 3133 pp. (The transcript of testimony concerning General MacArthur's dismissal and the conduct of United States Far Eastern policy.)
- MUHAMMADAN FESTIVALS. By G. E. von Grunebaum. New York: Schuman. 1951. 107 pp., illus. \$2.50.
- 1949 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK. International Tin Study Group. The Hague. 1950. 232 pp. \$4.20.
- READINGS IN ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHIES. By R. F. Moore. New York: R. F. Moore Co. 1951. 116 pp. \$3.
- RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, ASIAN REGIONAL CONFERENCE, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, Nuwara Eliya, January 1950. Geneva: International Labour Office. 1951. 318 pp.
- SOME ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Maurice Dobb. Delhi: Ranjit. 1951. 92 pp. Rs.1/8; 3s. 6d.; \$1. (The text of three lectures delivered at the Delhi School of Economics.)
- SUMMER LECTURES, 1950. Honolulu: University of Hawaii. Occasional Paper No. 54. 1951. 60 pp. (Includes "From the Empress Dowager to Mao" by Kenneth K. S. Ch'en, and "Approaches to Oriental and Occidental Art" by Stanton Macdonald-Wright.)
- SURVEY OF EXCHANGE CONTROLS AND RESTRICTIONS. Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund. 1951. 24 pp. (Includes Burma, Japan and New Zealand.)
- SURVEY OF UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, 1950. By Gardner Patterson and Jack N. Behrman. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1951. 310 pp. \$2.25. (Includes material on economic aid programs in Asia.)

CHINA

- CHINA ACCUSES! Speeches of the Special Representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China at the United Nations. Peking: Foreign Languages Press. 1951. 107 pp., illus.
- ELEMENTARY CHINESE. By Shaw Wing Chan. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1951. 468 pp. \$7.50.
- GENERAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON RURAL RECONSTRUCTION. October 1, 1948, to February 15, 1950. Taipei. 1950. 214 pp.

Book Reviews

- THE HEALTHY VILLAGE, AN EXPERIMENT IN VISUAL EDUCATION IN WEST CHINA.** *Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. 1951. 119 pp., illus. 125 frs.; 2/6; 50¢.*
- HONG KONG ANNUAL REPORT. 1950.** *Hong Kong: Government of Hong Kong. 1951. 139 pp., illus.*
- ON INNER-PARTY STRUGGLE.** *By Liu Shao-chi. Peking: Foreign Languages Press. 1951. 92 pp.* (A lecture delivered at the Party School for Central China, July 1941.)
- OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST PARTY (in Chinese).** *By C. C. Chang. Taipei: Central Reform Committee. Vol I. 1951. 437 pp.* (Covers the years 1894-1924.)
- PEOPLE'S HANDBOOK, 1951 (in Chinese).** *Shanghai: Ta Kung Pao. 1951. 2 vols. 304, 293 pp.* (Contains detailed information on the government and administrative structure of the "People's Republic of China", lists of central government and important local government officials, texts and analyses of important laws, chapters on foreign relations, the civil war, finance and communications, culture and education, political parties and organizations, and important conferences held in China during 1950.)
- RECENT BOOKS ON CHINA, 1945-1951. Compiled, and with an introduction and notes, by Knight Biggerstaff and S. B. Thomas. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. 1951. 16 pp., mimeo. 25¢.**
- THE RISE OF CHINGHIS KHAN AND THE CONQUEST OF NORTH CHINA.** *By H. Desmond Martin. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1950. 360 pp. \$4.75.*
- TAIWAN TODAY.** *By Han Lih-wu. Taipei: Hua Kuo Publishing Co. 1951. 157 pp.*
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INDIA—PAKISTAN

- CENSUS OF INDIA'S FOREIGN LIABILITIES AND ASSETS.** *Department of Research and Statistics, Reserve Bank of India. Bombay. 1950. 291 pp.*
- DEVALUATION OF THE RUPEE. What It Means to India.** *By B. N. Ganguli. Delhi: Ranjit. 1949. 46 pp. Re.1.*
- EDUCATION IN INDIA.** *By Aubrey A. Zellner. New York: Bookman Associates. 1951. 272 pp., illus. \$3.50.* (A historical study of conditions under British rule.)
- FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IN MADRAS STATE.** *By B. Natarajan. Madras: Director of Information and Publicity, Government of Madras. 1951. xxii, 255 pp. Re.1.*
- HINDU CULTURE. Essays and Addresses.** *By K. Guru Dutt. Bombay: Hind Kitab. 3rd ed. 1951. 254 pp. Rs.8/8.*
- THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE. Vol. I: The Vedic Age.** *Edited by R. C. Majumdar. London: Allen & Unwin. 1951. 565 pp., illus. \$8.*
- INDIA'S MESSAGE. FRAGMENTS OF A PRISONER'S DIARY. Vol 2.** *By M. N. Roy. Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers. Rev. ed. 1950. 306 pp. Rs.6.* (Studies in Indian society and culture.)
- INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN PAKISTAN.** *Office of the Economic Adviser, Ministry of Economic Affairs. Karachi: Government of Pakistan. 1951. 75 pp.*
- MAIN TRENDS IN POSTWAR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.** *With special reference to those aspects which affect Indian-American relations. By Vera Micheles Dean. Bombay, London, New York: Oxford University Press, under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations. 1950. 137 pp. \$1.75.*
- NEHRU AND INDIA.** *By Christopher Birdwood. London: Bureau of Current Affairs. 1951. 59 pp. 9d.*
- NEUTRALISM IN INDIA.** *By M. R. Mazani. Bombay: Democratic Research Service. 1951. 20 pp. 8 annas.*
- PAKISTAN LABOUR YEAR BOOK 1949-50.** *By M. Shafi. Karachi: Labour Publications. 1950. 88s pp. Rs.19.*

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THE PROBLEM OF FRENCH INDIA. By N. V. Rajkumar. *New Delhi: All India Congress Committee. 1950. 108 pp. Rs. 1/4.*

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ATOLL RESEARCH BULLETIN. Washington, D. C.: *Pacific Science Board, National Research Council*. Nos. 1-2, September 1951. 39 pp. (Contains data on coral ecology and on coral atoll research.)

EARNING, SPENDING, SAVING IN HAWAII. Honolulu: *Bank of Hawaii*. 1950. 12 pp.

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THESE ARE AMERICANS. By John A. Rademaker. Palo Alto, California: *Pacific Books*. 1951. 278 pp., illus. \$5. (A pictorial account of Japanese-Americans in Hawaii.)

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A CENTRAL JAVANESE VILLAGE IN 1950. By Paul M. Kattenburg. Ithaca, N. Y.: *Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University*. 1951. 12 pp., mimeo.

CHINESE SCHOOLS AND THE EDUCATION OF CHINESE MALAYANS. By a Mission invited by the Federation Government. Kuala Lumpur: *Government Press*. 1951. 42 pp.

INDO-CHINA. A Key to the Far East. Paris: *L'Economie. Supplement to the December 14, 1950, issue of L'Economie*. 31 pp. 100 frs. (An account of French policy.)

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ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE. Results as Accepted in the Second Plenary Meeting Held on November 2, 1949, at The Hague. *The Hague: Secretariat-General of the Round Table Conference*. 1950. 145 pp. (Includes the Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, and communications exchanged by the Indonesian and Netherlands delegations.)

SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND ITS FUTURE. By Guy Wint. London: *Batchworth Press*. 1951. 32 pp. 1/6.

TIN, 1950-1951. A Review of the World Tin Industry. *The Hague: International Tin Study Group*. 1951. 84 pp. 75¢.

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The Resurgence of Military Elements in Japan

Robert Guillain

BEFORE the outbreak of the Korean war, it was difficult to determine whether former members of the old Japanese army were engaging in clandestine activities. Not only did the individuals in question exercise the utmost prudence, but few courses of direct action lay open to them. Not many of them thought that they would ever again be permitted to return to their former calling. Embittered, discredited, impoverished, and discharged, most ex-soldiers had retired to the remote countryside, where they had more or less vanished among the ordinary people. It was easier for them to live there, restored to the peasant families from which almost all of them had come originally. There they could try to forget and be forgotten.

A very small minority, however, sought to "keep the flame alight". According to some estimates (probably exaggerated), this minority numbered about ten per cent of the wartime army. Its activities were sporadic and disorganized, and took the form mainly of what the Japanese call *renraiku*, that is, personal relations of various kinds, such as mutual assistance in coping with the misery and difficulties of post-war life, occasional encounters, exchanges of information by word of mouth, and so forth. The outside observer could conclude only that certain small groups existed and were centered on their most active members. These groups, resembling clans, were united by old bonds of friendship, of regional origin, or of common membership in one or another former military unit. They did not as a rule collaborate with one another; in fact, mutual dislike or hostility usually prevailed.

In 1950 the situation began to change: in January General MacArthur's New Year message invited the Japanese to prepare to defend themselves against danger from abroad; in June the Korean war broke out; in July the Yoshida Government, at the instance of SCAP, started to recruit for a National Police Reserve, which was to become a para-military force; and in February 1951 John Foster Dulles, in Tokyo, urgently requested the government to undertake rearmament.

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The Korean war and these accompanying events caused a profound climatic change in Japan, which was suddenly wrenched loose from its previously protected position. As soon as the idea of a renascent Japanese army became politically acceptable and the word "rearmament" was no longer taboo, the outlines of secret Japanese military activity began to appear more clearly. Theretofore only a vague cloud had been perceptible; now the cloud began to assume more substantial form—to condense.

When Prime Minister Yoshida, while resisting Mr. Dulles' objurgations as stubbornly as he could, decided to give personal attention to the rearmament problem in the months preceding the signing of the peace treaty, various plans for the rebuilding of the army suddenly blossomed forth as if by magic; all of them originated with former officers who were now serving as military advisers to the political parties or to individual politicians. It then became apparent that some of the ex-military groups referred to above had extended their activities more widely and rapidly than had been suspected.

The Japanese classify these groups of former military figures in three categories: that of former generals; that of former colonels and members of the general staffs; and that of majors, captains and non-commissioned officers. According to well-informed Japanese, the second category is to be taken most seriously. The ex-generals' activities are not considered significant, if only because these men are elderly and, for the most part, unlikely to participate actively in a new Japanese army. The "captains' movement" appears to be still in its infancy, although it includes men of ambition and audacity; it perhaps best preserves the old spirit, at once military and revolutionary, which inspired the famous officers' plot of February 26, 1936.¹ All of these groups are behaving with increasing freedom and boldness, but they

¹ On September 15, 1951, at Honganji Temple in Tokyo, thirty-six former army captains assembled in secret. All of them had been members of the fifty-fifth class of the former military academy. At the close of their meeting they gave unanimous approval to a resolution demanding: (1) the immediate "depurge" of all ex-military men without exception; (2) the freeing of all war criminals still held in prison; (3) the rehabilitation of Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine, the Japanese military pantheon, in which are enshrined the spirits of those who have fallen in war; and (4) government grants and pensions to men wounded in the last war and to families of soldiers killed in action. The resolution ended with a declaration that, if these demands were met, "then we shall place our lives at the service of the country". These men were, in effect, giving notice that they would collaborate in Japanese rearmament and resume their places in a new army only on certain conditions. Their meeting represented the first appearance since the surrender of concerted activity—activity, it should be noted, with a political purpose—on the part of young officers.

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remain divided by questions of clan, personality and policy. In the old Japanese army, beneath an appearance of great solidarity, schisms and rivalries were endemic, just as wrangling and quarrels among the different services persisted even at the very climax of the Pacific war. In former times, however, dissension was moderated by two factors: a common veneration of the Emperor, and the presence at the apex of the military hierarchy of a paramount leader. Today the imperial prestige is diminished, even among the ex-military, and there is disagreement over who is to be the next generalissimo. The latter question preoccupies all of the military groups, each of which sponsors its own "great man", and the disputes on this score are endless.

Instead of presenting a general sketch of the different groups and their tendencies, the following account deals with only two, which are significant examples and of sufficient importance to warrant attention. Rather than calling them groups, it will be more accurate henceforth to employ their Japanese name—*kikan*—which means "organization". This term applies to associations that are somewhat shapeless in organization, flexible in purpose and animated by the personal influence of a leader and his principal lieutenants. In other words, the ex-soldiers' "organizations" are not highly organized; but, in the Japanese environment, this does not affect their importance. The information presented below is drawn largely from Japanese sources which may be described as moderate in that, although not opposed in principle to rearmament, they think it necessary both to keep a watchful eye on the circumstances in which former military personages return to public life and to control their activities thereafter.

THE Hattori Organization (*Hattori Kikan*) is considered to be one of the most, if not the most, important of the clandestine associations of ex-officers in Japan. It takes its name from its founder, Colonel Takushiro Hattori, who is probably the most vigorous proponent of a new Japanese army. Among the ex-military, he is regarded as a coming leader, and his name is often mentioned together with those of men who stand the best chance, when the time comes, of being chosen to head the new army.²

² After graduating from the Tokyo military academy, Hattori began his brilliant career by joining the general staff soon after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1931. Between 1934 and 1936 he first was attached to the office of the Japanese military attaché in Paris and then went to Ethiopia, where he observed the war from the Ethiopian side. On returning to the Far East, he was assigned to the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and participated in the

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The Japanese defeat in the Pacific war did not really interrupt Hattori's military activities, since he succeeded in joining the only military organization that was officially authorized after the dissolution of the Japanese army. This was the Demobilization Bureau, which, under American supervision, was charged with liquidating the Japanese military establishment. When this bureau was dissolved in June 1948, Hattori moved to the unit that replaced it, the Repatriation Bureau, which was responsible for looking after ex-military personnel on their return from the continent. He was thus enabled to maintain contact with the staff of General Willoughby, MacArthur's chief of intelligence and principal aide. He gradually got onto excellent terms with Willoughby, who, taking him under his wing, made use of Hattori's extensive knowledge of the old Japanese army—or of as much of it as Hattori chose to divulge to him. Within the Demobilization and Repatriation Bureaus, Hattori, assisted by other former high-ranking Japanese officers, provided SCAP with reports on such matters as the history of the Pacific war and the lessons to be drawn from it, as well as with dissertations on contemporary events of international significance. He became, in fact, one of the main points of contact between General Willoughby and SCAP on the one hand and former Japanese army personnel on the other.

Two schools of thought regarding Japanese relations with the United States existed among ex-military circles. One favored collaboration. Acting in an informal capacity, some former officers used to exchange ideas with the Americans on the question—still theoretical and in principle prohibited—of eventual Japanese rearmament. When the Korean war broke out, they furnished SCAP with many studies of Korea. Certain of these men were charged with sharing with the general staff of SCAP their many-faceted knowledge of Korea, China and the Soviet Union, and to that end worked night and day in great secrecy in the American offices.

The other and larger school of thought avoided contact with Occupation personnel. Many of these ex-soldiers are still extremely cautious

"pocket war" at Nomonhan, which ended in a Japanese defeat that had a marked effect upon later Japanese policy toward the Soviet Union. Subsequently he became chief of the operations section in the Tokyo general staff, a position of great importance, since the army was then preparing for the Pacific war. When General Tojo succeeded to the premiership in October 1941, Hattori was one of Tojo's closest aides and later became his secretary. After Tojo's fall in mid-1944, he was again assigned to head the operations section of the general staff. The end of the war found him in China, in command of a division.

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on the question of rearmament; they believe that the hour for action has not yet struck. It is all right, they say, to make plans and to discuss the problem, but it will be essential to move slowly, to avoid any haphazard action, and to devote serious study to the situation. In their view, the main consideration is that an army which is rebuilt too soon will possess neither an ideal nor an ideology and will have no definite national ambition to champion. It will run the risk of becoming an army of mercenaries, destined to serve United States policy and built around a motley crew lacking real military worth—jobless adventurers and youths without either money in their pockets or convictions in their hearts, who will be attracted only by the prospect of good pay. Under the Occupation, these men assert, Japanese youth has lost almost all sense of patriotism; in school it is no longer taught the old imperial creed, and the formula which once was on everyone's lips—*o-kuni no tame-ni*, "for the sake of the country"—is now but rarely heard. In order to rebuild the army it will, therefore, be necessary to take the youth in hand and to inculcate in it afresh a desire to serve the country.

Hattori has tried to occupy a position between or, rather, above these two points of view. Although SCAP knew him as a skilled and useful collaborator, he remained in touch with the non-collaborators and enlisted representatives of both groups in his organization.

The existence of the Hattori *Kikan* is widely known in Japan, but factual data concerning its operations are not easily secured. Contrary to general belief, it is not a large organization but a small nucleus of extremely resolute men, about whom gravitate groups that function in a generally uncoordinated manner.⁸ The central group regards itself as a kind of secret general staff and as the proper agency for rebuilding the Japanese army. In its opinion, the first military cadres should be supplied by it and its affiliates, which maintain contact with that cloud of ex-military men mentioned earlier. Hattori is reported to have compiled an extensive card-index of future officers who belonged to the old

⁸ Hattori's chief lieutenants are Colonels Susumu Nishiura, who was a member of the bureau of military affairs in the general staff at the outbreak of the Pacific war; Kurao Imoto, who was attached to the operations section during the war; and Kazuo Horiba. Hattori, Nishiura and Imoto were all at one time secretaries to General Tojo. Together with Horiba, they comprise the executive of the organization. After them come Fujiwara (first name not known), Shiro Hara, Morishiro Hashimoto, Eiji Hirose, Katsushiro Mizumachi, Nojiri (first name not known), Kengoro Tanaka and Nizo Yamaguchi. These dozen men really constitute the Hattori *Kikan*. On the provincial level, it is loosely organized and includes about 300 members, all former officers and mostly, like the forenamed, colonels or lieutenant-colonels.

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professional army, and it is not unlikely that at least a part of his lists is known to the American military authorities. These records are sufficiently detailed to make possible a fairly extensive mobilization, after which, it is said, Hattori will decide on promotions according to his preferment list.

The Hattori *Kikan* has three catchwords: *Jishiu* (self-reliance), *Jiritsu* (independence) and *Jiei* (self-defense)—which are interpreted within the organization as follows. *Jishiu* means: we must neither enter an American military system nor depend on the United States to do what must be done, but instead must rely on ourselves. *Jiritsu* means: American aid will have to be only temporary; arms and matériel can and doubtless must be furnished by the United States at first, but as soon as possible they should be produced by Japan itself. *Jiei* means: we must return to the Japanese concept of the citizen-soldier and teach every Japanese that his first duty is to guard his country—to be a civilian-soldier; let us kindle in every heart a patriotic urge to defend the Japanese nation.

The secret instructions of the organization, drafted by Hattori, envisage the future re-establishment of military conscription. But Hattori realizes that at the present time any overt move in that direction would be very unpopular. Accordingly he favors starting with a less obvious system which, combining conscription with voluntary enlistments, would be based on a system of nomination or recommendation. Under this system, prefectures, cities and villages would be asked to supply the army with a certain number of recruits. If volunteers did not come forward in adequate numbers, recruits would be selected by the authorities. Whether they were volunteers or not, men would be chosen for the army on the recommendation of prefectural and local authorities, whose advice could of course be disregarded in cases where these authorities happened to belong to left-wing political parties.

As for the size of the future army, Hattori envisages one of fifteen to twenty divisions in peace time, and of at least fifty divisions in time of crisis or war. Most of the rearmament plans now under consideration are less ambitious; they provide for at most twenty divisions. Hattori does not consider this adequate, since he believes that ten Russian divisions would have been sufficient to overrun Japan at the end of 1950, when the United States was heavily engaged in Korea.

In general, the Hattori organization does not work against the

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United States. It realizes that Japan will be able to rebuild its forces only with American aid, and recognizes the parallelism of Japanese and United States policies, at least in the years immediately ahead. But its ultimate goal remains *jiritsu*, an independent policy. Hattori and his followers believe that Japan must refuse equally to be a satellite either of the United States or of the Soviet Union.

Another significant indication of the tendencies endorsed by the former military is the fact that the Hattori organization is trying to assure liaison between the old army elements and the new by placing in the new army men who are deeply imbued with the traditions of the old and are dedicated to retaining its ideals. It must unfortunately be said that great influence is being regained by the very men who were Tojo's closest collaborators. Doubtless they have pondered the defects of the old military order which brought defeat upon Japan. But there is a danger that, unless their activities are subjected to strict civilian control, these men will tend once again to give priority to military considerations in the formulation of Japanese policy. This danger becomes very clear indeed in the course of an examination of the role of another typical organization closely associated with Hattori's, namely, the Tsuji *Kikan*.

JAPANESE know Colonel Masanobu Tsuji as the man who took Singapore at the beginning of the Pacific war. They regard him as something of a relic of the past, a simple franc-tireur, more noisy than influential—and they are quite wrong. For Tsuji has regained importance not only because he is extremely active and knows how to publicize his ideas, but also because he has a *kikan*.⁴

⁴ When Tsuji was a colonel attached to the Tokyo general staff, he was regarded by his peers as having one of the best military brains in Japan. It was he who, in Tokyo and in the field, prepared and executed the principal operation in Japan's South Pacific *Blitzkrieg*—the conquest of Malaya. Later, when the tide of Japan's fortunes was ebbing, he became an expert in salvaging hopeless situations; it was he who supervised the evacuation of Guadalcanal and who, toward the end of the war, tried to rally the Japanese forces in Burma when they were already in flight. After the surrender, he travelled in disguise from Burma to Indochina and then on to China, a country with which he was already acquainted through his participation in Japanese political and military adventures from the time of the Manchurian Incident. Finally, by way of Formosa, he returned to Japan.

Sought as a war criminal, he remained in hiding there until 1949, reappearing only after SCAP had terminated its prosecution of war criminals. His reappearance caused a splash, for it coincided more or less with the publication of a book which he had written while in hiding. This was "A Secret Voyage of 3,000 Leagues", an account of his adventurous postwar odyssey, which became a best-seller and was followed by other books published by Tsuji himself, who

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Tsuji worked with Hattori on several occasions in the old days, most notably at Nomonhan, and he is reported to have re-established contact with Hattori on his return to Japan after the war. But, unlike Hattori, Tsuji avoided SCAP and General Willoughby. Eventually he set up an organization distinct from Hattori's, with which, however, he has maintained close relations. Since his reappearance, Tsuji has constantly toured the countryside, making public speeches and undertaking "comfort missions" to families whose sons were killed or mutilated in the war. In the course of these journeys he has built up the framework of his organization. The government has become uneasy over his activities, but though he has been warned or placed under surveillance by the police on several occasions, he has escaped arrest. The authorities have evidently preferred to leave him at liberty rather than give him publicity.

The Tsuji *Kikan* is based in the hinterland, avoiding Tokyo and the other big cities. It is an aggregation of former officers who have retired to the countryside and of veterans of the lower ranks, non-commissioned officers and even privates. Their rank is immaterial; the important thing is this association of men who have proved staunch patriots in the past and who are certain to remain loyal in future. In certain cases membership is extended to men who lack a military background but are good patriots and possess influence in local affairs. The movement has made greatest progress in the traditionally nationalist prefectures in Kyushu and in the Tohoku region in the north; it is strongest in Yamagata, Niigata and Nagano prefectures. It reportedly has ties with certain nationalist secret societies that have become active in the past two or three years as well as with the Nichiren Buddhist sect, which has always had nationalist and militarist inclinations. Nichiren doctrine is becoming fashionable once again, and some of its adepts are found among Tsuji's followers.

Unlike Hattori, Tsuji has no desire to supply the chieftains for the

established a firm for the purpose. In these books, the proceeds from which support him, Tsuji describes various episodes in recent Japanese military history, and in doing so tries to clear himself of responsibility for their disagreeable consequences.

These writings have brought Tsuji publicity rather than popularity. There is in Japan a much stronger current of opposition to rearmament than is commonly realized abroad. The ex-military remain by and large in very bad odor. Tsuji's books afford ample justification for those who accuse him of having been fanatical, narrow-minded, badly informed and in general harmful to his country; he is reproached particularly with having displayed extraordinary ignorance of the true strength of his main enemy, the United States. His ideas nevertheless exert considerable influence, for they are agreeable to the resurgent nationalism of the Japanese and foster a growing anti-American sentiment.

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new army or to build up a small elite. He is content to concentrate his efforts on maintaining close relations with his supporters, fostering a spirit of unity among them, and disseminating his ideas among the people at large. According to Japanese who appear well informed regarding his activities, Tsuji wants to organize cells or groups in towns and villages in order to create a kind of patriotic militia. His organization already has a fairly widespread network; unlike Hattori's, which has few members, it numbers some ten thousand, the most active of whom are former students of his at the military academy.

For the present, the Hattori and Tsuji *kikan* are functioning independently of each other. To all appearances, the members of both are on friendly terms, and their leaders exchange information and cooperate with each other when occasion offers. Hattori is said to be hopeful of one day taking over Tsuji's organization. Whatever the case, well-informed Japanese declare that if the two organizations should merge, they could wield considerable power in Japanese affairs and become a center around which the cloud of ex-military groups might take definite form.

For men like Hattori and Tsuji the creation of the National Police Reserve (NPR) in July 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean war and at the suggestion of MacArthur, posed a weighty problem. Trained and equipped by the United States, the NPR is in theory a militarized police force designed to prevent domestic disorders, but the United States, with the blessing of the Japanese government, views it as an instrument of military defense and as the core of a future Japanese army. The problem, then, was this: should the secret organizations cooperate with the NPR, ignore it, or even oppose it? Former professional soldiers have little respect for the NPR, which they regard as a mercenary crew that is over-paid and coddled instead of being properly trained by the rigorous methods employed in the old army. There is, besides, a definite rivalry between the NPR and such organizations as Hattori's and Tsuji's, since these, too, expect to provide the core of the future Japanese army. In its early stages, therefore, the NPR was boycotted by the secret organizations, which had decided to prevent it from becoming a real army and to relegate it as soon as possible to the secondary role which theoretically was its proper one—that is, the role of a police force, not of a military force.

But the occurrence of a major transformation within the NPR

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unfolded entirely new perspectives and altered the attitude of the clandestine organizations. This development was the granting of permission to the NPR to admit former professional officers who had served in the imperial army before and during the war. Until October 1951, such individuals had been strictly barred, for two reasons: first, because they were included in lists of purgees who were prohibited from participating in official or public life; and, second, because the intention was to build the NPR upon an entirely new foundation by staffing it with new blood. Such former officers as had been accepted were all reservists, not professionals. Both of these obstacles to the return to military duty of former professional soldiers were now removed. The "depurge" lifted the ban from almost all of them, excepting only war criminals and those who had occupied top positions in the government at the time of Pearl Harbor. Moreover, the government decided that the NPR would not be adequately staffed or imbued with a sufficiently strong military spirit unless it availed itself of the services of the most experienced soldiers, the professionals of an earlier day. Consequently, on October 1, 1951, a first group of 400 depurged former officers entered the military school at Etchujima, near the Yokosuka naval base, and this vanguard has since more than doubled in size. Other ex-officers restored to duty have gone to the United States for training in new weapons and combat methods.

These developments reportedly caused the Hattori and Tsuji organizations to alter their attitude toward the NPR; their present policy is to infiltrate rather than to compete with it, so that they may shape it from within and prepare for the time when they can assume leadership of it. Accordingly, secret members of the Hattori organization have recently established cells within the NPR. Their activities are opposed by the government, which, while agreeing to the return to duty of depurged officers, is trying to uncover members of clandestine military groups, and particularly followers of Hattori, in order to exclude them from the NPR.

THE question of Colonel Tsuji's views on Japanese policy, and of their influence in former military circles, is particularly interesting now, when the Japanese peace treaty and the accompanying Japanese-American security pact have recently come into force. The two main consequences of these agreements are primarily military in that they

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permit the establishment of United States bases in Japan for defense purposes and authorize or, rather, invite Japan to rearm and to manufacture munitions. Tsuji's views are in no sense representative of official policy, with which they most often conflict; nor do they reflect the thinking of that group of ex-military men who, as already noted, are generally more cautious than Tsuji. Nevertheless, his ideas do represent a current of thought that is extremely widespread among those who oppose present government policy. Their very violence and dynamism may lend them a certain fascination for the mass of the people, and thus exert influence on Japanese politics and especially on future tendencies in the army that is now coming into being.

Tsuji talks and writes a great deal. In one of his latest books, published in the spring of 1952 and currently a best-seller, he returns to his favorite arguments under the title "Self-Defensive Neutrality" (*Jiei Shuritsu*). On the basis of opinions which he has expressed in private and of others which he has publicized in books and lectures, his arguments can be summarized more or less in the following way.

Tsuji holds that Japan should join neither the American nor the Russian camp. It must have but one aim—to gain a position of independence and neutrality. To the question which side will win the war, cold or hot, between the Eastern and Western blocs, he replies that the outcome need not greatly concern Japan. The important thing is that the Japanese should survive, and this will be possible only if they refuse to take part in the conflict. Japan, he argues, is fundamentally anti-communist and is impelled to resist Russian influence by all of its deepest instincts—by its traditional sentiments and memories of victory in the Russo-Japanese war; by its nationalism, which could never accept subjection to Russia; by the incompatibility of Marxist doctrine and communist materialism with Japanese ideals; and by the natural instinct of self-defense against any neighboring country that menaces the sacred homeland. The United States, to whose advantage it is to pursue a policy calculated to support and utilize this anti-communist force, must begin by ascertaining the degree of cooperation that it may expect from Japan. If it demands too much—if, for instance, it tries to employ Japan as an American base—and if the Japanese are led to think that they are being exploited as mercenaries in order to spare American lives, then the United States will obtain results quite contrary to those it intends. "If the United States wishes us to defend ourselves against

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communism and to protect our country against a Red invasion, it need only adopt a very simple and effective course: let the Japanese themselves defend Japan." In Tsuji's opinion, which is very widely held in Japan, the maintenance of United States bases in the country will alienate public sentiment and undermine existing goodwill toward the United States. If the latter remains in Japan, the people will gradually become hostile to it; if, on the other hand, it leaves the country, Japan will feel obliged to support the American cause and, in serving its own interests, will serve American interests as well. Washington should ask Tokyo to defend Japanese, not American, interests. Only thus can the policies of the two countries be made to coincide.

The obvious weakness in this reasoning is its failure to recognize that the departure of United States forces would leave Japan completely defenseless vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Korean war has demonstrated that Japan is one of the prime objectives of international communism and that the slightest show of weakness in that part of the world automatically invites a communist thrust. Tsuji, who tends to carry his views to extremes, is a trifle vague on this essential point. Apparently he believes that it is practically impossible to avoid an intermediate period during which the defense of Japan will be partly the responsibility of the United States and the provision of American arms will offer the sole means of rebuilding a Japanese army, air force and possibly also a navy. This period, however, he thinks should be as short as possible.

Tsuji has gone so far as to propose a Draconian solution which he insists could be put into effect immediately: the United States and United Nations forces should abandon Korea and give Japan the bulk of the arms now collected there. The way in which he supports this proposal is quite characteristic of the state of mind of Japanese nationalists. "Let the Americans," he says, "simply leave on our shores only half of the arms they have in Korea, and then go away. They can rest assured that we will surmount our difficulties very well with these arms. In short order we will have an effective army." But would not the abandonment of Korea greatly magnify the Russian threat to Japan? To this objection, Tsuji replies: "That will be all to the good. It is precisely an awareness of common peril that will galvanize the Japanese, bring about a national awakening, and arouse unanimous support for defense and rearmament." Here, easily recognizable, is the familiar

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argument of the prewar nationalists: threats from abroad are to be welcomed, for they can be made to serve our ends. Tsuji continues in characteristic fashion by stating that if the arms in question are received and put to use by "true patriots", then an army can be built very rapidly. Who are these true patriots? Who else but the members of secret organizations, such as Hattori's and Tsuji's, that are preparing the groundwork for a new army? These men, he declares, would need no more than six months to mobilize a body of infantry.

Tsuji is confident that the Soviet Union does not intend—at least until war has started elsewhere, possibly in Europe—to risk a frontal invasion of Japan. The Russians' tactic, he asserts, is that of indirect and invisible invasion, in peace time and through the activities of an internal fifth column, since Moscow wants the communist revolution in Japan to be led by Japanese and not by foreigners. The work of the communists' fifth column will be greatly aided if the United States maintains garrisons in Japan overlong. If, on the other hand, these forces are removed, Japanese nationalism can be counted on to defend the country against the danger of an "invasion from within".

What would happen, however, if a world war broke out and Japan, being allied with the United States, became involved in the conflict? At the beginning of 1951, Tsuji gave a talk behind closed doors at the Industrial Club in Tokyo before an audience of politicians and businessmen; his remarks caused quite a stir. In the course of a long exposition, he developed the argument that any war between the United States and the Soviet Union would have to start before 1955 and that it would necessarily be a very extended struggle which would cause terrible destruction. The conflict would center in or near Europe, with the Far East being only a secondary theater. This war for world supremacy would concern only the United States and the Soviet Union; if they wished to survive, Japan and the other countries of Asia, including China, would have to remain out of the struggle.

Drawing on information obtained from Japanese sources immediately after the end of the Pacific war and in the years since, Tsuji offered a comparative analysis of the present and potential power of the United States and the Soviet Union, and concluded that the Americans underestimate the true strength of the Soviet Union. In the event of war, he said, the Russians would be in a position to begin with a *Blitzkrieg*, which would place them in possession of Europe and of the

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main sources of raw materials before the Western powers could take effective action. In three months the Soviet Union could secure mastery of the Eurasian continent. The United States would then be placed in a difficult defensive position, and would have to undertake a war of attrition, which might last five to ten years. Major obstacles confronting it would be the vast distances that it would have to traverse in order to strike at the bases of Russian strength, and the fact that Soviet industry not only has removed its main centers beyond the Urals into central Asia but has also decentralized its factories and reorganized its industrial regions in such a way that they are independent of one another, so that the destruction of one would not necessarily impair the value of others—in contrast to the situation in the United States, where over-concentrated industries are highly vulnerable to attack by atomic bombs. Hence Tsuji's conclusion, expressed both in the talk in question and in his book "Self-Defensive Neutrality", that the United States is by no means certain to win the next war.

As far as Japan is concerned, Tsuji believes that the Soviet Union could easily conquer it with a rather small force of between ten and twenty divisions. Hokkaido would be seized first, and then Kyushu in the south, which would be overrun with the help of a Chinese Communist army, the Russian air force meanwhile protecting the invaders as they crossed over from the continent and paralyzing the Japanese defense by bombing attacks and by dropping parachute troops directly on Tokyo. In the face of this onslaught, the United States would abandon Japan rather than trying to defend it; possession of it would not be indispensable to the United States, since it is too remote from the vital centers of Soviet Russia to afford valuable bases for air attack—the real bases for such attacks upon the heartland of the Soviet Union lying elsewhere, between India and Morocco. The United States would gradually discover that Japan is at once too difficult to protect, too distant to supply, and too expensive to support. Washington would, therefore, decide to abandon the country, while hoping to regain it after defeating Russia. But the Americans would not leave until they were satisfied that Japan had been rendered useless to the Russians as well. Before departing, they would systematically destroy Japanese industry, wipe out all military installations, wreck the transportation system, and so forth; if necessary, they could finish this task after

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evacuating Japan, by means of air attacks from their nearby island bases on Okinawa and Guam.

In support of his somber predictions, Tsuji frequently cites the statement made in Tokyo in 1949 by the then United States Secretary of the Army, Kenneth Royall, who implied that the United States was not formally obligated to defend Japan under all circumstances and might abandon it under enemy attack. Tsuji intentionally ignores the facts that since the time of the Royall statement American policy has become much firmer and that the Korean war, the Japanese peace treaty and the Japanese-American security pact have fundamentally altered the situation in Northeast Asia. He disregards the additional fact that the Soviet Union is not a major naval power and that the Pacific will remain an American ocean—which is to say that it would be easier for the United States to supply Japan than for the Soviet Union to do so, since the remoteness of the Siberian bases creates formidable logistic problems. Finally, Tsuji is behind the times regarding the major factor in the situation, namely, American rearmament since the beginning of the Korean war. The United States should soon have available large forces which will enable it, if not to use Japan as a base for counter-attack against the Soviet Union, at least to organize a sufficiently strong defense to prevent an invasion of Japan by Communist armies.

But the purpose of this account is not, after all, to criticize the ideas of Colonel Tsuji and others like him; that would be only too easy, and in any case has already been done. The point to be stressed is that these ideas not only exist but influence the thinking of a sector of Japanese opinion. In urging upon the Japanese the goal of armed neutrality, they combine two tendencies which are becoming increasingly apparent—neutralism and nationalism. As a result of the building of a new army, the former military will gradually emerge from the shadows to take part once more in Japanese public life. Will they, in the name of these two “isms”, thwart United States policy and encourage anti-American resistance? This is one of the major questions of the new era that is dawning in the land of the Rising Sun.

Paris, June 1952

The Philippine-American Experiment: A Filipino View

Jose A. Lansang

PHILIPPINE conditions and prevalent Filipino thinking today are the result of what has been called the Philippine-American experiment. In historical terms, this unique enterprise was launched unilaterally by President William McKinley in January 1899 when instructing American commissioners who were setting out to establish civil government in the Philippines. "The Philippines," the American president wrote, "are ours, not to exploit but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government. This is the path of duty which we must follow or be recreant to a mighty trust committed to us."¹ The experiment became Philippine-American after Emilio Aguinaldo, the president of the first Philippine Republic, proclaimed in the same month, had been captured by United States troops and his republic had "collapsed under the pressure of [the American] military forces".² It was then that William Howard Taft, the chairman of the second Philippine Commission and subsequently the first civil governor of the Islands, announced and set in motion the policy of "the Philippines for the Filipinos", which elicited the support of a segment of the Filipino leadership of that time.

The course of later developments in the country was shaped by the McKinley policy and Taft's renunciatory slogan. The unbalanced development of the national economy, the systematic, if unsuccessful, "Americanization" of Filipino life and thought, the subtle stifling of nationalist sentiments until a Filipino chief executive could recently say, "The only voice I hear is that of President Truman", as well as the emergence of the many Philippine social and economic problems that vex the two peoples today—all have been direct consequences of the policy underlying the joint experiment. No recrimination is intended by these simple statements of fact. Neither the Americans nor the Filipinos deliberately sought their chance association. They stumbled into it, and it was natural that the policy governing this unexpected relationship should have been characterized by improvisation and

¹ Quoted in Francis Burton Harrison, *The Cornerstone of Philippine Independence*, p. 36.

² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

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unrealism. The Americans proceeded to develop rather than to exploit the Philippines, with the disconcerting result that the Islands became, in time, an irritant in the economy of the United States.³

In accordance with McKinley's instructions, the Americans tried to "civilize and educate" the Filipinos, who had at least 500 years of history behind them and were the inheritors of a great Oriental culture much older than the Americans' own. The result of this unrealistic approach is that, after a half-century of American education, the Filipinos have become familiar with all of the forms and symbols of American democracy, but continue to think, and to act, as confused Orientals who do not quite know how to effect their own salvation.⁴

The Americans tried also to teach "the science of self-government" to the Filipinos, who, just before Taft's arrival in Manila, had adopted a constitution based on European parliamentary systems and, in accordance with it, had proclaimed a republican government for the whole country, with a successful revolutionary leader as its first president. But the genius and spirit which produced that "first republic" were soon dissipated and perverted by determined American "teaching", with the unhappy result that, to this day, both the domestic and foreign policies of the Philippines bear the unmistakable brand: "Made in the U.S.A." Thus, the present Constitution of the Philippine Republic had to be approved by the President of the United States; the basic internal economic development program was dictated by the American Bell Mission of 1950 and is being executed jointly by the Philippine Committee for United States Aid and the United States Mutual Security Agency; and the Philippine Mission to the United Nations almost invariably cooperates with the United States Mission. If the Philippines has failed thus far to ratify the Japanese peace treaty, this is not because the government is officially opposed to ratification but because the Opposition majority in the Senate has hopes of effecting a different arrangement with the new Japan.

Sometimes, even since the achievement of Philippine independence, American "tutelage" has reached extremes reminiscent of the "colonial"

³ Thus, "The United States not only did not need the resources from the Philippines, but found the colonial administration expensive and a drain on the American tax payer, especially noticeable in an era of depression. The Tydings-McDuffie Act (the Philippine Independence Law of 1934), therefore, was generally interpreted as a decision to rid the nation of its costly hostage." Paul E. Eckel, *The Far East Since 1500*, p. 627.

⁴ One recent American observer has termed the Philippine educational system one of the "most destructive" in Asia. Albert Ravenholt, "The Philippines: Where Did We Fail?", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1951.

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period. Both the sweeping reorganization of the Philippine Army and the appointment of Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense in 1950 were urged by the Americans; the organization and nationwide activities of the National Movement for Free Elections, which was in some measure responsible for the relative absence of irregularities in the elections of November 1951, were inspired and partly financed by the United States Embassy in Manila. Yet, writing in the winter of 1952, the former American diplomat William Bullitt, declared:

"President Quirino still has two years to serve. The fate of democracy in the Philippines is likely to be decided in those years. The present lack of confidence in democracy can be overcome by ruthless honesty and efficiency in administration. The economic misery which breeds Huks can be overcome by land distribution and assisted migration. With additional troops Magsaysay could conquer the Huks.

"All this—and more—can be done if the political leaders of the Philippines can now rise to the level of moral literacy which distinguishes the little people of their country. If they cannot, 'the show window of American democracy in the Far East' will continue to display dirty, shoddy products. And, in the end, Communism will hold the field because democracy has failed."⁵

Here, indeed, is another hastily improvised judgment, no more carefully considered than was the policy framed by President McKinley in 1899. Mr. Bullitt is not unsophisticated, but he did not stop to ask himself why, after a half-century of the Philippine-American experiment, during which the American policy was "to teach the Filipinos the science of self-government", there should be a "lack of confidence in democracy" in the country. And, although he may be correct in asserting that "the economic misery which breeds Huks can be overcome by land distribution and assisted migration", he does not indicate how President Quirino, in the two years remaining in his current term of office, is to accomplish what the American administration in the previous four decades did not even consider doing, or, if it did, could not accomplish. It is a matter of record that during the forty-six years of direct United States control of the Philippine government, clarification and full legalization of land titles in the country did not exceed the halfway mark.

Again, Mr. Bullitt may of course be right when he says, "With additional troops Magsaysay could conquer the Huks." Apparently he did not care to pursue his speculations. After the Huks are conquered, then what? The same old reliance on primary production, the same old

⁵ William Bullitt, "No Peace in the Philippines", *Reader's Digest*, March 1952.

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dominance of the feudal landlords, the same old control of foreign trade by alien import-export barons, the same old near-monopoly of retail trade by other aliens? In other words, the same system that flourished in the heyday of American "tutelage"?

THE truth is that, with the rumble of communist drums growing audible in the distance, the Filipinos' American mentors have suddenly become frantic and are trying to telescope into the space of two or three years, which they perceive to be critical ones, all that should have been done earlier, in the most favorable decades of the Philippine-American experiment.

Labor experts attached to the United States Embassy and the Mutual Security Agency in Manila are now seeking to speed the organization of free trade unions, which might serve as instruments for a more equitable distribution of the national income; but in the face of the powerful company unions that have been tolerated since the days of the American governors-general and high commissioners, their efforts are naturally encountering obstructions at every turn. By bringing strong pressure to bear, the Mutual Security Agency persuaded the Philippine Congress to enact a minimum wage law in 1951, but since social and governmental techniques and machinery necessary for the enforcement of such a disturbing law were not developed in earlier years, the staff of the newly-created Wage Administration Service is no match for the employers, who know dozens of ways of evading the law. American advisers who have come to understand the crux of the crisis are searching desperately for a sizable middle class which might be mobilized as a spearhead for reforms; but if a large middle class failed to materialize in earlier decades, it certainly cannot be created in a year or two.

Similarly, some American educators, aware of the role of youth movements in the development of such countries as Burma and Indonesia, have journeyed up and down the Philippines in quest of a genuine youth movement. Failing to find one, they wonder how Philippine youth can remain so apathetic in the face of such obviously deteriorating conditions. "What future do they think they can expect if they don't bestir themselves?" asked a lady educator from Columbia University. She might have spared herself trouble if she had examined the content of the courses offered in the colleges and universities, particularly in the social sciences, the very essence of which is never to

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question the existing state of things; or if she had thought to observe how thoroughly college students in the Philippines have been beguiled by Hollywood movies, pulp-magazine literature, which is imported by the ton, and colored "comic books", for which Manila offers possibly the largest market outside of the United States. If the protagonists found in this genre of entertainment were heroes of the labor movement or of student organizations fighting for social and economic reform or for academic freedom, instead of the incredible escapist creatures that they are, Filipino youth might today be more militant and democratically oriented than its counterparts in other countries. But "Superman" never led a picket line, and "Captain Marvel" never stood up to an oppressive landowner. How, then, is the young Filipino to realize that in a democracy such things sometimes need to be done?

The college youth who manages somehow to acquire progressive notions from the few American liberal magazines that reach Manila, by subscription, must be very brave indeed to discuss his new ideas in public or even indiscriminately with his fellow-students. The situation is such that, if a group of students and faculty were to conduct a public forum on, for instance, the celebrated "White Paper on China" published some time ago by the United States Department of State, all of its members might well find themselves under surveillance, as possibly subversive individuals, by the military intelligence. The accepted, respectable version of the fall of China to the Communists holds that the latter won because they are the "devil's own brigade", robots manipulated by the Ogre in the Kremlin.

A student who, in talking about China, failed to berate the Communists while emphasizing the corruption and ineptitude of the Kuomintang, would be suspect; and, if he lacked political influence and good connections among the governing class, he might encounter difficulty in securing a position either in the government or in a respectable business house. There is no strong and progressive labor movement to give him support, no independent middle class to give him shelter. If youthful integrity and idealism caused him to consider how he might best help his country to escape from a fate similar to China's, he might conclude that his safest course would be to enlist in the battalion combat teams now fighting the Huks. Yet, conditions in the government and in the national economy being what they are, he would also realize that, even if he were physically fit for army service, which he probably would not be, his fate would perhaps be not much

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different from that of a young Chinese who enlisted in Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist army in, say, 1948.

What, then, could this youth, bursting with ideas of change, do? He might join the National Movement for Free Elections, but if he became too prominent in it, he would undoubtedly also become *persona non grata* to the present administration. Moreover, he would be aware that, while free and clean elections are always desirable, they can have decisive value in the present situation only if powerful leaders or candidates are prepared to give support publicly to a program that involves tampering with the existing state of affairs. Since such is not in fact the case, no matter how many clean and free elections are held, whoever comes to power may perhaps achieve a fairly honest and efficient administration, but sooner or later he must knock his head against a wall of impersonal economic facts.

These facts are numerous and diverse. Government revenues are declining because national output is not increasing appreciably, and even if it were, the monetary value of the major exports—sugar, copra, lumber, minerals, abacá and rope—is falling. No one can create many jobs when the national treasury is nearly empty. Idle capital, or capital that is heavily committed to speculation in real estate or commodities, cannot be persuaded to invest in manufacturing in the absence of a favorable domestic market, nor can such a market develop as long as workers on the land, who comprise the bulk of the country's laboring class, are held in virtual peonage. Most agricultural workers earn about a dollar a day during the three months of each year in which they have steady employment; during the balance of the year they try to eke out a living as best they can. Under such conditions, the entire agricultural labor force in the Philippines generates insufficient purchasing power to sustain even a single large manufacturer of cheap cotton cloth. This is perhaps the reason that not one such textile mill exists in this country of some twenty million inhabitants. Clearly, a brute economic fact of this kind cannot be banished by means of free and clean elections. And yet, there is available an enormous productive potential in the shape of unutilized man power. According to conservative estimates, approximately four million persons are either wholly unemployed or gainfully employed for only part of the year. These represent the most valuable of the country's undeveloped natural resources and, incidentally, excellent raw material for future communist legions.

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AMONG the desperate needs of the nation are (1) a free, unfettered and progressive public-education system able to lift the masses out of their lethargy and brooding discontent; (2) strong but free peasant organizations that can raise morale in the countryside and open avenues to improvements in living conditions and opportunities which the poor can see and understand; (3) powerful, democratic labor unions in the cities and towns that can exert effective political pressure in the direction of enactment and enforcement of genuine reforms; (4) vigorous encouragement in colleges and universities of study and research in the social sciences, particularly in economics and history, and of experimentation in the applied sciences so that as speedily as possible a body of dependable knowledge may be acquired about the innumerable social and economic problems of the nation, and thus serve as a basis for the formulation of intelligent policies and programs; and (5) youthful, intelligent and dedicated leadership in all fields.

The young man just described, who is seeking a position in society in which he can articulate his ideas of change, must come sooner or later to recognize one or more of these five needs. They are, after all, five major institutions of democracy that have been neglected in the course of the Philippine-American experiment. But how, or where, is he to begin? If he manages to make a little progress on some undertaking of his own, he is bound to encounter what almost all of the Mutual Security Agency experts—certainly a tough breed and backed by enormous power—have found so crippling in their efforts to meet any of the five needs mentioned above. This exasperating obstacle to any democratic group effort is the Filipinos' complete lack of skill in handling the most elementary democratic techniques.

For it is one thing to be familiar with all of the different and enthralling definitions of democracy, or with the most vivid descriptions of its institutions and processes, and quite another to have correct knowledge of how to manage its simplest techniques. During a recent visit to the Philippines in the course of a survey of student movements in Southeast Asia, a leader of a large American student organization attended a conference of Filipino student leaders south of Manila. He had been pained to note, he said afterward, that a group of elementary-school boys and girls in any Chicago public school could probably manage a committee meeting better and more fruitfully than had the Filipino student leaders whom he had observed in action during a

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supposedly important conference. He did not mean to suggest, he added, that the students were lacking in seriousness or intelligence, but "they just did not have the know-how of conducting and managing a conference as a technique of the democratic process".

The central article of faith of the democratic system posits the dignity and worth of the individual; the basis of its egalitarian premise is that a man, no matter how humble, must be permitted to have his say and may contribute something of value to any group decision. The simplest mechanism for the exercise of that privilege is the committee or the conference, which gives meaning to the principle of majority rule. The Filipino student leaders whom their American counterpart saw in action appeared to be wholly unaware that unless a conference encourages free and general discussion, it is not in fact democratic.

The explanation for what the visitor from Chicago witnessed is not, of course, far to seek. Since time immemorial, Filipino society has been based on authoritarian concepts and practices; it is still semi-feudal. From childhood, a man is told to believe, taught to obey, ordered to do this or that, and enjoys no recognized right to question or to receive an explanation. The background of Filipino social development is entirely different from that of the American, and the Filipino has never learned the proper use of so elementary a democratic tool as the committee or the conference. In the course of a half-century of American tutelage, which in reality continues to this day, the Filipino came to know all of the symbols and forms of democracy but not how to use effectively the simple tools with which he might have hammered and carved the substance of daily living into shapes more responsive to the needs and aspirations of the common people. Perhaps if he had learned how to wield such tools, he might long ago have seriously disturbed the existing state of things. Under the circumstances, however, both the Filipino youth intent on reforms and the Mutual Security Agency technician eager to assist in freeing the country from its difficulties have to begin at the very beginning, rehearsing the individuals with whom they must work in the use of the simplest democratic techniques—how to conduct a committee meeting, how to gather statistics and other information thoroughly and objectively, how to afford respect to the ideas and rights of the humblest citizen.

He is a determined and sturdy soul who does not sooner or later quit the fight in the face of this striking discrepancy between theory and practice—not to mention the roadblocks which those who would

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preserve their power and privilege at all cost generally erect in the path of necessary and desirable change. As a rule, therefore, the young reformer gradually loses his zeal, and finally ends up as a government clerk or a minor executive in a business house, where, in an occasional slack hour, he may be seen sitting as if in a trance, with a far-away look in his eyes. The Mutual Security Agency technician has a speedier and less painful way of escape: he boards the next plane for home, where the stagnation and futility of Philippine rural life, which he had tried unsuccessfully to disturb, soon becomes nothing more than the vague memory of an unpleasant dream. For their part, the Filipino intellectual who has some comprehension of the nature and dimensions of the crisis confronting democracy in his part of the world, and the honest Filipino labor leader who knows that the only hope lies in fundamental and rapid change, have no easy way out of their dilemmas. They find themselves caught in violent cross-pressures between those who would preserve the existing state of things, even if they can do so only by ruthlessly employing fascist methods, and those who would bring about change, violently and bloodily, if possible through one terrible blow. There is no longer any space in which to stand still.

And yet, something certainly can still be done, given imagination, boldness and a willingness to release the creative potential of the common people of free Asia. The course of the Philippine-American experiment can be made to swerve sharply, away from a half-century of support for a decadent socio-economic system and toward unqualified support for those democratic ideas which, alone, can perhaps spell salvation: free trade unionism, powerful peasant organizations, free and clean elections, honest and efficient government, effective protection of individual rights, full academic freedom, an impartial judiciary, equality before the law, gainful employment for all who need it, increasing opportunities for education and for leisure, a guaranteed modicum of health services for everyone. These phrases may have a trite sound, having been rendered meaningless by abuse in political speeches, but their meaning can be as real as a bowl of rice to the masses of the Philippines and the rest of Asia if they are made, as they can be made, a part of the peoples' daily experience. They constitute the warrants of democracy, and it is their fulfilment—today, not in the vague future—that can deny the field to communism.

Manila, July 1952

Aspects of the Vietnamese Problem

Buu Loc

OBVIOUSLY each of us is free to view events in his own way, through the spectacles he has made for himself of his prejudices and beliefs, of whose existence he is commonly unaware. It is equally clear, however, that despite this latitude, or perhaps because of it, those who have personally experienced an event are better equipped to view it in its proper light than others are. As far as the Vietnamese problem is concerned, the Vietnamese themselves are, clearly, strategically situated to appraise the course of events in their own country. This is one reason why it is important to ascertain how they, from their particular point of vantage, have viewed and interpreted recent developments there.

In the first place, what is their impression of the events which preceded the signing of the Agreements of March 8, 1949, between His Majesty Bao Dai and President Auriol of France, in which France formally recognized the independence of Vietnam? Next, what infringements upon this independence have they noted, and—to state the same question in a somewhat different way—are they satisfied with the present form of the French Union? Finally, how do they propose to go about constructing a sound national society, now that France is no longer responsible for such matters?

There is obvious value in discovering how the Vietnamese view these three basic problems. If one took the trouble to do this, before considering the problem of Vietnam from a French, American or other standpoint, many serious errors of judgment could doubtless be avoided. Such an approach would help to reveal the facts and thus to formulate an effective day-to-day policy.

Some observers insist even to this day that the Vietminh is a nationalist movement, the champion of national independence, and that it therefore deserves sympathy and aid. The question involves a delicate problem of historical interpretation. Some persons, who are other-

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wise perfectly sound, read history in terms of abstract principles in whose immutability they delight; they entirely ignore the effect of evolution, which causes constant change in aspect, character and activity. To avoid any such static and abstract interpretation of the Vietnamese problem, it will be well to recapitulate briefly the history of recent years, despite the inevitable difficulties which, for want of historical perspective, are involved in a description of events that, as it were, are still warm to the touch.

National sentiment has always been very strong among the Vietnamese. It stems from something very deep and persistent in this people who, in the course of the two millenia of their history, have had to defend themselves constantly against their powerful neighbour in the north—China. Naturally, this sentiment was not extinguished in the period of the French protectorate. During the second world war it manifested itself in the establishment of a league called “Viet-Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi” (in abbreviated form, Vietminh), which embraced all of the Vietnamese political parties of that period, including the Indochinese Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh. Its program was nationalist—to oppose French rule and to restore the independence and unity of Vietnam. Immediately after the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Vietminh decided to resort to violence in furtherance of its objectives. Ho Chi Minh, who was directing the campaign, invited His Majesty Bao Dai to serve as his “supreme adviser”—a political action of great significance, since it demonstrated that he had correctly appraised the great popular prestige enjoyed by the Emperor.

So much for the origin of the Vietminh. But what of the opinion of those who persist in arguing that, as of mid-1952, it represents a nationalist movement? Certainly, it was nationalist in the early days, when the Indochinese Communist Party, operating on an equal footing with the other nationalist parties, had not yet captured the movement. But in the following years, under Ho Chi Minh’s leadership, the Vietminh abandoned the nationalist camp in order to espouse with increasing vigor the cause of Stalinist communism, whose agent it has since become. The processes provided an example of the familiar tactic of the communists, who do not hesitate to join forces with nationalists as long as these can serve their ends. On their part, the nationalists regarded the communists’ behavior as tantamount to

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treachery or, as the communists would term it, "deviationism". The Vietminh's deviationism took two different directions, one inside the country and another outside it.

Within the country the communists gained progressive control of the Vietminh by exterminating the nationalist political parties one by one. They broke an agreement between Ho Chi Minh and these parties, according to which the latter were to have participated in a National Government including all parties and to have held the vice-presidency. Moreover, they did not hesitate to falsify election returns in their favor. Later on, when peace and quiet have been restored, it will be possible to write this page of history objectively. It will then be seen that the entire classical armory of pressure weapons employed in totalitarian countries was widely used in Vietnam at that time. It was not unusual, for example, for the number of votes recorded in a village to exceed its total number of inhabitants, including children. And once this simulacrum of an election had been completed, the Assembly which it established was immediately dismissed and replaced by a "Bureau" composed of communists or their sympathisers. The powers of government were gradually gathered into the hands of a "Committee of the Resistance", which was of course a communist organism. But there is no need to describe in detail the process by which the communists captured the Vietminh, since it bore a disheartening resemblance to what has become so familiar through repetition in the other people's democracies of the world. In any case, the Vietminh, which started out as a nationalist body, soon became a wholly communist instrument.

While seeking, inside Vietnam, to rid themselves of "traitors"—that is, of everyone who, for whatever reason, did not share their way of thinking—the communists followed a foreign policy which, though paying constant lip-service to the most patriotic aims, was in the end to hurt the national interest. Thus, at the outset in 1945, Ho Chi Minh looked for support to China, whose military forces, under General Lu Han, were then occupying Vietnam as far south as the sixteenth parallel. Early in 1946 he took a different tack, signing agreements with France in March and September which sharply disappointed the aspirations of the Vietnamese people. These agreements merely postponed the solution of the problem of Vietnam's unity—that is, of the restoration of Cochinchina to the national territory—and in fact made

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even a later solution uncertain, since they promised nothing more than a referendum "when circumstances permit". It was as if someone were to offer you a piece of candy—to which he had attached an elastic band. As far as the problem of independence was concerned, these 1946 agreements committed France to recognize only the "autonomy" of Vietnam, not its independence. Moreover, since Vietnam was to exercise this autonomy within the double framework of an Indochinese Federation functioning under French supervision and a French Union, whose form was not at that time yet defined, Vietnam bore a curious resemblance to an invalid encased in a double iron lung. In return for these "advantages" granted by France, Ho Chi Minh agreed that northern Vietnam would "extend a friendly welcome" to French troops under General Leclerc.

Why did Ho Chi Minh sign an agreement that failed so signally to satisfy Vietnamese nationalist demands? First of all, it should be remembered that the Communist Party was at that time the leading political party in France and that Maurice Thorez was Vice-President of the Republic. Furthermore, many people believed that, in taking the course he did, Ho Chi Minh had in view ridding the country of General Lu Han and his forces. But, from a strictly Vietnamese point of view, and in the light of the situation then prevailing, it is questionable just how beneficial this action really was, since it simply involved the replacement of General Lu Han's forces by those of General Leclerc.

Moreover, shortly afterward, Ho Chi Minh launched upon a course which led in exactly the opposite direction. On December 19, 1946, he resumed the struggle against France—against the very troops to which only a few months before he had undertaken to "extend a friendly welcome". Since then the problem has of course become more complex and has entered the arena of international politics; in addition, a new factor was introduced with the advent to power of Mao Tse-tung in continental China. But, essentially, the course begun in December 1946 is still being pursued; its principal feature is dependence on the Chinese Communists in the struggle against France.

Ho Chi Minh's foreign policy may thus be said to have exhibited certain reversals of direction which perhaps appear puzzling on superficial scrutiny. In reality, however, they were entirely understandable, since they faithfully followed postwar fluctuations in Stalinist policy

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toward the West. Thus, the period of Soviet cooperation with the former Allies, and particularly with China under Chiang Kai-shek, immediately after the war coincided with Ho Chi Minh's pro-Chinese phase and with his 1946 agreements with France. In the same way, the resumption in December of that year of the conflict with France corresponded in point of time with the beginning of the division of the world into two blocs.

What, then, of the argument that Ho Chi Minh is and has been a nationalist and the champion of Vietnamese independence? The question is important and should be weighed as objectively as possible. The writer believes that it is very difficult to account for human emotions and motives and that, in any case, a controversy of this kind, bearing on intentions, is essentially moral rather than political. As far as politics is concerned, it is immaterial whether Ho Chi Minh did or did not think like a nationalist or whether he now does or does not think like a good communist. The important thing is to know how he *acted* and whether his actions, within the context of the concrete situation prevailing in Southeast Asia in particular and in the world in general, have served nationalist interests and have advanced the cause of Vietnam's independence.

Now, it is clear that the original Vietminh quickly changed in aspect, character and activity; originally nationalist, it soon became a communist tool for exploitation in the interests of Stalinist communism. If one wished to draw a comparison with any other country, one could say that the course pursued by Ho Chi Minh has been exactly opposite to that taken by Tito in Yugoslavia.

Although the present article is concerned with the development of the Vietminh only up to March 1949, when the Bao Dai-Auriol agreements were signed, it seems necessary to note that subsequently the processes of sovietization of the Vietminh and of its "satellization" by Communist China were further accelerated as a result of the arrival of Mao Tse-tung's forces on the common frontier. The course was marked by certain stages. In July 1949, for example, the extremist "Chinese" wing of the Vietminh led by Dang Xuan Khu routed the "Western" wing. On January 16, 1950, the Ho Chi Minh government was recognized by Communist China, and on January 30 by the Soviet Union. In March 1951 the Workers' Party (Lao Dong) was established. This was merely a reincarnation of the Indochinese Commu-

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nist Party, which had been dissolved in 1945 in order to reassure the nationalists. Finally, the Vietminh was dissolved in its capacity as an Independence Front, and was succeeded by the Lien Viet under the official leadership of the Workers' Party. The mask has, therefore, definitely been dropped. When, recently, Ho Chi Minh appointed an ambassador to Moscow, he demonstrated how radically the situation had changed since his declaration of some years ago to the effect that his government would "remain neutral between the two blocs" and "employ only its own resources in gaining [Vietnam's] independence".

To return now to the earlier period, the record shows that before the signing of the March 1949 agreements with France, which had been in the wind since some time, Bao Dai had decided to withdraw his support from the Ho Chi Minh regime and to retire to Hong Kong, where he was later joined by numerous nationalist leaders. The year 1948 had witnessed the gradual reconstitution of the former nationalist parties by elements that had succeeded in escaping the communists' embrace. Having determined to take action, but only insofar as it might be consonant with truly national objectives, they turned to the man who, in a statement which Vietnamese still celebrate, had declared that he preferred "to be a citizen of a free country than the sovereign of an enslaved people". These nationalist parties invited Bao Dai to resume the conduct of Vietnam's affairs so that the sacrifices of the Vietnamese people might once again possess genuine national significance. After some consultation, Bao Dai agreed to establish contact with France with a view to reaching an acceptable solution to the existing impasse. On its side, the French government welcomed negotiations, which, at the end of several months, terminated in the agreements of March 8, 1949.

THESE agreements resolved the problem of the territorial unity of Vietnam by joining Cochinchina, now no longer a French colony, to the rest of the country and by establishing the national capital in Saigon. The problem of Vietnam's independence and association in the French Union was settled in three documents: the same March agreements, and two supplementary conventions, one of which was signed in December 1949 and the other in 1950. The general principles at issue were stated very simply: Vietnam was to be independent on the international level, to exercise complete and absolute internal sov-

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creignty, to adhere to the French Union (defined as an "association of free and equal peoples"), and to enter a customs union with Cambodia and Laos. Since, however, a country's independence, like its foreign relations, hinges not on words but on realities, it may be useful to inquire how these principles have been applied in practice. In other words, just how independent is Vietnam today? Many people like to ask such questions as these: "Have you a central bank, a police force, a diplomatic service, your own customs, and the like? When are you going to join the United Nations? Is your government already independent in its foreign trade, fiscal policies, finance, and so forth?" Since these are perfectly reasonable questions, they deserve frank answers, in which a distinction should be drawn between the internal sovereignty of Vietnam and its independence on the international plane.

Under the protectorate, Vietnam had been represented abroad by France. The agreements of March 1949 terminated that arrangement; Vietnam now has its own foreign service, and its government has been recognized by some three dozen countries, many of which have representatives accredited to Bao Dai. Moreover, Vietnam is an active member of several international organizations, to which it regularly appoints representatives; and recently it applied for membership in the United Nations. On the international level, then, Vietnam can be said to enjoy all of the prerogatives of a sovereign nation.

But at the time that it acquired independence, Vietnam adhered to the French Union. The reasons for this action, which is of great significance for the country, are self-evident. The Vietnamese are not inhabitants of the moon who have chanced to parachute to earth. They are fully aware that nowadays the independence of a country does not necessarily render it inviolate. The countries that espouse peace and democracy must unite in defense of their ideals and their very existence. Moreover, a common culture and a deep intellectual affinity form a natural bond between Vietnam and France. The Vietnamese, therefore, were quite willing to adhere to the French Union. This adherence calls for some degree of coordination between Vietnamese and French diplomacy, which is achieved through the agency of an institution known as the High Council or through direct consultation between the diplomatic missions of the two countries. Vietnamese regard this coordination as affording support for their young diplomatic service

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and as representing a form of mutual assistance between two friendly associated states.

As regards the situation within Vietnam, it may be recalled that jurists like to distinguish between the possession and the exercise of a right—a useful distinction when considering the present problem, which, although basically simple, has been muddled by certain complicating factors. Two questions, then, are in order. Does Vietnam possess all of the internal prerogatives of an independent state? And does its government exercise them?

As for the first, Vietnam is clearly master in its own house; the writ of the government runs the length and breadth of the land. The few exceptions (affecting control of foreign exchange and of the port of Saigon, to mention but two) are only temporary and will shortly disappear. It is in connection with the second question that some explanation is called for. Most of its prerogatives the government of Vietnam exercises alone. There are, however, some that it exercises along parallel lines with France, which continues to have temporary authority because of the state of war prevailing in the country. This parallelism affects particularly national security measures and, in a certain measure, the mixed courts. The government of Vietnam administers its police and security services, but it has agreed that the French should have their own services of this kind as long as they have troops fighting in the country. Again, Vietnam shares certain economic powers with Laos and Cambodia because the three countries are associated in a customs union. Finally, there are certain prerogatives which Vietnam shares with France inasmuch as both countries belong to the French Union.

The question then arises: Are the Vietnamese satisfied with the situation which has just been described? So general a question is of course impossible to answer properly. For, since satisfaction is a personal feeling which depends, in the case of each individual, upon how closely his actual lot approximates his desires, how can one say that the twenty-five million Vietnamese are or are not satisfied with the present status of their country? Moreover, it is premature to try to render a final verdict on this problem of independence, which is still so young and uncrystallized. Does one judge the worth of a play by its first act alone? The problem, therefore, should be restated. Vietnamese independence is now a fact, and since the people of the country are

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determined to use it as a base for further progress, the most advantageous course of inquiry will lie in trying to discover what obstacles and defects mar the existing system and to ascertain the possible remedies therefor.

In the writer's opinion, one respect in which improvement is both possible and necessary is the manner in which the government of Vietnam exercises its prerogatives. In the first place, a clear advantage is certain to result from suppression of the parallel services already referred to, which the present state of war may explain but cannot justify. To be sure, everyone knows that the French security service is functioning only on a temporary basis and on conditions mutually agreed upon. Yet the fact remains that its very presence is tantamount to a restriction on Vietnamese sovereignty, so that the Vietnamese are eager to see it removed as soon as possible—and who can blame them?

In the second place, the mere existence of the customs union with Cambodia and Laos calls for a certain amount of consultation on matters of policy affecting the three countries. The Vietnamese do not believe that the structural machinery of such a union need be elaborate in order to function efficiently. Moreover, any procedure that involves consultation regarding policy must respect the sovereignty of its member states, none of which should be privileged to interfere in the domestic affairs of the others. There is no reason for Cambodia or Laos to have a voice in the formulation of Vietnam's foreign-trade program, so long as this does not conflict unnecessarily with their own programs.

In the third place, it is important to discover the real significance of the coordination, within the framework of the French Union, of Vietnam's internal and foreign policies with those of France. Since, as noted earlier, Vietnam's association with France provides a solid security for the future, some sharing of privilege—in other words, coordination—on the Union level seems desirable rather than not, the more so because it does not involve any surrender of prerogative but merely a certain way of exercising it, and is therefore compatible with the sovereignty of both Vietnam and France.

The several opportunities encountered thus far for testing the machinery of the French Union, both at international conferences and in the High Council, which met most recently in November 1951, have demonstrated that coordination of this kind is useful in numerous fields. To be sure, there is still a certain clashing of gears that must

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be expected of any motor that has not been completely broken in, but this will doubtless disappear in time, given sufficient goodwill on all sides. To be quite frank, however, it must be said that the Vietnamese will value this coordination only if it applies equally and similarly to all of the states in the Union. They have demonstrated their political maturity by agreeing to the coordination of their sovereignty with that of other countries. But such an arrangement will prove acceptable only if it accords equality to all of its members. If one country should seek to subordinate the interests of the rest of the Union to its own, instead of regarding itself as being bound by the same regulations as govern the other members, then the attraction of the system would soon disappear and the system itself would be endangered. The Vietnamese would regard such discrimination as a relic of a bygone day.

Vietnam, therefore, accords unqualified support to the concept of juridical equality among member states because it regards this as essential to the continued existence of the French Union. And, be it noted, equality signifies that juridically France is an "associated state" like the others and that all occupy a similar footing within the Union. At the same time, there is obvious point in simplifying the coordinating machinery in order to increase its efficiency. The more treaties that exist between two countries, the more often are problems likely to arise, and all the more when not two but several countries are concerned.

How, then, do the Vietnamese view the French Union, an association of "free and equal peoples"? A country is free only if it has sole control of its affairs. The fact that it is associated with other countries need not affect its freedom, since the sole purpose of the association is, not to permit one country to interfere in the affairs of another, but simply to strengthen each through mutual support. Indeed, in such an association it behooves each state to be even more solicitous of the independence of its associates than of its own, since this will ensure the independence of all. Furthermore, the Vietnamese believe that free peoples are also equal peoples. Equal among themselves, or equal to something else? In other words, should the French Union be a confederation or a federation? The writer believes that, before trying to decide this question, it would be more practical to work towards mutual equality, which will be attained when France comes to regard itself, and to act like, an "associated state", that is, like the other mem-

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bers of the Union.¹ When that point has been reached, Vietnam will consider that a true coordination of interests among all of the states in the French Union has in fact been achieved. For the French Union will then clearly be designed to support and not limit the sovereignty of its members, as the late Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny once declared should be its purpose. Meanwhile it will be best to adopt the same hopeful attitude toward the Union as toward the independence of Vietnam. For the Union, too, was born of war and is still in process of development. Like other living things governed by natural laws, it still contains contradictions. But time, friendship and mutual confidence will help to remove these contradictions and to transform the Union into a desirable form.

ONE must assume that eventually the French Union will attain equilibrium and Vietnamese national independence its maturity. Concern with this problem should not be allowed to obscure another one of great significance in the present period of experimentation. National sovereignty is an excellent thing, but a people must have the courage to look beyond it and to ask what use is to be made of it. Now that the Vietnamese have become masters of their fate, what kind of life are they going to seek, what type of society are they capable of creating?

Nationalism by itself is not enough; it is merely a sentiment, a desire, a state of mind, which can usefully serve a program of political action only during the struggle for independence. As soon as independence has been won, nationalism alone can no longer provide inspiration because its purpose is to throw off foreign domination, not to indicate how, after that burden has been unshouldered, a new national society is to be created. On this question it remains silent and neutral. In a sense, therefore, nationalism is a force both for good and for bad. Everything depends on how it operates—on which of its component forces its adherents choose to stress. This choice would obviously be bad if nationalism were to free the people from the former mother

¹In several friendly countries (particularly the United States), Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos are often termed "Associated States of Indochina". That France should employ this expression in reference to Vietnam, and vice versa, is logical, since the two countries are linked by a treaty of association. But the term "associated state" is meaningless when used to describe Vietnamese relations with other countries. Such usage has the effect of adding to existing categories in international law (such as "independent state", "non-autonomous territory", "trusteeship territory", etc.) the wholly senseless one of "Associated State within the French Union".

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country only to place them at the mercy of a handful of their own fellow-countrymen. In other words, the danger of nationalism is that it may champion the rights of peoples while neglecting to protect the rights of man.

Vietnam will choose the best aspect of nationalism if it regards the problem of colonialism not merely as one of replacement (of the former mother country by fellow-citizens) but as one of genuine liberation both of the nation and of its people. Nationalism has an opportunity to create a society founded on social justice and incorporating reforms demanded by the masses, who are eager for an improvement in their lot and newly aware of their rights. Young countries that have just gained their independence are sometimes given to seeking ephemeral diplomatic triumphs or to playing with parliamentary forms of government, whereas their real task lies in the direction of social and economic reform, which they must have the desire and the boldness to undertake in order to lay a solid foundation for their national independence. This is the problem which confronts the Vietnamese nationalists, now that they have gained their independence.

It is often said that the Vietnamese people, like others in Southeast Asia, are faced with a choice between communism and feudalism. This is an over-simplified view and an incorrect one. Since both feudalism and communism represent backward forms of social organization and are equally undesirable, why should the Vietnamese people be condemned to choose between them? Does not their real choice lie between the good and the bad types of nationalism referred to earlier? Apparently so, for the simple reason that, under the guidance of Bao Dai and his government, they have already decided on the kind of society they want. In fact, following the signing of the March 1949 agreements, Bao Dai solemnly declared that "the ultimate political form of government of the country will be determined by the people when circumstances permit the holding of free and honest elections". This democratic decision, which unreservedly confirms the rights of the people, has nothing in common with the feudal spirit.

From the social and economic point of view, Bao Dai's every act is inspired by a conviction which he expressed in one of his public addresses and which might well be inscribed on the base of Vietnamese public monuments: "National independence is only a step in the direction of the liberation of man." Proceeding from this basic prin-

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ciple, Bao Dai has instructed his government 'to leave no stone unturned in the effort to institute agrarian reform and a program for the economic development of the country. He has even stated specifically, by referring to the experiences of totalitarian countries, that in his opinion the object of agrarian reform should be, not to increase the powers of the state, as the Vietminh would have it do, but to endow the people with a larger share of social justice. In the same way, he believes that any increase in national revenues derived from the economic development of the country should benefit the people as a whole and not merely certain groups among them. These basic ideas on economic and social matters have been communicated to the people on several occasions—notably in Bao Dai's message celebrating the Vietnamese New Year in 1951.

It is clear that the course outlined by Bao Dai is the only one that can transform Vietnam into a modern and truly democratic nation. And, in the long term, it offers the only effective defense against communism. For, since Vietnam is an economically under-developed country, even though now independent, it has not been able to eliminate all social injustices. In these circumstances, it cannot hope to combat the communist menace by preserving the exercise of traditional privileges. The great strength of the Marxist revolution is its stress on hope. To many people it holds out hope for a better future. In reality, of course, this hope leads only to despair, but the despair is not encountered until the morrow, whereas the hope is felt today. It is necessary, therefore, at once and without a moment's further delay, to deprive communism of its main strength by substituting for the hope that it offers another kind of hope—hope for social and economic reforms undertaken within a truly democratic society.

Underlying the difficulties resulting from the present war are three tasks which the Vietnamese people must undertake: national independence must be consolidated; the French Union must be brought to a point of equilibrium so that it may offer effective support to the sovereignty of its member states; and a new Vietnam must be built with the help of a boldly reformist nationalism. These tasks are not simple, but they are exciting. And the Vietnamese people, under the guidance of Bao Dai, are in the mood to undertake them with a right good will, knowing that good will is always rewarded in the end.

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Reflections on India's Five-Year Plan

C. N. Vakil and P. R. Brahmananda

DURING the period of almost one year since its publication, the Draft Outline of the Five-Year Plan for the economic development of India has been the subject of discussion in the central and state legislatures, state governments, industrial and labour associations, chambers of commerce, committees of political parties, economists, engineers and other sections of the Indian community, many of which have communicated their views to the Planning Commission, its author, in response to a request for criticism and suggestions. Although it is too early to anticipate the exact form of the final Plan, it should be useful to consider some of the suggestions that have been offered, since the Commission intends to take due note of these in preparing the final Plan. The object of the present article, then, is to examine certain of the major criticisms that have been made and to indicate the nature of the conflicts and difficulties that confront the planners under existing circumstances.¹

At the outset it must be stressed that the Planning Commission had to work under extremely difficult conditions. The country was experiencing strong inflationary pressures, and both the central and the state governments had already embarked upon numerous projects of various kinds on the assumption that ample financial resources therefor would be available. There was no clear or consistent policy governing price control, foreign trade, allocations of resources, or other crucial matters. The activities of the different parts of the public, or government-managed, sector of the economy had not been systematised, nor had there been much effort to coordinate them with those of the private sector. The government's attitude towards the private sector vacillated, and its views regarding nationalisation underwent periodic revision. Projects contemplated both by the public and by the private sectors appeared to exceed greatly the capacity of the country to produce or to acquire the necessary construction and other materials. There was no clear-cut scheme of priorities, and the different state

¹ For a discussion of the background and aims of the Plan, see V. K. R. V. Rao, "India's First Five-Year Plan—A Descriptive Analysis", *Pacific Affairs*, March 1952.

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governments were pursuing conflicting objectives. The full implications of the acceptance of social welfare commitments and of the pursuit of ethical policies were not yet quite understood; and scarce resources, which were more urgently required for building up capital equipment, were being used for various welfare measures. The limitations of the economic system and the significance of the inelasticity of production in industry as well as in agriculture had not been perceived; and at different stages the government was tightening and relaxing controls. In fine, there was no systematic effort to view each problem in a national perspective, to emphasise the national point of view as against the views of separate sections, or to concentrate on the formulation of measures which would ease the problems of the country on a long-term basis.

One of the most significant achievements of the Planning Commission has been its attempt to appraise the financial resources that will be available during the period of the Plan (1951-52 to 1955-56) and to shape various projects according to their availability. At the end of 1950 it was calculated that the total cost of central and state schemes then under way would amount to thirty-five billion rupees, and it was hoped that these schemes would be completed within six years. The Planning Commission concluded, however, that no more than 11.2 billion rupees can be raised during the period with which it is concerned. Its main task, therefore, was one of pruning—not an enviable task, inasmuch as it had to engage in protracted bargaining with each department of the Centre and with each state government in order to persuade them to curtail their projects. As the central and the state governments were already committed to a number of development schemes, the Commission was left very little opportunity to effect a new pattern of distribution of resources. If it had introduced new projects of its own, these could have been undertaken only at the cost of others on which expenditures had already been made. In its pruning, the Commission held that, since food deficiencies represented the most pressing problem, the bulk of the available resources should be devoted to the construction of irrigation and multi-purpose development projects. It also took the view that the objective of the Plan should be the establishment of an appropriate economic base which, after the first five-year period, would permit an acceleration of development. For this purpose, a sizable proportion of available resources would have to be devoted to the development of public utility services. Moreover,

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the railways, which had been subjected to constant wear and tear since the beginning of the last war, would require rehabilitation, as would the transport system in general. In view of these demands on the country's limited resources, not much would remain for industrial development, which the Commission consequently left mostly to private initiative, although suggesting certain controls for the purpose of coordinating the activities of the public and private sectors of the economy.

The perspective governing the Planning Commission's recommendations for implementation of the Plan was similar to that adopted in determining the allocation of resources. Finding that discrepancies in the controls governing competitive crops, and the prevalence of high prices for commercial crops, had led to a large-scale diversion of acreage from food to commercial crops,² the Commission recommended that the prices of the latter also should be controlled and that price incentives should be consistent with the over-all priorities established by the Plan, since, if food production was to have first priority, farmers should not be offered maximum incentives to grow commercial crops. To convert the basis of Indian agriculture from subsistence to mixed farming and thus to increase its efficiency, the Commission suggested various organisational measures, chief among these being the constitution of joint village management boards which would treat each village as a single unit of management and pool and allocate its resources. The Commission recognised that the food problem in India is caused by the growing disequilibrium between population and supply, and that it can be met only by relatively long-term correctives; meanwhile, as minimum interim measures, it proposed monopoly procurement of foodgrains and urban rationing in all states.

In the matter of taxation, the Commission accepted the view that any increase in direct tax rates would harm the capital market, and suggested a voluntary moratorium on the payment of dividends for a limited period in order to encourage reinvestment of profits in industry. Holding that the development of small-scale and cottage industries should proceed on lines complementary to those of large-scale industries, it suggested the levy of a cess on the latter in order to assist small-scale industries and the apportionment of raw materials as well as markets between the two groups. In regard to family planning, it

² Competitive crops in different parts of the country include cotton and jowar, sugar cane and paddy, jute and paddy, and oilseeds and millet.

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merely recommended that the government should supply facilities for sterilisation and for the provision of contraceptive advice on economic as well as physical grounds.

The Commission had to choose between competing objectives and to withstand conflicting pressures. Given the limited supply of resources, it had to make a choice between agriculture or industry and between reserving maximum support for the public sector or allowing relatively more leeway for private capital formation. It had also to decide between measures designed to achieve greater immediate equality of incomes at a lower level of aggregate production, and others calculated to increase total production and thus to provide an opportunity later for an absolute increment in the income of each citizen; it took the position that radical redistribution measures would reduce the volume of savings and thus the rate of capital formation. The Commission had also to decide whether to give first priority to the needs of small-scale industries or to those of large-scale ones; in view of the widespread public support for them, it was obliged to suggest some measures for re-allocating resources to small-scale industries, even at the cost of efficiency. Concerning the extension of government activities in industry, the Commission had to choose between broadening the scope of nationalisation or concentrating the limited resources of the public sector on the expansion of its productive capacity; it preferred the latter course. In the interest of raising agricultural efficiency, it had to decide whether to recommend collectivisation or redistribution of land to small peasants; it proposed joint village management boards as a compromise, for these are to increase the size of the management unit while permitting peasant landownership. In respect of labour, it proposed that wage increases be avoided, but suggested only a voluntary moratorium on dividend payments. In short, the Commission, whose aim was to formulate a programme which would attract the widest possible support among the national community as a whole and at the same time operate within the institutional framework formulated in the new Constitution, evolved a Plan that avoids extreme courses of action.

IT is not surprising that such a Plan should have met with a mixed reception. A plan which seeks to follow a middle way in economic policy and in the allocation of resources is unlikely to satisfy the expectations or demands of extreme elements in the community. Thus,

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while some sections hold that the Five-Year Plan has gone too far, others insist that it has taken no commendable steps forward; it is termed realistic by some and impractical by others. Very few have realised that, since the Plan had to be compatible with the over-all objectives of national policy described in the Constitution and clarified by government statements, the scope of the Commission's efforts and the extent to which fundamental structural changes could have been suggested were restricted. As the Commission itself has remarked, the Plan could not be the medium for radical institutional changes which might lead to wide differences of opinion among different sections of the community. It had, therefore, to adjust the tempo of suggested change to the climate of social opinion as expressed in the new Constitution and elaborated by spokesmen of the political party in power.

It is clear, then, that the Commission wished to avoid supporting the extreme courses advocated on the one hand by proponents of unrestricted private enterprise and on the other by exponents of unlimited government intervention and control. It is hardly astonishing that private business and industrial circles have received the Plan with some satisfaction. The Commission's clear statement that during the next five years the government should not expand the scope of its industrial activities afforded a welcome sense of security to private interests desirous of expansion. At the same time, industrial circles were disappointed that the Plan held out no hope for a reduction in direct tax rates; they argued that it left development of the entire industrial field to the private sector without, however, meeting the latter's need for development funds. In pressing for tax relief, the industrial community tended to exaggerate the soundness of the financial position of the central government.

On the other hand, the revenue surpluses envisaged in the Plan depend in large measure upon the continuance of large export-duty collections, which in turn depend upon the maintenance of foreign demand for several export commodities required abroad for defense stock-piling purposes. Impartial observers have reminded the Commission that this source of revenue is contingent on foreign stock-piling programmes and hence is impermanent. At present, in fact, the 1952-53 budget indicates sharply reduced collections, with the result that, instead of a surplus of 260 million rupees in the Central Budget as anticipated in the Five-Year Plan, barely forty million are available from

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revenue sources for capital projects. Under these circumstances, assuming that the projects in the public sector must be completed and that the objectives of the Five-Year Plan should be achieved, there is little room for relief of direct taxation. Moreover, the government has argued that private funds released as a result of any such relief would not necessarily be invested constructively but might be used instead for speculation or consumption. A reduction in direct taxation might, therefore, excite dissatisfaction among the poorer sections of the country and thus dampen the general enthusiasm for the Plan as a whole.

The industrial community has expressed the belief that the restrictions contained in the Industries Act, which authorises the government to determine the location as well as the minimum size of any new manufacturing unit, will tend to discourage private investment. It has, however, welcomed the Planning Commission's suggestion that development councils be established in various industries. It has disagreed with the emphasis placed by the Commission on the need for development of small-scale industries, which it regards as relatively inefficient, and has shown some disappointment over the Commission's failure to recommend removal of price controls. The Commission's exhortations to private enterprise to realise its responsibility and to take voluntary measures to increase its productive efficiency have in general not been relished by the business community, which has responded by pointing to the need for equal stress on efficiency in government enterprises. The importance given to agriculture as against industry has also been criticised, on the score that there can be no permanent basis for economic development without appropriate industrial expansion. Exception has been taken particularly to the Commission's lack of emphasis on the establishment of capital goods industries and on the expansion of industries producing steel and pig iron, which are in acutely short supply.

It cannot be denied that some of these criticisms possess merit. The extension of government control over the location as well as over the size of manufacturing units is inappropriate in a time of lagging industrial development. It is one thing to emphasise the need for redistribution of industries and another to impose restrictions on their location, unless the government is prepared to offer counter-balancing advantages in the areas of its choice. Arbitrary emphasis upon decentralisation may inhibit expansion, since if new industrial units must be located in a region which does not offer advantages available elsewhere,

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the probability is that they will not be established at all. The government must choose between a policy which seeks to maximise the rate of development for a given period before concerning itself with the factor of location and one which emphasises immediate decentralisation at the possible expense of over-all economic development.³ The regions selected for development in the Five-Year Plan undoubtedly have potential resources and will develop in time; but since the important factor is the relative ability of a region to contribute to output within a given period, it appears necessary to strike a balance between the objective of decentralisation on the one hand and that of development on the other, so that in the endeavour to increase production in some regions more output is not sacrificed elsewhere. The pace of economic development depends upon the creation of a production surplus, and any measure which delays the achievement of this goal may prove to be disadvantageous when viewed in an over-all perspective.

In recent years increasing responsibilities for labour welfare have been imposed upon private industries, which have resisted this trend on the ground that it has a depressant effect upon the rate of reinvestment of profits. In considering this problem, one must realise that a backward economy undergoing rapid industrialisation faces different conditions than do advanced countries. In the United Kingdom, for example, the emphasis on labour welfare and social security measures came more or less at the close of the Industrial Revolution. In a country such as India, on the other hand, unless the government provides for transfers of resources from capital to labour for welfare purposes, it is likely to lose the political support of a large section of the population. The present climate of social opinion differs from that of 150 years ago. Unless private business realises that welfare measures are

³ The pursuit of decentralisation as an objective in itself can produce startling results. For example, the Five-Year Plan contemplates an expansion in electric-power output of about one million kilowatts, mainly in the less developed regions of the country and without adequate consideration for the needs of developed and rapidly expanding manufacturing complexes such as that in the Bombay-Poona region, which contributes seventeen per cent of India's total industrial production and about one-third of its direct tax revenues. Inadequacy of local power supplies had necessitated the rejection of applications for an estimated 100,000 kw. of power in the region by the end of 1951. Owing to insufficient rainfall in the catchment area of the hydro-electric system, an acute power shortage has prevailed in the entire region since October 1951, and a twenty-three per cent cut in industrial consumption had to be imposed for a nine-month period. It has been estimated that the resulting hypothetical loss in terms of value of output exceeds Rs.600 million.

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essential to the maintenance of a democratic system in the country, a "mixed" economy will be able to function only with difficulty. The case for private enterprise in undeveloped countries rests upon its willingness to accept a large share of social responsibilities. Labour welfare measures are a condition of public support for private enterprise. The transition would be smoother if enlightened sections of the Indian business community understood more fully the implications of acceptance of a mixed economy in a backward country.

ANOTHER corollary of a mixed economy is the system of controls by which the government allocates the available resources to various fields of activity in such a manner that its scheme of social priorities is fulfilled. In a country suffering from inflationary pressures and desirous of undertaking a large-scale development programme, controls—particularly those governing prices—have a significant function. The Planning Commission has advocated the continuance of certain price controls. Sections of the business community, however, believe that a relaxation of controls would serve to increase industrial production. It is difficult to find much substance in their argument. For example, when the government experimented with partial control of the sugar industry, manufacturers had to sell a certain percentage of their output to the government at a fixed price; the remainder could be sold in the free market. A noticeable increase in sugar production resulted, but at the cost of reduced acreage in foodgrains. In the same way, the increased foreign demand for oilseeds led to a reduction in the acreage devoted to cereals. Unless much land is reclaimed for cultivation, or unless new irrigation works permit an increase in the cultivated area and in the yield from existing acreage, the prospect for improved agricultural output seems to be limited in the short run, which is to say that an increase in prices of agricultural commodities would not lead to a rise in aggregate output. Higher production depends upon large-scale capital investments of a type far beyond the reach of the ordinary farmer.

In the case of industry also, the extension of specific price incentives to a particular group might create difficulties by encouraging the manufacture of one product at the expense of another. In an undeveloped economy which suffers from shortages both of monetary and of real capital and from an inadequacy of complementary resources

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(such as technical skill and new land), the effectiveness of price incentives is definitely limited. Since several industries in India depend upon imported raw materials, an increase in the price of manufactures will not necessarily bring about an improvement in the supply of raw materials, unless foreign-exchange earnings improve. A greater price incentive will not necessarily set in motion the various processes that must precede an expansion of any particular industry. Capital must be raised, equipment must be imported, technicians and skilled labour must be found, and the industry must acquire the requisite raw materials. Unless these complementary processes are coordinated, the price stimuli will not induce an increase in the aggregate productive capacity of the system, so that more of one product can be manufactured without causing a diminution in the manufacture of another. By itself the price incentive appears too weak to achieve the desired responses in an undeveloped country and, if pressed too far, may aggravate inflationary pressures, since an increase in the price incentive offered one sector will raise costs in others.

While employment of price incentives may induce greater manufacturing efficiency in economically advanced countries, it does not necessarily have a like effect in undeveloped countries, such as India, which suffer from serious shortages in capital equipment and technical personnel. An increase in manufacturing efficiency is contingent upon an improvement of existing processes; if the new method involves less labour than the old, problems of displacement will result. In a rapidly developing community in which industries expand at such a pace that they can absorb labour displaced elsewhere, the problem may not be acute, but in India mechanisation will intensify the frictions of the transitional period. Any increase in agricultural production by means of mechanisation will bring about displacement of labour which cannot be absorbed under existing conditions.

As long as the aggregate supply of most commodities falls woefully short of total demand, and as long as the possibilities of a speedy expansion in their over-all production are sharply restricted, the nation must depend upon price controls to allocate resources in accordance with the pattern of social priorities established by the government. The complaints of private business on this score are justified insofar as the controls have operated unsatisfactorily because of administrative defects and a lack of integration among the various controls. An improvement in administrative efficiency would go far to abate prejudice

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against controls, which are necessary for the smooth operation of the economy.

THE priority given by the Planning Commission to agriculture as against industry has aroused considerable dissatisfaction. This decision was governed in part by the urgent need to solve the food problem through an increase in the agricultural potential. But in reserving the lion's share of resources for agriculture, the Commission ignored the necessity for expanding industrial capacity in order to ensure a supply of the construction materials required for irrigation projects, among other things. It is reasonable to ask whether the country's long-term problems will be solved by the pattern of allocation recommended by the Commission. Population pressure is compelling the diversion of ever larger resources to agriculture in order to feed the people—a problem whose solution can be anticipated only if more irrigation projects and fertiliser plants are built and vast areas are reclaimed—activities requiring capital-intensive investment.

The problem of agricultural production in India is not merely one of organisation. More tractors and greater mechanisation will not effect significant increases in output. Apart from geographic factors and the suitability of different kinds of land for the use of machinery, mechanisation will not lessen the dependence upon rainfall. The capacity of any community to divert resources to the construction of permanent capital equipment such as irrigation systems depends upon the supply of construction materials, which depends in turn upon the productive capacity of the industries that manufacture them. Although India possesses large deposits of iron and other important mineral ores as well as considerable unused land, these potential resources can be exploited only with the aid of large-scale capital equipment applied over a long period. If the Planning Commission had made provision for a substantial expansion of construction-materials industries as well as of some capital goods industries, it would have set the scene for speedier development of potential resources at a later date. Had industrial rather than agricultural development received priority, the method of capital formation involved would have been more roundabout than that in fact proposed, but it would probably have yielded better results in the long run.

Another aspect of the rivalry between agriculture and industry concerns the likely response of farmers to economic stimuli, upon

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which the success of several of the measures proposed by the Planning Commission will depend. As the vicissitudes of the grow-more-food campaign recently demonstrated,⁴ the average farmer's response to various forms of assistance is extremely limited and is likely to remain so until he has acquired greater education and understanding and has been freed from dependence on the vagaries of rainfall—processes which will require considerable time. On the other hand, the employment of stimuli on the same scale in the industrial field will attain better results more quickly. If the country could wait indefinitely, it could go on investing in agriculture, even though the response was limited. In fact, however, unless the problem of poverty is solved soon, social upheavals may rend the entire fabric of the existing system. It is in this sense that an expansion of the industrial potential, which would indirectly benefit agriculture, may be regarded as possibly more advantageous than concentration on agriculture alone. Since, then, the agricultural problem must be attacked through measures undertaken in the industrial field, there is ground for complaint that the Commission should have earmarked greater resources for industrial development.⁵

THE Five-Year Plan has been subjected to severe criticism also because of its modest objectives. It seeks to restore prewar living standards, and envisages a gross rate of investment of barely four per cent of the national income. Several sections of the community have been extremely disappointed by the modesty of these goals; for public response to a development plan depends upon what it promises, and this one offers only meagre rewards. Yet the modesty of the planners was due not to a deficiency of imagination but rather to the existence of certain limitations, over many of which they lack control. The extent to which the rate of investment can be raised does not necessarily depend upon the size of the aggregate national income. The factors determining a country's investment potentialities include the distribution of income, the capacity for saving, the public response to an austerity programme, the period to which such a programme can

⁴ See, for example, K. G. Sivaswamy, "Indian Agriculture—Problems and Programmes", *Pacific Affairs*, December 1950.

⁵ It is to be hoped that in Part Two of the Five-Year Plan, whose execution will hinge upon foreign assistance, the Commission will provide more adequately for industrial development.

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be prolonged, the rate of population growth, the capacity to secure resources necessary for the execution of investment programmes, and so forth.

To take the most important factor, it is clear that as long as supplies of capital equipment, easily cultivable new land, skilled labour, basic raw materials, etc. are limited as at present, and as long as increases in the rate of supply of these resources also are restricted, the mere investment of more money will not produce greater real investment. In an economy with a limited capacity to produce materials as well as to procure equipment and technical personnel, an increase in the rate of investment beyond a certain point must be counter-balanced by a decrease in the amount of resources available for consumption. That is to say, in India consumption and investment generally compete for the limited resources available. Since the supply of resources is limited, the effect of merely increasing the rate of monetary outlay in the construction of various projects will be to inflate prices, and in consequence some projects will have to be slowed or left uncompleted, if they are not entirely abandoned. It would definitely not be to the interest of the country to embark upon enterprises for whose completion adequate resources are not assured. Rather, prudence dictates that it undertake only whatever volume and pattern of investment can be sustained with the aid of resources that are likely to become available. One of the serious technical limitations of the Five-Year Plan is its concentration in the main on the monetary and financial aspects of the resources necessary for its execution, without any accompanying systematic effort to calculate in detail the requirements of the various projects in terms of physical resources. While the financial aspects of a plan may be consistent, its "real" aspects may reveal glaring weaknesses. Unless the various types of supplies required for its different projects are available in the right quantities at the right time, its schedule cannot be maintained and several of its targets will be only partially attained. In view of the restricted supplies of such basic materials as lumber, pig iron and steel and the difficult foreign-exchange position, it is questionable whether even the modest rate of expansion envisaged in the Plan will be achieved without appreciable foreign aid.

Under these conditions, an increase in the rate of investment will depend largely upon the extent to which resources can be diverted

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from consumption to investment. As is well known, the low Indian standard of living places serious limitations upon savings. An austerity programme which demanded greater sacrifices on the part of high-income groups might, however, evoke more enthusiastic popular response. In the development process, the total response of the nation to the Plan will depend upon the extent to which sacrifices are made by all sections of the Indian community, in which marked inequalities in wealth and income exist. If the government should impose a general austerity programme involving greater sacrifices by the relatively well-to-do, the resulting public response would probably serve to accelerate the pace of economic mobilisation. There has been a tendency in economic theory to emphasise the consequences of inequalities in income and wealth. From the standpoint of social tension, what matters is the extent of inequality in the enjoyment of income. Conspicuous consumption in undeveloped countries, where the majority lives in bare poverty, is doubly undesirable: not only does it utilise resources that would otherwise be available for investment, but it also diminishes popular support for any national plan calling for austerity. In this sense, the Planning Commission seems to have overlooked the significance of the need for an austerity programme in order to increase resources available for capital formation as well as public enthusiasm for its Plan. It would be difficult to estimate to what extent the pace of economic development could be accelerated by increasing the austerity required of the people, but one result would be certain: the forces clamouring for radical social and economic reforms would be weakened thereby. Moreover, if the wealthier groups were prepared to forgo the consumption of luxury articles and to place national interests above personal interests, the atmosphere in the country would be very different from what it is today.

Particularly in undeveloped countries, the degree of individual response to economic inducements is not necessarily dependent wholly upon the size of the monetary incentives offered. The response of labour, for example, to calls for increased production is affected by the behavior of other sections of the community. If the government wishes to see a new spirit animate the country, it will need to enforce uniform treatment far more strictly than has hitherto been the case. There is no social justification for permitting different rations for different parts of the country, nor is it equitable to seek a voluntary moratorium on dividends on the part of capital while imposing a compulsory wage-

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freeze on labour. It is unjustifiable, in the existing social and political climate, to perpetuate great inequalities in landownership merely because the government is not in a position to pay compensation immediately to the dispossessed owners. Recent reverses suffered by the Congress Party in some regions have indicated that land reform is popularly regarded as overdue. Compensation should be paid, but possibly on a sliding scale inasmuch as payment in full in all cases might serve to perpetuate existing inequalities of income and might also delay reform. What is at issue is not merely a conflict between landlord and peasant or between the landlord and his state government, but a wide-ranging problem which deeply affects the economic, social and political future of the country as a whole. Since, unless the pace of land reform is hastened, the consequences may be catastrophic, any sound programme for economic development should contain provision for some degree of land redistribution if a social revolution is to be averted.

THE conclusion that emerges from a study of the Indian economic situation is that the problem of poverty must be attacked on several fronts and over a lengthy period. Because of the large size and rapid growth of the population and the seriously limited resources available for capital expansion, the pace of economic change can be only gradual. The Five-Year Plan is the first official planning effort in India to have considered the significance of the limitations imposed by the realities of the economic situation. Its authors have not yielded to the temptation to make wild promises of plenty and prosperity in the near future, but instead have shown that the road ahead is long and arduous. Any sudden rash of large-scale organisational changes at the present juncture would not necessarily transform the productive capacities of the economy or free the country from the need for hard work.

The economic position of India today is somewhat different from that which prevailed in countries similarly situated a few years ago. For example, the Indian food problem is caused by the widening gap between productive capacity and demand. In the last fifty years India has changed from an exporter of food and raw materials to a large-scale importer of both. The partition of the subcontinent increased the dependence on foreign raw materials of the two large manufacturing industries of India, jute and cotton, and aggravated the disequilibrium existing between the country's population and food supply. The food problem is not merely one of inadequate distribution, which might be

overcome by government control of marketable surpluses, but rather one of insufficient production, which can be remedied only by large-scale investment. In a country such as the Soviet Union of a few years ago, the problem was more one of effecting certain improvements in organisation so that ampler supplies could be made available to the non-agrarian population or for export. In India the scope for increasing total production and the resources available for capital investment by means of sweeping organisational changes appears to be limited. The population problem can hardly be solved in a few years unless many people are permitted to starve. The growth in population is creating not merely food-supply difficulties but severe balance-of-payments difficulties as well. Without foreign assistance and the sterling balances, food imports would consume more than one-fourth of normal foreign-exchange earnings—and their requirements are increasing.

Full comprehension of these difficulties impelled the Planning Commission to be realistic in the selection of its goals and the formulation of its recommendations. It adopted a democratic approach to the problems involved and agreed to modify its draft plan in response to expressed public sentiment. Though possibly somewhat roundabout, this approach should yield more enduring results than one involving extensive coercion, which, under existing circumstances, could hardly effect a rapid or significant improvement in the lot of the masses. It was only through pioneering enterprise and hard work that the standard of living was raised in the West, and it is a truism, however unpalatable it may be to the wishful thinker, that no country has become prosperous overnight. The difficulties of the transitional period in India will be so much the less if conflicting interests within the nation are reconciled, if a livelier spirit of voluntary sacrifice appears among the different groups, and if foreign capital is forthcoming in large amounts and in the desired fields. Yet the magnitude of the problem of poverty is such that, at best, foreign capital, even if it should be made available in increasing quantity, can only lighten the burden somewhat. Most of the effort and resources must come from within the country. The margin of difference represented by an inflow of foreign capital might, however, alter the entire picture by affording the necessary impetus to local efforts.

Bombay, June 1952

NOTES AND COMMENT

Agricultural Planning in East Pakistan

NEARLY fifty million of the eighty million inhabitants of Pakistan live in the eastern part of the country which, separated from the national capital at Karachi by a thousand miles of Indian territory, lies on the dividing line between South and Southeast Asia. For its prayers, the Muslim community of East Pakistan faces West, but in other respects it looks to the East. The region, typical in general of much of tropical monsoon Asia, is part of a vast area in which rice grows in the fertile silt of great rivers and on low-lying land, but where, despite an abundant supply of water and fertile soil, the standards of living and of literacy are among the lowest in the world. This state of affairs is not immutable, and great efforts are being made in the direction of modern development. Distances are shrinking, and other ways of life are infiltrating even this remote part of the Commonwealth, giving rise to speculation about what effect the adoption of new techniques is likely to have on a people whose behaviour and attitudes have in general changed little since the days of the Prophet.

It is not easy to determine what technical devices may prove suitable in the special conditions of tropical Asia. It is even more difficult to foresee what impact industrialisation will have on local society and its relations with the outside world. Of late, numerous well-intentioned experts have come to Asia, bringing with them the experience and also the impatience of the West, and have given advice which, while perhaps applicable in the technical sense, may do irreparable damage unless it is designed to harmonise with the outlook and behaviour of the people to whom it is given. For example, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, where the East Bengal provincial government is endeavouring to raise the living standards of one of the country's religious and racial minorities, the writer found the care of cows and the amount of their yields to be even less satisfactory than elsewhere in East Pakistan. In response to an enquiry whether the technique of artificial insemination was known to the district agricultural officer and might be acceptable to the local community, he received an affirmative reply on both counts. One of his informants pointed out, however, that such a device might be rejected if it became known as a product of foreign ingenuity.

Since the population increases each year by 1.5 per cent, more food must be provided if the economic stability of the country is not to be endangered. The assurance customarily offered by government spokesmen, that Muslims are immune to a Communist philosophy, may apply as long as the Indians

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in Kashmir are considered the enemies before the gates. But Communists are in fact infiltrating East Pakistan from West Bengal and Burma, and it might be unwise to regard their selling of matches in the bazaars as anything but a temporary occupation for trained agitators. It is hazardous to predict on which issues the Bengali will be susceptible to political incitement. Thus far it has been exclusively the academic youth, demonstrating against the use of Urdu in place of their native Bengali, that has brought Dacca, the capital of the province, into newspaper headlines abroad. As long as the price of jute remains high in world markets and the farmer profits from the increasing demand for rice, the village community is likely to remain politically inarticulate and the Communist agitators will have to go on selling matches in the bazaars. However, the economic boom and political stability may not last so long as optimistic government officials would like to believe. If, for instance, owing to the development of kenaf fibre, the jute market should break, and rice prices should follow the downward trend, the present limited prosperity of the Bengal villager might come to an end. In that event, Soviet, Chinese or native brands of extremism might find a fertile ground in another of Asia's peasant communities which appear ready for a fling at Communism.

In any event, in a country in which nine out of ten persons are farmers, economic progress and political stability must exist in the villages if they are to exist anywhere. Much is heard nowadays about the Asian cultivator, but what a village in tropical Asia really represents is not always understood. In Bengal the village is a mere conglomeration of bamboo or mud huts, its sole sanitary facility being the communal pool. Its educational apparatus is limited to a school attended, for two or three terms, by boys who may thus be enabled to write their names under documents which they cannot read. To expect to find a newspaper or a book in this environment is to apply Western standards to Eastern society. If it is to be effective, therefore, education, whether professional or otherwise, must be vocal and visual.

Farming methods are the same as they have been for centuries, probably since the first cultivators settled on the waterlogged land. The plough is of wood, and the draft animal is a feeble bullock or buffalo, incapable of heavy work. To scratch the soil takes ten times as long as proper ploughing in the Western world. Crop yields are at best two-thirds as large as average yields in Europe, but milk yields and carcass weights are not more than one-fourth as large. Although the supply of human labour is ample, cultivating and seeding are rarely done at the right time, and little land is utilised for a second crop during the dry season.

There is a vicious circle here that has not yet been broken. The soil, though fertile, is in deplorable condition because of the lack of sufficient draft power when it is needed most, between the end of the old and the beginning of the new season. The draft animals are so weak that they cannot pull tools

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heavier than the wooden ploughs now in use. In the absence of sufficient fodder for draft animals, there is no hope for breeding heavier animals; and in the absence of sufficiently strong draft animals, there is no hope for growing fodder as a second crop after rice.

In these circumstances, the only possibility for relief lies in the introduction of mechanical draft power from outside. This solution sounds simple enough, and more than one adviser has ended by endorsing it. Yet, when one comes to carrying such advice into effect, many obstacles intervene. The average size of the East Bengal farm is less than three acres, smaller in Mymensingh, north of Dacca, but somewhat larger in Jessore in the west. An additional handicap is presented by the fragmentation of holdings that results from the practice of dividing the land, once in each generation, among the sons of the deceased former owner. It is often said that the plots must be consolidated before the mechanisation of farming can be considered, but if such were in fact the case, mechanisation would never come, short of a social revolution. Precious few landlords or cultivators can be expected to concede, in advance of mechanisation, that it might be to their advantage to exchange and consolidate plots.

If, then, it would be impractical to begin by trying to force the cultivators to adapt their lands to the usual requirements for mechanisation, the alternative course must be to adapt mechanical equipment to fit the existing pattern of land tenure and management. Luckily, this is feasible. All modern tractors have hydraulic lifts which make it possible to raise the plough or disc harrow with which the tractor is fitted whenever a boundary between neighbouring plots has to be crossed. Admittedly, this is not an ideal way of applying tractor power to the land, but if it should be asserted that a tractor is less flexible in such an operation than a pair of bullocks, their relative efficiency should be tested on the spot. The outcome of such an investigation cannot be in doubt.

In a country in which human labour is plentiful and cannot find alternative productive employment, the function of the tractor must not be to replace men on the land. Its only justification lies in the possibility of its performing heavy cultivation work properly at the right time and thus enabling the farmers to employ their own labour effectively on tasks never tackled before. Of course, there are other means of improving the output of farm products—for example, through use of fertilisers, weed killers and insecticides. All of these are important requisites, but none of them is likely to be effective unless the basic need for improved cultivation is met first.¹

¹ In its original draft proposal submitted to the Colombo Plan authorities, the East Bengal provincial government gave undue importance to the role of fertilisers. These should have received second priority, after a programme of mechanisation, and it is to be hoped that in any revision of plans this order of procedure may be accepted.

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Such a programme can achieve complete success only if it is adapted to the village society of the region in which it is to function. The purpose of using the hydraulic lift, against better technical judgment, must be to demonstrate to the village community that the iron bullock is not intended to destroy the boundaries of existing plots. It is not unreasonable to hope that, if this procedure was observed for a sufficient length of time, the villagers would voluntarily request the consolidation of their plots instead of being forced from outside to accept it. In this way, the adjustment to the use of modern equipment might be achieved without inviting mental reservation or physical opposition.

Even competent government administrators are sometimes unable to see the village communities of their own country in this light. In fact, the foreign visitor is apt to be struck by the degree to which central administration and village community are divorced from each other. The writer not long ago inspected a government-run model farm that is ably managed but rarely visited except by high officials and foreigners. When officials go into the countryside, they usually meet district officers but not ordinary village folk. One of the most urgent needs in connection with any technical development plan that involves the modernisation of farming is for an educational programme in the first instance, and the education has to start before it is carried into the villages. As technical development plans stand at present, they appear strikingly unreal.

While the role of the tractor in any agricultural programme should not be overemphasised, it may be taken as an illustration of the untapped reserves existing in the villages. At present, half of the central budget of Pakistan is devoted to military expenditure; but when relations with India ease, many young men who have received training in various military trades will drift back into the villages or become a disgruntled element in the cities unless they can find constructive work. If properly trained for civilian occupations during their final months of military service, many of these youths could constitute both the spearhead of industrialisation and the nucleus of a village elite, particularly if the mechanisation of farming were made an integral part of a programme of professional education.

As matters stand now, there is a grave shortage not only of village mechanics and blacksmiths but also of teachers. So widespread is illiteracy that the only way of raising the level of education is through recourse, on a communal basis, to radio broadcasting and film-strip projection. In view of the physical impossibility of mass education in the customary sense, the question arises whether unconventional practices may not be more effective—that is, whether, for example, it may be possible to spread education without attempting to erase illiteracy. There is reason to believe that the traditional

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form of education could be not only supplemented but indeed replaced by teaching through radio and film, provided that this were carried on in a practical way, closely associated with the daily affairs of the village and directly linked with any measures taken to improve farming methods. The experience of radio and film-strip operators in certain under-developed areas would seem to warrant such a scheme, which is likely to be both cheaper and more effective than general education of the conventional kind.² The object of this type of teaching should be to train the villagers to become good craftsmen rather than to acquaint them with the intricacies of reading and writing. Thus, general education among villagers would become a likely by-product of the teaching of modern farm techniques instead of its prerequisite. Given proper training beforehand, the demobilised soldier might well prove capable of combining the functions of tractor driver and blacksmith, radio technician and film-strip operator.

In view of the lack of skills in East Bengal, parts of such a programme would have to be introduced from outside. Experts and officials have been made available in the past for purposes of this kind by government departments and international agencies; more will be needed in the future. Since the way in which contracts are negotiated at present offers no encouragement to private individuals to accept appointments, expert advice will have to be secured in connection with technical assistance programmes which safeguard the working conditions of the advisers during their terms of service with the provincial government. On the other hand, the value of training students from East Bengal in Western countries should not be overestimated. Frequently such students, after returning home, are less able than Westerners to apply constructively to Eastern conditions the knowledge acquired in the West.

The writer is quite aware that to plan a concerted agricultural policy is more than to compile a shopping list of individual requirements for equipment or training. Certain of his observations and suggestions are not original; some are so obvious that they may not require mention; others perhaps appear rather unconventional. Yet these are unconventional times, and the

² The possibilities of this form of education have been described by, among others, J. Grenfell Williams in his book *Radio in Fundamental Education* (UNESCO, Paris, 1950) and in a series of pamphlets on "The Film and Fundamental Education" (Film Centre, London 1950).

The "saucepan special", a cheap radio receiving set used to an increasing extent by African audiences for individual and community listening, has been described by H. Franklin, the former Director of Information at Lusaka, in a paper published by the Government of Northern Rhodesia (Lusaka, 1950).

When the present writer recently suggested that educational broadcasts might usefully be combined with the showing of filmstrips related to the broadcasts, both Messrs. Williams and Franklin agreed that such a procedure appears feasible for even so under-developed a country as East Pakistan.

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Western world will have to render help swiftly, lest the force which rules from Bohemia to Manchuria should reach southwards into a subcontinent that has thus far for the most part withstood temptation from beyond the northern borders.

London, April 1952

W. KLATT

The Background of the Hindu Code Bill

TO observers unfamiliar with the social background of India, the position of Indian women appears in many ways to constitute a paradox. In civic and national affairs, the women of India seem to be finding their rightful place with an ease and rapidity which astonish the Western world. Yet there still exist laws and social customs which are inequitable and impediments to women's progress. This seeming contradiction puzzles the foreigner, for it cannot be resolved by explaining that India has produced only a few exceptional women qualified to serve, for example, as an ambassadress, a cabinet minister or a governor of a state, since the representation accorded Indian women in national and international assemblies is at least equal to that found in other, so-called advanced countries. Indian women have, indeed, demonstrated their ability to make valuable contributions to the deliberations of various bodies in the United Nations. Within India, their role in the making of the Constitution, as well as in the proceedings of the Provisional Parliament and assemblies, municipal and district councils, and local boards is acknowledged to be of a very high order.

On the other hand, such social customs as the dowry system still linger. Although child marriage is prohibited by law, early marriages persist and many women are prematurely aged because, in the absence of family planning, they produce babies year after year without encountering any provision for adequate maternity care or child welfare. Poverty and ignorance, and prejudices born of ignorance, are their daily lot; in a country in which literacy is restricted to not more than seventeen per cent of the population, theirs is a fate which most Indian men and women share. Looking at the other side of the medal, however, one finds that the new Constitution assures men and women equal franchise on the basis of adult suffrage. That this is not merely a theoretical right was demonstrated in the recent General Elections, when sixty per cent of the female electorate exercised its franchise with an enthusiasm which surprised even Indian leaders. Nor was it through special reserved constituencies or seats that women members won election to Parliament and to the state assemblies; they stood for election on an equal

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footing with men. Their numbers in the legislatures may appear small when compared to those of men, but they are sizable in comparison to the number of women legislators in the West. The fundamental rights guaranteed by the new Constitution clearly outlaw discrimination on grounds of sex. The Constitution has abolished all restrictions operating against women in the pursuit of any career or entry into any of the public services. Although lack of education and training as well as some social prejudices impede their progress, during the past five years an increasing number of women have entered a wide variety of services and vocations, thus emphasising the incongruity of the old social laws of marriage and property which still operate and impair the position of women in India.

The Hindu Code Bill is designed to equalise the social laws of marriage and property between men and women for the vast majority of Indians who are guided by Hindu law. It is difficult for an outsider to understand why this reform measure should have caused such a storm of controversy in present-day India, inasmuch as the framers of the Constitution met with no opposition in conceding equal franchise rights and guaranteeing a position of legally enforceable equality to women. Opponents of the Bill occupy an illogical position, since they are defending iniquitous social laws whose continued existence stands in direct contravention of the provisions of the Constitution. Even without the passage of such a Bill, judicial decrees would doubtless undermine these laws bit by bit, but such a legal process would take time and might, at least initially, involve conflicting judgments which would create a chaotic situation. Enactment of the Hindu Code Bill would greatly simplify this procedure. However, before attempting to analyse the Bill, it will be useful to inquire into the changing social structure of India and into certain problems of the transitional period.

In the remote past of the Vedic and Epic ages, women enjoyed a position of social equality with men. The great epic *Mahabharat* contains a chapter, known as "Bibahaparba", which describes contemporary marriage laws and customs. At that time marriage vows between men and women were equal, and the custom of *swayambara*—freedom of choice in marriage for women—prevailed. Child marriage was unknown; the earliest recorded instances in India occurred in the tenth century A.D., when the practice, having existed in the West from Roman times, was widespread in Europe.

In the Vedic age, women participated in religious rites and could officiate as priests. It was customary in ancient times for writers, painters and sculptors to remain anonymous and to ascribe their work to mythical personages; thus, though the names of a few women artists are known, there are indications to suggest that their numbers were in fact much larger. Women mathema-

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ticians, philosophers and civil administrators are among the nation's illustrious ancestors whose names are household words and are recited in drama and song throughout the villages of India. It is a generally accepted fact that women once participated in public life and enjoyed a position of social equality with men. Their spiritual disfranchisement came at the time of Manu, the law-giver who placed a taboo upon the participation of women in the Upanayan (or sacred thread) ceremony. Since religion was the basis of society, this prohibition had a tremendous effect upon the status of women in other respects as well, and from that time onwards they gradually lost their position in society. Because property and inheritance rights were bound up with religion, women's prerogatives suffered in this field also. The daughter was the first sufferer, her right of inheritance to her father's property being abolished. As women's position in society worsened, the process found reflection in the laws.

Under British law until the nineteenth century, when the Married Women's Property Rights Act was passed, women might not hold property, although under Hindu law women have never lost the right to do so. The concept of *stridhan*, or women's property, though subjected to increasing restrictions over the centuries, at no time disappeared entirely. With the advent of British rule, certain of the property rights of women suffered further curtailment as a result of interpretations and translations offered to British judges by reactionary pandits and priests. At the same time there arose the concept of "the widow's limited estate", which permitted a woman to hold property inherited from her husband only during her lifetime but not to dispose of it. Marriage laws, too, gradually departed from their former equal treatment of husband and wife. Hindu law permitted polygamy only in cases in which the wife had proved barren; later, this exception was interpreted to include wives who had had no male issue. In time, child marriages became frequent, widows were forbidden to remarry, the dowry system spread, and in consequence the marriage laws lost all semblance of equal rights.

Some persons contend that the Hindu marriage was a sacrament and that accordingly divorce or the dissolution of marriage was unknown in Hindu law. Yet a well-known text of the ancient law-giver Narada clearly states that dissolution of marriage is to be permitted under certain conditions. In other words, Hindu law has varied at different times, owing to the diversity of interpretations given it, so that contrary texts can be cited, as they often are, by reformers on the one hand and by die-hard conservatives on the other to support their own particular arguments. Moreover, Hindu law has varied not only in point of time but also amongst different classes and regions. It is not uniform throughout India. There are, in the main, two systems of law,

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the Dayabhaga and the Mitakshara, and even these have their subdivisions. Side by side with them is the matriarchal system, which flourished in the pre-agricultural age and still lingers in Malabar and certain other parts of the country. Under the Aliyasantana and Marumakkattayam systems of law, which are matriarchal in conception, women enjoy rights not only equal to but fuller than those accorded men. A difference exists also between the Brahmanical Hindu law of marriage, which guides the so-called upper classes of society, and the marriage laws observed amongst the lower strata, where customary divorce is recognised and has taken place all along and where the laws in question are more equitable to women. The custom of dowry, which obliges the bride to provide an inheritance on marriage and which still prevails amongst the upper and middle classes, is completely reversed amongst the lower strata, where the bridegroom must pay a dowry in order to obtain his bride. Differences exist even in the laws which govern the upper classes. Thus, in Bombay, under the Mayuk school of law, the daughter's right of inheritance continues unimpaired, while in Bengal the widow's right to her husband's property suffered restriction only with the beginning of British rule.

Custom, even more than law, has been injurious to the cause of women. Today, changes in custom are taking place very rapidly in India. Early marriage was prohibited by the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929. The purdah system, which denies women opportunities for social intercourse and which came into vogue during Muslim times, has been discarded by Hindus and is largely on the wane among Muslims as well. The joint-family system amongst Hindus at one time afforded a means of social insurance for the aged, the disabled and the sick. Later it became a major impediment to women's progress because it tended to tie them down to domestic tasks and denied them an opportunity for free participation in the social life of the community. This system, too, is now disappearing rapidly under the impact of present-day social and economic forces.

THE mid-nineteenth century saw the first glimmerings of progress, for it was then that the great pioneer and social reformer Raja Ram Mohan Roy appeared and championed, almost single-handedly, the cause of women's rights and of social reform. At that time the custom of *sati* (self-immolation by the widow on her husband's funeral pyre) was observed in some parts of the country. Sati had been brought to India by Scythian influences and was confined at first to the Rajputs, the renowned warrior class of Rajasthan, but later became more widespread. It was due to the efforts of Raja Ram Mohan Roy, who fought against great odds, that an act was passed prohibiting this custom. Pandit Ishwar Chandar Vidyasagar was another great reformer who

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maintained that the remarriage of widows was sanctioned by the ancient Hindu scriptures and whose efforts resulted in the passage of the Widow Remarriage Act in the late nineteenth century. Toward the turn of the century, progressive Hindu groups, such as the Brahmo Samaj and the Arya Samaj, which found sanction for their reforms in the Vedas and the Upanishads, broke with many retrograde customs and, by helping their women members to enjoy an education as well as opportunities for self-expression, enabled them to take their place amongst the most progressive women in the world. The liberalising influence of the great Tagore family, which produced several pioneer women reformers, was gradually felt throughout the country. Later came such figures as Hari Singh Gour, Dr. Deshmukh and Rai Haribilas Sarda, who were responsible for the enactment of bills in the Central Legislature which removed some of the more glaring injustices. Great impediments remained, however, because the British government pursued a policy of non-intervention in the religious and social affairs of its colonial subjects and was, therefore, reluctant to introduce reform measures.

The most momentous change in the position of women in India was due to the efforts of Mahatma Gandhi, who, in launching his campaign of non-violent non-cooperation in the struggle for Indian freedom, ignored both law and custom by specifically calling upon women to participate. They left the seclusion of their homes and, courting imprisonment, came forward to help in every emergency that faced the country. No legislation could have been more sweeping or more effective than the Mahatma's call, which leveled the barriers of established custom almost overnight. Thus, the non-cooperation movement for national independence brought the emancipation of women in its wake. Thenceforth women in ever larger numbers became increasingly active not only in the freedom movement but also in various fields of social service.

Meanwhile the occasional pioneer woman reformer was being succeeded by local women's societies whose object was to better the lot of their sex in India. As time went on, women's associations of increasingly wide scope came into existence. The first all-India organisation was the Women's Indian Association, which sought political enfranchisement. Then came the National Council of Women, which, however, was not initiated by Indian women and did not, at least in its early days, reflect national sentiment. Finally, in 1929, the All-India Women's Conference was established and soon had many branches throughout the country. Almost every Indian woman leader of today either has helped to build up or has received training in social work from this association, which has come to reflect the will and aspirations of the great majority of Indian women.

Certain features distinguished the women's movement in India from that

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of the Western world. For one thing, it is dedicated to the restoration, not the creation, of women's rights. The history of the Indian movement affords ample evidence that it has not been based on a narrow suffragist conception: from the start the struggle has been between the forces of progress and reaction. Men of vision championed their cause even before women had grown generally aware of the need for reform. Moreover, the movement became part of the national struggle for independence. The women's organisations resisted all attempts by interested parties to create separatist tendencies or to organise a women's bloc as a divisive element within the country. Both sexes participated on an equal basis in the struggle for freedom, and it was assumed that the advent of independence would bring them equal political rights.

Extraordinary as it may appear to the foreigner, many of the bitterest enemies of equal social laws for men and women have encouraged the latter to participate in public life on equal terms with men; even the illiterate villager finds nothing strange in women's activities in public affairs. Yet many persons are unable to see anything illogical in encouraging women to occupy positions of great responsibility while keeping them subject to iniquitous social laws of marriage and property. It is often argued that in the normal home legal distinctions do not matter and that accordingly the majority of women are not affected by their legal position. This contention may have some merit, but it is equally true that the unfortunate woman who does have to resort to the law courts for protection finds that the social laws oppose her interests.

Piecemeal legislation designed to redress some of the glaring injustices but creating much confusion and many anomalies was insufficient to overcome the growing sentiment, beginning in the 1930s, for a wholesale revision of existing laws. The movement for the removal of women's legal disabilities gathered strength throughout the country and enlisted public opinion in support of a demand for an official enquiry into the laws with a view to wholesale revision and codification. After some delay, the government was induced to establish a committee to report on the whole question of reform of Hindu law. This committee, known as the Rau Committee on Hindu Law, whose chairman was Sir B. N. Rau, now a judge on the International Court of Justice, was charged with the modification and codification of Hindu law in order to bring it into conformity with the requirements of the times. Its terms of reference, however, were strictly limited in the sense that it had to find sanction within the corpus of Hindu law itself for any changes that it might suggest. The Rau Committee drew up two bills, the Hindu Marriage and the Intestate Succession Bills, which were introduced in the Central Legislature in 1943 but were eventually allowed to lapse because of opposi-

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tion from the conservative element that constituted the main support of the British government in power at the time. Yet the pressure of public opinion and the urgent need for the reforms in question led the government to reappoint the Committee, which then toured the country, taking evidence from many associations and representative individuals, both progressive and conservative, before presenting a report, on the basis of which it drew up the Hindu Code Bill.

Since that time the Hindu Code Bill has encountered a series of difficulties. It was introduced in the old Central Assembly, where it was once again shelved. The Congress Government reintroduced it in the first Parliament of independent India in 1947. When the Congress Government came to power, the general belief was that there would be no further difficulty in securing the passage of this measure, which accords with the objectives for which the Congress stands and has publicly declared to be its policy. However, between the time of its reintroduction in 1947 until the dissolution of the first Parliament of India in 1952, although considerable time and labour were devoted to it, the Bill failed to attain the final stages of enactment. The fact that it is a very bulky legislative measure (though much of it comprises mere codification) facilitated the delaying tactics of its opponents. In the long debates that accompanied every legislative stage of the Bill, certain individuals delivered speeches of great length in which they reiterated various points repeatedly, on occasion for hours and even days on end. Since a measure of social reform was involved, the Government was hesitant about moving closures, and thus in effect aided the opposition. The parliamentary conflict over the Bill demonstrated the need for changes in legislative procedure if the majority will is to prevail when contentious measures of this nature are at issue; for the present practice allows a dozen or so members to delay and almost halt legislative processes at certain stages. Not only did the Government, with Cabinet sanction, sponsor the Bill, but on the many occasions that the Congress Parliamentary Party considered the Bill, an overwhelming majority voiced approval of it, though certain members of the Party expressed vociferous dissent. Since the Congress Party possessed a large majority in Parliament, the supporters of the Bill, assuming that it would ultimately be enacted, were lulled into a false sense of security. The filibustering tactics employed by a handful of members both inside and outside the Congress Party had a very adverse effect.

THE Bill, which has been so long on the anvil of the legislature, seeks in the main to achieve unification and codification of the Hindu social laws of marriage, property, guardianship and adoption. Apart from this, it introduces certain provisions which are necessary to adapt the laws to the changed social outlook of the present day. These changes derive their sanction from

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ancient Hindu texts or from progressive laws existing in some parts of the country. Some of the provisions are merely permissive in character. For example, the Code sanctions inter-caste marriages, which are in fact not uncommon. Other permissive provisions countenance both the dissolution of marriage and divorce under certain circumstances; whilst allowing divorce in Brahmanical society, they also restrict the acceptable grounds for customary divorce amongst the lower social strata, in which divorce has been so easy as to exert an injurious effect on family life. Polygamy is penalised under the Hindu Code.

In regard to property, the Bill restores the woman's absolute right of inheritance by establishing as her property (*stridhan*) whatever she may inherit from her husband, his family, her parents or any other source. It gives daughters equal shares with sons in their father's property in the event that he dies intestate. In the same way, sons become equal sharers with daughters in their mother's *stridhan*, whereas formerly any property to which a woman had obtained unrestricted title went to her daughters if she had made no other testamentary disposition. The position between sons and daughters is thus equalised in cases of intestate succession.

It is noteworthy that the changes in Hindu law affecting marriage and divorce, as contained in the Bill, have already been enacted in certain major states, e.g., Bombay and Madras. In fact, apart from a few die-hard conservatives, no one objects seriously to these provisions. Even in respect of the absolute right of inheritance for women, the opposition is not vehement, although the Code could have been enacted more easily if the provisions governing the daughter's rights of inheritance had been deleted from it. But its supporters believe that this provision contains the very essence of the Code, which would have little meaning without it. In a country in which the great majority of the people exist in abject poverty, relatively few sons and daughters inherit any property at all, but recognition in social laws of women's economic rights is a prerequisite for acceptance of women on an equal footing in society. The daughter's right to share in her father's property is a natural right, and the struggle is one for recognition of an equal social status.

Since the Hindu Code Bill was not enacted by the time that Parliament was dissolved in preparation for the General Elections, it has remained one of the Congress Party's legislative objectives. That Party has now been returned to power with a sizable majority, and it is reasonable to conclude that the great majority of the people have voted in favour of enactment of this reform measure. Because the Code is so bulky that, if debated as a whole, the opposition might once again be able to employ delaying tactics, the present intention is to introduce the Bill in the new Parliament in sections, with each principal section being regarded as a separate bill.

It may be objected that in a secular state it should be unnecessary to effect

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reforms of social laws on a community basis. Would it not be better to establish a national code applicable to all communities alike? Without doubt, a uniform code of social laws for the whole country, irrespective of religious considerations, would offer the most satisfactory course. The nucleus of such a common code for all communities exists today in the Special Marriage Act and the Indian Succession Act, which accord men and women equal rights, but their observance is not mandatory, and only such individuals as wish to do so come under their jurisdiction. Although it would probably not take very long to enact a common code of social laws in India, certain practical and legal difficulties stand in the way. In the first place, the new Constitution guarantees freedom of worship to all communities, and since social laws are regarded as having a religious basis, the various communities would have to abandon certain of their tenets before they could be made subject to the same social law. In the meantime, the Hindu Code, if enacted, will apply to the vast majority of the people and will thus bring about the desired reforms for the largest sector.

Then again, the changes that are required in the social laws of non-Hindu communities vary widely in nature. The institution of common marriage laws would necessitate many changes, including the enforcement of monogamy, amongst those guided by Islamic law, although the Koranic law of property accords women more equitable treatment than Hindu law does, and the fact that Muslim women are less advanced socially than their Hindu sisters is due more to custom than to law. Only a few changes would be required in the social laws of Christians and Parsis to achieve a position of complete equality for women. In any case, while much thought has been given to the question of a common code, the progressive elements in India have argued that, once Hindu law has been reformed and the changes required in Islamic law have been introduced, the institution of such a code will prove more feasible.

Although it has been said, with justice, that legal reforms do not in themselves produce equality of status, and while education and training and the extension of other economic rights, such as recognition of the housewife as an economic entity, are indubitably needed, the fact remains that the reforms under consideration represent a step in the right direction. Their implications would be better understood outside of India, and particularly in the West, if preconceived notions of what constitute the main difficulties in the way of Indian women's emancipation were abandoned. As noted earlier, what in the West were major impediments, giving rise to a long, bitter struggle for equal franchise and representation in public life, hardly exist in India. Therefore, the focus and emphasis of reformers have naturally been different, even though the ultimate objectives are the same. To an Indian mind unacquainted

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with the lore of Western culture, it may seem strange that, whilst women in the West have attained equal social status and are even in a position to enforce individual rights to an extent perhaps harmful to the home and family life, they are still confronted by a multitude of obstacles and prejudices against their participation in public life.

Although the Hindu Code Bill constitutes only a mild reform measure, and though it cannot by itself effect all of the changes necessary to accord women a position of equality in society, it has become a symbol of progress, and its fate is being watched with great interest in India. In many quarters its fortunes are regarded as a measure of the strength of the elements of progress and reaction. In the years before the dissolution of the Provisional Parliament, progressive elements in the country did not organise their forces so effectively as the opposition did, because they believed that the Congress Government was bound to secure enactment of the Bill before the Parliament rose. Now, however, a rallying of progressive elements is again discernible. For example, a Fundamental Rights Organisation was established recently when it became apparent that the likelihood of speedy enactment of the Hindu Code Bill was diminishing; its main objectives are to acquaint citizens with the fundamental rights accorded them by the Constitution and to prevent violation of these rights. An integral part of its activities will involve pressing for the discard of social laws which contravene the fundamental rights of individuals.¹

It is not yet possible to foresee what procedure for equalising the social status of men and women will ultimately prevail in India. Clearly, however, whether the Hindu Code Bill, now once again on the anvil of Parliament, is finally enacted or the social laws are brought into conformity with the constitutional structure, the dynamic urge of society cannot be withstood indefinitely. If the statute books remain burdened with outworn laws that have only a nuisance value, they will deteriorate into incongruous relics of a past age, unacceptable and meaningless in the society of a resurgent India. The paradox may continue to exist on paper, but life will follow a different pattern. The law may hamper but cannot permanently fetter the forces of progress.

Calcutta, June 1952

RENUKA RAY

¹ Article 15(1) of the Indian Constitution declares: "The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them."

Minority Problems in Ceylon

IN recent years much of Southern Asia has been plagued by minority problems. Social, political and economic grievances have tended to draw sustenance from communal differences. Frequently political instability has been the price of unimaginative handling of minority questions. Ceylon, too, has become a multi-communal society. Its communal problems have become more complex in the course of the past half-century and are now reaching a point at which only wise counsels can ease the growing tensions that are manifesting themselves.

Within Ceylon's 25,000 square miles reside Sinhalese, Ceylon Tamils, Ceylon Indians, Muslims, Burghers, Europeans and other smaller groups.¹ Of these, the Sinhalese (both Low-Country and Kandyan)² comprise the majority community, having come to the island more than two thousand years ago, probably from a region close to Bengal.³ It is difficult to determine when the Ceylon Tamils settled in Ceylon; a few of them may have been there as traders when the Sinhalese first arrived, but it is certain that they appeared in considerable numbers with the invasions from South India. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, they established an independent kingdom in the north of the island.⁴ Although, on superficial view, these two peoples may appear quite distinct from each other—the Sinhalese being of Aryan and the Tamils of Dravidian descent—in fact the differences are not so great, for there is considerable Tamil blood among the Sinhalese.

¹ The Census of 1946 reported the distribution of population by race or community as follows:

Low-Country Sinhalese	2,902,509	Burghers and Eurasians	41,926
Kandyan Sinhalese	1,717,998	Malays	22,508
Ceylon Tamils	733,731	Veddahs	2,361
Ceylon Indians	780,589	Europeans	5,478
Ceylon Moors	373,559	Others	41,116
Indian Moors	35,624		
		TOTAL	6,657,339

² The distinction between Low-Country and Kandyan Sinhalese is today largely geographic, but for historical and economic reasons it is worth retaining. After the Portuguese conquest of the maritime provinces, a Sinhalese kingdom was established in the central hills of Ceylon. Since this kingdom remained independent until 1815, a feudal type of society persisted longest there. One consequence is that, while Kandyan Sinhalese society retains largely semi-feudal forms, Low-Country Sinhalese have been exposed to a greater measure of Western influence and have taken to English education, trade, plantation enterprise, etc. with relative alacrity.

Ceylon is divided into nine provinces: Western, Southern, Eastern, Northern, Central, North-western, North-Central, Uva and Sabaragamuwa. The Western province, whose capital is Colombo, is the most populous.

³ A. L. Basham, "Prince Vijaya and the Ariyanization of Ceylon", *Ceylon Historical Journal*, January 1952.

⁴ G. C. Mendis, *Early History of Ceylon*, p. 11.

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The Moors came to Ceylon about 400 years ago, mostly as merchants engaged in the carrying trade of the Indian Ocean before the arrival of the Portuguese. The Burghers are descendants of the Portuguese and Dutch conquerors of the island.⁵ The Europeans, mostly British, are planters, businessmen and the like, whose forebears arrived in the wake of the British conquest and remained for economic reasons. The most recent addition are the Ceylon Indians, who began to arrive in force in the mid-nineteenth century, having been attracted by opportunities of employment in the coffee plantations, on which the Sinhalese peasantry were unwilling to work. When coffee cultivation was abandoned, the Ceylon Indians stayed on to work in the rubber estates.

In a strict sociological sense, no basic or irreconcilable difference separates Ceylon's two major communities, the Sinhalese and the Tamils. To be sure, the Sinhalese are mostly Buddhists, while the majority of Tamils are Hindus, but Buddhism derives from Hinduism, and no Buddhist temple in Ceylon today is complete without its Hindu gods. Certain linguistic dissimilarities exist, but many Sinhalese words have Tamil roots. There are far wider differences between two social classes of the same race than between the two races of the same class, so that a Tamil lawyer, for example, is much more at home in Sinhalese middle-class society than among peasants of his own race.

The great majority of Ceylon Indians appear to lead a life apart, largely because of their special economic circumstances. As plantation workers, they live in houses provided by the estates, to which their activities are largely confined. Having only infrequent contacts outside, their way of life is roughly comparable to that of certain mining communities in the United Kingdom.

In general, relations among these main communities in Ceylon are cordial, unmarred by the sort of friction that exists between Hindus and Moslems in India. Except for one sad episode in 1915, racial riots have been unknown. Religious and racial harmony is present in high degree: Buddhists celebrate Christmas, Christians take part in Wesak illuminations, Buddhists appear in great numbers at Hindu festivals, and so forth. Yet communal differences have been exploited and multiplied for political and economic reasons and, once aroused, they tend to linger long after their political or economic use has vanished. In Ceylon today, the minority problem is partly economic and partly political.

COMMUNALISM, or the minority problem in political form, first appeared in 1833, when communal representation was introduced into Ceylon with the

⁵ From the beginning of the sixteenth century until the middle of the seventeenth, when they were driven out by the Dutch, the Portuguese controlled the maritime provinces of Ceylon. The Dutch were in turn ousted by the British at the close of the eighteenth century.

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establishment of a Legislative Council. Initially the communal question had a Tamil-Sinhalese complexion. A very close correlation appears to have existed between the emergence of a Ceylonese middle class, the rise of a nationalist movement and increasing demands for constitutional reform on the one hand and the growth of a minority problem on the other.

The beginning of the nineteenth century witnessed the beginnings of a Ceylonese middle class. Before the advent of the British, Ceylon society had been essentially feudal, the bulk of the population consisting of an army of cultivating peasants. The British introduced a plantation and money economy, which fostered a middle class of lawyers, doctors, merchants, contractors, transport agents and the like,⁶ who came largely from the Sinhalese, Tamil and Burgher communities.

Until about the first decade of the present century, middle-class Sinhalese and Tamils collaborated in the movement for constitutional reform. The first political manifestation of the development of a middle class was the emergence of the national independence movement; the second was the disagreement, on a communal plane, among the middle class. This disagreement was apparent in the various proposals offered regarding the question of political representation, which has been a source of contention in all multi-communal colonial societies during their periods of political adolescence—quite naturally since constitutional reform generally involved an increase in the number of legislative seats accorded local representatives. The demands and proposals of the various communities regarding representation have constituted a barometer of the communal problem.

In Ceylon, for instance, as late as 1909 the Tamils were opposed to communal representation, which meant that they and the Sinhalese still thought much alike. When, however, the Constitution of 1910 retained the communal basis introduced in 1833, the Tamils asked that they be given half of the Sinhalese seats. The middle-class Tamils who, assuming the leadership in this matter, appealed to their community and developed existing communal differences into major political problems, were impelled to do so by economic motives.

Since industrial development was absent in Ceylon and private commercial establishments were staffed by Europeans, the other communities found their most lucrative employment in the public service.⁷ Because an English-type education was necessary to qualify for public-service appointments, those who received it enjoyed a clear advantage over those who did

⁶ G. C. Mendis, *Ceylon Under the British*, p. 168.

⁷ In 1948, a year for which comparative data are available, the salary of a public servant of the highest grade was one hundred times greater than the average per capita income in Ceylon, and a clerk, on entering the service, received a salary twelve times greater than the average income. Corresponding figures for the United Kingdom were ten and two times. (Ceylon Sessional Paper No. 5 of 1948, p. 20.)

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not. The location of English-type schools was therefore important, and in this respect the Tamils had a good start.⁸ When, after 1870, the government subsidised the denominational schools, their advantage was increased. As a result, Tamils were enabled to obtain a share of posts in the government service that was disproportionate to their numbers.⁹ At the turn of the century, however, a Buddhist revival occurred, and since in Ceylon Buddhists are mostly Sinhalese, the latter began to regain lost ground, although as late as 1931, for instance, the number of Sinhalese students in English-type schools was only twice that of Tamil students.¹⁰

The Tamil middle class, therefore, was motivated by fear that its economic interests might be threatened by the Sinhalese middle class, with which the nationalist movement and the consequent demand for constitutional reform were largely identified. Liberalisation of the constitution signified, in effect, the entry of the representatives of these two middle-class groups into the various spheres of government—a development which, the Tamils anticipated, might affect their economic interests adversely if the number of Sinhalese officeholders should increase too greatly.

This was the explanation for the close correlation between the intensity of the Ceylon Tamils' demands and the liberalisation of the constitution. Until 1909, when local members of the Legislative Council were still being nominated by the Governor, the Tamils opposed communal representation. Thereafter, as the role of local representation increased, they demanded weightage for minorities. When, in 1931, the Donoughmore Constitution gave the local people a considerable share in the administration of the country, the Tamils urged the adoption of a "fifty-fifty" formula. Under this scheme, no community would have been in a position to dominate another, which is to say that half of the seats in the Legislature were to have been distributed to the minorities and half to the majority community; the Executive Council, or Cabinet, was to have been similarly constituted, for the Tamils were by now aware of the possibility of discrimination in the administrative sphere. In other words, when the exercise of local power was confined to representation in the Legislature, the Tamils demanded special consideration there; when it extended to administrative functions, they sought concessions there as well.

In 1945, however, the Soulbury Commission, rejecting these demands, attacked the minority problem by proposing that all of the minorities taken

⁸ From the time of the Portuguese conquest of the maritime provinces in the sixteenth century, Christian missionaries were very active in the north of Ceylon, where Tamils largely resided. Their success in converting many of these people accounts in part for the establishment of a large number of schools in these areas.

⁹ The Tamil middle class also sought to obtain a voice in the allocation of government expenditures, with an eye to securing a maximum share for the Tamil areas (the Northern and Eastern provinces), where Tamil contractors and transport agents, among others, stood to benefit.

¹⁰ *Administration Report of the Director of Education for 1936*, Colombo, 1937, pp. 56-60.

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together should be given a number of seats slightly larger than that which they would have received under a system of proportional representation. This was done by distributing seats according to population and area. Since, for the most part, the minorities inhabited the sparsely-populated provinces, it was possible to achieve the desired result by assigning one seat for every thousand square miles of area and 75,000 of population. Constitutionally a highly workable scheme was in effect in 1946.

Economic factors also helped to ease the Sinhalese-Tamil problem. The general elections of 1946 returned an unexpectedly large number of Sinhalese leftist members to Parliament. These members of the Opposition, whose inspiration was derived from Marxist sources, generally advocated the replacement of a capitalist by an egalitarian society. The Tamil middle-class members, elected to Parliament on a communal ticket by voters who had responded to purely communal propaganda, thus found themselves in an awkward position. A "rightist" Government had come to power with a narrow majority; the slightest rift in its coalition of United National Party, Labour Party, Independents and nominated members would have caused its fall. The Tamils, elected on the communal Tamil Congress ticket, had either to support the Government or to join the Opposition. Most of them embraced the former alternative, possibly because their economic interests ruled out an alliance with the Left.

A few former Tamil Congress supporters, however, decided to stand apart from this shift of policy and to campaign for a federal constitution, which is, in a sense, a logical development of the earlier "fifty-fifty" theory, since it represents merely a different constitutional formula for defending the same middle-class interests. The pressure of political events, on the other hand, has diverted the Federal Party into somewhat different channels from those followed by its parent body, the Tamil Congress.

The latter, now supporting the United National Party, is espousing an alliance between the Tamils and the right-wing, largely Sinhalese, governing party. Since many of its number have answered the Tamil Congress' call, the Tamil middle class has been split in two. One group has allied itself with the Right; the other—the Federalist—accepts whatever help may be forthcoming from the Left. This is not to suggest that Federalism is a predominantly leftist movement; its political direction still lies with the middle class. Since, however, a fair number of its allies are leftist-oriented, and since it advocates regional autonomy on cultural and linguistic lines and suggests the possibility of a greater decentralisation of political power, the Federal movement will bear watching in the years ahead.¹¹

¹¹ The term "federal", as currently employed in the Ceylonese context, is ill-defined. Even the leader of the Federal Party has failed to explain specifically the nature of the federalism that is desired.

In an earlier day, the Tamils sought acceptance of a "fifty-fifty" formula, which was intended

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By far the most explosive minority problem is posed by the Ceylon Indians. The question of their voting rights did not arise during the nineteenth century, when even the Sinhalese, Tamils and Burghers did not have the vote. As late as 1924, when elected members of the Legislature were in a majority, the question was unimportant, for the franchise was so limited by property and educational qualifications that few Indians were eligible to vote.

The trouble really began with the Donoughmore Constitution in 1931. The Donoughmore scheme recommended universal adult suffrage, and since there was no special provision for "citizenship" in a semi-responsible constitution such as that of 1931, all British subjects, including the Indian settlers in Ceylon, would have received the vote. The Sinhalese opposed this recommendation, mainly because they feared the growth of "foreign" influence in the affairs of what they thought should be regarded as basically a Sinhalese country. For their part, the Kandyan aristocracy believed that enfranchisement of a large population of Indian origin would place them at the mercy of Indian leaders in all political matters.¹² The upper-class Kandyans retained considerable authority over the local peasantry, but their influence stopped abruptly at the estate gates. In the absence of Indian counter-propaganda, the aristocracy was able to persuade the rest of the Kandyan Sinhalese that their culture and very livelihood would be imperilled if the Indian community were to receive a voice in the affairs of the country. Another cause of Sinhalese hostility lay in the gradual capture of much of Ceylon's retail and export-import trade by efficient, thrifty Indian merchants who were ousting the Sinhalese middle class from lucrative commercial activities all over the island.

Thus, for both emotional and, particularly, economic reasons, Sinhalese opposition to total Indian enfranchisement was very strong. In 1931, therefore, the Colonial Office proposed a compromise formula providing three ways for obtaining the franchise: (1) by the 1924 system, which enfranchised all well-to-do British subjects (largely Europeans); (2) by domicile, designed for the old-established population; and (3) by certificate of permanent settlement, for Indian settlers.¹³

The number of Indians who have exercised the franchise has varied from

to divide political representation in a unitary legislature equally between the Sinhalese majority and the minorities. Federalism envisages the division of the country in such a way that Tamils will have responsibility for affairs in Tamil areas, i.e., in the Northern and Eastern provinces, although the Federalists have not indicated clearly whether they have in mind fragmentation of the island into separate states.

Federalism attracts leftists in Ceylon for much the same reason that the idea of "linguistic provinces" appeals to the Communists in India.

¹² Most estates are in Kandyan areas, where the Ceylon Indians mainly reside.

¹³ A certificate was obtainable only after compliance with complicated requirements. The applicant had, among other things, to prove that he had resided in Ceylon for five years and to declare that he intended to remain there permanently.

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time to time. For several reasons, many of them have not wished to apply for certificates of permanent settlement, since that procedure generally involved sacrificing the special protection accorded estate labour. Thus, between 1931 and 1945 only some 500 certificates of permanent settlement were issued,¹⁴ although many Indians registered for the vote under the domicile clause. In registering the Indians, the greatest care was not always taken to ensure that only genuinely domiciled individuals were accepted. It is possible, therefore, that some Indians whose names appeared on the electoral lists did not in fact wish to be Ceylonese. Moreover, the lists compiled by estate superintendents, headmen and other enumerators were usually received without critical examination.¹⁵ But in the late 1930s the government grew stricter about registering Ceylon Indians, with the result that the number of Ceylon Indian voters fell from 225,000 in 1939 to 168,000 in 1943. The size of the electoral list during these years did not yet, however, seriously concern the Sinhalese politicians, since, under the prevailing system of direct plural voting in single-member constituencies, very few Ceylon Indians won seats in the State Council.

But with the subsequent inauguration of the Soulbury Constitution, the situation altered radically: the number of seats in the new Parliament was doubled; provision was made for multi-member constituencies; and the weightage given the area factor benefited the minorities. As a result, seven Ceylon Indians won seats. The political situation, too, was changing markedly in consequence of the rise of "right" and "left" political forces. The Ceylon Indian seats went to those who controlled the estate workers rather than to the Indian merchants in the Western province. Even though some of the Ceylon Indian members of Parliament came from the middle class, they depended on the estate workers for their seats. In several marginal constituencies the Indian vote tipped the balance in favour of leftist candidates, who, after their election, opposed the "rightist" Government.

It was in these circumstances that the Citizenship Act of 1948, the Indian and Pakistani (Citizenship) Act of 1949, and the amendment to the Elections Order in Council of 1946 became law. In effect, these acts limited the franchise to those who are citizens either by descent or by registration,¹⁶ but

¹⁴ Oral evidence taken by the Soulbury Commission, 18th Sitting.

¹⁵ Ceylon Sessional Paper No. 14 of 1938, p. 7.

¹⁶ Citizenship by descent is restricted to individuals who were born in Ceylon prior to August 5, 1949, and can prove that their father or paternal grandfather and paternal great-grandfather also were born there. If the claimant was born outside Ceylon, his father and paternal grandfather or paternal grandfather and paternal great-grandfather must have been born in Ceylon. A person born in Ceylon after August 5, 1949, is a citizen if his father is or was such; but if he was born outside of Ceylon after that date, not only must his father be a citizen, but in addition his name must have been properly registered within one year of his birth. (Citizenship Act of 1948, Sections 4 and 5.)

Citizenship by registration is available to a person whose mother is a citizen or would have

Minority Problems in Ceylon

even these must comply with an extremely complicated, semi-judicial procedure. In their opposition to the Citizenship Act, the Ceylon Indian members of Parliament received the support of most of their Tamil colleagues¹⁷ and of the "leftist" groups, but in the end their efforts proved fruitless.

More than 237,000 citizenship applications were filed before August 5, 1951, the closing date.¹⁸ Of these, fewer than 10,000 have been considered thus far. Since the burden of proof rests with the applicants, Ceylon Indians are regarded as non-citizens until the contrary has been proved. Therefore, almost the entire Ceylon Indian community was omitted from the electoral register for 1950, which provided the basis for the 1952 general elections.¹⁹ Thus, in effect, virtually all of its members, including those who had previously been permitted to vote, have been disfranchised.

The Ceylon Indian case rests, in the first place, on the argument that the Indian and Pakistani (Citizenship) Act insists on conditions "impossible" of fulfilment.²⁰ In the second place, it is urged that Ceylon Indians whose names were on the voting lists in the 1949 register have been removed therefrom without consideration of whether or not they were citizens. It is held that there is a *prima facie* case for accepting the view that electors whose names have been on the lists since 1931 are citizens even on the basis of the rigorous standards established by the government. In deciding otherwise, the government has, it is said, disfranchised many persons who are—morally if not legally—Ceylon citizens, just because they happen to have Indian names.

In reply, the United National Party and its Government allies insist that careful scrutiny of citizenship applications is necessary to obtain definite and conclusive proof of the applicants' interest in Ceylon. They argue that the fact that many Ceylon Indians regularly remit money to relatives in India

been one under certain other circumstances; to a spouse of a Ceylon citizen; and to former citizens who have renounced Ceylon citizenship for another nationality. Citizenship by registration is open to the Ceylon Indian community under the Indian and Pakistani (Citizenship) Act of 1949. Any Indian or Pakistani of Ceylon who, before 1946, was continuously resident in Ceylon for ten years if single and for seven years if married, with temporary absence not exceeding twelve months, may become a Ceylon citizen by registration if he applied for citizenship before August 5, 1951, has an assured income of reasonable size, and, if a married male, can prove that his wife and minor dependents have ordinarily been resident in Ceylon. (Citizenship Act of 1948, Section 11, and Indian and Pakistani (Citizenship) Act, Section 6.)

¹⁷ In general, the Ceylon Tamils favour enfranchisement of the Ceylon Indians on communal grounds. The main difference between the two groups is that the Tamils have represented a regional element in the island for more than a thousand years, whereas Ceylon Indians did not begin to arrive in large numbers until the last century. Ceylon Indians are frequently referred to as Indian Tamils in order to distinguish them from Ceylon Tamils.

¹⁸ Because heads of families applied also in the names of their dependents, the total number of individuals concerned was nearly 650,000. (*The Hindu*, Madras, May 18, 1952.)

¹⁹ The government explained the use of the 1950 electoral register on the ground that it had been impossible to complete a more recent one.

²⁰ *Congress News*, Colombo, May 19, 1952. This is the organ of the Ceylon Indian Congress.

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indicates that they have not relinquished their connections with that country. There is, in addition, a belief in certain quarters that any large-scale grant of citizenship rights to resident Ceylon Indians would encourage other Indians to flock to the island en masse. This notion, which will not bear close examination, is supported by newspaper accounts of large-scale illegal entries by Indians, although evidence for such reports is scanty. In general, however, it may be said that the main Sinhalese objection, where one exists, against enfranchisement of the Ceylon Indians is a communal one; whereas the main motivation of the leaders who are familiar with the problem is political.

The matter of greatest present interest is neither the motives nor the arguments of either side, but the nature of the situation which they have created. Whatever the rights of the matter in terms of law or of logic, the fact remains that one-twelfth of the inhabitants of Ceylon today are not citizens and yet represent much of the economic lifeblood of the country. Nothing could be more unwise or more fraught with danger than to retain within the body politic such a large minority group that is compelled to look abroad for protection because it is denied an opportunity for assimilation within the country. Yet no one suggests a wholesale repatriation of the Ceylon Indians because such a course would ruin the country's economy.

Recent events in Ceylon—particularly the general elections of May 1952, in which the Indian question became a major issue—are not calculated to foster communal harmony. There is a serious danger that mutual distrust will increase if communal differences are exploited in political platforms. The Indian problem cannot be solved by ignoring the presence of the more than 800,000 Ceylon Indians in the country; whether or not they are citizens, their presence will have to be taken into consideration. And since the "right" denies them the vote and the "left" promises it, they will gradually be drawn into the latter camp.

Already the Ceylon Indian problem is losing its communal character and assuming a class colour. It has been suggested in certain quarters that the real reason for the disfranchisement of the Ceylon Indians is that they happen to belong to the working class and so vote "left". Even if that were not the reason, their disfranchisement has made the leftist elements feel the loss of the votes of their possible supporters.²¹ Those who would help the Ceylon Indians in their efforts to obtain civic rights are also in the main drawn from working-class elements and hold progressive views.

The present trend in Ceylon is worth noting. The Ceylon Indian question has become a class problem and a serious political issue. The communal problems of the island originated largely in middle-class rivalries for political

²¹ See W. I. Jennings, "Mr. Senanayake and His Opponents", *Times of Ceylon*, Colombo, May 20, 1952.

The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association

and economic power. They are still unsolved because the middle class is closing its ranks against whoever would question the foundations of its society. Thus, communalism, which once concealed intra-class differences, now cloaks the inter-class conflicts that are slowly maturing in the island.

Colombo, July 1952

I. D. S. WEERAWARDANA

The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association

THE full story of the Soviet Russian bid for influence in Communist China has yet to be told. It involves not only education and propaganda but activity in the economic and social spheres as well. Estimates of the extent of Soviet influence will vary as long as they rely mainly on statements emanating from Russian or Chinese sources, which are generally unverifiable; but it is possible to discern with some accuracy the general methods employed by Soviet propaganda and to study certain organisations which serve as its outlets in China. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association (SSFA) is of particular interest both because of its extensive influence in China and because it furnishes a striking example of the increasing support which the Chinese are prepared to accord propaganda organisations. Its aims are extremely simple and explicit; the sole test of its activities is their political success; and the Chinese themselves carry its message.

The internal organisation of the SSFA, as described in its Charter,¹ indicates how it disseminates its particular brand of propaganda. Its purpose is "to develop and solidify the friendly relations between China and the Soviet Union, and to strengthen the ties between the two nations in cultural, economic and other affairs". Membership is open to all, upon introduction by two members in good standing, and application may be made to any of its offices. Members, who pay dues periodically, may participate in all of the activities of the Association, and may subscribe to its publications at special rates. The national headquarters is in Peking. Each region, or main administrative division, has a regional office, and each province or special municipality, a branch office; every enterprise, factory or school is supposed to maintain a sub-office. The authority of these offices derives from meetings of elected representatives, which are convened by the national and regional offices once every three years, by the branch offices once a year, and by the sub-offices once every six months. The national office has a president and seven vice-presidents, who are elected at the all-China meeting, and the

¹ Published in the "Sino-Soviet Friendship Magazine", November 1, 1949, pp. 48-49.

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organisation as a whole is controlled by a board of directors, which elects several executive secretaries. The Association derives its income from membership fees, exhibitions and stage shows, sales of its publications, and donations.

The advantage of this organisation is its relative simplicity, which permits easy multiplication of offices. Descriptions of branch and sub-offices are difficult to obtain, but one relating to the model organisation of the national office in Peking has been published.² This office has six divisions, presumably headed by the executive secretaries; certain of these administer the day-to-day affairs, but the divisions styled Publications Investigation Department and Library and Research Materials Department indicate one of the main tasks of the Association, namely, the making of decisions about what books and other materials supplied from Russia are to be pushed.³ The national board of directors contains the names of 199 individuals, many of them personages of great importance in Communist China. Ch'ien Tsun-jui, the Vice-Minister of Education, is the Secretary General, and Soong Ching-ling, who is Chairman of the People's Relief Administration of China, is a Vice-President. There is no evidence of Russian advisers within the Association, although Russians may become members in the same way as Chinese do, and of course many reports of Association functions list Russians as having been guest speakers. It is clear that the SSFA was never intended to have, and has never won, anything approaching a monopoly in the dissemination of Russian propaganda in China. Its rapid growth appears to be due largely to the simplicity of its aims and to the adaptability of its internal organisation.

The first anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship was celebrated in February 1951, when there was pressing need for speedy Russian assistance as a result of Chinese involvement in the Korean war. The SSFA had already begun to organise branches throughout the nation, and had assumed responsibility for ensuring that all other organisations gave proper study and publicity to the necessity for promoting Sino-Soviet friendship. By the beginning of 1951, the Association believed that its activities would bear public scrutiny, for it had been enterprising indeed during the previous year. Its early operations are worth recording, since they were the drops that heralded the present flood.⁴ The SSFA had organised exchanges of both influential missions and individual scholars. From the Soviet Union had come a Cultural, Arts and Science Workers Mission, a Youth Delegation, and a Literary and Arts Workers Mission, while reciprocal missions and an

² See "The People's Handbook 1951", Vol. II, *Am* 39.

³ The magazine published by the SSFA carries advertisements for Russian works.

⁴ The following information is from a New China News Agency (Peking) release of January 17, 1951.

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Athletic Delegation had been sent to Russia. Scholars famous in the communist world—such as Yudin the philosopher, Nujikin the biologist and Markalova the economist—had delivered more than two hundred lectures in Chinese cities.

The SSFA had already initiated the importation of both general and technical publications which has become so significant in educational circles and which is culminating in the widespread adaptation and translation of Soviet textbooks for school use in China. This movement for translating Russian textbooks, which is still expanding, helps to explain the existence in China of textbooks of the required Marxian type, many of which, notwithstanding their low standards, might well have taken several years to produce otherwise. At the time that it launched its membership campaign in February 1951, the SSFA published some interesting figures on the inflow during the previous twelve months of Soviet educational materials from the Soviet VOKS (Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries). The Association reported that VOKS had sent 7,000 books, 11,000 periodicals, copies of 14 different Russian newspapers, five trucks equipped with generators, projectors, radios and microphones, and a number of cinema films, lantern slides, gramophones and the like.⁵ The SSFA also claimed that it had organised 99 exhibitions throughout China and that they had been visited by more than 1,500,000 persons.⁶ These exhibitions had been displayed under the suggestive titles of "Soviet Women", "Soviet Children", "Construction in the Soviet Union" and "The Soviet Trades Union Council", and had obviously been designed as important elements in the penetration by the Soviet Union of the Chinese way of life. The Chinese had reciprocated with exhibitions of Chinese art in Moscow and Leningrad, and of fine arts and industrial products in Kiev. The use of exhibitions for propaganda purposes was presumably considered to be particularly effective, for these have since become a permanent feature of the Chinese scene. Another of the early ventures of the SSFA had been its sponsorship of Russian language study, both in evening classes and by radio. In February 1951 there were six radio classes and 121 evening classes in different parts of the country, with 31,000 students at various stages of attainment. In Peking the SSFA had opened a model night school for the study of Russian, containing eleven groups divided into elementary, junior and senior grades.⁷

In the months since February 1951, the SSFA has developed rapidly, having become a recognised agency for erasing anti-Soviet ideas as well as doubts

⁵ New China News Agency, Peking, February 13, 1951.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ New China News Agency, Peking, January 17, 1951.

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on the part of the Chinese public about the solidity of Sino-Soviet friendship, and for administering the exchange of technical information and personnel on which so much of the Chinese effort of reconstruction now depends.⁸ In the early stages of its expansion, there was a tendency to publish obviously inflated claims: thus, the North East Region of the SSFA reported that it had organised meetings attended by a total of 22,000,000 persons, and the Sinkiang Branch alone claimed a membership of 3,000,000 and acknowledged receipt of a half-million books from Russia, in addition to one and one-quarter million school texts, many of which allegedly had already been translated into the Uighur and Kazakh languages so that even the minorities in Sinkiang could receive schooling, thanks to Russian assistance.⁹ This tendency to exaggeration was later modified. For example, in September 1951 the North East Region claimed 3,553,977 members,¹⁰ and, as of March 31, 1951, the SSFA reported a total membership of 5,373,582, a figure whose accuracy there is no particular reason to doubt.

Analysis reveals that the organisation was succeeding in attracting intellectual leaders: twenty-three per cent of its members were either teachers or employed in allied fields, and another twenty per cent were students. Subsequently the SSFA penetrated the trade unions, peasants' associations and students' federations, and special regulations were issued for the formation of local branches. Some idea of the ramifications of the Association was afforded by a list of organisations represented at a conference called to consider ways and means of "introducing the Soviet Union".¹¹ The roster included, among others, the China New Democratic Youth League, the All-China Federation of Labour, the All-China Democratic Women's Federation, the All-China Students' Federation, the Chinese Educational Workers' Labour Union, the All-China Association of Drama Workers, and the All-China Federation of Literary and Arts Workers.

In October 1951, when the SSFA held its first national conference,¹² its membership was said to total 17,000,000. (It reached 23,110,000 in February 1952.¹³) It was reported that the Association had issued 74 different publications and some 500 books and pamphlets. (However, as far as it is possible to check the record of publications for which the SSFA has been directly responsible, the record is not particularly impressive. In January 1951 the

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ New China News Agency, Mukden, February 15, 1951.

¹⁰ New China News Agency, Mukden, September 2, 1951.

¹¹ New China News Agency, Peking, February 2, 1951.

¹² Except where otherwise stated, the information in this and the following paragraph is from a New China News Agency (Peking) release of October 6, 1951, and an accompanying editorial published in the Peking *Jen Min Jih Pao*.

¹³ New China News Agency, Peking, February 13, 1952.

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Association claimed only to have published eight books and to have contributed twenty articles to the Peking *Jen Min Jih Pao*, in addition to producing its own monthly magazine, which lacks broad popular appeal and appears to be addressed mainly to the Association's active organisers.¹⁴ The national conference learned also of such other accomplishments as the organisation of 140 teams to show Soviet films in cities and in the countryside, and the holding of 10,000 photographic exhibitions portraying the Soviet scene.

As the *Jen Min Jih Pao* noted, the emphasis of the SSFA programme had shifted from the popularising of general slogans to the establishment of concrete activities. By February 1952, regional offices had been set up in North East, East, Central-South, South West and North West China, and one was being organised in North China.¹⁵ There were 1,340 branches and 62,880 sub-branches in the country, and 5,000 persons had received special training to forward the work of the Association.

Information regarding the operations of the local branches is less easily available than that regarding the programme of the Association as viewed from the national level. The Shanghai Branch, however, records its activities from time to time in the *Shanghai News*, and is obviously a propaganda force of some importance in the city. A noteworthy event in May 1951 was the opening, in the central district of Shanghai, of a Sino-Soviet Friendship Hall, boasting a cinema, an exhibition room, a reading room and a Russian-language school. At the opening, the exhibition room featured pictures of "peaceful construction" in the Soviet Union. In October 1951 the Shanghai Branch claimed a membership of 606,497, or one-eighth of the total population of the city; it had 353 sub-branches and its own publication, the "Sino-Soviet Friendship Association Handbook".¹⁶ By November, the Branch reportedly had 650,000 members, was holding Russian-language classes at three centres, and had already organised more than one thousand exhibitions.¹⁷ It planned to increase its membership to one million during 1952, and to establish a unit in every Shanghai factory.¹⁸

Thus is the legend of Soviet Russia as the bastion of world peace, and the dependable friend of China, spread through the land. Working outside the gates of established educational institutions in its initial stages, the SSFA has developed its own centres and methods to such a point that it should

¹⁴ Only 22,500 copies of its fourth 1952 issue were printed.

¹⁵ New China News Agency, Peking, February 13, 1952.

¹⁶ *Shanghai News*, October 14, 1951.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, November 7, 1951.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, December 25, 1951.

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have little difficulty in carrying other communist people's organisations with it. Certainly an indigenous propaganda organisation which selects and disseminates its own foreign-inspired material is likely to be more effective than one which is dominated by foreigners. In the SSFA, Soviet Russia has gained an effective channel through which to pour a constant stream of propaganda into the hearts and minds of the Chinese people. To the early pattern of cultural exchanges and exhibitions has now been added the recruitment of local leadership in broadcasting pro-Soviet doctrine. In the explicitness of its aims, in the direct assumption of executive responsibility within it by the Chinese themselves, and in its lavish provision of expensive materials and equipment, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association is without a parallel in the non-communist world today.

Hong Kong, June 1952

K. E. PRIESTLEY

L'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient*

CONCERN about recent political and military developments in Indochina has tended to divert public attention from a noteworthy event—the fiftieth anniversary of the *Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient*, an eminent pioneer in Western studies of Asia. Despite its name, the organization is not a teaching institution but an institute for research in the history, archaeology and ethnology of the Indochinese peninsula and of neighboring countries, especially India and China, from which the Indochinese cultures were derived. Until recently, it was also responsible for the preservation of historical monuments.

Although established in 1898, it was not until 1900 that the *Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient* (EFEO) assumed its present name, which is intended to indicate its intellectual and organizational ties with the *Ecoles françaises* of Athens and of Rome. In 1901, following the change in the seat of the government, it moved from Saigon to Hanoi, where its headquarters have since remained. In 1920 it acquired the status of a public institution with financial autonomy; subsequently various government decrees defined the prerogatives of the director and members (1931), determined how they were to be nominated (1937), and threw open staff appointments to Indochinese (1939). More recently, agreements with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have modified the structure and functions of the EFEO in consonance with the new position

*This account is based on Georges Coedès and Louis Malleret, "L'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient", *Cahiers français d'information*, Paris, April 15, 1951.

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of the Associated States. At present it is governed by an Administrative Council (in which Cambodia, France, Laos and Vietnam are equally represented) and run by a director and secretary-general; its staff includes scientists, technicians and administrative personnel. Expenses are met by annual contributions on the part of the governments of France and the Associated States, proceeds from sales of its publications, income from real estate and securities, gifts, and so forth.

The members' main resource is the EFEO Library in Hanoi, which from the beginning has tried to collect all works relating to Indochina as well as the principal publications concerning other countries in the Far East. The European collection comprises approximately 15,000 titles; the Chinese, some 4,000 titles in 27,000 volumes, a detailed description of which is in process of publication; the Vietnamese, about 5,000 titles; the Japanese, 2,000; and there are in addition numerous manuscripts, engravings of inscriptions, and the like.

The EFEO formerly had three museums, which have recently become the joint property of the governments of France and the Associated States. Hanoi is the site of the Louis Finot Museum, which displays works of art representative of an area extending from Japan to Afghanistan. In Tourane, the Henri Parmentier Museum is devoted exclusively to archaeological exhibits dating from the Champa period. At Phnom Penh, the Albert Sarraut Museum has a unique collection of Khmer art. In addition, the EFEO is responsible for policy matters affecting the Blanchard de la Brosse Museum in Saigon (the repository of, among other things, valuable examples of archaic Khmer art) and the Khai-Dinh Museum in Hué, where Vietnamese artifacts used to be housed.

Before the signing of the recent agreements with the Associated States, the EFEO was responsible for the care of some 1,200 historical monuments. The group at Angkor received special protection, made possible by a special government subsidy, which permitted a variety of activities ranging from research to restoration. The new agreements place responsibility for the preservation of historical monuments upon the governments of the Associated States, but as long as these are unable to muster sufficient qualified technicians for the purpose, the EFEO will continue to perform the necessary work and a French curator will remain in charge at Angkor.

In the last two decades, four principal developments have marked the work of the EFEO. These have been an improvement in methods of preserving historical monuments; a new impetus in studies of ethnology and prehistory; progress in research on Vietnamese civilization; and dissemination, for the benefit of the general public, of the results obtained in the various fields in which the EFEO has been engaged.

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With regard to the preservation of ancient monuments, especially those constructed of stone, a revolution occurred in 1931 in the methods employed by the Archaeological Service, which had previously refrained from any attempt at reconstruction. Following a visit to Java in 1930, the curator of Angkor inaugurated a program of restoration inspired by work which the Netherlands Indies archaeological service had been doing in Java. The new method, which involved reconstructing a monument with the original materials when available, permitted not only accurate restoration but also study of the ancient construction techniques and of any alterations previously undergone by the monument.

During its first three decades, the EFEO was concerned mainly with research in philology and archaeology, since there was an urgent need to establish a firm chronological foundation for subsequent studies and to collect and catalogue existing documents. In this endeavor to preserve what remained from the past, the study of prehistory on the one hand and of contemporary society on the other was temporarily put aside, in part because qualified specialists were lacking. A new departure was marked, however, by Robequain's and Gourou's studies of human geography, Colani's and Lévy's research in prehistory, the establishment in 1937 of an ethnological department in the EFEO, and the provision in the museum at Hanoi of rooms devoted to prehistory.

Collaboration on the part of Indochinese staff members in the scientific work of the EFEO was formalized in the course of the last two decades. One of the happiest results of this development was the fresh impetus given to Vietnamese studies, which found expression in several important papers in the *Bulletin* and other publications of the EFEO.

In order to defend itself against unjustified charges of functioning in an ivory tower, the EFEO decided in 1932 to sponsor a series of annual discussions intended to inform the elite of Hanoi about its work. Two years later, following the establishment in Paris of a Society of Friends of the EFEO, it began publication of a quarterly journal containing accounts of its activities and résumés of its discussions.

THE writings of members of the EFEO now fill forty-three volumes of the *Bulletin de l'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient*, thirty-one volumes of *Publications*, eight volumes of *Mémoires archéologiques*, five volumes of *Textes et Documents sur l'Indochine*, and various other, miscellaneous publications, such as *l'Inventaire du fonds chinois*. Only those of particular importance can be noted here.

Concerning the Indochinese peninsula in general, there is Cordier's *Bibliotheca Indosinica*, a bibliographical dictionary of works relating to the

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area. With respect to Vietnam, the ethnological investigations of de Lajonquière, Bonifacy, Cadière, Nguyễn-van-Khoan and Nguyễn-van-Huỳnh have made it possible on the one hand to determine the distribution of ethnic groups in Tonkin and on the other to understand the essential aspects of Vietnamese customs. The geographical studies of Chassigneux, Robequain and Gourou have laid a solid foundation for the human geography of Tonkin and Thanh-hoa, while Pelliot, Cadière, Maspero and Gaspardone have done the same for the history and historical geography of Vietnam. Vietnamese linguistic science owes much to the work of Cadière and Maspero. Excavations of ancient tombs in Tonkin and Thanh-hoa by Parmentier, Goloubew and Janse have shed light on the life of the country during the first century before, and the early centuries of, the Christian era. Bezacier has described the chronology and diffusion of Vietnamese art.

The EFEO has brought to light the ancient civilization of Champa, Cabaton and P. Mus have made important studies of its language, while Parmentier and Claeys have been chiefly instrumental in saving its art from the oblivion to which it was previously consigned.

The Cochinchinese delta, long regarded as a "newly" settled area lacking archaeological remains, has yielded a considerable number of sites to Maléret's patient explorations; these include some sites that are among the most ancient in Indochina—notably that of a coastal city which reveals traces of commercial relations with the West dating back to the first centuries of the Christian era.

In Cambodia, in addition to the work done at Angkor, de Lajonquière launched and Parmentier completed an inventory of Khmer monuments. Cambodian epigraphy, which is almost the sole means available for reconstructing the ancient history of Cambodia and for establishing the chronology of its monuments, has been the subject of numerous works by Finot, Coedès and Dupont. The EFEO collection of Cambodian manuscripts and inscriptions is unrivalled.

As for Laos, research in various fields has been conducted by Parmentier, Colani, Lévy and Finot. Several important publications have dealt with the upland peoples of southern Indochina.

The activities of EFEO members have not been restricted to French Indochina. Among the most important of those undertaken in a wider area are those by Foucher on Gandhara art, by Huber on Buddhist literature, by Chavannes, Maspero and Demiéville on China, by Maitre, Péri and Renondeau on Japanese literature and drama, by Coedès, Claeys and Dupont on Siam, and by Pelliot, Coedès and M. Mus on Malaya and Indonesia.

Incomplete though it is, this list conveys some idea of the variety and scope of the research undertaken by the EFEO. But it does not make clear

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the part which the organization has played, or the prestige which it enjoys, in neighboring countries. Its scientific reputation enabled it in 1937 to conclude an agreement with Siam authorizing it to carry on archaeological excavations there for a five-year period. Its reputation also enabled it to continue functioning throughout the period of Japanese occupation, even after March 1945. The respect which Indochinese have for it allowed it to emerge undamaged from the period of the Vietminh occupation of Hanoi.

By restoring their history to the Indochinese after they had in large part forgotten it, and by preserving for them the tangible remains of their past, the EFEO helped to arouse national sentiment in the best sense of the term. In accepting them as members of its scientific staff and allowing them to conduct research on a footing of complete equality with its French members, the EFEO anticipated, to its profit, the voluntary collaboration which today characterizes relations between France and the Associated States. And it is symptomatic that the various criticisms which the Indochinese have directed at the French colonial administration have generally spared the EFEO.

With the signature of the agreements establishing its quadripartite structure, the EFEO entered upon a new phase. It was the first inter-state organ to be constituted and to function. Implementation of the agreements was effected through nomination of the present director by the four governments and, immediately afterward in August 1950, the convening in Saigon of the inaugural session of the Administrative Council.

The new organization of the EFEO implies the establishment of its scientific activities in the capitals of the Associated States in the form of study centers and administrative stations to which temporary or permanent study centers will be attached. Permanent representatives are located in Saigon, Phnom-Penh and Vientiane; an ethnological research center is functioning at Nhatrang, and other centers will be established, as need arises and circumstances permit, in Hué, Xieng Khouang, the Thai country, and among the mountain people of the Hauts-Plateaux.

BOOK REVIEWS

ECONOMIC SURVEY OF ASIA AND THE FAR EAST, 1950. By the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, United Nations. New York: Department of Economic Affairs, United Nations. 1951. 534 pp. \$3.75.

SURVEYS of this sort are virtually impossible to review. No single guiding mind lies behind the work as a whole; indeed, every chapter is itself the result of wide collaboration. Moreover, frankness, which might give offense to governments, is undesirable, since the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East depends upon these very governments for both its funds and its information. Nowhere in the book, therefore, is there a real thesis or a real criticism. Instead there is an enormous compendium of facts, dispassionate, comprehensive and reasonably lucid. The facts have been selected, put together in order and given meaning by the contributors' great knowledge of their subject. The result is a narrative which quite often shows a masterly ability to compress a mass of difficult statistics into a few quite simple paragraphs. Nowhere else can so much be learned in so short a space about the economy of Asia as it developed through 1950.

One can see the broad general trends: the improvement in the terms of trade throughout the area caused by the Korean war, or the decline in income per head in India, China or Japan in the last generation. One can also see quite small developments: the recovery of the Philippine sugar industry, the surprisingly high proportion of deposit money to total money in Ceylon, or the great increase in velocity of circulation since before the war in Thailand. Much of what the *Survey* has to say is familiar. The rise in prices in 1950 was not confined to Asia, and state planning takes a form in Asia differing from that of Europe in matter, not in spirit. Asian conditions impose a greater concentration on irrigation and means of communication; but the belief in the community's organising itself for its own welfare, and also the creeping disillusionment as it is realised how clumsily that organisation can be, are the same in both continents. The food difficulties created by increasing population and the drop in rice production in Burma and Indochina also are now well enough known; and the general chapter on emigration, for all of its admirable detail, only proves two long accepted truths—that the Asian peasant has never been an eager emigrant, and that Asian emigration has always been, and is likely to remain, on too small a scale to make any real impression on the population problem. This is natural enough. The economy of Asia did not suddenly change in 1950, nor is it for a body as official as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East to present new and startling theses. Thus, the least satisfactory part of the book is the Note on Land Re-

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form, where the need for tact, and perhaps also a lack of field knowledge, make it quite impossible for the reader to tell what all this mass of legislation has really meant in practice.

Nevertheless, there is so much in this mine of information that every reader will be able to dig out nuggets that to him are gold. It may be the very high percentage of the government debt of the region which, after the increase in internal debt of the last few years, is now held by the banks, largely the central banks. Or it may be the bland insouciance of the Burmese government, which, despite its quite favourable foreign-exchange position, is making no attempt to pay anything on its debt to either India or Great Britain. Or the great improvement in the economic position of Formosa, where inflation has been checked and production, whether of sugar or of electric power, has been increasing rapidly; Chiang Kai-shek's government must be more effective than it is usually given credit for. Or the fact that the most severe land reform in the area, so far perhaps even more severe than China's, was that in Japan under General MacArthur. There is, indeed, hardly any limit to the fascinating facts to be found in this volume.

Bombay, April 1952

MAURICE ZINKIN

THE GEOGRAPHY OF HUNGER. By Josué de Castro. Foreword by Lord Boyd-Orr. London: Gollancz, 1952, 288 pp., 18s.; Boston: Little, Brown, 1952, 337 pp., \$4.50.

THIS is a sequel to Mr. de Castro's *Géographie de la faim: la faim au Brésil*. In his Foreword to the earlier volume, André Mayer expressed the belief that hunger—that "taboo subject"—must eventually disappear, both because its effects can now be accurately measured and because the new technology will permit large increases in food production. Such is also the opinion of Mr. de Castro, who sees no likelihood of world overpopulation and cites estimates of the present capacity of the earth ranging from 5½ to 11 billion persons. He argues that hunger is not the result but the cause of overpopulation. One does not have to accept his thesis entirely in order to conclude that, at least in the case of certain countries (e.g., Chile, Peru and Mexico), malnutrition is traceable to other causes than a simple excess of population.

The deficiency of calcium in the diet is particularly striking: the daily consumption of calcium in Santiago averages only 0.49 gramme per person, whereas 0.8 gramme is the minimum required for normal health. This deficiency, together with a lack of sunlight, is largely responsible for the rickets that prevails in much of the country. Moreover, dental caries occur in from 40 to 75 per cent of the schoolchildren. Iron, too, is deficient in the diet of most of South America. Yet, as the author notes, such deficiencies

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cannot be attributed to the existence of overpopulation. After all, 25 per cent of the land area of South America could be cultivated, but not more than five per cent is in fact utilized. Mr. de Castro emphasizes that, if the situation is to be improved, an attack must be made upon the evils of monoculture and the latifundia system.

In the case of China, the difficulty seems to be due to something quite different, namely, excessive parcellation of land, accompanied by very low human productivity. Only a small fraction of the land is cultivated, and that by inadequate means. Of every 100 calories in the ordinary Chinese diet, only two or three are of animal origin, compared to forty in the United States. In Japan the situation is less clear. The adoption of Western techniques permitted a more effective struggle against hunger, but the governing class, being dissatisfied with this objective, sought military power as well. The result is a very delicate situation, from which emerges (along with several obscure problems) one absolutely clear fact, namely, the existence of hunger.

Mr. de Castro considers that the term "overpopulation", as distinct from malnutrition, cannot properly be employed in the present state of knowledge of the factors involved. After describing the diverse aspects of hunger in different parts of the world, he prescribes certain remedies, which he finds not in Malthusianism but in the attainment of an economy of abundance. The well-nourished man, he believes, will avoid excessive propagation. This optimistic view will be contested, and its practical application will encounter staggering social and political difficulties. Yet it has the shining merit of proposing a humane solution.

Paris, June 1952

A. SAUVY

LESSONS FROM ASIA. Edited by Ernest Minor Patterson. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Philadelphia, July 1951. 197 pp. \$2.

THE "lessons from Asia" drawn by speakers at the 1951 annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, and collected in the volume under review, vary widely in caliber. They discuss four general topics: "Economic and Social Aspects", "Political and Military Aspects", "Totalitarianism and Opposing Groups" and "How Asians View Us". The papers are relatively non-technical, but it is disappointing to find a serious publication containing an extensive array of factual and statistical material and yet lacking documentation of sources.

Certain misconceptions in the use of social-science concepts and terminology require comment. Several occur in "Behind the Asian News" by N. G. D. Joardar, whose confusion, a common one, needs to be replaced by clear-cut concepts of the nature of and differences between race, culture and

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language. Joardar sets up four "blocs" of peoples in Asia: Mongolian, Hindu, Semitic, and the population of the U.S.S.R., the first of which is racial, the second religio-cultural, the third linguistic, and the fourth political. Furthermore, he lists these categories of peoples as "ethnic strains", but refers to those grouped as "Semitic" as being "in racial affiliation". What he has really done is to mark off certain cultural spheres, though some of his boundaries could be questioned. His "Mongolian bloc" is, for the most part, the Chinese sphere of cultural influence, though Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos should have been grouped with India.

Reference to one more misconception must suffice to illustrate a weakness of some of the papers in this volume. Emil Lengyel in his discussion of "Social Tensions in the Middle East" asserts, "Western civilization began there, and social tension must, therefore, also have started in that region." The equation of social tension with Western civilization is, to say the least, a vast oversimplification of the characteristics of the world's cultures. For refutation it is necessary only to refer to ethnological descriptions of the Melanesian Dobu or the American Indian Kwakiutl, both of which are well documented and amply described as societies with a high level of social tension.

The reviewer derived most pleasure from Gardner Murphy's "Social Tensions in India", which reports on the work of a UNESCO mission in India and describes the enthusiasm and skill with which Indian scholars and students participated in the investigation at all levels, from the establishment of principles and goals to the field work. This article shows up a weakness inherent in some of the other papers (e.g., "How Asians View the United States" and "Asian Mentality and United States Foreign Policy") that lack documentation for their theses in the form of field observation of people on all levels.

Although quite brief, the two articles under the heading "How Asians View Us" discuss types of problems which have possibly the greatest ultimate value as lessons from Asia. Any lessons that help the West to understand the attitudes of any Asian group are probably of primary importance, since behavior is incomprehensible without some understanding of attitudes. It is in the careful study of the total cultural conditioning of the many groups and subgroups of Asia that the most significant lessons from Asia will be found.

Saigon, May 1952

WILLIAM A. SMALLEY

MARX ON CHINA. *Introduction and notes by Dona Torr. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 1951. 98 pp. 8/6.*

THIS collection of articles contributed by Karl Marx to the *New York Daily Tribune* between 1853 and 1860 might have had some historical value,

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as raw material, if its sponsors had been capable of appreciating the essence of their creed. In that case, they would have admitted that there is no such thing as immutable, ultimate truth and that a judgment of events pronounced a hundred years ago, on the basis of a prejudiced interpretation of inadequate information, cannot be valid today. By preaching that Marx was an infallible prophet, they degrade a powerful critic and a scientific thinker to the level of an impostor who claimed that the final truth of history stood revealed to him. Of course, Marx himself provided the warrant for the scholastic interpretation of his doctrines: the passionate prophet of revolution contradicted Marx the philosopher. The present vulgarisation of Marxism and its degeneration into a fanatical faith result from that contradiction.

The present volume, a piece of Marxist scholasticism, is designed to prove that Marx accurately foresaw the course of history and thus foretold precisely the nature of events in contemporary China. Obsessed with the idea that revolution was imminent, and having gained some knowledge of the Taiping Rebellion from the German missionary Karl Gützlaff, "Marx dreamed"—the Introduction declares—"that when our European reactionaries have to take refuge in Asia and at last reach the Great Wall of China, guarding the very hearth of reactionary conservatism, they may find inscribed above its gates: 'Chinese Republic—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity'."

This fantastic expectation resulted from a sound judgment: that a fundamental social revolution in Asia was necessary for the progress of mankind as a whole. Marx characterised the British conquest of India as a revolution, because it disrupted a stagnant social order. But his articles on the Opium War, though containing a fully warranted moral judgment against the British adventurers, completely ignored its historically revolutionary significance. While depicting in journalistic terms the destructive impact of modern trade on patriarchal Chinese society, he even doubted the wisdom of the basic formula of dialectics—"interpenetration of opposites"—which he regarded as the law of nature. He roundly condemned the "war of civilisation" in China because "the new expansion of capitalism in the East may have a negative effect on the socialist revolution in Europe"—and thus prove him a false prophet.

To dream of the rise of a Chinese Republic proclaiming "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" in the mid-nineteenth century and to expect a socialist revolution in Europe at the same time were equally fantastic. Yet, Marx dreamed of the one because he hoped that it might usher in the other. In one passage he depicted the "war of civilisation" as an unmitigated evil; in another, as a revolution. "England having brought about the revolution of China, the question is how that revolution will in time react on England and, through England, on Europe." His answer was to predict an economic crisis which would herald a revolution in Europe. "It may safely be argued

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that the Chinese revolution will throw the spark into the overloaded mine of the present industrial system and cause the explosion of the long-prepared general crisis which, spreading abroad, will be closely followed by political revolutions on the continent."

To reprint these fantasies a century after their concoction in the imagination of a passionate utopian contributes nothing to an understanding of history. Youthful enthusiasm gives birth to many brain children which the wisdom of age disowns. But the thoughtless followers of Marx are determined to discredit their Master by advertising the indiscretions of his intellectual adolescence.

Dehra Dun, April 1952

M. N. Roy

THE LAND OF THE CAMEL. By Schuyler Cammann. New York: Ronald Press. 1951. 235 pp., illus. \$5.

THE end of the Pacific war found Dr. Cammann stationed, somewhat incongruously for a member of the United States navy, on the northern fringe of the Ordos Desert in Suiyuan. His book shows that the incongruity was one of the happier of those seemingly inseparable from war service, for he was not a stranger to the borderlands of Inner Mongolia, having travelled in Suiyuan nine years earlier, and, moreover, evidently is fluent in the Chinese language. The latter qualification, in particular, enriched his trips to nearby Mongol temples and lamaseries during a stay of some two months at Shanpa, which lies about a hundred miles west of the Pingsui railway terminus at Paotou.

Dr. Cammann's references to the Chinese whom he found on the border and to their attitude towards the Mongols are not complimentary; evidently he felt to the full the initial impact of Mongol charm and dignity on most Western travellers, perhaps without fully balancing the complicated factors which have brought some others to a less simply romantic view. It is indeed a question whether his accounts of temple visits and talks with lamas do not lose something from a pervading "museum" atmosphere. This does not grate so harshly as the end-flap suggests it might when it says: "The Western Inner Mongolians we meet here have never been carefully studied and described, and the author makes the most of his opportunity to view them casually in their natural surroundings." But the human figures seldom come above bas-relief, while the temple ceremonies and treasures are only superficially set in the pattern of their significance. The book wears the air of a very full day-to-day diary of things honestly and keenly observed and painstakingly set down by a wide-eyed stranger rather than of an organized exposition. Yet, perhaps for this reason, it certainly creates, or recalls, a vivid and attractive impressionist picture of this land and people.

London, June 1952

PETER HUME

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JAPAN. Edited by Hugh Borton. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1951. 320 pp. \$4.

THE twenty-three chapters in this reprint of material on Japan in the *Encyclopedia Americana* are by experts eminent in the United States, and constitute an authoritative work. The purpose of the book is not, however, altogether clear. The style employed, suitable for an encyclopedia, is likely to deter the general public as much as it stimulates the specialist, but there is inevitably much condensation, which each specialist will probably conclude affects chiefly his particular subject.

For the serious beginner, the volume offers an excellent general survey of Japan—one of three divergent aims stated in the Preface: "a concise introduction for anyone interested in background material on contemporary Japan". The word "background", however, may be misleading, since the book is in effect a stock-taking, through American eyes, of the foreground features in Japan, and provides a sort of inventory of the country's physical and cultural assets. Except in such sections as those on industrial and financial development, the focus is not sharp enough to fulfil the second of the three declared aims—to provide a "basic" as well as a "factual" survey of Japan. Objectivity is meaningless when matters can be understood only by means of frequent comparison with other nations, and with the rest of Asia in particular. Japan is treated here as a problem in itself rather than as a vital part of Asia and the world. European and Asian critics may perhaps consider this *ad hoc* treatment to be somewhat characteristic of the American approach to Japan in particular, and possibly to foreign affairs in general. The third stated purpose, "to give the reader a ready-reference to events prior to the Korean war", is not very well achieved. Since the chapter headings are general and there is no subject-index proper, "ready reference" is not made possible.

These remarks may appear hypercritical. They are, however, intended to offer warning that, while this is an impressive data-book, it may not satisfy the reader in respect of the other claims it makes.

Hong Kong, May 1952

E. STUART KIRBY

INDIA, PAKISTAN, CEYLON. Edited by W. Norman Brown. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1951. 234 pp. \$3.

THIS collection of articles from an encyclopedia seeks to cover in a brief space the art, law, religion, history, economy, geography and so forth of India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Inevitably many of the chapters—that on Literature, for instance—are no more than the lightest of sketches, while others, notably that on Economic Development, rely on sweeping generalisations which are not always of great value. Perhaps the best of the sections on India and Pakistan are Holden Furber's two chapters on the history of the

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period from 1707 to 1947 and on the present organisation of the two countries; these are clear and provide a good summary. The last chapter, covering Ceylon in twenty-six pages, is understandably breathless by the end but nevertheless succeeds in conveying much useful information. Ceylon seems fated to be dismissed in this fashion, as a mere appendix to other countries in the area; if it were less peaceful and prosperous, it might perhaps receive more attention. Despite its limitations, the book is a good "child's guide" and would be better if the useful book-lists at the end of each chapter were occasionally somewhat fuller and if the Index were not restricted to "persons and places".

London, May 1952

A. S. B. OLVER

PLANNING OF POST-WAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA. *By N. V. Sovani. Poona: Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, in co-operation with the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. 1951. xi, 108 pp. Rs. 3/8; 5s.; \$1.75.*

Of the countries in southern Asia that have recently achieved independence, India has long had the best-equipped civil service and the best-established administration. These advantages, it might be thought, would have placed India well ahead of the others in achieving social and economic development. Moreover, while India has had the problems of Partition, of refugees and of near-famine and the strain over Kashmir, there have not been the major problems of internal security such as have existed, for example, in Burma and Indonesia. Some persons, particularly in India itself, have therefore expected that the country, freed of political control from London, would accelerate its economic development and quickly become an example to the other countries of southern Asia. It is difficult to account for such a view. In fact, in the light of the realities existing in India, it is surprising to find that a serious book bears the title of Mr. Sovani's. Under the circumstances, there can be no effective planning in India today.

What are the circumstances? First, the Indian Constitution has not been drawn up to permit national economic planning; secondly, the government does not own or control the basic resources of the country; and thirdly, there is not the political will to conduct economic planning. There are other reasons, of course, such as the immensity of the task, but the main reason is the lack of a will to plan. India is not alone in this: she shares her position with the feudal states, the free-enterprise states and the welfare states. That is why Mr. Sovani should have retained the earlier title of his work, "The Problem of Social and Economic Development in India", and put even more stress than he has on the limitations (on development plans) exercised by the political, social and administrative background of the country.

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Some of these limitations are, in fact, set out in the thoughtful Foreword by D. R. Gadgil, who declares that any idea of comprehensive planning is completely absent from the Indian situation. In discussing the avoidance of government controls aimed at definite social objectives, he notes: "Private interest can alone be served by partial policies and partial controls, and while these operate in a private enterprise economy, the profit maker can alone get advantage from them." There is no basic agreement among the major elements of the dominant political party in India that planning is necessary. Dr. Gadgil states that one group within the party has archaic ideas regarding the rural economy and is hostile or indifferent to development with the aid of modern technology; this element "actively helps the large capitalist groups in their campaign for unhindered private enterprise". A second group, because it believes that the state can or should do little in existing conditions, adopts a *laissez-faire* approach towards economic affairs. A third, small minority has vague and romantic semi-socialist ideas, but cannot think out their logical implications or "contemplate with equanimity the large changes in social and political structure that these might involve". The result, according to Dr. Gadgil, is "complete disorder". Economic policy is the product of chance rather than of deliberation, as Mr. Sovani shows clearly in his illustrations of the conflicting approaches of different government departments and the changing and unsteady "policies" written within the departments themselves. The "plans" drawn up by the individual states are a "series of unco-ordinated estimates of expenditure on constructional works and social services"; the estimates even for individual departments have not been based on clearly-defined objectives; many of the wartime controls which assisted central planning have been abandoned so that the Centre has failed in co-ordination; and the opposition to planned economic development has captured the propaganda field.

Mr. Sovani's analysis of the reasons for the failure of economic planning in India are convincing and should be read by those who prefer realistic views. However, the first three chapters of the book—those dealing with the formation of government policy and the development of provincial and central government programmes—are unsatisfactory and even confusing. There are descriptions of proposals for plans, of planning committees or programmes, of the suggested roles of the state and private enterprise, but in too many cases there is no account of what, if anything, happened next. For the student of methods of economic development, an analysis of existing proposals and of the machinery established to administer them, together with an estimate of the degree of success anticipated, would have been helpful. Nevertheless, the larger purpose has been served—to show that planning for economic development is "at least as much a political and sociological problem as an economic one".

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Mr. Sovani is unromantic also about the international factors in economic development. He believes that in southern Asia the economies of the various national areas are being developed to compete with, rather than to complement, one another. He notes that the peoples of backward areas are impressed by what the Soviet Union has achieved in developing former colonial areas and that the "giving of aid on the basis of immediate political or military considerations . . . is patching up a rent for the time being only". Dr. Gadgil's Foreword has the same theme: "The only country which can contribute at present substantial resources over a series of years for the development of backward economies is the U. S. A. This country is, however, evidently interested at the same time in upholding a social philosophy which, whatever its merits in a rich country with special traditions, is apt in a different context to encourage atomistic beliefs and anti-social interests highly inimical to the entire planning effort. Therefore, even if the unexpected happens and large investments are intelligently made for the development of countries like India, these appear likely, in existing circumstances, to lead immediately not to desirable social objectives but to the strengthening, on the one hand, of the forces of monopoly and to an increase, on the other, of social discontent and conflict."

Wellington, June 1952

W. B. SUTCH

MILITANT HINDUISM IN INDIAN POLITICS: A Study of the R.S.S. By J. A. Curran, Jr. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. 1951. 100 pp., mimeo. \$1.50.

THE American author of this exhaustive study of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), an extreme right-wing militant organisation, is, like many of his countrymen, interested in learning whether parliamentary democracy is likely to endure in India or whether it is more likely to be replaced by totalitarianism and, if so, whether this will be communist or fascist in type. As yet, while the National Congress and the Socialists are committed to democratic ideologies, other parties—the Communists on the extreme left and the Hindu Maha Sabha on the extreme right—are equally committed to totalitarian ideologies, and there is no conclusive proof that the former will prevail. It is in this context that Mr. Curran has examined the RSS.

His study is both factual and interpretative. As a factual study, it is highly successful, providing a generally accurate account of the history of the RSS, the lives of its founder and of his successor, its philosophy and programme, its methods of recruitment and training, and its relations with other Indian political organisations. According to Mr. Curran, the RSS has a membership of more than 600,000 Hindus (of whom half are active), and appeals most strongly to the young; it is intensely anti-Muslim and is op-

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posed to communism as an irreligious movement dominated by alien influences; and it is opposed also, though less bitterly, to the Indian National Congress, whose policy of secularism and of appeasement of the Muslims it considers undesirable. The main features of the RSS, which have caused Mr. Curran to regard it as an extreme rightist and anti-democratic force, are the restriction of its membership to Hindus, its emphasis on the superiority of Hindu culture, the semi-military training which it gives its members, the highly centralised nature of its organisation, and the implicit obedience to the leader which is an integral part of its creed.

In addition to providing a factual account of the history and programme of the RSS, Mr. Curran has tried to explain why such a militant organisation came into existence, where its strength lies and what its future is likely to be. In this attempt at interpretation he has been less successful, since he has failed to account adequately for the peculiar nature of the organisation. An adequate explanation would have to explore more deeply the history of India's struggle for independence, the anti-national and pro-British attitude adopted by most leading Muslims during it, and their advocacy of the two-nation theory—that Hindus and Muslims have nothing in common and that, therefore, an independent India would have to be partitioned into a Hindu and a Muslim state. Some account would have to be taken also of the numerous defects in the system of education introduced by the British—its over-emphasis on book-learning, its denationalising tendency, its indifference to the physical, moral and spiritual development of Indian youth, and so forth. For it was in reaction to the anti-nationalism of the Muslims and to the defective nature of the British system of education that the RSS originated. It is in this wider perspective that the effectiveness of its work in the past and the hold which it possesses over large sections of the Hindu population can be understood. The belief persists that the Muslims in independent India have not abandoned the two-nation theory and that the Congress government has not done enough to reform the system of education. Many also think that the RSS is a better instrument than even the National Congress for fighting the Communist Party, which has been gaining in strength.

Since Mr. Curran mentions but does not examine these factors, which help to explain the vitality of the RSS, his report may create an impression that the RSS is merely a fanatical anti-Muslim organisation and that it opposes the Congress simply because the latter is anxious to safeguard the interests of the Muslim minority. The danger of such a misapprehension is all the greater because Mr. Curran refers more than once to a difference between "the publicly avowed aims and the genuine objectives of the RSS". Yet, notwithstanding these remarks, his report is a model of patient research, detachment and sympathetic understanding.

Secunderabad, July 1952

M. VENKATARAMAIA

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AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN UNKNOWN INDIAN. By *Nirad C. Chaudhuri*. New York: Macmillan. 1951. xii, 506 pp. \$6.

THE author of this autobiography is by no means a "typical" Indian nationalist, even though he has obviously shared most of the experiences characteristic of those of his countrymen who are perhaps typical. This conclusion follows less from his criticisms of Indian nationalism than from his general outlook, for it is the latter that sets him somewhat apart. At the same time, his development does help to illumine the stresses that produced modern Indian nationalism. The book is thus of considerable value to Westerners who perceive the difficulties in the way of a deeper comprehension of the driving force behind nationalism in colonial areas and who therefore realize the necessity for knowing more about the pressures that formed the nationalist "mind" as well as about the techniques that were commonly used to channel this nationalistic sentiment into positive action. Almost without intending to, Chaudhuri's pages provide this information vis-à-vis the growth of Bengal nationalism in the first two decades of this century.

The book is of interest also because it reflects the breadth of learning among Indian intellectuals under Western impact. While the author may exemplify this broad and humane learning at its best, one can assume that it was a generalizable aspect of the Indian intellectual response to alien stimulation. Certainly, that the spirit of the Enlightenment in Western culture met with a warm response in Chaudhuri's case appears from the stimulating paper on historical methodology which he wrote when barely twenty years of age and which is included in the book.

In sum, the merits of the book far outweigh its faults, even though some of the author's assumptions regarding his people are questionable and despite the fact that he seems to violate his own canon of scientific method when he ascribes to his countrymen certain "inherent" shortcomings that might be regarded as by-products of social situations which would probably generate the same results in any part of the world.

Chicago, February 1952

ROBERT I. CRANE

A DRAGON APPARENT. By *Norman Lewis*. New York: Scribner's. 1951. 317 pp., illus. \$4.50.

WORKS in English about Indochina are rare, and one must be thankful to Mr. Lewis for offering a lively and intelligent record of his travels, undertaken as recently as 1950. His journey was of course circumscribed. He could not venture into Tongking or into Annam to the east of the Annamese Chain. Those Vietnamese whom he met were mostly in Cochinchina, where he visited the headquarters of the Caodai sect and was in vague contact with some Vietminh agents. He covered a good deal of ground in the central highlands and was able to observe not a few of the "primitive" tribes—Mois

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in general, Rhadès, Djirais, Bahnars and Méos. He says what he has to say—whether it is about missionaries, settlers or French soldiers—without undue emphasis and with no moralising at all. He met both the Emperor Bao Dai and the King of Cambodia, and if the former was noncommittal, the latter let himself go in political comment. Mr. Lewis also gives his impressions of Angkor and of the fragile paradise of the Laos.

There is no index but the photographs are remarkably fine. As the author was on his first visit to Southeast Asia, some of his asides are a little misleading. The distant, even sullen, demeanor of the Vietnamese is nothing new and has little to do with recent events. Gia-Long was not "the last of the great emperors", but the first of all the Emperors of Annam. The "brilliant civilisation" of the Chams had faded away long before the Annamese conquered all of the south of the country. But such details are minor blemishes in a most readable and informative account of a world which is changing very fast indeed. Mr. Lewis' book will have to go upon the short list of required reading about Indochina.

London, April 1952

ALAN HOUGHTON BRODRICK

SARINAH, KEWADJIBAN WANITA DALAM PERDJOANGAN REPUBLIK INDONESIA. By Dr. Ir. Soekarno. *Djakarta: Jajasan Pembangunan. 1951. 329 pp.*

WHEN President Soekarno's book on "the duties of women in the struggle [for independence] of the Republic of Indonesia" first appeared in 1947, the supply was quickly exhausted. Although the present, second impression is much more attractive than the first, it contains several passages which, while to the point in 1947, have little relevance to 1951 conditions. The author refers repeatedly to the struggle for independence as still needing to be won and hence demanding a supreme effort. In the absence of a new preface to this impression, one can only guess whether the failure to revise such passages was inadvertent or purposeful. The "Sarinah" of the title—the name of a woman who helped the author's mother take care of him in infancy—represents Indonesian womanhood in general. Five of the six chapters in the book deal with the social position of women; most of the sixth concerns general political issues.

The author starts with the thesis that the Indonesian woman is regarded by the other sex as an innocent goddess whose position at home and abroad raises the question of how she can be liberated. The problem of harmony between the sexes, which is as old as the world and as wide, can be solved only through their being accorded the same rights and opportunities, each sex "according to its natural pattern". In developing his main theme, the author discusses at length how all of this came about, elaborating, more or less uncritically, Bachofen's theories—that social relations between the sexes

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develop from promiscuity through matriarchy to patriarchy. His sole deviation from Bachofen lies in his quiet omission of the first, promiscuous stage in order to represent the other two as thesis and antithesis—which in turn calls for a synthesis. He leaves no doubt about what this synthesis should be. After repudiating matriarchy and stating that his only objection to patriarchy is its excesses (which he considers to be grave and treats in detail), he turns to the emancipation movement as the introduction to the third, synthetic stage. The latter should culminate in the achievement of the fundamental equality of men and women. An important means to this end involves making the community responsible for most household duties.

The author appears to want women to apply their revolutionary zeal first of all to the national struggle for independence. And there the book leaves off. Nothing is said about what women should do, after independence, to solve the basic problems with which this book deals. Nonetheless, it is an interesting work. Few heads of state are given to serious writing on basic social problems in their own countries; indeed, in these days of exhausting efforts to improve and stabilize national affairs, not many Indonesians find an opportunity to analyze a problem in detail and to point in the direction of its possible solution.

In both his analysis and his proposals for a solution, the author reveals that he has been deeply affected by Western thought—in a positive sense, as in his frequent citations of Western sources, and occasionally in a negative sense, as in his descriptions of Western society, which, to a Western reader, betray a lack of balance. Yet his way of thought is by no means copied from the West. He is, and wants to be nothing more than, an Indonesian thinker—which is precisely why it is difficult to categorize his reasoning. As already noted, he has been markedly influenced by historicism and even by dialectical materialism: such writers as Marx, Engels, Clara Zetkin, Rosa Luxemburg and others of the same school are quoted on nearly every page. Several lengthy quotations in Dutch (practically the only real quotations in the book) are from the writings of the famous socialist Henriette Roland Holst. Yet to say that President Soekarno belongs to a particular political party or school of social and political thought is extremely difficult. He specifically refuses to be identified with any such party or school, and attacks the Indonesian Communist Party with arguments drawn from its own doctrine. He wants only to be called a socialist, "in the broadest and most general sense of the word". Since, unlike most European socialists, he shows no awareness of the deep chasm separating socialism from communism, one might ask whether his theories would afford him an adequate defense if put to the test under conditions of direct confrontation with the clear-cut, aggressive theories and practice of modern totalitarian Marxism.

Leiden, April 1952

C. A. O. VAN NIEUWENHUIJZE

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FIRST MALAYAN REPUBLIC. The Story of the Philippines. By George A. Malcolm. Boston: Christopher. 1951. 406 pp. \$5.

THE general reader will find much information in this comprehensive guide to the Philippines, which describes almost every conceivable aspect of the country, its people and its history. Judge Malcolm has made systematic use of a wide selection of material and has left few gaps. A notable feature of this survey is its persuasive note of intimacy. Where his knowledge is only general, the author writes like a Baedeker, but most topics are enlivened by the personal touch of one who went to the Islands as early as 1906 and for many years held important posts which gave him a wide range of personal associations. Indeed, few living Americans can match the long experience in the Philippines enjoyed by Judge Malcolm. Thus, his portraits of Presidents Quezon, Osmeña and Roxas and of his fellow Justices of the Supreme Court are first-rate because they are first-hand. Admirable, too, is his lucid exposition of constitutional developments, on which he is an authority. His descriptions of the country and its people are friendly and sympathetic. Tone and view are uniformly benign.

Indeed, his inveterate kindness proves a handicap when Judge Malcolm turns to politics, concerning which he can conclude, "All in all, the Filipino *politico* is a lovable individual." He does, to be sure, castigate the Republic's administration for its tolerance of "graft, rackets, thievery", just as he also criticises the United States government for its tardiness in aiding rehabilitation and its "shabby treatment of the Filipino veteran". As an orthodox conservative, moreover, he dismisses anything "radical" as *ipso facto* unimportant. In general, however, he writes with charity towards all and with a certain political innocence. Thus, he accepts the Roxas view of the vexed issue of wartime collaboration with Japan, and praises President Roxas for his tolerance towards Laurel, who had been President under the Japanese. Yet, considering his own record, what other stand could Roxas have taken? So, too, the author skates lightly over the awkward facts of the Harrison regime, the MacArthur influence on the 1946 elections, and Filipino resentment over the "parity" provisions of the Trade Act and the manner in which these were forced upon the Republic of the Philippines by means of the Rehabilitation Act.

In the economic field, more details on peonage conditions in Central Luzon, the failure of the Roxas tenancy law, and the significant changes in the character of the Hukbalahap movement might well have replaced the florid extracts given from political speeches. Fine words, these, but they buttered no parsnips for the impoverished Pampangan peasant. In politics and economics alike, the interpretations lack realistic penetration. The book is weak in critical analysis, just as it is strong in its presentation of a wealth

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of information, expert discussion of the Republic's constitution, close knowledge of Philippine personalities, and disarming geniality.

Canberra, May 1952

T. INGLIS MOORE

GEOGRAPHY OF THE PACIFIC. Edited by Otis W. Freeman. New York: Wiley. 1951. 573 pp. \$10.

UPON the outbreak of the Pacific war, the Allies found not only that there was a dearth of operational data about the South Pacific but also that no complete bibliography on the area existed. Four years were needed to compile one, and in the process much new information became available. The symposium under review may be regarded as a product of a new awareness of problems, ranging from anthropology to geography, and from island cultures to international relations, in the area as a whole.

Mr. Freeman and his thirteen associates have written an authoritative, comprehensive account of the physiographical framework, climates, currents, islands and peoples, industries and trade of the region. They have also produced that rare thing, a compound of the geography and history of peoples and of the environments that moulded them and controlled their activities. The migrations of these peoples, the invasion of the region by the industrial systems of the West, and the intrusion of Occidental social and religious concepts upon the older Asian cultures and primitive island superstitions were responsible for serious tensions. It was a massive task to present the geography and economic background of this vast revolution.

The volume devotes most attention to the island world; it includes Australia but not China, Japan or the United States. And, although it contains much else of value, it is of greatest interest when dealing with the islands and their inhabitants; the discussion, which interweaves physical and human problems, is skillfully planned and executed.

Certain omissions, confusions and inaccuracies call for comment. Why is New Zealand part of Polynesia—because of Hawaiian colonisation, or because of geographical connection? Where are the foci of atmospheric instability located—in the equatorial or the polar belts? The discussions of blizzards generated in the Arctic and Antarctic and of tropical typhoons need some revision, even in the maps, which place the normal tracks of tropical storms as far south as the Australian Bight and Tasmania. On the other hand, it is good to find emphasis upon correct terminology—for example, repudiation of so-called tidal waves in favour of technically correct “seismic” disturbances of water level. The genesis of monsoons by the alternating “hot plates” of Asia and Australia might be regarded as a suggestion for emphasising the greatest example of convectional change in the world atmospheric system.

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But, when all has been said, this symposium is a satisfying one—scientific in its attack, workmanlike in its execution, and most helpful to the teacher in search of worth-while texts. The one difficulty for the student is its cost—£6 in Australian currency—but if there is any reference to inflation as a Pacific problem, the reviewer overlooked it.

Melbourne, May 1952

G. L. Wood

THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. By Douglas L. Oliver. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1951. 313 pp. \$5.

DR. Oliver's introduction to the history of the Pacific and its peoples ranges, in chronological terms, from the earliest migrations to the present and, in geographical terms, from Australia and New Guinea to the easternmost islands. It contains summary sketches of the ways of life of the Australian aborigines, Polynesians and Micronesians. At least a superficial impression of the cultural variations that mark Melanesia is afforded by a description of three societies—the Dobu, Sepik and Siuai.

Despite their ethnic complexities, certain problems are common to the 10,000 islands of Oceania, and since the main recorded alien influences have been European, a general pattern of change has characterized the area as a whole. Dr. Oliver discusses each phase of social, economic and political change, describing the problems by island areas yet conveying a clear impression of the picture as a whole. He divides the years since 1500 into several periods—that of the European explorer, before 1780; of the whaler, trader and missionary, 1780-1850; of the planter, blackbirder and merchant, 1850-1914; and finally of the miner and administrator—and notes the effect of each on the Pacific scene. Unlike the first, the second world war had a tremendous impact on the islands; its effect extended far beyond those on which fighting took place. Since, in a political sense, the Pacific islands during the last half-century have come to assume an international importance disproportionate to their size or material and human resources, a chapter is devoted to their strategic potentialities as naval and air bases.

In considering possible future developments, Dr. Oliver mentions the existence of several schools of thought on the matter. One thinks in terms of colonization, raw materials and markets, and views the native peoples primarily as a source of labor. Another, including many officials and politicians, regards the islands in terms of national destinies and demonstrates greater concern for native welfare. A third group would like to place the area under international administration and eliminate exploitative types of colonial enterprise; some members of this school advocate what Dr. Oliver calls the "ethnic zoo" idea of insulation, while others would protect the islanders from exploitation and leave them free to adopt or reject Western concepts. A

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fourth group views the area as a likely outlet for Asian emigration. On the broad subject of over-all Pacific development, the attitudes of the natives themselves, as varied as the particular local influences to which they have been exposed, are in general unformed.

Although, for reasons of space, Dr. Oliver has had to be selective in treating his vast subject, his choice of material reveals excellent judgment. He has produced a highly acceptable general work which anyone not already familiar with the history of the Pacific should find very useful.

Honolulu, April 1952

LORING G. HUDSON

CHAMORROS AND CAROLINIANS OF SAIPAN. *Personality Studies. By Alice Joseph and Veronica F. Murray. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1951. xviii, 381 pp., illus. \$5.*

ANTHROPOLOGISTS have long doubted the validity of the results obtained by applying to persons of other cultures a psychological test originally designed for Europeans. The problem of eliminating questions that require for their solution information which persons of European background absorb as a matter of course can be overcome with comparative ease, but the test situation is ordinarily outside the experience of other peoples. In addition, there are the obvious difficulties of language—the fact that the tester and subject must communicate with each other through an interpreter who is too often not completely bilingual—and of possible differences in the traditional values and attitudes.

This scepticism has been largely influenced in the past by the extravagant claims of some psychologists. If, instead of asserting that the test was a precise and universal measure, they had been content to stress its value in the cross-cultural field as an indicator of trends, they might have been listened to more readily. The work of Drs. Joseph and Murray should help to redress the balance: they are modest and fully alive to the possible limitations of their medium. They say, in effect: our psychological examinations suggest that the inhabitants of Saipan are like this; the conclusions confirm and supplement the views of various officers with recent experience in Saipan; perhaps, then, we have a useful scientific tool. It must be admitted, however, that the Saipan islanders are unique in the Pacific and that the success of the experiment here is not necessarily an argument for going farther afield. (On the other hand, there is no reason that this should not be done, even though extra difficulties will have to be overcome.) Saipan, having had close and continuous contact with the "civilized" world since the seventeenth century, is no longer a primitive area.

Drs. Joseph and Murray have written a wise and thought-provoking book which should interest a wide public.

Sydney, May 1952

IAN HOGGIN

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A HISTORY OF FIJI. By R. A. Derrick. *Suva: Government Press. Vol. 1. 2nd ed. 1950, 278 pp., illus. 12/6.*

IN this revised edition of the early history of Fiji, Mr. Derrick provides a scholarly setting for his yet unpublished second volume on the later period. He relates Fijian history up to the Deed of Cession (1874), which gave Britain control over the islands. It is a fascinating story of explorers, missionaries, beachcombers, traders and planters. There is some discussion of traditional native society as well as accounts of the native wars and of the first, fumbling steps toward a formal government. Finally, Mr. Derrick describes the cession of Fiji in detail.

Of particular interest are those parts of the book which relate directly to the European impact on Fijian society. Also significant to anthropologists concerned with inter-cultural contacts in the South Seas is the record of Tongan influence, which became pronounced in eastern Fiji in the early nineteenth century. Tongans had long had contacts with eastern Fiji, but by the 1850s they were establishing definite areas of conquest there. If the Fijian chiefs had not ceded the islands to Britain, a much larger area might have come under Tongan influence, and, even so, the eastern islands now display a predominantly Tongan culture.

Besides being of interest to anthropologists and to others concerned with the area, Mr. Derrick's book has considerable value for students of British colonial history. Nowadays, when the pros and cons of colonial administration are attracting world-wide attention, it is especially useful to have some acquaintance with the historical background of current affairs in such places as Fiji. Fiji has not thus far attracted much attention abroad, but if antagonism between its Indian and European communities should increase—and there are signs that it may do so—the Colony may well become a troubled area in the South Seas.

Ithaca, New York, June 1952

RONALD GATTY

BRITAIN AND THE DOMINIONS. By W. R. Brock. *London and New York: Cambridge University Press. 1952. xxi, 522 pp., illus. \$2.50.*

THIS comprehensive historical survey begins with the origins of British overseas expansion and traces developments in each area of British settlement or colonization to the point where India, Pakistan and Ceylon became full members of the Commonwealth. The first in a series of studies of overseas members of the Commonwealth, it performs its introductory task with clarity and discrimination. Copious illustrations, maps and diagrams help to provide some of the atmosphere necessarily sacrificed by the brevity of the text. Like most British books, it lacks a bibliography, and the infrequent footnotes include additional information, not references to sources.

Northampton, Massachusetts, April 1952

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER

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MIGRATION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM TO THE DOMINIONS. By G. F. Plant. London and New York: Oxford University Press, under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1951. 186 pp. 16s.; \$3.

THIS brief outline of migration from Great Britain concentrates upon attempts to finance and organize settlements in North America, South Africa and Australasia. The bulk of the work concerns the period 1914-39, and here the author is at his best. Writing clearly and intelligently out of his long experience as Secretary to the United Kingdom Government Overseas Settlement Committee (1918-37), he guides the reader through the findings of various commissions, through the activities of numerous public committees and private societies, up to a series of pertinent and stimulating reflections: the fallacy of large-scale schemes, the "economic disharmony" between colonies and mother-country, the ideal relationship between public and private organizations, the futility of insisting upon repayment of loans, the importance of training, the vital need for adequate housing and communications, the significance of market conditions and movements in commodity prices. Above all, the author insists that migration is a movement of human beings, succeeding best where personal needs and qualities are taken into account.

All of this—notwithstanding a natural tendency to dwell upon government rather than private activities—is very good. Elsewhere the work is less happy. False emphases, doubtful statements and loose generalizations mar both the sections covering the years before 1914 and those containing the author's own general conclusions. Apparently Mr. Plant tends to neglect sources other than British government reports and is inclined to read back into thinkers such as Wakefield opinions he himself has formed from a much later experience. On balance, however, the book is well worth while, and one cannot but fully endorse the bulk of its lessons and exhortations.

Canberra, June 1952

C. A. PRICE

SOVIETS IN CENTRAL ASIA. By W. P. and Zelda K. Coates. New York: Philosophical Library. 1951. xi, 288 pp., illus. \$4.75.

THIS collection of publicity materials purports to describe the Soviet development of Central Asia and seeks to show the difference between Imperial Russian exploitation and its modern counterpart. The writers deal with the Russianisation of each "Republic" in more or less identical fashion, employing a geographical, ethnographical introduction in the course of which they slang tsarist and British exploitation, and emphasising the introduction of Soviet methods of irrigation, the joy of the present inhabitants at being dispossessed of their lands and cattle, and their willingness to be-

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come factory workers. The description of the "attraction" of the Kazaks to the mines represents a grossly misleading attempt to gloss over the process whereby dispossessed nomads were allowed to starve before being given employment; the tens of thousands who died from malnutrition and disease are not mentioned. An impression is conveyed of Kazaks "enthusiastically sending their sons into the fighting forces". The authors obviously were not allowed to see the slave-labour projects, but instead enjoyed the usual conducted tour of collective farms and homes of Party members. Some of the production figures cited are amazingly out of date, while others represent future goals—which is to say that the authors have employed a well-known Soviet technique in order to impress the uncritical reader. The value of the book may be deduced from the fact that by far the greater part of it consists of prefabricated propaganda materials.

London, May 1952

GEORGE FOX HOLMES

NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS. *Edited by Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson. Boston: World Peace Foundation. 1952. 310 pp. \$3.50.*

THE question whether one can in fact negotiate with the Soviet Union, and what such negotiation entails, is of such importance that the intentions of the editors of this volume, to collect the experiences of men who have negotiated with the Russians on relatively detailed issues during and since the last world war, were wholly admirable. Their ability to carry out this plan has been hampered by the obvious limitation that not all of the contributors hoped for were available, and by the less obvious one that the book is a record of negotiation by Americans, that is to say, by citizens of another giant Power, and that their experiences would not necessarily be reproduced by nationals of other states towards which the Soviet Union stands in a different power-relationship. In fact, however, the peculiarities of Soviet conduct in the international field spring so directly from its internal structure and its dominant ideology that many of them are constants; and the volume would have been worth sponsoring if only for the brilliant concluding chapter by Philip Mosely, which should be compulsory reading for anyone of whatever nationality who finds himself confronted with the task of negotiating with the Russians.

Of the chapters on specific negotiations, some are of general international interest, such as that by Frederick Osborn on atomic energy, and by Ernest Simmons on cultural exchanges. Others deal primarily with issues concerning Europe. Only two chapters contain material dealing directly with Far Eastern affairs. General John Deane's section concerns the long-drawn-out and ultimately abortive negotiations for securing bases in the Soviet Far

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Eastern territories for carrying on the air war against Japan. George Blakeslee contributes an account of the negotiations that preceded the creation of the Far Eastern Commission. It is clear from this account, as indeed it was before, that what the Soviet Union wanted was some form of control council in Japan itself, probably combined with a separate occupation zone such as it secured in Germany and Austria. As in other such negotiations, its main reason was asserted to be a desire for security. But the record elsewhere and the performance of Soviet representatives on the Allied Council in Tokyo, which formed part of the ultimate compromise reached, suggest that with greater opportunities more positive policies would have ensued.

The compromise in Japan was in fact much closer to the American than to the Soviet position because United States forces were in fact in control; where the position was reversed, as Mark Ethridge and C. E. Black show in their chapter on the Balkans, the result was also different. Successful negotiation with the Russians depends on there being a balance of strength; but, even so, the ordinary amenities of negotiation are worth maintaining, as E. F. Penrose suggests in his chapter on refugees. For, as is indicated in Sidney Alderman's discussion of the Nuremberg Trial agreements, where a common purpose exists, the tremendous differences in technique and temper are no obstacle to success.

Oxford, May 1952

MAX BELOFF

THE GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT. By Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. New York: Farrar, Straus & Young. 1951. 336 pp. \$3.75.

THE clash with which this book deals arose in connection with events in Asia, but it might have occurred elsewhere. In only one respect did it matter that the Pacific was in fact the theatre of dispute, and that was in respect of public opinion in the United States. For, as the authors of this volume remark, "the Pacific Ocean has become in this century the Republican ocean; the Atlantic, the Democratic ocean". It is the Republicans who in the past century have prompted most of the American adventures in the Pacific, and the Democrats who have tended mostly to withdraw from them; and it is the Democrats who by and large have led the country into its European involvements. Some difference of outlook is perhaps inevitable, but it is not a pleasant prospect for the rest of the world if every change of party administration in Washington is to result in an about-turn of American external interest from east to west, or vice versa.

The clash had one remarkable consequence: unprecedented public discussion of the military policy and strategy of a great nation, and publication

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of an enormous amount of material, relevant to the facts and calculations underlying the "containment" policy of the United States, where the dissemination of this material helped to crystallize a public opinion which had been dangerously vague about the world situation and America's task therein. The amount of such information that is carefully correlated in this volume constitutes its chief claim to attention.

Toronto, May 1952

B. K. SANDWELL

MARK AGAINST THE PEASANT. A Study in Social Dogmatism. By David Mitrany. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1951. 301 pp. \$4.50.

THE "non-proletarian" and "peasant" character of Chinese Communism has confused many, including the Communists themselves, who have often employed contradictory strategy and tactics toward the peasantry in "semi-colonial" lands. This is hardly surprising in that the success of the Communists in China and Russia—both non-industrial and preponderantly agrarian countries—stands in startling contrast to the Marxist assertion that socialism would develop on the basis of a proletarian movement achieving power in a crisis-torn, "advanced", industrial, capitalist state. Dr. Mitrany's book is an indispensable aid in dispelling some of this confusion surrounding the peasant problem.

While based on Eastern European events and not concerned with the Far East, the study provides a structure and vantage point from which Asian Communism can be better understood. Dr. Mitrany patiently explores the ideological development of both the Socialist and Communist movements in regard to the peasant question and attempts to show how their Marxist bias contributed to conflict between the organized forces of the proletariat and peasantry in the inter-war period. In providing his own analysis of the peasant problem, he illuminates the internal difficulties of the Soviet regime as well as the external difficulties of the Communist International. Finally, he discusses the curious paradox of a movement that rides to power on the basis of utilizing peasant discontent only to facilitate its own programs of proletarianization.

One may quarrel with the way in which Dr. Mitrany favors the peasant parties of Eastern Europe as bulwarks of democracy, but this is hardly the place to do so. Students of the Far East, however, can scarcely afford to ignore his valuable study that bears so directly on the political future of Asian peasant lands.

New Haven, May 1952

MILTON SACKS

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Vol. XXV, No. 4

December 1952

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The Bell Trade Act and the Philippine Economy

M. Cuaderno 1955

THE Philippines is fortunate in being a country with frontiers to conquer and new lands to open. Surveys indicate a vast amount of idle resources that are available for exploitation in order to increase the nation's wealth. The rate of literacy is one of the highest in Asia: in 1948, 59.8 per cent of all persons ten years or more of age were literate.¹ The training of a skilled labor force should therefore present no insurmountable difficulties. One would expect the country to be relatively self-sufficient in many things.

And yet, if the facts are examined, it is disconcerting to find that a large proportion of the country's demands must be met from imports rather than from domestic production. The immediate postwar years were of course not illustrative of this condition because they spanned a period in which the country was recovering from the ravages of conflict. However, a certain measure of normalcy returned to the economy in 1948 and 1949, which may be considered the most representative of recent years. (Later years cannot serve as valid examples because of the imposition of strict trade controls and the outbreak of the Korean war.) In these two years, twenty-three per cent of the national income was expended on imports. In 1948, CIF imports totaled ₱1,311.8 million and the national income amounted to ₱5,713 million; in 1949, CIF imports were ₱1,313.5 million and the national income stood at ₱5,646 million. It is interesting to note that, prior to the imposition of trade controls, about seventy per cent of these imports consisted of consumption goods.²

The high percentage of national income spent for imports indicates the existence of a fundamental defect which prevents the Philippine

¹ Although high in comparison with those found in most Asian countries, this rate (reported by the Philippine Bureau of the Census and Statistics) is much lower than those of the more advanced nations of the world, and does not warrant complacency.

² Central Bank of the Philippines, *First Annual Report, 1949*, Manila, 1950, p. 35.

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economy from realizing its full productive potential. This defect cannot be lack of land. The total land area of the Philippines is approximately 29,749,000 hectares. The potential area available for agricultural, industrial and other purposes after the removal of timber amounts to some 18,163,000 hectares. Yet, the gross area planted to crops in 1951 was only 5,560,390 hectares. Total public lands disposable for agriculture amounted to 9,983,665 hectares as of June 30, 1951.⁵ Vast tracts remain unsettled, unsurveyed and in many cases unexplored.

The defect cannot be a lack of labor, since unemployment and underemployment remain unsolved problems. According to a current report by a rural sociologist attached to the Philippine Mission of the United States Mutual Security Agency, "unemployment and underemployment appear to be the most persistent and baffling problems of the Philippines". In a recent "survey of 13 barrios, 35.1 per cent of all persons 14 years old and over, excluding housewives not working outside the home and children in school, were not employed on any day during the week ending Dec. 22, 1951. Among males and females of this age group, the percentages unemployed for that period were 26.0 and 48.5, respectively."⁴

The defect is probably not lack of investment. According to the Bell Mission Report, "the amount of investment in the post-war years was very large, ranging from 20 to 25 per cent of the gross national product."⁵ Proceeding further in the Bell Report, however, we find that much of this investment "was not directly related to increasing production in agriculture and industry".⁶ Most of it went into commerce and real estate, and into the rehabilitation of prewar industries rather than into the establishment of new ones. In fact, it was only after the imposi-

⁵ Bureau of the Census and Statistics, *Facts and Figures about Economic and Social Conditions of the Philippines, 1948-1949*, Manila, 1950, p. 1; Bureau of Forestry.

⁴ "Major P.I. Rural Problems", *Manila Daily Bulletin*, July 22, 1952, p. 6.

⁵ Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines, *Report to the President of the United States*, Washington, D.C., 1950, p. 16. This Mission, composed of American experts headed by Daniel W. Bell, formerly Under-Secretary of the United States Treasury, was appointed by the President of the United States at the request of the President of the Philippines "to consider the economic and financial problems of [the Philippines] and to recommend measures that will enable the Philippines to become and to remain self-sufficient".

The Bell Mission Report should not be confused with the Bell Act (Philippine Trade Act of 1946), passed by the United States Congress, some of whose principal economic provisions are summarized in footnote 10, below.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

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tion of exchange and import controls in 1949 and 1950 that a sudden outburst of activity in productive industries occurred and that significant new plants were erected and new activities launched. This development is vividly illustrated by figures showing the number and paid-in capital of newly-registered manufacturing corporations and partnerships.⁷ An unmistakable spurt in manufacturing activity took place in 1950 and 1951, both in the number of firms and in the amount of capital paid in. Although 1951 was lower than 1950 in the latter respect, it was still much higher than in pre-control days.

There is, therefore, sufficient reason to believe that the postwar pattern of the economy, up to the imposition of trade controls, was seriously defective. And the trend of investment and rehabilitation in that period reflected a situation quite similar to that existing before the war. The economy was being restored, not changed; yet a change was called for and had been called for since the early days of the Commonwealth.

WHY did the basic pattern of the Philippine economy require a transformation? An outstanding feature of that economy is the importance in it of foreign trade. Much too high a proportion of export receipts is earned by a few products, whose profitability has attracted investment in their production to the disadvantage of less profitable but perhaps more socially necessary commodities, such as rice, for ex-

⁷NUMBER AND PAID-IN CAPITAL OF NEWLY-REGISTERED MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS, 1945-51
(1,000 pesos)

Year	Partnerships		Corporations		Total
	Number	Paid-in Capital	Number	Paid-in Capital	Paid-in Capital
1945	13	617	7	143	760
1946	15	365	29	996	1,361
1947	25	777	22	2,507	3,284
1948	18	745	29	2,459	3,204
1949	20	772	26	1,883	2,655
1950	61	3,335	103	19,968	23,303
1951	128	7,095	102	5,341	12,436

Source of basic data: Securities and Exchange Commission.

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ample. Before the Pacific war, three export groups—sugar, abacá and rope, and coconut products—accounted for more than two-thirds of Philippine export earnings; in 1940, for example, they amounted to ₱163,687,000, or 69.3 per cent of total exports valued at ₱236,049,000. After the war, even in the supposedly normal years 1948 and 1949, these same groups accounted for more than four-fifths of export receipts. In 1948 they earned ₱520,996,000 (82 per cent) out of a total of ₱635,583,000, and in 1949 they were responsible for ₱410,787,000 (80.9 per cent) out of a total of ₱507,510,000. In 1950 and 1951 the percentages were 72 and 81.1, respectively. However profitable trade in these items may be, too much reliance is being placed in a narrowly-restricted range of commodities. A fall in the world demand for any of them would surely work hardship on great numbers of people. In 1939 more than six million people, or about thirty-eight per cent of the total population, depended for their livelihood on the export groups mentioned above;⁸ the same percentage of the population today would amount to more than eight million people.

There is no doubt that the Philippine economy is highly vulnerable to developments abroad. A drop in demand for any of its major products would not only decrease the incomes of the people producing the goods in question but would also drastically reduce the foreign-exchange earnings of the country as a whole, and thus diminish its capacity to import the goods it requires to maintain Philippine living standards. Since the need to import becomes greater with the increase in specialization in a restricted number of export products, the way out of the dilemma lies not in increasing the concentration of investment and activity in a few types of enterprise but rather in distributing them among a greater number, thus raising income and production and concurrently diminishing the need to import. In short, the economy must be diversified. It must produce a considerable amount of what it now imports if any hope is to be held for its stability. Thus far it has been unable to do so. Not only has the economic pattern followed prewar lines, but the rate of increase of production has fallen far short of the rate of increase of population. Population rose from 15.4 million in 1937 to 20.6 million in 1951, or by 33.8 per cent. The index of the

⁸ Philippine Economic Survey Commission, *Philippine Agricultural and Industrial Development Program—Revised 1950*, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1950, p. 4.

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physical volume of production for 1951, however, was only 11.9 per cent above the 1937 level.⁹

Evidently it is necessary both to increase the rate of growth of production, so that it may overtake the rate of population growth, and to change the pattern of the economy in order to diversify it and make it less vulnerable to external conditions and more responsive to the basic needs of the people. These would appear to be the fundamental needs of the Philippine economy. Many foreign students of Philippine economic conditions have failed to perceive the basic underlying defects; they have often appraised Philippine conditions by foreign standards, by criteria applicable to highly-developed countries but not necessarily to less advanced economies.

Unfortunately experience, especially since the war, has shown that as long as unlimited quantities of American goods are permitted to enter the Philippines duty-free, there can be scant incentive to establish plants for the production of domestic substitutes, and accordingly

*INDEX OF PHYSICAL VOLUME OF PRODUCTION, 1937-1940 AND 1946-1951
(1937 = 100)

Year	Combined Index	Agricultural	Manufacturing	Mining
1937	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1938	98.2	85.3	109.1	129.4
1939	93.4	82.8	98.8	152.3
1940	109.9	98.0	117.1	165.0
1946	38.7	58.2	21.0	2.0
1947	75.6	79.5	77.5	16.8
1948	85.3	86.4	89.4	36.0
1949	91.5	92.2	94.7	49.1
1950	97.5	97.4	101.6	59.0
1951	111.9	102.9	126.0	73.1

Sources of basic data: Bureau of the Census and Statistics, Bureau of Commerce, Bureau of Forestry, Bureau of Mines, Sugar Quota Office.

TOTAL POPULATION, 1937-1940 AND 1946-1951*

As of July 1:	Population	As of July 1:	Population
1937 Estimate	15,444,500	1946 Estimate	18,337,500
1938 Estimate	15,813,600	1947 Estimate	18,781,700
1939 (Census of Jan. 1)	16,000,303	1948 (Census of Oct. 1)	19,234,182
1939 Estimate	16,191,200	1949 Estimate	19,695,000
1940 Estimate	16,577,000	1950 Estimate	20,164,300
		1951 Estimate	20,642,300

*Population estimates for postwar years are adjusted to Census figures and for war mortality.
Source: *Philippine Agricultural and Industrial Development Program—Revised*, 1950, p. 12.

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the Philippine economy will remain unbalanced. On this point, it may be useful to refer to the following passages from a recent note written by the author in reply to a series of editorials appearing in a Manila newspaper:

"With the unlimited free imports from the United States, how could we expect to diversify and increase production? How many people are going to risk their capital in new industrial plants for the production of consumer goods if they are continuously threatened by competing duty-free goods from the outside? Ask those of our people who have taken this risk if they are not worried about it. The duty-free import of U.S. goods made possible by the Bell Act¹⁰ has served to discourage the investment of foreign capital in the Philippines. What would be the need for American investors to risk capital on manufacturing enterprises in this country, if they could more easily make their profits by merely exporting consumer goods? What inducement can be given to foreign capital to invest in this country when domestic producers cannot be afforded adequate protection from the cheap mass-produced goods coming from the United States?

"It is obvious that if our objective is to increase domestic production, we must first provide the proper climate for investments. The present trade arrangement by permitting the free entry of all American products into this country, including consumer goods which we are capable of producing, has stifled the incentive for engaging in processing industries. The proposed selective free trade agreement will enable us to select for free entry only those articles

¹⁰ Philippine Trade Act of 1946, passed by the Congress of the United States in April 1946. An Executive Agreement implementing the Bell Act was signed in Manila by the United States and the Philippines on July 4, 1946, when the latter was granted its independence.

The Agreement provides for free trade with the United States for a period of eight years from July 4, 1946, to July 4, 1954, and for gradually increasing tariffs (or declining duty-free quotas in the case of certain specific exports from the Philippines) for the remaining twenty years of the effective life of the Agreement, which will terminate on July 3, 1974. A graduated duty of five per cent of the basic Philippine tariff rate, increasing by an annual average of five per cent, will be imposed beginning July 5, 1954, on all dutiable United States articles entering the Philippines, and similarly on all dutiable Philippine articles entering the United States, with four exceptions: coconut oil, cigars, scrap tobacco and pearl buttons, for which absolute and duty-free quotas are fixed, the duty-free quota declining by an annual average of five per cent during the twenty-year period beginning also on July 5, 1954. The absolute quotas fixed for these articles are as follows: coconut oil, 200,000 long tons; cigars, 200,000,000 pieces; scrap tobacco, 6,500,000 pounds; and pearl buttons, 850,000 gross. The above absolute quotas are duty free up to July 4, 1954, but after that date there will be an increasing difference between the absolute and the duty-free quotas. During the remaining period of the Agreement, exports of these articles in excess of the duty-free quota will be subject to the full United States tariff. Absolute quotas are fixed also for: sugar, 850,000 long tons; cordage, 6,000,000 pounds; and rice, 1,040,000 pounds.

All other articles not specified above are without quota limitation and are free from ordinary customs duties up to July 4, 1954, but will be subject to graduated tariffs after that date. On the other hand, no quota is fixed on United States articles entering the Philippines during the life of the Agreement, so that while its tariff provisions appear to be literally and technically reciprocal, there is in fact no similar reciprocity with respect to the quantity limitations of exports and imports.

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necessary for health and welfare and for the expansion of our productive facilities. In conjunction with a scientific tariff program, it is bound to stimulate the levels of production, income, and employment in the country. When this condition is reached, it would be possible for us to dispense with existing trade and exchange controls, inasmuch as the major obstacle to the maintenance of a stable currency would have been eliminated. . . .

"In the strategic positions I have occupied and still occupy in our government in the postwar years, I have been able to observe the bad effects of the trade and currency provisions of the Bell Act on the Philippine economy.¹¹ I have seen how the unlimited free entry of goods from the United States during the past six years has had a discouraging effect on our plan to industrialize our country, and as a result investment in the Philippines has shied away from industrial development to enjoy the more lucrative fields of trade, commerce, and real estate; how the trade resulting from the Executive Agreement under the Bell Act has been the source of the recurring balance of payments difficulties of the Philippines; and how the quota limitations on Philippine exports, without a corresponding limitation on imports from the United States, will intensify our balance of payments difficulties in the years to come. When business recession takes place in the United States, the principal market for Philippine exports, because of the tapering off of armament expenditures after 1953, demand for and prices of Philippine exports will recede and our balance of payments difficulties will be further aggravated."

It is no longer possible to argue plausibly that free trade develops the special capacities of every nation through operation of the law of comparative advantage. Granted that it may do so in the ideal case, the fact is that we have to live in a world of harsh reality. And the reality of the present situation is that the kind of free trade which the

¹¹ Paragraph (f), Section 402, of the Bell Act provides: "That the value of Philippine currency in relation to the United States dollar shall not be changed, the convertibility of pesos into dollars shall not be suspended, and no restrictions shall be imposed on the transfer of funds from the Philippines to the United States, except by agreement with the President of the United States."

The views of the present writer on the need to eliminate these currency provisions were expressed in the recent report of a Special Committee of the National Economic Council, of which Committee he was chairman, as follows:

"Experience in the past few years indicates the imperative necessity of eliminating the provisions of the Executive Agreement which limit the power of the Philippine Government to control and administer the Philippine currency. The requirements that the Philippine Government should get the consent of the President of the United States before it could change the par value of the peso, or restrict transactions in foreign exchange, could be productive of serious consequences to the international position of the Philippine currency. If and when either of these measures has to be taken, there is no assurance that information concerning such a plan would not leak out during the period of consultation with the authorities of the United States Government. Furthermore, on questions of exchange and monetary matters, prompt and decisive action may be necessary; any delay arising from consultation, considering that there is already a similar commitment with the International Monetary Fund, may have serious consequences to the stability of the economy." ("The Need for a Revision of the Executive Agreement with the United States", *Central Bank News Digest*, May 8, 1952, p. 5.)

Philippines has experienced is free trade with *one* country, coupled with restricted trade with the rest of the world.¹² Those who favor real free trade consider this to be indeed a most peculiar form of that institution. To pretend that the law of comparative advantage still operates in this context and that the "special capacities" of the nation are thereby developed is to indulge in sheer economic quackery.

The applicability of the principle of comparative advantage in the case of under-developed countries is being called increasingly in question. Thus,

"The case which the underdeveloped countries advance in favor of their 'balanced growth' and 'diversification' is not always well received. Does it not mean turning away from the principle of comparative advantage? Why do these countries not push their exports of primary products according to the rules of international specialization, and import the goods they need for a balanced diet? The answer is: because the notion of balance applies on the global scale as well. For fairly obvious reasons, expansion of primary production for export is apt to encounter adverse price conditions on the world market, unless the industrial countries' demand is steadily expanding, as it was in the nineteenth century. To push exports in the face of an inelastic and more or less stationary demand would not be a promising line of development. If it is reasonable to assume a generally less than unitary price elasticity of demand for crude foodstuffs and materials, it seems reasonable also to contend that, under the conditions indicated before, economic growth in underdeveloped countries must largely take the form of an increase in production for the domestic market."¹³

Furthermore, it is now generally conceded that the productive capacity of a nation is not a fixed magnitude but, on the contrary, is capable of development and growth. Although at present certain goods cannot be produced so cheaply in one country as in another, this fact is no warrant for assuming that the situation is immutable. The organic nature of a national economy allows room for improvement, and, given the proper climate for investment and sufficient time to train managerial personnel and a dexterous labor force, there is every reason to assume that within a few years the production of many commodities can be put upon a basis as economically sound on the whole as that in other producing countries.

¹² See "America and the Philippine Economy", *Philippines Quarterly*, March 1952.

¹³ Ragnar Nurkse, "Some International Aspects of the Problem of Economic Development", *The American Economic Review*, May 1952, p. 576.

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THE problem of increasing the productivity of the Philippines, then, is intimately bound up with the question of what policy to pursue in the field of foreign trade. From what has been stated thus far, the inescapable conclusion would seem to be that only the erection of a sound tariff system can offer substantial hope for development of the Philippine economy. Historically speaking, it is hard to find any country, with the exception of Great Britain, which developed its economy without the aid of tariffs. The United States to this day conforms substantially to the recommendations proposed by Alexander Hamilton in the early days of the Republic.¹⁴ The effectiveness of Hamilton's proposals is now history, and the theoretical foundations underlying them were further bolstered by the writings of Friedrich List and Henry Carey, both of whom lived in the United States in the years of national expansion and perceived the importance of tariffs in the development of the economy.

It may be argued that the establishment of a tariff system is needless in view of the protection afforded Philippine industry by exchange and import controls. The stimulus to productive investment mentioned earlier might be cited as proof of this contention. Such protection, however, is uncertain and temporary and has never been regarded, at best, as more than an unsatisfactory substitute for a good tariff structure. Moreover, trade controls are inherently difficult to administer, and do not raise much revenue for the government; if they cause price rises in certain items as a result of quantitative restrictions, windfall gains accrue to merchants without necessarily benefiting either the national treasury or the country as a whole. It is contrary to all tenets of progressive public finance to redistribute income in favor of middlemen, and no such step will be taken in the Philippines if it can be prevented.

Tariffs have a more permanent character, are easier to enforce and provide more revenue for the public coffers. In a country such as the Philippines, whose budget must be balanced in order to keep inflationary forces under control, these considerations are of prime importance.

¹⁴ Hamilton's *Report on Manufactures* of 1791 recommended the following measures among others: "Protecting duties, or duties on those foreign articles which are the rivals of the domestic ones intended to be encouraged . . . this species of encouragement . . . has the additional recommendation of being a source of revenue" and "Prohibitions of rival articles, or duties equivalent to prohibitions. . . ."

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It will be impossible to establish a tariff system, however, as long as the Bell Act remains in force. This Act commits the Philippines to allow United States goods duty-free entry. Since more than seventy per cent of Philippine imports come from the United States, this arrangement deprives the government of substantial potential revenues and leaves local industry defenseless against the inflow of mass-produced consumer goods. Revision of the Bell Act is, therefore, a prerequisite to the formulation of a tariff system. The fifteen-man committee recently named by President Quirino to study the problem has cited many reasons why revision of the Bell Act is necessary—among them the following:

(1) The present arrangement not only constantly endangers the stability of the Philippine economy but makes extremely difficult the achievement of an economic pattern strong enough to withstand adverse developments abroad. (2) It is the source of recurring balance-of-payments difficulties which cannot be overcome by trade- and exchange-control measures alone. (3) Quota limitations on Philippine exports to the United States without corresponding restrictions on Philippine imports from the United States will intensify balance-of-payments difficulties because they will limit Philippine capacity to pay for imports. The effects of this unequal arrangement will become acute in 1954. (4) A business recession in the United States, the Philippines' main market, would have tremendous adverse effects on the economy of the Philippines. (5) The free flow of imports from the United States has stunted the growth of infant industries and has created a tendency to over-import. (6) Not all Philippine exports need tariff preference in the United States. (7) Free trade discourages domestic production of consumer goods, and thus contributes to the high cost of living. (8) It has also discouraged commerce with nations other than the United States. (9) It has, furthermore, prevented the Philippines from tapping a major source of revenue—duties on imports from the United States. (10) The currency provisions of the Bell agreement prevent the Philippines from adopting monetary and exchange measures needed to protect its economy. (11) The Bell Mission recommended revision of the agreement as a prerequisite for stabilization of the Philippine economy.

The erection of a tariff system should not, however, involve an abrupt, wholesale termination of free-trade relations between the

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United States and the Philippines. The developments of half a century cannot be undone in a day. After all, representatives of the Philippine people have opposed such trade arrangements since as long ago as 1909.¹⁵

The most equitable solution would seem to lie in the establishment of a tariff system allowing for free Philippine-United States trade of a given magnitude—possibly \$150 million in each direction. Such an arrangement would allow the Philippine economy to adjust itself to the requirements of the development program; it would safeguard the interests of the great majority of the people by permitting free entry of the most essential goods; it would prevent the recurrence of chronic balance-of-payments difficulties by taxing nonessential goods heavily; and it would reduce the tax burden of the American people by eliminating the need for continual assistance in extricating the Philippines from economic difficulties.

The construction of a tariff system containing a provision for selective free trade between the Philippines and the United States is essential to a solution of the basic problems of the national economy. It offers the only means of balancing Philippine foreign trade. It is the best way to stimulate local production and to lessen the country's need for imports. It holds out the most promise for lightening the tax burdens of both the American and the Filipino peoples. And it is the solution most commensurate with the maintenance of the national dignity of both nations.

Manila, October 1952

¹⁵ The late Benito Legarda, when Resident Commissioner in the United States, made the following statement to the United States Congress during the debates in 1909 on the Payne-Aldrich Bill, which first established free trade between the United States and the Philippines:

"If, instead of the free admission without limitation as to quantity of American products into the Philippine Islands, this bill provided only for the free entry there of agricultural machinery and other commodities of prime necessity, such as cotton cloth, and which are needed for the agricultural and industrial development of those Islands, or if this bill provided only for such reciprocal exchange of commodities custom-duty free as would balance the limited quantity of American products to be sent from here,—if such were the provisions of this bill, it would be our pleasant duty as representatives of the Philippine people to make manifest to this House their gratitude."

The WHO in Southern Asia and the Western Pacific

F. W. Clements

THE Fifth World Health Assembly, meeting in Geneva in May 1952, approved a program of activities for the World Health Organization (WHO) for 1953 which includes a comprehensive range of projects for the countries of Southern Asia and the Western Pacific. Their cost will be approximately US\$900,000 out of a total working budget for the Organization of about 9½ million dollars.¹ In terms of the population of Asia (excluding the Soviet Union and continental China) and the countries of the Western Pacific, the field budget for these areas represents a per capita expenditure of about one-seventh of a cent for the year. Expressed in these terms, the program seems hopelessly inadequate—or might it be that this method of measuring the work of WHO is wrong? To answer this question, it is necessary to know how WHO goes about its work in relation to the problems confronting it in these two regions.

The scientific activities of WHO fall within two major categories—central technical services and advisory services to governments. The former include the collection and dissemination of intelligence regarding epidemic diseases and the standardization of biological products, such as insulin, the hormones, the vitamins, vaccines and sera. These activities entail the pooling of knowledge and experience obtained from various countries, which are then available on an equal basis to all countries through WHO publications. The advisory services to governments are specific services provided in response to requests for assistance. The latest knowledge and skills needed for the solution of particular health problems or for general strengthening and improvement of local health or medical services can be placed at the disposal of governments.

The advisory services are provided through the regional staffs of the Organization. Unlike the United Nations and the other Specialized Agencies, WHO now operates through six regional offices in

¹ *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 39.*

The WHO in Asia and the Pacific

addition to the headquarters in Geneva. Decentralization has proved costly in terms of money and effort, but the Director-General of WHO reports that its advantages are now becoming apparent.² Regionalization has made it easier for the Organization to develop programs fitted to the specific needs of the individual countries of each region.

The Southeast Asia Region, with its office in New Delhi, comprises Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, the Maldives Islands and Thailand. The Western Pacific Region, with its office in Manila, comprises Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China (Formosa), Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaya, New Zealand, North Borneo, the Philippines, Sarawak, Singapore and Vietnam. Both of these regions include population groups whose ways of life are scarcely removed from those of the Stone Age, and who inhabit the non-self-governing territories administered by various national governments. The total population in these territories is not large, but each presents a number of problems connected with the social advancement of the people. Because of its geographical and economic position, Pakistan is here considered with the other countries of Southeast Asia, although it is formally in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region.

Although Australia and New Zealand are members of the Western Pacific Region, each presents conditions and health problems different from those found in most of the other countries in the two regions under consideration. Both countries enjoy a high standard of living and an ample, varied diet, which has helped to ensure a uniformly high nutritional status for their populations. Their mortality rates are amongst the lowest in the world; and, in general, the medical care available for the physically ill is good and the standard of preventive medicine is high. There are, however, in both countries certain health and medical problems—for example, aspects of mental health, phases of industrial medicine, broader concepts of nursing, chronic alcoholism, etc.—which require reconsideration in the light of modern experience and thought.³ Since the problems in these countries are minor in comparison with those of most of the other countries under discussion, Australia and New Zealand will not be considered further in the present account.

² *Official Records of the World Health Organization*, No. 38.

³ New Zealand has requested a fellowship from WHO for 1953 in order to enable a national to study public health administration outside the region.

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The remaining countries have certain features in common. The standard of health of great masses of their population is poor. According to the Director-General of WHO, the most urgent need is for control of malaria, tuberculosis and venereal diseases, of which malaria is probably the most important public health problem. For example, in India malaria involves an annual economic loss of upwards of 225 million dollars; in the Philippines it affects two million people and causes 10,000 deaths each year; in Burma 220 in every 100,000 of the population die from it every year. The death rates from tuberculosis reach 250 per 100,000 in many parts of Asia, compared with about 40 per 100,000 in Australia and the United States. In addition, thousands die annually from cholera and dysentery, while malnutrition and starvation claim many deaths both directly and also by lowering people's resistance so that they fall easy victims to infections.⁴ Obviously these are burdens which no country can afford to bear.

Many Asians have never had enough to eat. One review of Indian famines lists sixty-nine severe famines between the years 297 and 1907; and several relatively minor ones occurred between the latter date and the Bengal famine of 1943, in which 1½ million people died.⁵ Since the beginning of recorded history, periodic famines have swept large areas of China as well. Not only is the total supply of food inadequate, but the diet of most people in these and other Asian countries is badly balanced. Population pressure on the available land is such that a large percentage is used for the production of crops with a high caloric yield per acre—that is, rice and wheat. Pasturage for food animals is not available, although in India the sacred cow roams at large, often destroying human food crops. The cow does, of course, provide milk for human consumption, but the average yield per cow is less than half that of well-bred, well-fed cattle in economically developed countries.

Rice production and consumption involve the hazards of beriberi, which has been a serious problem in parts of India, the Philippines and China. In the Philippines in 1946 and 1947, beriberi ranked second to pulmonary tuberculosis as a cause of death, and in 1947 at least

⁴ C. E. A. Winslow, *The Cost of Sickness and the Price of Health*, WHO Monograph Series, No. 7, 1951.

⁵ A. L. Loveday, *History and Economics of Indian Famine*, London, 1914.

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24,000 persons died from this disease.⁶ If rice is fully milled and polished, most of its vitamin B₁ content is removed. Consumption of such rice as a staple food is likely to produce beriberi, a hazard not associated with partially milled or parboiled rice. Beriberi is appearing as a problem in Thailand; formerly most of the rice was milled in the homes, but now small mills are being established in the villages, and an increasing number of farmers are taking their whole crop to be polished.

Attempts are being made to increase the supplies of those foods which can help to correct some of the major defects in the diets of many countries.⁷ Most of the inhabitants of the non-self-governing territories are primitive hunters and gatherers of food; others have developed a fairly high level of horticulture.⁸ The methods of the hunters and gatherers usually provide diets adequate in quantity for adults but inadequate in quality for infants, young children, and pregnant or nursing women.

Inadequate and badly balanced diets affect all sections of the population, reducing its working capacity, lowering resistance to certain diseases, such as tuberculosis, and affecting particularly the children. It is now recognised that the health and diet of the pregnant woman are reflected in the nutritional status of her baby. Incorrect and inadequate feeding, the fate of most babies in Asia, is the underlying cause of the high infantile mortality rates. In many countries there is insufficient cow's milk for the requirements of infants and young children, or such milk as is available is unsafe, being either heavily contaminated with disease-producing bacteria or improperly treated prior to feeding. A similar situation prevailed in Europe throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and part of the nineteenth centuries, when infantile death rates were as high as they are in Asia today.

Probably the most important advance in the care of infants and young children in the last fifty years in Europe, the United States, Australia and New Zealand has been the establishment and whole-

⁶ J. Salcedo, E. O. Carrasco, F. R. Jose and R. C. Valenzuela, "Studies on Beriberi in an Endemic Sub-tropical Area", *Journal of Nutrition*, Vol. 36 (1948), p. 561.

⁷ "The State of Food and Agriculture", *Review and Outlook*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 1951.

⁸ In most of these territories food is produced in individual gardens by primitive but by no means unsystematic methods which constitute horticulture and not agriculture in the modern sense.

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sale application of satisfactory techniques of infant feeding. This was the outcome of several factors, including a rising standard of education, industrialization, a revolution in the status of women, and the development of dairying parallel with increasing demands for milk. Until the introduction of satisfactory measures for the proper feeding of infants, a marked improvement in Asian infantile mortality cannot be expected. In some Asian and Pacific countries it may be possible to develop the dairy industry sufficiently rapidly to provide the full milk requirements of infants and children within a reasonable time. Elsewhere, alternative methods of feeding will be necessary.⁹ A parallel step must be the development of maternal and child welfare services to teach sound infant-feeding techniques. To some extent, this program will depend upon a reduction in illiteracy, which is so widespread in the region, although considerable progress has been made among illiterate groups by the use of demonstration methods.¹⁰

Sanitation and community hygiene are universally bad. Improper disposal of human excreta increases the risks of intestinal infections, such as the dysenteries, cholera, intestinal parasites, etc., through contamination of drinking water or food. The contraction of bilharzia depends upon the contamination of surface water with infected urine or feces.

The authorities in most of these countries regard housing and community development as major public needs, second in importance only to food production. According to a recent United Nations survey, roughly 100 million rural and urban Asian families are living in crowded, unsanitary, sub-standard quarters.¹¹ Although it is sometimes said that bad housing conditions are limited to cities, a high proportion of the rural populations of Asia live in virtual slums, few of which have either an adequate safe water supply or satisfactory arrangements for the disposal of human excreta. Altogether, conditions are favorable for the rapid spread of tuberculosis, cholera, pneumonia and similar diseases.

In many countries the overwhelming majority of the population

⁹ F. W. Clements, "Infant Foods", *Nutrition Review*, Vol. 9 (1951), p. 129.

¹⁰ *The Mexican Cultural Mission Programme*, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1950.

¹¹ *Low Cost Housing in South and South-East Asia*, United Nations Department of Social Affairs, 1951.

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receives medical care from indigenous practitioners,¹² who in some parts of the non-self-governing territories are little more than witch-doctors.¹³ In most countries less than one orthodox medical practitioner is available for each 5,000 inhabitants, and the majority of doctors are congregated in the cities. The villagers, who constitute at least seventy per cent of the population, have no alternative but to consult the indigenous practitioner or the witch-doctor.

Overpopulation represents perhaps the greatest single threat to many countries in Asia and the Pacific. Java, one of the most crowded spots on earth, supports about 1,000 inhabitants per square mile. If the present rate of increase is maintained in India, the population will increase by 104 million, or 28.6 per cent, in the next twenty years.¹⁴ In Ceylon, birth rates have recently risen, while death rates have sharply fallen, resulting in a marked increase in population. In most of the non-self-governing territories, however, population pressure is not a problem except in the case of small isolated groups.

THE foregoing brief account presents a vicious circle of disease—poverty—underproduction—malnutrition—disease. From his study of the conditions of life of the American Negro, Myrdal believes that a persistent condition of ill health constitutes both cause and effect of a low earning capacity, widespread illiteracy and low food production.¹⁵ Improvement in health can bring about improvement in all other conditions; similarly an improvement in any other condition can favourably affect health and the remaining conditions. Because this mass of interrelated forces exercises a cumulative effect, it is undesirable to attack only one aspect of the problem, although this is often done.

Leaders of thought in the various medical and social fields believe that the greatest need is for a concerted effort to improve conditions

¹² H. E. Sigerist, "The Need for an Institute of the History of Medicine in India", *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, Vol. 17 (1945), p. 113. The term "indigenous practitioners" refers to individuals who practice primitive medicine.

¹³ S. Ella, "Native Medicine and Surgery in the South Sea Islands", *The Medical Times and Gazette*, Vol. 1 (1874), p. 50; S. M. Lambert, *A Yankee Doctor in Paradise*, Boston, 1941; C. H. Wedgwood, "Sickness and Its Treatment in Manam Island, N.G.", *Oceania*, Vol. V. (1934-35), pp. 84, 280.

¹⁴ *Report of First All-India Conference on Family Planning*, New Delhi, November-December, 1951.

¹⁵ Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, New York, 1944.

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in several fields at once.¹⁶ At the international level, machinery exists for the coordination of attacks on these interrelated social ills. One function of WHO is "to establish and maintain effective collaboration with the United Nations, Specialized Agencies, governmental health administrations, professional groups and such other organizations as may be deemed appropriate".¹⁷ Each international body has its own program of assistance to member states.

Through its Social Affairs Department, the United Nations is interested in improving social conditions, including housing. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) will, at the request of governments, provide assistance in raising the quality and quantity of food production and in developing satisfactory distribution methods. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in response to the challenge of mass illiteracy, is prepared to assist governments in undertaking projects for the fundamental education of the masses, mainly with the purpose of helping people understand their immediate problems and giving them the skills and advice necessary for solving these problems through their own efforts. The International Labour Office is interested in working conditions and related problems. The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) provides material assistance to governments in order to enable them to implement programs for the feeding of children, the control of diseases and the instruction of doctors and nurses in the care and treatment of children. The United Nations has also established an Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, a monetary fund on which the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies can draw for extra appropriations with which to provide additional technical assistance to under-developed countries. In addition to these international organizations, several inter-governmental agencies, such as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, function in some of the countries in question. A number of these countries have entered into bilateral agreements with others outside the Asian and Pacific regions, under which they receive material aid, as in the case of the Mutual Security Agency of the United States.

These organizations or agencies have funds with which to assist

¹⁶ E. H. Ackerknecht, "The Role of Medical History in Medical Education", *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, Vol. 21 (1947), p. 135.

¹⁷ Constitution of the World Health Organization.

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governments in their fields of interest, but none does the work of a national government for it. They provide technical advice and some materials, but the initial request for their services must come from the government, and the bulk of the work must be done by the country with its own resources.

UNICEF, the Mutual Security Agency and the Commonwealth Colombo Plan, in addition to WHO, are concerned with improving public health in Asia and the Western Pacific. These recognize WHO as the proper coordinating body in this field, and seek its advice on how to make their help most effective.

IT must not be assumed that, before the advent of WHO and the other international agencies, nothing was done in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific to control disease or raise health standards. Some of the countries in this area have made notable contributions to medical science, and most had developed and maintained extensive and, in not a few cases, good services for medical care and the prevention of disease. Investigations into the mosquito transmission of malaria were originated in India by Ronald Ross, whose work has been vigorously continued, first by the Malaria Survey of India and later by the Malaria Institute of India.¹⁸ The epidemic of pneumonic plague which invaded Manchuria and North China in 1910-11 laid the foundations for extensive research into this disease in China and was instrumental in establishing systematic public health work there.¹⁹ The transmission of dengue by mosquitoes was first successfully demonstrated in 1907 in the Philippines,²⁰ where the prewar standard of public health was good. A notable contribution was the introduction of enriched rice to prevent beriberi; the first suggestions that beriberi is a food-deficiency disease were formulated in Java in the last century.²¹

What help, then, can the international agencies give? Malaria, tuberculosis and venereal diseases, it has been noted, constitute the

¹⁸ G. Covell: "The Malaria Survey of India", *Journal of the Malaria Institute of India*, Vol. 1 (1938), p. 1, and "The Malaria Institute of India", *Indian Journal of Malariology*, Vol. 1 (1947), p. 1.

¹⁹ Wu Lien-teh, *Manchurian Plague Prevention Service. Memorial Volume, 1912-1932*, Peking, 1934.

²⁰ P. M. Ashburn and C. F. Craig, "Experimental Investigations Regarding the Etiology of Dengue Fever . . .", *Philippine Journal of Science*, Vol. 2 (1907), p. 93.

²¹ L. J. Harris, *Vitamins and Vitamin Deficiencies*, London, 1938.

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most pressing health problems in Asia. The discovery of the antibiotics and the development, in the last ten years, of new techniques for the mass control of certain diseases have provided public health officials with new and relatively cheap weapons. Penicillin has proved effective in the treatment of venereal diseases and can be used for their eradication by removing the human source of infection. Residual spraying with DDT and similar preparations kills mosquitoes resting on the sprayed surface as long as six months afterward, and thus breaks the cycle of transmission of malaria. Bacillus Calmette-Guerin (BCG) was first employed as early as 1922, but its use became widespread only after the recent war; since then many millions of persons, mostly children, have been vaccinated. Supporters of BCG vaccination believe that it greatly reduces the risk of contracting tuberculosis.

These techniques for the mass control of the three groups of diseases under discussion were, for the most part, newly available as WHO began its work in 1948. It was able to offer the countries of Asia and the Western Pacific experts experienced in them and, to a limited extent, supplies of the materials required. Demonstration of techniques for the mass control of these diseases, teaching programs connected with them, and provision of supplies have constituted the main items of WHO field programs. The cost of similar programs in 1953 will total twenty-seven per cent of the regular budget of WHO and forty-one per cent of the funds drawn from the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA) for field work in the two regions. In addition, UNICEF and other agencies will contribute more than one million dollars.

Since most of the countries in question face shortages of trained nurses and of teachers of nursing trainees which affect the quality and quantity of medical care available and limit the amount of community health work that can be done, they have asked WHO for help in strengthening existing nursing schools and in opening new ones. As a result, in 1953 the various nursing projects will require approximately forty per cent of the regular WHO budget and twenty per cent of the funds drawn from EPTA for field work in the two regions.

To reduce their high infantile and child mortality rates, these countries need many more children's doctors for both curative and preventive work and many more public health nurses to teach good methods of infant and child care at the village level. For this reason,

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nine per cent of the regular WHO budget and nearly twenty per cent of the funds drawn from EPTA for field work in 1953 will be spent in maternal and child health programs. UNICEF has allocated nearly a quarter of a million dollars for supplies for these programs.

The basis of effective public health work and of good, inexpensive medical care is a sound, efficient administrative service. Some six per cent of the regular WHO budget and fifteen per cent of EPTA funds have been allocated for assistance in 1953 to several countries to help them strengthen their public health administration.

Other items on the 1953 program include schemes for improving control of such communicable diseases as plague and cholera and for bettering environmental sanitation. Two projects of considerable significance will involve assistance to two governments in establishing plants for the manufacture of DDT and antibiotics.

Combined operations for attack on more than one of the inter-related social problems are limited to one project in Ceylon and one in India. WHO has provided technical assistance for a health demonstration area in Ceylon, where government cooperation assumes the form of improvements in agriculture through irrigation schemes and expanded general educational activities. A demonstration team in malaria control began operations in the Terai of India in 1949 with a malariologist and a public health nurse supplied by WHO; subsequently an entomologist and a public health engineer were added. FAO, which has joined with WHO in making this a project for both disease control and land reclamation, is trying to ascertain the merits of mechanisation in a country where manual labour can be hired at a low wage.

THE technical assistance provided by international organizations has both local and general effects. The local effects depend upon the nature of the enterprise. A malarial control team can protect communities of 100,000 or more local inhabitants. The five WHO-UNICEF malaria units which have collaborated with Indian government teams will thus be able to give protection to upwards of three-quarters of a million people—a program extended by other Indian teams to affect nine million inhabitants.²² Whereas this type of project

²² P. F. Russell, "The Present Status of Malaria in the World", *American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene*, Vol. 1 (1952), p. 111.

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does not require more than the minimum cooperation from the local population, projects for venereal disease control and BCG vaccination against tuberculosis, as well as maternal and child health teams, require intimate participation on the part of the people. The idea that the work of a team or unit can be of considerable benefit must be sold to them. When the skin ulcers of yaws disappear after one injection of penicillin, people are easily persuaded. It is less easy to convince suspicious and illiterate people that a small injection in a child's arm will prevent its suffering from tuberculosis in later life, or that the practice of child care advocated by a group of strangers, even though they be fellow-nationals, is better than those followed by the villagers for generations. This kind of work is much slower, affects fewer people directly, and is more expensive in time and personnel; it may be dependent on improvements in the status and literacy levels of women; and it requires a great deal of tact and patience.

If the benefits of the work of an international team were limited to the local population among whom it works, it is doubtful whether its support would be justified. Even with the expenditure of large sums, international teams in most countries reach but a small percentage of the total population. What, then, are the wider effects to be expected from the presence of an international team or expert?

In any political system the direction and strength of a social program are the result of the interaction of several forces. Stated in simplest terms, these are (a) the pressures exerted by the community, (b) the knowledge and experience of the technical branches of the administration, and (c) the attitude of the executive (including the treasury). The thrust by the community depends on the amount of collective knowledge that exists about a particular problem, the strength of the "felt needs" that something should be done, and the facilities available for giving expression to these opinions. It is difficult to estimate the influence which demonstration teams in Asia and the Western Pacific have on community thinking outside the immediate sphere of their operations. Information about their work is generally spread by someone who interprets and passes it on as part of an educational campaign. To claim that the operations of international teams have a direct influence on community thinking and action is over-optimistic.

The technical branches of the administration frequently have as

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much knowledge and experience as the international experts. Sometimes, however, isolation from large scientific centres has prevented local officials from keeping abreast of modern developments; in such cases the demonstration unit is, of course, of great value. Its real worth becomes manifest when it produces evidence which the health administration can present to the executive in support of claims for a larger share of the national income for the continuance of a particular project. While wishing to eradicate certain diseases, the executive is frequently forced to divert moneys that could be used for this purpose to other schemes designed to strengthen the over-all national economy. The struggle of all of these countries to raise their level of economic development demands vast expenditures on capital works and equipment. Even in more developed countries the sums that can be allocated from national revenues for health and other projects intended to improve social conditions fall far short of what is needed.

The ability of a country to absorb assistance offered by any international organization is no greater than its capacity to "match" such international aid. If its results are to be permanent, the work initiated by an international team must be continued by local services—by a suitably trained national staff and equipment, for which funds must be provided from the national exchequer. Health schemes are expensive. The cost of "matching" the help requested from WHO in 1953 will be greater for some countries than the contributions of the international agencies—this in addition to the costs of the routine health services. Further proof of the stimulating effect of WHO may be seen in the increased activities for the mass control of malaria, tuberculosis or venereal diseases in India, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines following the initial demonstrations by WHO.

LACK of finance will prevent the expansion of health services in the under-developed countries of Asia and the Western Pacific from approaching the goal that most international workers would set. Certain other factors also may serve to retard the development of satisfactory social reforms. For an appreciation of these, it is helpful to recall the history of public health and social reform in Europe. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, conditions of life were not vastly different from those prevailing today in Asia, where there exists "a lack of bare necessities to give overwhelming masses of the

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people a decent standard of living and a great gap between educated highly sophisticated leaders and the people".²³

Two developments played major roles in improving the lot of the common man in Europe. One was the rise of industrialization and the concomitant formation of capital which was used for social advancement (schools, hospitals, etc.) as well as for economic development, and which, when invested in the New World, provided greatly increased amounts of cheap food. The other was the intangible force exerted by the new Christian sects that emerged between 400 and 150 years ago. It has been said that "the coincidence in time of Wesley and the Industrial Revolution had profound effects upon England for generations to come".²⁴ The humanitarian spirit of the eighteenth century, and the care which it bestowed on the bodies and minds of the poor and unfortunate, was a significant aspect of the revival and reformation of religion. It became an essential and prominent feature of the Western Tradition and one of the driving forces which have helped to bring about improvements in living conditions. The importance of a force of this kind in European developments prompts the question whether similar forces are to be found in the cultural traditions of Asia and the Western Pacific. They apparently exist in Mahayana Buddhism,²⁵ but comparable developments do not seem to have occurred in either the doctrine or the practice of Islam, Confucianism, orthodox Hindu thought or Taoism. Standard accounts of these religions are silent on this point. Where an active ideal of social service or reform has appeared—as, for example, in the teachings of Gandhi—it is treated as something new. The fact that such movements have occurred suggests, however, that, given the necessary stimulus, they do arise; and not a few have flourished because of the encouragement they have received.

The cultural traditions may operate in another way. "Indian culture," it has been noted, "is deeply imbued with philosophy and this is why not only illiterate villagers but highly educated men sometimes prefer indigenous practitioners to scientifically qualified men. They claim that medicine that comes from the west is too mechanical, that

²³ Gwendolen M. Carter, "The Asian Dominions in the Commonwealth", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 22 (1949), p. 369.

²⁴ G. M. Trevelyan, *English Social History*, London, 1944.

²⁵ H. de Lubac, *Aspects de Bouddhisme*, Paris, 1951.

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it is soulless, that it has no philosophy, that it is foreign to Indian thought, while the indigenous systems are deeply rooted in the religious and philosophical traditions of the country."²⁶ Another factor may be important in the nation-wide extension of the work commenced by the international teams: according to one observer, "there are in many under-developed countries vested interests in the continued employment of old methods and in the preservation of the *status quo*".²⁷ It is impossible to assess the importance of these intangible forces in any country. That they exist must, however, be taken into account in any attempt to foresee the results of the present programs of assistance.

Another aspect of the total problem is worrying an increasing number of people. It has been noted that over-population is a major difficulty in some of the under-developed countries. Numerous health workers and sociologists are becoming concerned over the effect of large-scale health projects on population trends. Some indications of what may be expected are already available. An effective island-wide malaria control program, accomplished with fewer than 1,000 workers and at an annual cost of roughly fifteen cents per head of population, reduced general mortality in Ceylon by one-third²⁸ and infantile mortality by about one-half.²⁹ Similar results are reported from Cyprus and Sardinia.³⁰ It seems clear that the immediate effect of the health projects supported by WHO and other internal agencies will be to increase the total populations of the countries concerned. At first a large part of the increase will be in the non-productive child population, for experience has shown³¹ that one result of most health schemes is a fall in infantile and child mortality rates. In at least several areas, more mouths will have to be fed with the produce from the same amount of land, although the healthier population may be capable of greater individual output.

²⁶ Sigerist, *loc. cit.*

²⁷ G. Myrdal, "Economic Aspects of Health", paper read at the Fourth World Health Assembly, Geneva, May 1952.

²⁸ M. C. Balfour, "Problems in Health Promotion in the Far East" in *Modernization Programs in Relation to Human Resources and Population Problems*, Milbank Memorial Fund, New York, 1950.

²⁹ Russell, *loc. cit.*

³⁰ E. J. Pampana, *Lutte Antipaludique*, World Health Organization, 1951.

³¹ Russell, *loc. cit.*

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Can increased food output meet the increased demands? It has been calculated that, if the present rate of growth is maintained in India (excluding the possible effects of large-scale disease-control projects), the population will increase by 104 million in the next twenty years.⁸² For this additional population, a ration of twelve ounces of food grains per person per day (providing a meagre 1,200 calories) represents the yearly production of an extra eleven million tons. The same source holds that when all of the irrigation projects now under construction in India are in full operation, the extra food grains produced will not exceed three million tons. The great rice-producing areas along the river systems of Thailand and Burma have, in some years, exported upwards of three million tons of rice to India. These areas may not be able to expand their exports greatly because *their* populations can be expected to increase with improved health conditions. Can new land be brought into production or old lands reclaimed fast enough? To the need for extra food must be added the need for increased supplies of clothing and for additional housing. Clearly the tasks likely to be imposed by the projected increase of population will place a tremendous strain on Indian resources. A somewhat similar situation exists in other Asian countries.

There appears to be a general fear that the chain of developments which in Europe brought about a stabilization of population—namely, industrialization, higher standards of living and education, and increased agricultural production—will operate too slowly in Asia to be effective. It is not yet possible, however, to determine whether the Asian pattern of population development will repeat the European. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that public and private groups in several countries are exploring the possible utility in the Asian context of family-planning and birth-control programs. In this field, as in many others, WHO stands ready to assist.

Camperdown, New South Wales, September 1952

⁸² *Report of All-India Conference on Family Planning, cit.*

Agricultural Credit in India— The Missing Link

M. L. Dantwala

NO plan for Indian agrarian reform can claim to be comprehensive unless it affords due recognition to the importance of providing farmers with adequate credit facilities. While the role of credit in assisting agricultural production is fairly well understood, there is less general appreciation of its contribution in acquiring farm ownership and—what is more to the point in under-developed countries—in preventing its loss. One way to secure an increase in production in under-developed economies is to link it with a social purpose and to assign the primary producer a more significant role in the building of the new society. To this end, the relationship of the producer with the factors of production must be made more intimate and stimulating. He cannot reasonably be expected to give of his best in the task of production as long as he thinks that the fruits of his efforts will not accrue either to himself or to the community as a whole, but will be appropriated by a few privileged individuals. Hence the need for social change which will release the genuine producers from their passive role and accord them a status of active partnership.

Credit, without which many farmers cannot attain this higher status and secure a share of the factors of production, can be a powerful instrument for softening the rigid, production-inhibiting stratifications of class structure in the agricultural economy. Under a *laissez-faire* system, credit is extremely class-conscious and plays an important part in perpetuating and even widening inequalities. It is so oriented and organised that it helps only those sectors of the community that are economically sound and ignores those that, from its point of view, are not credit-worthy. In under-developed economies, in which impoverished farmers constitute the bulk of the agricultural population, this conception of the proper function of credit requires reorientation.

In India the early British administration, attempting to “improve” the agrarian economy according to Western concepts of economic and social organisation and its own imperial interests, effected a revolu-

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tionary change in the system of agricultural credit. In seeking to substitute contract for custom, it gave the customary inequities an institutional cast: the payment of exorbitant interest rates, to which neither borrower nor lender intended to adhere, became a contractual obligation enforceable in the law courts, which issued decrees for the attachment and sale of properties. The consequences were disastrous. Agrarian riots broke out in many parts of the country, assuming grave proportions in Bombay. In 1875 the Government of India appointed a Committee on Riots, on whose recommendation one of the earliest legislative measures pertaining to agricultural credit and indebtedness—the Deccan Agriculturalists Relief Act of 1879—was passed. Though it was intended primarily for Bombay Province, some of its sections were made applicable throughout British India. This and subsequent relief acts, however, accomplished little of a constructive nature. On the contrary, they altered the very basis of moneylending in India. Formerly borrowers had obtained loans without having to execute written documents, or, at most, by placing a signature or thumb-impression in the account-book of the moneylender. Now moneylenders insisted upon receiving conditional-sale deeds or usufructuary mortgages before granting credit. The Indian Famine Commission observed in 1901: "There is positively room for holding that transfers of property both by sale and mortgage have become more frequent in districts to which the Relief Acts apply." The acts were also responsible for a great increase in the volume of litigation.

On the recommendation of the Indian Famine Commission of 1882, the central government instituted two other measures, the Land Improvements Loans Act of 1883 and the Agriculturists Loans Act of 1884, under which the government assumed responsibility for providing a part of the farmers' credit needs. Both are mainly enabling Acts which empower state governments to advance loans from state funds and to frame regulations governing their issuance. As its title indicates, the first-mentioned is intended to apply to agricultural improvements, while the second is concerned mostly with relief of distress. During the period of British administration, the amount of loans extended under these Acts was insignificant; in no year between the time of their enactment and 1940 did such loans exceed Rs. 10 million.

Reporting in 1931, the Central Banking Enquiry Committee estimated rural indebtedness at Rs. 9,000 million; a decade later the Re-

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serve Bank placed it at twice that figure. High agricultural prices during and after the second world war brought some relief, but, as an official enquiry into indebtedness in Madras Province revealed, their benefits were confined to the big and medium peasants. According to this survey, the total rural debt of the province, which was Rs.2,720 million in 1939, had fallen to Rs.2,180 million in 1945, or by about twenty per cent. If allowance is made for new debts contracted during this period for the purchase of land and for other productive purposes, the gross reduction in debt amounted to Rs.800 million, or about 37.6 per cent. Most of the reduction was due to sales of land, estimated at Rs.469 million; only Rs.247 million was attributed to the effect of higher prices for farm produce. Per capita debt had fallen from Rs.51 in 1939 to Rs.40.8 in 1945; the burden of debt, in real terms, however, had been further reduced to about one-third of the figure for 1939. The enquiry found, on the other hand, that most of the benefit had been confined to the larger and medium landholders (whose debts had decreased by forty and twenty-five per cent, respectively), that the position of the small holders had been affected much less (their debts having decreased by only twelve per cent), and that the situation of tenants and labourers had in fact deteriorated (their debts having increased by four and forty-six per cent, respectively).¹ Reporting on this matter in 1950, a central government committee observed: "While debts of large and medium landholders have been substantially reduced, those of small holders, tenants and labourers have not been reduced significantly."² Records of the cooperative movement indicate that since 1945 "fresh borrowings and outstandings have tended to increase rapidly".³

That the early legislation undertaken to meet the problem proved largely ineffective may be inferred from the spate of laws which followed the assumption of power by the Congress Ministries, first in 1937 and then in 1945. During this period almost every state government passed moneylenders' acts, whose main provisions govern licensing and registration of moneylenders, limitations on interest rates, and maintenance of accounts in prescribed form. Some informed observers think that the imposition of restrictions on the activities of moneylenders has had an adverse effect on the availability of rural credit because so few

¹ *Report of the Enquiry into Rural Indebtedness, 1946*, Government of Madras.

² *Report of the Rural Banking Enquiry Committee*, Government of India, 1950.

³ *Ibid.*

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other sources of finance exist. The honest moneylender does not consider it worth while to conduct business under the new regulations, while the dishonest one has devised devious methods for evading them. On the other hand, the government and the cooperative movement, even if they possessed the resources—as the latter certainly does not—do not command the administrative machinery necessary for coping with the problem of dispensing credit in millions of scattered villages. During the first Congress Ministries, attempts were made to reduce the burden of debt through conciliation and scaling-down measures, but the outbreak of the last war and the rise in prices of farm commodities were followed by a marked slackening of such efforts.

AGRICULTURAL credit in India is provided by the following agencies: the village moneylender, the cooperative movement, and the government. If marketing credit is included, the trader, the indigenous banker and a few joint-stock banks may be added to this list. Rough estimates of cultivators' total annual short- and medium-term capital needs are sometimes published. In 1951 the Reserve Bank of India estimated the figure at Rs.5,000 million. In its report published in June 1952, the Grow-More-Food Enquiry Committee appointed by the Government of India placed the figure at Rs.8,000 million, on the basis of Rs.60 per acre of wet land and Rs.20 per acre of dry land. Since no exact statistics are available regarding the shares of the foregoing agencies in the supply of credit, it is necessary to accept rough estimates in order to have some perspective for viewing the problem. The moneylender, then, provides, the bulk, perhaps as much as eighty per cent, of agricultural finance; the cooperative movement accounts for ten to fifteen per cent; and the balance is supplied by the other agencies. Complete statistics are not available on the extent of business done by moneylenders. As for the cooperative movement, which in recent years has made good progress, in 1950 there were in the Indian Union 116,534 agricultural societies, with a membership of 4,817,545, working capital of Rs.352 million, and new loans of Rs.180 million.

This over-all picture does not, however, reveal some of the dark spots. For one thing, only landowners may belong to cooperative credit societies; thus, tenants, who cultivate as much as half of the land in India, receive no direct benefit from the cooperative movement. Even amongst the landowners themselves, the small farmer derives little

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advantage from it. One investigator found that, of 674 loans advanced by land-mortgage banks in the Bombay Karnatak in 1949-50, only 2.8 per cent had been made to farmers owning five acres or less.⁴ A survey of the cooperative movement in Kodinar (Bombay State) found that one-third of its members were continuing to borrow from moneylenders despite the relatively high rate of interest involved. It was also discovered that, whereas the larger cultivators had been able to increase their assets by purchasing more land, smaller cultivators had sold some of their land after joining the cooperative societies. The average size of holding cultivated by small and medium farmers, while members of the societies, had declined from 9.3 to 4.3 *bighas* and from 18.5 to 16.5 *bighas*, respectively.⁵ Thus, in the area surveyed, the cooperative movement had been unable to provide the small farmers with sufficient credit facilities or to arrest the transfer of their land.

Although its direct contribution to agricultural credit is negligible, the government helps the cooperative movement through the Reserve Bank of India and through financial assistance to the provincial and district cooperative banks. The primary cooperative societies in the villages are financed by the district banks, and these in turn are financed by the provincial bank. In some districts which lack district banks, the provincial bank has its own branches. The Reserve Bank deals only with the provincial bank. The Reserve Bank Act has recently been amended in order to liberalise the terms on which credit may be extended to the cooperative movement. The Reserve Bank is authorised to afford the cooperative movement financial accommodation in the following forms: (1) Loans and advances against government securities, payable on demand or on the expiry of a fixed period not to exceed ninety days; these are subject to such limits and margins as the Bank may stipulate. (2) Loans and advances to provincial cooperative banks against bills of exchange and promissory notes of district (central) cooperative banks or marketing societies, endorsed by the provincial cooperative banks and drawn to finance seasonal agricultural or marketing operations or to rediscount such bills of exchange or promissory notes maturing within fifteen months. (3) Loans and advances on

⁴ K. N. Naik, "Co-operative Movement in Bombay Province", unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Bombay.

⁵ *Co-operation in Kodinar*, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, Bombay, 1951. One *bigha* is here equivalent to 0.59 acre.

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promissory notes of provincial or cooperative banks supported by documents of title to goods which have been transferred, assigned or pledged as security for a cash credit or overdraft granted by the provincial cooperative bank to a district (central) bank or marketing society for bona fide commercial or trade transactions or to finance seasonal agricultural or marketing operations. Most of these loans are extended at a rate of interest $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent lower than the bank rate. Since, in the absence of licensed warehouses, the cooperative movement has been unable to take advantage of the third of these provisions, many states have now arranged for the construction of such warehouses. In recent years, however, cooperatives have been making increasing use of the facilities offered by the other two provisions.⁶

Some state governments provide direct financial assistance to co-operative credit organisations. The Bombay government, for example, has contributed Rs.5 million to the share capital of the Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank, and has agreed to contribute in addition a maximum of Rs.2.5 million to the share capital of the district banks. To enable the provincial bank and the district banks to open new branches for the purpose of providing credit facilities to all credit-worthy borrowers, the Bombay government has also undertaken, for an initial period of three years, to subsidise the "uneconomic" branches to the extent of the actual deficit incurred by each branch, subject to a maximum of Rs.5,000. In return, the financing agencies are obliged to provide crop loans to their primaries at four per cent, so that the latter may offer their members loans at $6\frac{1}{4}$ per cent.

The government extends very little direct financial assistance to cultivators. Recently, to counteract the effect of stricter regulation of moneylenders' activities, the scope of loans under the Land Improvements Loans Act has been broadened to include contour bunding,

*Loans and Advances to
Provincial Cooperative
Banks by Reserve Bank
(Rs. million)*

<i>Year</i>	
1945-46	0.12
1946-47	0.15
1947-48	1.68
1948-49	10.26
1949-50	27.07
1950-51	53.78
1951-52	125.13

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construction of wells and installation of costly agricultural machinery, and the permissible maximum size of loans has been increased. In 1937-38, loans advanced by all state governments amounted to Rs.10 million; in 1950-51 the figure reached Rs.150 million. In Bombay State, the total of state loans rose from Rs.10 million in 1947-48 to Rs.65 million in 1949-50, and then fell to Rs.36 million in 1951-52. The recent notable increase in government loans is, however, viewed as a stop-gap arrangement, for the state governments have no intention of assuming full responsibility for directly providing all normal agricultural credit.

The provision of credit is of vital importance in achieving social mobility and a position of greater influence for the depressed sector of the agricultural population. Experience with recent measures of land reform has shown that the purpose of legislation may remain unfulfilled if the latter is not supported by appropriate credit arrangements. Thus, in the absence of financial assistance enabling tenants to purchase land, abolition of zamindari (landlord) tenure, undertaken with a view to transferring the proprietorship to statutory tenants, accomplishes no more than the substitution of the government for the zamindar as landlord. Under the Zamindari Abolition Act in Uttar Pradesh State, the government is to transfer land to certain categories of tenants only after they have paid a sum equivalent to ten times their annual rent. The Uttar Pradesh government has launched a drive to collect this amount, but only a small percentage of the tenants have been able to produce the necessary funds. In Madhya Pradesh State, where tenancy legislation provides for the purchase by tenant-cultivators of land at a reasonable price, (absolute occupancy) tenants can acquire proprietary (Malik Makboozas) rights from their landlords by paying an amount equivalent to three times their annual rent; but, although this provision has been in effect for two years, such purchases have been negligible. If the government is serious in its desire to make land available to the tiller, it will have to provide something more than legal authority. As experience with land reform in many other parts of the world has shown, improvement in tenure status is almost impossible in the absence of credit.

The only source of long-term credit, other than loans extended under the Land Improvements Loans Act, are the land-mortgage banks, most of which constitute part of the cooperative credit organisation.

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Their scale of operation is, however, extremely limited: in 1949-50 there were five central and 283 primary land-mortgage banks in the Indian Union. The primary banks had a membership of 186,330 and working capital totaling Rs.58.6 million; loans issued by them during the year amounted to Rs.10 million, and loans outstanding at the end of the year stood at Rs.53.4 million. Most land-mortgage loans are extended for the purpose of redeeming agricultural debts. Thus, nearly ninety per cent of the loans advanced by the primary banks in Madras and nearly fifty-four per cent of those disbursed by primaries in Bombay in 1949-50 were for the redemption of prior debts. Of late, efforts have been made to extend their scope by encouraging grants of loans for land improvements proper, such as sinking, construction and repair of wells, and bunding, and for purchase of costly agricultural implements. The banks are, however, reluctant to undertake this type of business because of a lack of trained personnel capable of assessing the soundness of proposals for land improvement submitted to them. Employment of such personnel would entail costs which might exceed the means of these banks.

THE problem to which no serious attention has yet been devoted is that of financing basically uneconomic low-income farmers, who do not represent isolated phenomena confined to distressed areas or the result of some emergency but are coextensive with Indian agriculture. If this group is afforded no other source of credit, it must rely on the moneylender, whatever his terms, and even knowingly acquiesce in the infraction of laws that have been enacted for its protection.

Little thought and less action have been directed toward the solution of this problem. Economists and administrators tend to regard co-operation as a panacea. Yet the cooperative movement, not without reason, refuses to shoulder the task of rehabilitation of this vast sector of the agricultural economy which, it maintains, cannot be achieved through the extension of credit, but requires instead an all-out attack upon all of the factors that are responsible for the depressed situation of this group, and which is therefore a task that can be performed only by the government. The Agricultural Finance Sub-Committee appointed by the Government of India in 1944 recommended the establishment of government-sponsored agricultural credit corporations, though not specifically for the rehabilitation of the low-income group.

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Subsequent committees and expert opinion consulted by the government have found this plan impracticable on the ground that government machinery is unsuitable for and incapable of maintaining constant direct contact with millions of borrowers in numerous tiny villages. In consequence of this inability of the government and the unwillingness of the cooperative movement, nothing whatever is being done to attack the problem. Yet, although each of these uneconomic farmers individually is an insignificant entity, collectively they are responsible for probably the bulk of agricultural production in India. So long as no planned and determined effort is made to solve one of their greatest difficulties—the unavailability of agricultural credit on reasonable terms—no substantial improvement is to be expected in agricultural production or, therefore, in the standard of living of the agrarian masses.

Any attempt to solve the problem of rehabilitation of low-income farmers so that they may play an active role in an efficient agricultural economy must seek an answer to two questions: what is the most suitable agency for the provision of credit to farmers in this group, and how can the ancillary rehabilitation measures best be integrated with the provision of such credit? The same agency will presumably be responsible for both credit and rehabilitation functions. With respect to the provision of credit, there are two possible alternative agencies—the cooperative movement or the government. Neither moneylenders nor private banking institutions are suitable for this purpose, though for different reasons: in view of the large element of risk involved in lending to the low-income group, moneylenders will insist on exacting a rate of interest so high as to be socially unacceptable, while the private banks are likely to regard the business as not worth the trouble involved. The cooperatives, too, consider the credit risk to be unacceptable and the responsibility for rehabilitation to exceed their proper function. The government, on its part, cannot divest itself of responsibility for rehabilitation, but considers the task, particularly that of providing credit at the farmer's end, to be beyond its administrative competence. The result is an impasse.

Since each of these institutions finds the task beyond its particular competence, the solution would appear to lie in the creation of suitable combinations. Thus, in the writer's opinion, there would be much to recommend in a partnership between the government and the

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cooperative movement in which the former assumed the risk and the latter the responsibility for administration. In addition, the government should authorise the cooperative movement to undertake such rehabilitation measures as improvement of tenure relations, consolidation of land fragments, soil-conservation projects and the like, for which an "independent" cooperative movement lacks authority. This arrangement would have two clear advantages: it would avoid bureaucratisation of the administrative machinery, and would make possible a comprehensive attack on the problem. It would, however, involve certain disadvantages as well. For one thing, it would require a partial surrender of independence by the cooperative movement—to which some psychological opposition exists. Moreover, partnership with the government might be considered objectionable from the point of view of its possible threat to the proper functioning of the cooperative movement. Yet it is doubtful whether an alternative procedure can be found. If, in the context under discussion, the inadequacy of *laissez-faire* procedures and the dangers of totalitarianism are understood, the creation of suitable machinery for the economic advancement of under-developed countries obviously requires an original approach. In these countries, government participation in rehabilitation must be vigorous and at the same time the administrative machinery must, as far as possible, be popular and neither bureaucratic nor government-controlled.

Suitably strengthened by government support, the cooperative movement should accept the responsibility for supplying credit to low-income farmers and for reinvigorating their economy. If these tasks are tackled simultaneously, the risk incident on financing such farmers will be to some extent reduced. The operation of the credit and rehabilitation organisation should be modeled somewhat on the lines of that of the Farmers' Home Administration (formerly the Farm Security Administration) in the United States, whose distinctive features include a thorough appraisal of each borrower's home and farm economy, provision of technical guidance for both, and extension of credit accompanied by supervision of its use.

The cooperative movement in India is more or less deficient in all of these respects. Requirements regarding credit-worthiness are very strict and often rigid and mechanical, but once credit has been extended, the only responsibility that remains is that of repayment. The

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cooperative society, for all practical purposes, comes in contact with the borrower only at the times that it sanctions the loan and, later, recovers the dues; in the interim the borrower is left to fend for himself as best he can. This system should be remedied in at least two respects: the credit-worthiness of individuals should be assessed more liberally, with credit restrictions being based on their long-term repayment potential rather than on the value of their fixed assets; and stricter, more sustained attention should be given to the affairs of creditors. The task of a credit organisation does not end—but in fact begins—with the extension of credit, for the continuing soundness of the borrower's over-all economy (including his home), and not merely regular repayments on pain of forfeiture, should be the concern of a credit agency endowed with a social purpose.

In under-developed economies, credit must serve not merely to oil the wheels of a going concern but to build up the economy—a much more difficult enterprise. Its administration, therefore, must be accompanied by an interest in improving the over-all economy of borrowers. An arrangement which assigns credit functions to cooperatives and rehabilitation functions to the government is both unnecessary and impractical. The two functions should be entrusted to a single agency, the cooperative movement, and wherever this finds the undertaking to exceed its resources or authority, the government should come to its assistance.

Bombay, September 1952

The Economics of Australian Immigration

Kingsley Laffer

BETWEEN July 1947 and December 1951, the population of Australia grew from 7,579,358 to 8,538,736, an increase of 959,378 or 12.6 per cent.¹ Of this increment, 49.2 per cent came from net immigration,² and the balance from natural increase. The average annual rate of growth of 2.8 per cent is exceptionally high, being greater than that achieved for any substantial period during the past century by either Great Britain or the United States, and appreciably higher than those in such Asian countries as India and Indonesia.³ It is considerably in excess of early postwar estimates of Australia's absorptive capacity, which put the rate at which increased population could be absorbed at two per cent per annum.⁴

The primary reason for Australia's immigration programme is the desire for a larger population to defend the country. Fertility trends in Australia before the end of the last war held out little likelihood that adequate population increases could be secured without immigration.⁵ Demographic trends were linked also to economic con-

¹ Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, *Monthly Review of Business Statistics*.

² Commonwealth Department of Immigration, *Statistical Bulletin*.

³ See W. D. Borrie, *Immigration: Australia's Problems and Prospects*, 1949, pp. 12-13, 68-70; D. B. Copland, *Inflation and Expansion*, 1951, pp. 46, 57.

⁴ See Borrie, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

On August 2, 1945, the then Minister for Immigration, A. A. Calwell, told the House of Representatives: "It has been proven by hard experience over long periods that the maximum effective population absorptive capacity of any expanding country is usually about 2 per cent of its numbers." The concept of "absorptive capacity" must, however, be relative to some acceptable standard of living, and although this has not always been clear, Australians, in discussing population problems, have in fact generally assumed that existing living standards must be at least maintained. (See Borrie, *op. cit.*, p. 7; D. B. Copland, Foreword to W. D. Forsyth, *The Myth of Open Spaces*, 1942, p. vi.) In all essential respects, Mr. Calwell's policy has been carried on by his successor in office, H. E. Holt.

⁵ On August 2, 1945, Mr. Calwell warned the House of Representatives: "In view of the alarming fall in the birth rate, and the decline of the average family from six children in 1875 to three children in 1925, and then to slightly over two children at present, our immediate problem will be to hold our population figures without some migration."

Recent changes in the Australian net reproduction rate are, however, of interest: 1939, 0.986; 1940, 1.004; 1941, 1.053; 1942, 1.056; 1943, 1.148; 1944, 1.176; 1945, 1.220; 1946, 1.328; 1947, 1.364; 1948, 1.326; 1949, 1.332. Although the rate was well above unity by the time that Mr. Calwell made his statement, demographic experts tended to base their calculations

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siderations through the effect of low prewar birth rates on the age-distribution of the population; the number of persons entering the working-age group had fallen and the population was aging at a time when man-power requirements for development were very great.⁶ These factors influenced the character as well as the volume of immigration and resulted in preference being given to essential workers in the selection of immigrants and the allocation of shipping priorities. On the whole, however, economic considerations, though important, appear to have played a part somewhat subordinate to those of defence. Nevertheless, there is a general desire to develop the country; and the above-mentioned interest in the increasing proportion of old people, as well as the use of the concept of "absorptive capacity", implies a concern that "standards of living" be maintained. It does not appear to have been claimed officially that living standards might ultimately be raised by immigration, but Sir Douglas Copland has expressed such a view: "ultimately you have the larger population through which the whole resource structure of the community can be more economically used".⁷

Some writers have stressed the connection between Australia's economic development and the needs of Southeast Asia. Thus, in urging that Australia borrow from the United States in order to expedite its development, Copland states that failure to do so would "hamper Australia in her efforts to discharge her new responsibilities in South-East Asia. She will be in a better position to assume leadership in that area on behalf of the British Commonwealth if she is working in the

on the low prewar rates. They regarded the higher wartime rates as an abnormal feature arising from the wartime increase in the marriage rate. (See Borrie, *op. cit.*, Chapter I.) In fact, as the figures show, net reproduction rates have since risen, and this notwithstanding a decline in the crude marriage rate from 10.6 per 1,000 of the population in 1941 to 9.23 per 1,000 (or approximately the 1939 level) by 1949.

⁶ In a statement to the House of Representatives on November 28, 1947, Mr. Calwell put the issue with his customary vigour: "The Commonwealth Statistician estimates that in the year 1940 Australia had 644,100 boys and girls in the 15 to 19 year-old age groups. Four years hence, in 1951, this total will have fallen to 516,400—a loss of 127,700 young Australians. . . . The significance of these tragic figures . . . is that the population of this vital, pulsating young country is slowly but inexorably moving into the upper age groups—that Australia, although only 160 years old, is becoming senescent. . . ."

On the basis of prewar net reproduction rates, Borrie (*op. cit.*, pp. 4-5) argued that, without immigration, the working population aged 20-64 would increase only from 4.15 million in 1940 to 4.86 million in 1980 and then decline to 4.75 million by 2000, whereas the over-65 group would increase from 0.51 million in 1940 to 1.06 million in 1980 and to 1.11 million by 2000.

⁷ Copland, *Inflation and Expansion*, p. 52. He does, however, give most weight to political and general developmental considerations.

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closest co-operation with, and is supported by, the far greater resources of the United States of America."⁸ Borrie, aware of the pressure of over-population and poverty in Asia, argues that "Australia may best serve the interests of Asia by a migration scheme that will give her a strong industrial economic system, rather than by throwing her doors wide open to all who wish to enter the country."⁹ Within the same framework of thought, Sir Frederick Eggleston, in defending the so-called White Australia policy, has stated a more specifically moral case for Australian immigration, namely, "that no country is entitled to hold a vast territory and vast resources simply to protect its cultural heritage, and that, in a world where areas are suffering from over-population, such a country is bound to increase its population to the potential limit at a reasonable rate".¹⁰

Immediate humanitarian considerations served to reinforce the desire for a larger population.¹¹ An easing of the shipping position enabled Australia to tap the large available supply of displaced Europeans, and the original planned annual immigration of 70,000, based on the estimated absorptive capacity of two per cent per annum, was exceeded from 1949 onwards. Net immigration rose to 149,270 in 1949 and to 153,685 in 1950, declining to 110,362 in 1951.¹² The existence of excess demand and the continuance of a severe labour shortage¹³ made this unplanned expansion of immigration readily acceptable not only to the government but also to business and labour. These and other organized groups had, however, been well prepared from the start by careful efforts to interpret the immigration programme to them and by enlistment of their cooperation in carrying it out.

It should be added that the administrative arrangements for publicising the immigration scheme, and for selecting and receiving im-

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁹ Borrie, *op. cit.*, p. 9 and Chapter VI.

¹⁰ F. W. Eggleston, "Australia's Immigration Policy", *Pacific Affairs*, December 1948.

¹¹ "Australia should on humanitarian grounds make some contribution to the relief of certain of the distressed peoples of Europe," Mr. Calwell told the House of Representatives on November 22, 1946.

¹² Fuller figures on net permanent immigration are as follows:

1947 (last half)	9,778	1950	153,685
1948	48,468	1951	110,362
1949	149,270	1952 (first half)	56,504

Source: Commonwealth Department of Immigration, *Statistical Bulletin*.

¹³ The labour shortage was widely regarded—almost certainly incorrectly—as evidence of unused absorptive capacity.

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migrants, are generally agreed to have been excellent,¹⁴ thanks in no small measure to the ability and enthusiasm of Mr. Calwell and his successor, Mr. Holt. The cooperation of the British government with regard to British migration to Australia also played an important part in the scheme.

IT is now necessary to consider the economic effects, both short- and long-term, of the immigration programme. Demographic and other effects will receive only incidental consideration.¹⁵ It is the short-term economic stresses and strains that have received most attention in Australia. The country emerged from the last war with a huge unsatisfied demand for capital equipment, houses and consumption goods on the part of the government, business and consumers, and with inadequate productive capacity to meet this demand. Political pressure for a reduction of taxation, a relaxation of wartime controls and a return to "normal" peacetime conditions virtually ensured the continuance of a state of excess demand and overfull employment. In the event, this situation was intensified by the direct and indirect effects on the economy of a boom in export prices, the export-price index (average 1936-37=100) rising to a peak of 690 in 1950-51,¹⁶ and farm incomes mounting from 5.6 per cent of the national income in 1938-39 to 25.0 per cent in 1950-51.¹⁷ An enormous rise in wool

¹⁴ See Sir Douglas Copland, "Australian Development and Immigration", *International Labour Review*, June 1951, for an account of these arrangements. See also Borrie, *op. cit.*, Chapter III.

¹⁵ For a discussion of the demographic effects, see W. D. Borrie, "The Demography of Post-War Migration", read before the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, August 1952.

¹⁶ The index reached 912 in March 1951. Fuller export-price index figures (excluding gold) are: 1938-39, 82; 1945-46, 148; 1946-47, 209; 1947-48, 296; 1948-49, 348; 1949-50, 399; 1950-51, 690; 1951-52, 492. (Source: *Monthly Review of Business Statistics*.)

¹⁷ See Commonwealth of Australia, *National Income and Expenditure 1951-52*. Fuller figures (in million Australian £) are:

Year	National Income	Farm Incomes	Farm Incomes as Percentage of National Income
1938-39	779	44	5.6
1945-46	1,293	148	11.4
1946-47	1,365	174	12.7
1947-48	1,752	359	20.5
1948-49	1,938	337	17.4
1949-50	2,293	472	20.6
1950-51	3,116	779	25.0
1951-52	3,238	431 ^a	13.3 ^a

^a Preliminary figure.

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prices to a peak of fourteen times the prewar level and the lack of any wool-stabilisation scheme were of dominant significance.

Within this period the "C" Series index of retail prices (1936-37/1938-39=1000) mounted to 2488 by the second quarter of 1952,¹⁸ mainly because of (a) a rise in the domestic prices of exportable products, (b) an increase in import prices as shown by the rise in the Commonwealth Bank's import-price index (1936-37/1938-39 = 100) to 375 in 1950-51, (c) excess demand, and (d) the reflection of these, and of the prosperity of the economy generally, in wage increases and further price-wage-price increases. Excess demand resulted in a wasteful spreading of resources, production delays because of shortages of materials and power, and a substantial over-development of less essential industries to the neglect of basic ones.¹⁹ Pressure on management to be efficient was slight and, in general, productivity failed to improve. Excess demand made possible the passing on of cost increases without adequate scrutiny. Externally, it helped to produce an excessive demand for imports that led to balance-of-payments difficulties.

The immigration programme undoubtedly contributed to this excess demand. Early popular discussions tended to stress the contribution of immigrants to the supply of labour while neglecting consideration of the increased consumption and investment demands for goods and services that would accompany their admission to the country. This conception of immigration as a deflationary force was certainly mistaken. For, while the high proportion of workers among the immigrants²⁰ may have ensured that the labour contributed by

¹⁸ See *Monthly Review of Business Statistics*. Fuller figures are as follows:

Period	Retail Price Index "C" Series
1936-37/1938-39 (average)	1000
1946-47	1309
1947-48	1393
1948-49	1528
1949-50	1669
1950-51	1906
1951-52	2337

¹⁹ See D. B. Copland, "Balance of Production in the Australian Post-War Economy", *Economic Record*, December 1949.

²⁰ In 1950, 73.7% of all immigrants were in the 15-59 age-group, compared with 60.1% of the native population, while in 1951 the percentages were 72.1 and 60.6, respectively. In 1950, 54.6% of all immigrants were workers, and in 1951, 52.1%, compared with 42.2% recorded for the native population in the 1947 Census. (See Commonwealth Department of

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immigrants has somewhat exceeded the amount needed to meet their consumption requirements, immigration has also created capital requirements, including both enlarged capacity for production of more consumption goods²¹ and development works of a long-term character necessary to provide for a growing population. When this investment demand stimulated by an immigration programme is taken into account, there can be no question that such a programme is, on balance, a strongly expansionary force.

It has been argued, however, that immigration provided special assistance to the Australian economy, since the obligation of displaced persons²² and of some other assisted immigrants to serve where directed for two years after arrival ensured that a large proportion of immigrants became employed where labour shortages were most severe. For example, Mr. Holt said that "former displaced persons are producing one-eighth of the bricks, one-eighth of the steel, one-fourth of the cement, and one-eighth of the timber in every new house we construct".²³ But the housing requirements of immigrants during the peak period of which Mr. Holt was speaking have been estimated at 40,000 houses, which have to be added to native requirements of 40,000 a year.²⁴ Displaced persons would need nearly half of the 40,000 immigrants' houses, or nearly one-quarter of the total new houses required. If there had been no immigration, the backlog of 100,000 dwellings would have been gradually overcome.²⁵ As it was, the housing shortage worsened, notwithstanding the special labour contribution to housing by displaced persons. Immigrant labour did sometimes alleviate labour shortages—as, for example, in domestic service—but it seems certain that in most cases the extra demands

Immigration, *Statistical Bulletin*.) Borrie points out, however, that the contribution of immigration to the working-age group was so small in relation to the total population that it was insufficient to prevent the proportion of the Australian population within this age-group from declining. ("The Demography of Post-War Migration.")

²¹ Mr. Holt, the present Minister for Immigration, has stated that "migrants provide each year from their own labour for their consumption requirements, but only one-sixth each year of their capital requirements." (*The Argus*, Melbourne, March 6, 1952.)

²² Displaced persons totalled 168,199 and, on the assumption that no departures took place, constituted 35.6% of net immigration between July 1, 1947, and December 31, 1951. (See Commonwealth Department of Immigration, *Statistical Bulletin*.)

²³ *Report of Proceedings*, Commonwealth Jubilee Citizenship Convention, Canberra, January 1951, p. 6.

²⁴ See P. J. Lawler in *The Impact of Immigration*, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, October 1950, p. 14.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

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arising from immigration did more to accentuate bottlenecks than the extra supply of labour did to relieve them. It must be remembered, moreover, that displaced persons were under contract for only two years and that many of them left for what they regarded as more congenial occupations when their contract periods were over, and sometimes before. The prevailing conditions of excess demand made this easy. From this standpoint there is more than a little circularity in the "bottleneck" argument for immigration. Immigration was necessary to overcome bottlenecks in industry where labour shortages were most acute; and yet, it contributed to excess demand, which in turn enabled immigrants in due course to move from more essential to less essential industries, thus requiring further immigration to replace them.

The magnitude of the stimulus to investment afforded by an immigration programme is not easy to estimate, particularly since the stimulus is not confined to the direct and indirect capital requirements of immigrants but makes itself felt also in optimistic estimates of long-term trends of demand. As for the direct and indirect capital requirements of immigrants, three different estimates—by Copland, Colin Clark and P. J. Lawler²⁶—give figures which work out at approximately the same result, namely, a capital requirement, at 1948-49 prices, of £1,200 per head of additional population. On this basis, the 1948-49 net immigration of 96,668 would have required a capital investment of £116 million, or 5.1 per cent of the gross national product of £2,270 million, and an intake of 100,000 per annum would have required 5.3 per cent. These percentages would be higher if the maintenance costs of the extra capital equipment were taken into account. Unfortunately, no great accuracy can be claimed for these calculations, which are mentioned here only in order to convey some idea of the magnitude of the capital requirements involved. They do show something of the expansionary effect of the immigration programme. On the supposition that, according to their numbers, immigrants required the same proportion of the gross national product in other

²⁶ See Copland, *Inflation and Expansion*, p. 59; Colin Clark, *Queensland Bureau of Industry Economic News*, May 1950; Lawler, *loc. cit.* Copland's figure is in fact £1,000, arrived at by deducting £250 from his calculated figure of £1,250 because of the possibility of more intensive use of existing equipment as population increases. Account has to be taken, however, of the new large works which must be begun but are not fully used at first. Clark's calculation is in terms of "international units" per person in work and has been converted to pounds per head of the population.

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years, the following percentages are arrived at: 1947-48, 1.5; 1948-49, 5.1; 1949-50, 8.8; 1950-51, 7.0; 1951-52, 5.5.²⁷ In the same years the percentages of gross investment in terms of gross national product²⁸ were as follows: 1947-48, 26.1; 1948-49, 22.1; 1949-50, 27.3; 1950-51, 27.9; 1951-52 (preliminary), 35.7. Even allowing for a substantial margin of error in the estimates of capital requirements, it seems clear that they have represented a substantial proportion of gross investment, especially in the years 1948-49, 1949-50 and 1950-51, and that their effect must surely have been to aggravate an already inflationary situation.²⁹

As noted above, however, the direct and indirect capital requirements of immigrants do not constitute the whole of the stimulus to investment arising from immigration. It is necessary also to take into account the investment begun in anticipation of future expanded demand from a growing population. Although the extent of this cannot be estimated, because of it the inflationary effect of immigration has certainly been much greater than was recognized in the discussions of capital requirements. Neglect of these effects through expectations has probably been the most serious weakness in Australian discussions of the immigration programme. The present Minister for Immigration has declared: "In an inflationary period, migration has added another factor of pressure, but we accept it as part of the price we must pay for the gains in development, security and stature that population increase brings with it."³⁰ This is a defensible point of view, but it is doubtful if it could have been held quite so confidently had the inflationary effects of immigration not been considered solely in terms of capital requirements.

THE movement of real wages during the period of large-scale immigration is of some interest. It has frequently been argued that immigration, by increasing the supply of labour in relation to capital, tends to depress wages. This argument, however, tends to ignore the needs of a

²⁷ Based on immigration figures from Commonwealth Department of Immigration, *Statistical Bulletin*.

²⁸ Based on figures from *National Income and Expenditure 1951-52*. See footnote 32, below, for fuller details.

²⁹ See R. J. Cameron, "Immigration and Labour Shortage", *The Australian Quarterly*, March 1950; H. W. Arndt in *The Impact of Immigration*.

³⁰ Holt, *loc. cit.*

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growing population and their effect on the demand for labour.⁸¹ Nevertheless, one would expect the large additional investment demands arising from immigration to result, at least in the short run, in a transfer of resources from consumption purposes and a fall in real wages. Indeed, gross investment, which was only 19.5 per cent of the gross national product in 1938-39, did rise to 27.9 per cent in 1950-51, while personal consumption fell from 70.0 per cent of the gross national product in 1938-39 to 56.8 per cent in 1950-51.⁸² As measured by the Commonwealth Statistician's index of real wages (adult males), however, real wages increased by 23.6 per cent between 1936-37/1938-39 and the last quarter of 1950, and by 13.7 per cent between 1946-47 and the last quarter of 1950, since which time they have fallen slightly.⁸³ This index, moreover, understates the true rise in real wages, for it is based on minimum rates for various occupations and does not include either overtime payments or payments above minimum arbitration award rates, both of which have been substantial in the postwar period. Within this period, furthermore, the working week has been reduced from forty-four to forty hours.

This somewhat surprising result has been made possible mainly by the very high level of imports since the end of the war. Up to June 1951 this was associated with the record prices which Australia obtained for its exports and the resultant movement of the terms of trade in its

⁸¹ See Julius Isaac, *Economics of Immigration*, 1947, pp. 200-09, for some discussion of this question, and B. S. Keirstead's distinction between the "real mode" and the "aggregate mode" in his *Theory of Economic Change*, 1948, pp. 109-10 and Chapter VI.

⁸² Based on figures from *National Income and Expenditure 1951-52*. Gross investment includes investment in stocks as well as in fixed capital equipment, and it has been assumed, somewhat arbitrarily, that half of the investment in motor vehicles is for commercial purposes. Fuller figures are given below:

Year	Gross National Product (GNP) (million £)	Gross Investment (million £)	As % of GNP	Personal Consumption (million £)	As % of GNP
1938-39	921	180	19.5	645	70.0
1945-46	1,502	231	15.4	886	58.9
1946-47	1,619	381	23.5	1,038	64.1
1947-48	2,019	528	26.1	1,259	62.4
1948-49	2,270	502	22.1	1,456	64.1
1949-50	2,715	741	27.3	1,661	61.2
1950-51	3,619	1,008	27.9	2,055	56.8
1951-52 ^a	3,841	1,371	35.7	2,456	63.9

^aPreliminary figures.

⁸³ See *Monthly Review of Business Statistics*.

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favour.⁸⁴ Since then, export prices and the value of exports have fallen greatly, but, notwithstanding import restrictions imposed in March 1952, the volume of imports has continued at a high, though now slightly falling, level. Australia has financed these by drawing heavily on its international financial reserves, which, after having been built up, mainly by private capital inflow, from £199 million in June 1947 to £843 million in June 1951, had fallen to £362 million by June 1952.⁸⁵ Under the Australian wage-fixing system, most wage-earners have had their minimum wages adjusted quarterly to changes in the "C" Series index of retail prices, and have received two special wage increases in addition on account of the general prosperity of the economy. Immigrants have received the same minimum wages and adjustments. Notwithstanding the extra investment necessitated by the immigration programme, very favourable terms of trade have made real wage increases possible, and the wage-fixing system has supplied the mechanism whereby the possibility has been realised.

THE long-run effects of immigration on the Australian economy are necessarily somewhat uncertain, but, because they could well be of considerable importance, some assessment of the possibilities must be attempted. In the following analysis it is assumed that Australia will maintain an immigration programme of 100,000 per annum, a number well below the peaks reached in 1949 and 1950 but only slightly below the intake of 110,362 in 1951 and the rate of 113,008 achieved during the first half of 1952. Within wide limits, however, the ensuing analysis does not depend greatly on the immigrant intake assumed, and the reader

⁸⁴ The relevant figures are as follows:

Year	Value of Exports		Value of Imports		Export Price Index ^a	Import Price Index ^a	Terms of Trade
	(million £)	As % of Nat'l Income	(million £)	As % of Nat'l Income			
1938-39	122	15.7	113	14.5	83	101	82
1947-48	406	23.2	338	19.3	296	272	109
1948-49	543	28.0	414	21.4	348	285	122
1949-50	614	26.8	536	23.4	399	307	130
1950-51	982	31.5	744	23.9	690	353 ^b	196 ^b
1951-52	676	20.9	1,053	32.5	492		

^aThe bases for the export and import price indices are 1936-37/1938-39 = 100.

^bPreliminary figure.

Sources: Commonwealth Bank of Australia, *Statistical Bulletin*; Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, *The Australian Balance of Payments, 1946-47/1950-51*.

⁸⁵ See *The Australian Balance of Payments, 1946-47/1950-51*; Commonwealth Treasurer, *Budget Speech, 1952-53, August 6, 1952*.

should readily be able to adapt it to a different assumption. It is convenient to defer discussion of whether the assumed rate of 100,000 is, in fact, likely to be maintained.

The first question to be considered is whether Australia can afford the capital requirements of this number of immigrants, which, as has been noted, would approximate 5.3 per cent of the gross national product. Inasmuch as in recent years the country has managed a gross investment of about five times this amount, while increasing real wages very considerably, provision of the required capital would appear to lie well within its means. It has, of course, been helped by the very favourable terms of trade; these have already deteriorated and, as a result of the decline in export income, the real national income has fallen. Moreover, a large margin for error must be allowed in the calculations of capital requirements. On the other hand, since the end of the war Australia has had to try to overcome a large accumulated capital shortage—and also for a time sustained a much higher rate of immigration than the 100,000 that is being assumed. Taking these factors into account, it seems unlikely that provision of the necessary capital need impose an undue physical burden on the Australian economy or put serious pressure on living standards.³⁶

Unfortunately, this is not the whole story. For one thing, the likely appearance of bottlenecks will make it difficult to produce adequate quantities of particular kinds of capital—houses, for example—and special measures may be necessary to overcome such shortages. In the second place, when capital equipment has to be imported, balance-of-payments difficulties may impose a limit, especially in the case of goods requiring dollars. This question is considered below. Again, it must be remembered that immigration induces investment to meet not only existing, but also anticipated, capital requirements. When the latter are taken into account, it is conceivable that even the physical burden of the investment induced by immigration at an annual rate of 100,000 might be substantial. Moreover, the difficulty of securing political acceptance of the fiscal and monetary measures and direct controls necessary to check inflation in a full-employment economy would be increased as more burdensome anti-inflationary measures became essential

³⁶ Colin Clark has even argued that, "after fully equipping our rising population and providing for an increase in standards of living, Australia should still have a considerable surplus for investment elsewhere". (*Sydney Morning Herald*, July 4, 1952.)

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because of the additional investment demands. Over a long period, investment would tend to come in spurts as periods of investment in anticipation of future demands were followed by periods of consolidation, and cyclical fluctuations difficult to check might occur unless direct controls over investment were maintained whenever there was a tendency for it to exceed existing capital requirements too greatly. One must conclude that, although the physical burden of the capital requirements of 100,000 immigrants per year does not seem to be excessive, the indirect repercussions might give rise to difficult, though not necessarily insoluble, problems.³⁷

Of great importance for the future of living standards in Australia is the possible effect of immigration on international trade. A natural increase of 112,000, together with immigration of 100,000, would add 2½ per cent to the population of 8,538,736 as of December 31, 1951.³⁸ It is unlikely that agricultural production can expand at this rate. During the period 1919-20/1947-48, the average annual increase in quantity of agricultural production was only 1.8 per cent. Even in the period 1919-20/1929-30, which was one of exceptional agricultural expansion because of an exceedingly active government policy in the settlement of returned soldiers and immigrants on the land, and one in which a large amount of land suitable for settlement was still available, the average annual increase in the quantity of agricultural output was only 2.9 per cent.³⁹ Now that areas of suitable new land are extremely limited,⁴⁰ and since closer settlement usually requires slow and costly developmental works to provide such facilities as irrigation, it would seem that Australia would do well to maintain an annual rate of increase of even 1.8 per cent for any substantial period of time. If an inflationary pressure of

³⁷ See D. M. Bensusan-Butt, "Investment and Immigration in Australia in the 1950's", *Economic Record*, December 1950, for a theoretical discussion of some of the issues considered above.

³⁸ See Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, *Monthly Demographic Review*. The natural increase in 1950 was 112,404, and in 1951, 111,433.

³⁹ Based on the following quantity index numbers of farm production from Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, *Production Bulletin*, 1947, Part 2:

Year	Index Number	Year	Index Number	Year	Index Number
1919-20	765	1927-28	1005	1945-46	1200
1920-21	868	1928-29	1109	1946-47	1159
1921-22	913	1929-30	1028	1947-48	1368

⁴⁰ See Forsyth, *op. cit.*, Chapters 5 and 6, for a discussion of the scarcity of suitable settlement areas.

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excess demand is allowed to reappear, then, because of the difficulty of securing political acceptance of adequate anti-inflationary measures, renewed shortages of farm labour and of other farm requirements will almost certainly make such a rate of agricultural expansion impossible.

It is therefore highly probable that the rate of increase in agricultural output will be much less than our assumed population increase of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The volume of exports per head may be expected to fall as increasing quantities of exportable foodstuffs are consumed by the home population. Export surpluses of some commodities, such as meat, could easily disappear within a few years.⁴¹ As exports fall, the volume of imports per head must also fall. This result would be avoided if the terms of trade improved as the quantity of agricultural exports declined. The terms of trade have, however, been exceptionally favourable in the postwar period and any substantial improvement, especially for Australia's main export, wool, can hardly be expected.⁴² The situation might also be alleviated by overseas borrowing, which might well prove unavoidable if essential equipment for development is to be secured from dollar areas. Indeed, Australia has already borrowed \$150 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for this purpose. Nevertheless, if exports per head continue to fall, eventual repayment of such loans may prove difficult, and even payment of the annual interest may become increasingly burdensome.⁴³ Overseas borrowing does not seem to offer more than a temporary expedient. The volume of imports per head appears certain to decline along with exports. Some imports will then either have to be replaced by less efficient home production or be dispensed with, and, other things being equal, average real income per head will fall. Increasing self-sufficiency and less efficient production within Australia of capital equipment and con-

⁴¹ T. H. Strong, in *The Impact of Immigration*, has calculated that to feed a population of eleven million (a figure which will be attained by about 1964 on our present assumptions regarding the rate of population increase) at existing standards, while maintaining export surpluses at postwar levels, the following percentage increases in production above the 1946-47/1949-50 levels will be required: beef and veal, 40; mutton, 58; lamb, 23; pigmeats, 78; eggs, 31; sugar, 28; citrus fruits, 61; dried grapes, 15; total milk, 37; wheat, 7; and wool, 5 to 10. See also T. H. Strong, "The Cold War and Primary Output", *The Australian Financial Review*, September 6, 1951; Research Service (Sydney), *Problems of Immigration and Industrial Development in Australia, 1951*, p. 64.

⁴² See W. A. Lewis, "World Production, Prices and Trade, 1870-1960", *Manchester School*, May 1952, for "guesses" concerning the future prices of primary products.

⁴³ Copland's suggestion (*Inflation and Expansion*, p. 29) that Australia may be able to export more meat to the United States is hardly a happy one, for it is the export surplus of this commodity that is likely to feel most severely the pressure of rising home consumption.

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sumption goods formerly imported from abroad are the price that Australia is likely to have to pay for a continued high rate of immigration.

The placing of immigrants in employment is likely to tell in the same direction. It is doubtful if many immigrants can be absorbed in agriculture, except perhaps to replace those of the native population who leave rural for other areas. The long-term trend has been for technical progress to reduce the number of people employed in agriculture,⁴⁴ and it would be surprising if even a major drive by the Australian Commonwealth and state governments to increase agricultural production could enable agriculture to absorb more than the high rate of natural increase in the rural areas themselves. Immigrants will almost certainly have to go into industry, developmental works or provision of services, and employment in these occupations may be expected to increase much faster than employment in agriculture. Again, an increasing predominance of the industrial sector of the economy seems likely, with the resultant production within Australia of goods that might be obtained more cheaply from abroad, and a fall in living standards below what they would otherwise be.

It is perhaps idle to speculate whether such a fall in living standards would be other than temporary. Possibly production for an ever-growing domestic market may give rise to economies of scale that will make large sections of Australian industry as efficient as those in countries from which Australia now imports. There is also much scope for increased productivity even at existing scales of production. One factor which may check such developments, however, is the tendency for a large proportion of immigrants to go to the states which already have the largest populations, viz., New South Wales and Victoria,⁴⁵ and for a large part of the population increases in those states to be concentrated

⁴⁴ See Forsyth, *op. cit.*, Chapter 3.

⁴⁵ In *Economic News*, March 1952, Colin Clark gives the following figures:

	<i>Total Immigration Increase</i> <i>Oct. 1, 1948, to Sept. 30, 1951</i> <i>(Percentages)</i>	<i>Distribution of</i> <i>Total Population,</i> <i>Sept. 30, 1951</i> <i>(Percentages)</i>
New South Wales	43.5	39.3
Victoria	25.4	27.0
Queensland	7.8	14.3
South Australia	7.9	8.5
Western Australia	10.0	6.9
Tasmania	3.6	3.5
Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory	1.8	.5

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near the large capital cities. For example, between June 30, 1947, and December 31, 1949, the population of New South Wales rose by 191,097, of which 106,030 lived in Sydney and suburbs and adjacent areas.⁴⁶ Increasingly serious social costs are resulting from expansion of the already over-crowded large cities, and these are bound to be reflected more and more in economic costs as the expense of providing basic services, such as transport, mounts. Some of these increasing costs will be borne by the community in general through taxation, and thus will be met only partly by rates and taxes levied directly on the city industries themselves. But, however they are financed, they must be counted against any economies of scale that are achieved. Greater decentralisation of Australian industry seems to offer the only way of avoiding these long-run costs of over-expanded cities, and it is possible that many proposals for decentralisation which are not considered worth while at present may be regarded in a more favourable light if considered from a long-term point of view. Continued immigration seems certain to make the question of decentralisation increasingly urgent.

Whether Australia will maximise its real income per head as an international trading economy with a small population specialising largely in agricultural production, or whether it will maximise it by increasing its population at the present rate and becoming more and more industrialised and self-sufficient, depends largely on the considerations discussed above. Account must also be taken of the fact that the Australian economy would be more susceptible to world trade fluctuations as a small agricultural economy than as a large industrial one. Probably the only conclusion that can be reached safely at present is that it is not at all certain, to say the least, whether immigration is to Australia's long-run economic advantage. It is likely that support for the immigration programme must continue to be based largely on non-economic grounds.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ *Official Year Book of New South Wales*.

⁴⁷ The issues discussed in this section may have some relevance to the question of the extent and type of future Australian participation in the development of Southeast Asia. In the first place, Australia's capacity to supply such foodstuffs as wheat and flour may be diminished by increasing home consumption and the probable resultant diminution of export surpluses.

In the second place, Australia's capacity to assist Asia with capital equipment for transport, light industries and other development may be affected. Industrially, Australia is ahead of the countries of Southeast Asia and may be expected to provide some types of equipment. In the short run, however, Asia's requirements will be competitive with Australia's own developmental needs, and it would seem that, at best, the amount of assistance given will be very limited,

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THE previous assumption that an immigration programme of 100,000 a year will be maintained must now be examined. While it is impossible to make a reliable forecast, some of the forces which may condition future government policy can be indicated. First, the likelihood of temporary economic difficulties is always present. Thus, as part of its anti-inflationary policy, in August 1951 the Commonwealth government modified the immigration programme by placing special emphasis, in the selection of immigrants, on the skills required for food production and defence. It also made the gesture of reducing the annual target from 200,000 to 150,000, although, since net immigration for the first half of 1951 was only 61,920, or below the reduced rate, this was of little significance. In July 1952 the target was further reduced, temporarily, to 80,000, this time because of growing unemployment and threatened economic recession.⁴⁸ The Labour Party in Opposition has attacked even this reduced target, thus departing from the "bipartisan" approach to immigration policy which had obtained since the programme was inaugurated. As the effect of immigration is undoubtedly expansionary, this latter cut is somewhat surprising. First to cut the immigration programme as an anti-inflationary measure, and later to cut it as a measure for combatting deflation, reveals a striking confusion of thought. It is clear that not only changes in economic conditions, but also political pressures arising from misunderstanding of the impact of immigration upon them, may bring about modifications in the immigration programme, though one would expect these to be of a temporary character

especially when considered in relation to Asia's huge requirements. In the long run, if an industrialised Australia succeeds in attaining a high level of productivity, it may achieve an exportable surplus of capital goods, though by that time Southeast Asia should itself be producing many of its own needs.

In the third place, as Australia develops industrially and produces more of each type of skill and a greater diversity of skills, its capacity to provide technical assistance to Southeast Asia should steadily grow. Technical assistance is likely to continue to be the most useful type of help that can be given. Whether it takes the form of loans of teachers or of training Asian students in Australia, it is cumulative in its effects. One person may train many others, and with a moderate amount of help of this kind Asia will be placed in a position to produce a large proportion of its own requirements, whether on the higher levels of technical expertness or on the lower administrative levels. Aid of this sort has the further advantage of being two-sided: Australia has many problems in common with Asia, and the experience which Australians obtain there will be of great benefit to Australia when they return. Technical assistance and teaching are not only the kinds of help that will be of most value to Asia because they enable the Asians to help themselves; they are also the kinds of help that Australia will be able to provide most easily on an expanding scale.

⁴⁸ See the statement by the Minister for Immigration, *Sydney Morning Herald*, July 25, 1952.

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as long as the fundamental objectives of the programme continued to be strongly held.

Secondly, the diminution in the supply of displaced persons, who constituted 40.2 per cent of total permanent arrivals in 1950 but only 8.8 per cent in 1951, has forced the government to look to other sources, particularly German, Dutch and Italian immigrants. Mr. Holt has recently held discussions with the Acting Director of the Provisional Inter-governmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe, with the object of securing financial assistance in the settlement of a small number of rural families from Europe on the land in Australia.⁴⁹ These changes suggest that adequate supplies of immigrants may not be available indefinitely. Moreover, there is an unconfirmed report that the British government is to reduce its financial contribution to the cost of bringing British settlers to Australia, though this need not reduce the number of such settlers.⁵⁰ Another factor to be watched is a slight increase in the number of permanent departures, from 12,271 in 1948 to 21,862 in 1951.⁵¹ Any serious increase would, of course, tend to reduce net immigration. Australians will recall that a substantial net immigration in the 1920s was followed by net emigration in the early 1930s.

Thirdly, continuance of the immigration programme is likely, as already noted, to result in certain longer-term stresses and strains. Reduced imports per head might exert pressure on living standards. They might also necessitate a continuance of import restrictions so as to ensure adequate imports of essential equipment and materials. Import restrictions might in turn give rise to other controls, such as allocation of scarce imports and control of their prices. Investment controls might be needed to check excessive anticipatory investment beyond immediate capital requirements. All of this is somewhat speculative. Nevertheless, the possibilities exist, and any reduction in living standards, or any maintenance of direct government controls on business, would be likely to produce increasing opposition to the immigration programme.⁵²

⁴⁹ Statement by Howard Beale, Acting Minister for Immigration, *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 20, 1952.

⁵⁰ See *Sydney Sunday Herald*, September 21, 1952, for this report and Mr. Beale's comments on it.

⁵¹ Commonwealth Department of Immigration, *Statistical Bulletin*.

⁵² Australia's acceptance of the objective of "full employment" may, however, in any case involve the maintenance of some direct controls. (See Kingsley Laffer, "Economic Controls under Full Employment", *The Australian Quarterly*, December 1951, for an account of some Australian discussions of this question.) It may also involve the continuance of import restrictions. T. C. Chang has argued (in his *Cyclical Movements in the Balance of Payments*, 1951,

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The effectiveness of such opposition would depend largely on the strength with which the original objectives of the programme were held. Of the defence aim, a widely-held, though one-sided, view is that "if numbers alone meant strength, the race would be lost before we began".⁵⁸ The demographic arguments outlined in the first section of this article are weakened by the maintenance of birth rates well above those on which the postwar forecasts of population decline were based. The argument that, as a more fully industrialised economy, Australia would be able to render greater assistance in the development of South-east Asia is less cogent now that the main emphasis in Australian participation is on technical assistance. There is much room for difference of opinion concerning the significance of these arguments, but it is enough here to say that, if strong opposition to immigration were to develop, they would be likely to attract much more public attention than has so far been the case. Supporters of the immigration programme might then have to rely much more than they have done hitherto on Sir Frederick Eggleston's moral case for immigration into Australia: "in a world where areas are suffering from over-population, such a country is bound to increase its population to the potential limit at a reasonable rate".

Chapter X) that because Australia spends a relatively high proportion of any increased national income on imports, the country tends in boom periods to incur a deficit in its balance of payments on current account. His analysis of the 1920s is amply confirmed by Australian experience in the 1940s, when import restrictions had to be imposed. Moreover, his argument is strengthened when the time lag between receipt of higher income from exports and the subsequent increase in imports is taken into account. These considerations may not greatly affect the above argument, however, for people are perhaps unlikely to distinguish between, on the one hand, import restrictions and controls which might arise in any case under full employment and, on the other, those arising as a result of immigration.

⁵⁸ R. K. Wilson in *The Argus*, May 6, 1952, p. 17.

Sydney, September 1952

NOTES AND COMMENT

The Status of the Chinese Minority in Thailand

THE Chinese constitute the most numerous alien group in Southeast Asia. Although vastly outnumbered by the rest of the population in any one of the Southeast Asian countries, with the exception of Malaya, the Chinese must nevertheless be regarded as comprising the most important segment of the population in this area, both because of their strategic concentration and also because of their ties with a China which is rapidly becoming an imperialistic force in the Far East.

Two factors can be seen as determining the future role of the Chinese population vis-à-vis the New China of the Communists: one, the success with which individual Southeast Asian governments win their allegiance by incorporating them and their descendants as equal members of the larger society of Southeast Asia; and, two, the extent to which the Chinese Communist regime is able to exploit the differences between the Chinese and their host countries, and to enlist these overseas Chinese in advancing its own imperialist ends. The second factor cannot yet be assessed, but an analysis of the policies of one of these governments can furnish insight into the probable operation of this factor in the future.

As one might reasonably expect, the true situation of the Chinese minority in Thailand cannot be correctly assessed on the basis of partisan statements alone. Not long ago the Chinese Communist government charged that the Chinese were being persecuted by the Thai government,¹ which promptly issued a denial of this charge and claimed that the Chinese are treated with the same justice and consideration accorded aliens of other nationalities. The truth lies in a middle ground between these two statements and must be sought through an examination of the circumstances which caused such statements to be made.

It should be recognized, first of all, that in a strictly legal sense the Chinese are not singled out for discrimination. No law has ever been enacted specifically denying to the Chinese in Thailand rights which are granted to other alien groups. On the contrary, the very laws which extreme partisans of the Chinese regard as tantamount to persecution are applicable to all aliens without exception. The Thai government has been careful to adhere

¹ Reported in the *Bangkok Post*, March 31, 1952, on the basis of a Reuters dispatch from Hong Kong recording a statement by Ho Hsiang-ning, Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission of the Peking government, in connection with the increase by the Thai government in the alien registration fee, discussed below.

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to this policy of impartiality both in the formulation and in the execution of measures which affect the Chinese.

The problem arises from the fact that the Chinese constitute the largest alien group in the country. The 1937 census reported the presence in Thailand of some 623,000 aliens,² of whom 524,000 were Chinese nationals. In other words, eight out of ten aliens at that time were Chinese. Because of considerable subsequent Chinese immigration, the proportion of Chinese nationals to other aliens is presumably even higher today. Consequently, the Chinese community is most affected by measures directed at aliens in general, a fact which official statements concerning their impartiality cannot hide. Moreover, since restrictions placed on aliens have always been concerned with activities in which Chinese are prominent, if not predominant, it is obvious that the Chinese, rather than aliens in general, are the prime target of these restrictions. Thus, despite official denials, it is reasonable to conclude that many government measures have been basically anti-Chinese, although the label of impartiality affixed to them should not be ignored.

Restrictive measures directed at the Chinese are not new phenomena in Thailand, although they have become both broader and more intensive in recent years. The domination by Chinese of the trade and commerce of the country, and their apparent failure to become assimilated to Thai society, have long caused Thai leaders to regard them with envy and distrust. In 1914 King Rama V, employing a *nom de plume*, wrote a long series of newspaper articles excoriating the Chinese in Thailand. The Revolution of 1932, which replaced the absolute monarchy with the present constitutional monarchy, brought to the fore ultra-nationalists who gave

² According to the definition employed in the Thai immigration laws, "alien" refers to a person not having Thai nationality. By law, persons born in Thailand are Thai citizens; thus, the alien population of Thailand comprises, for the most part, immigrants who have not been naturalized as Thai citizens. However, many Thailand-born sons of Chinese immigrants have claimed to be Chinese citizens rather than Thai citizens (mainly to avoid military service in Thailand), and this group must be included in the "alien" population. While making no distinction between a foreign national and an alien—a person is either a Thai citizen or he is an alien—the government does tend to distinguish between native-born citizens with Thai fathers, native-born citizens with alien fathers, and former aliens who have been naturalized as Thai citizens—setting up, as it were, three categories of citizenship as far as certain rights are concerned, particularly in matters of voting, standing for public office, and owning land. For example, persons born in Thailand of Thai fathers are permitted to vote and to stand for public office when they have attained the age of twenty years. Persons born in Thailand of alien fathers, and former aliens naturalized as Thai citizens, must also satisfy certain educational requirements (at the present time, they must have completed studies at a Siamese middle school). Naturalized citizens must in addition have resided in Thailand for ten years since the date of their naturalization before being allowed to vote or stand for public office in a municipal or national election. Except when otherwise specified, the restrictions mentioned in the following account refer only to non-citizens, that is, to aliens, and not to any category of Thai citizen.

this latent anti-Chinese sentiment expression in formal legislation. Some controls on the Chinese were introduced under the absolute monarchy, but the main steps in this direction were taken after the 1932 Revolution.

Prewar restrictions were directed at two specific targets: Chinese schools and Chinese economic activities. Since the early 1920s, the Chinese in Thailand have generally had their own schools, established as private institutions under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. The earliest government controls were designed to modify the exclusively Chinese character of these schools. In order to reduce the number of Chinese teachers brought directly from China, all private-school teachers were required to pass examinations in the Siamese language before being licensed. The Siamese language had to be used almost exclusively as the medium of instruction, with non-Thai languages, such as Chinese, limited to six hours, and later to two hours, per week in the case of primary schools. The government reviewed syllabi, schedules and textbooks, eliminating those influences which it considered an impediment to the pupils' assimilation of the new Thai national spirit. Whenever possible, the schools evaded these controls;³ yet failure to obey the regulations furnished the government with an excuse for closing down many schools and, finally, for eliminating the Chinese schools entirely. In the year 1937-38 a total of 197 Chinese primary schools and twenty secondary schools were in operation in Thailand. By 1941 no Chinese secondary school was known to be open in the whole country, and by 1944 the government had closed all Chinese primary schools as well.

The restrictions on Chinese economic activities were likewise outgrowths of the new nationalism or, the other side of that coin, anti-foreignism. At first, beginning about 1934, legislation merely sought to extend government control over business activities: businesses were required to register; signboards in foreign languages had to include Siamese translations; and commercial firms were instructed to keep their accounts in Siamese. These early measures were followed by legislation whose implicit aim was to curtail Chinese commercial enterprises and, at the same time, to create employment opportunities for Thai nationals.⁴ During the war years, when

³ Sometimes through the use of bizarre devices. One Chinese school in Bangkok installed a burglar alarm which, being rung at the approach of inspectors, permitted unlicensed teachers to hide. (Kenneth Perry Landon, *The Chinese in Thailand*, 1941, p. 272.)

⁴ According to Landon, during the late 1930s Chinese were eliminated from the production of salt and tobacco by the simple expedient of bringing both industries under government control. The right to own coastal vessels or to fish in Thai waters was restricted to Thai nationals. Not less than 75 per cent of the crew manning any coastal vessel had to be Thai. Aliens were forbidden to drive vehicles for hire. They were barred from selling food and drink on the premises of various government ministries. At least some Chinese butchers and meat retailers were replaced by Thai nationals. The government took steps to establish a number of cooperative

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the government was under the virtual dictatorship of Phibun Songgram, the present Premier, the Chinese found themselves excluded from a long list of occupations. A Royal Decree of 1942 provided that twenty-seven different occupations and professions were to be "reserved only to the Thais in all the localities throughout the Kingdom".⁵ In 1949 this was superseded by another Royal Decree, also issued under the aegis of Phibun, which reduced the number of restricted occupations but retained the principle of reserving certain occupations for the Thai people.⁶

With the exception of the 1949 Decree, there has been no formal legislation to curtail the economic activities of the Chinese since the end of the last war. Government policy has been to issue restrictions on aliens in ministerial regulations and directives, in which form they attract much less publicity but lose nothing in effectiveness. Often anti-Chinese practices are carried out as the personal policy of an official in the administration of his department, presumably with the tacit approval, if not the encouragement, of the government. Thus, Chinese are no longer chosen as retail agents of tobacco, wine, sugar or canned goods produced by government factories. Butchers' permits are not being issued to Chinese. The Ministry of the Interior has forbidden alien vendors of drinks or foodstuffs to sell or bring their goods into Ministry offices, and has instructed municipalities throughout the country not to permit aliens to monopolize stalls in food markets. It has been reported that aliens will soon be barred from selling cloth for use

societies in rural areas to compete directly with Chinese rice millers and merchants. (Landon, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-60.)

In the matter of hawking food and drink in government offices, and butchering and retailing meat, enforcement was weak. Apparently only when Thai citizens were able and willing to engage in the occupations reserved for them was the exclusion of aliens enforced. The restrictions remain on the books, however, and can be enforced whenever circumstances seem to warrant.

⁵ These occupations included the making, casting or selling of images of The Buddha; making or selling of bricks, firewood, charcoal or torches; manufacture of women's hats; cutting or tailoring of women's dresses; weaving wicker, with the exception of mats; manufacture of lacquer or *niello* wares; setting of Siamese printing types; making of fireworks, dolls or toys; manufacture of umbrellas; hair waving or hair cutting; and legal practice. Aliens engaged in hair cutting or in legal practice received one year's grace; those in any of the other occupations listed were given but 90 days.

⁶ The following occupations were reserved for Thai nationals: making or casting images of The Buddha; lacquer and *niello* work; driving tricycles, motorcycles or automobiles for hire; rice or salt farming; hair cutting; and Siamese type setting. Non-nationals engaged in any of these occupations received one year in which to find other employment. It was reported that many more occupations had originally been listed in this bill at the insistence of members of the National Assembly, but that, in consideration of the abilities and experience of the Thai people, the government had decided to remove most of these from the list finally included in the Decree. (*Liberty*, Bangkok, January 4, 1949; *Siam Nikorn*, Bangkok, February 4, 1949.)

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by Buddhist monks or as religious offerings,⁷ as well as from owning coffee shops, driving tricycles hired for the private use of others, or selling pork at retail. Aliens have been forbidden to serve as porters or hawkers in railway stations; these functions are being reserved for Thai nationals.⁸ In addition, members of the National Assembly have urged the government to promote the employment of Thais in the construction industry and in various skilled trades which are now largely in the hands of Chinese. The Ministry of the Interior is reported to be making a survey of commercial and industrial occupations in which aliens predominate, with a view to determining which may be suitable for Thai nationals to take over.⁹

The possibility of requiring all businesses to employ a certain proportion of Thai nationals has been considered for many years. Landon states that by 1940 the personnel of all factories, whether government-owned or private, had to be at least 75 per cent Thai, but it is doubtful whether this regulation was ever enforced. Early in 1950 Premier Phibun was quoted to the effect that the government planned legislation requiring every foreign firm, including small Chinese shops and restaurants, to employ a "certain percentage" of Thais.¹⁰ Again, in 1952 it was reported that a bill had been drafted for enactment by the National Assembly requiring every business to hire at least two Thai nationals. In one way or another, the government has made it clear to European firms that it does not favor their employment of Chinese aliens, and most have stopped hiring Chinese whenever possible.¹¹

Moreover, the government itself has begun to eliminate aliens from its own organizations. Early in 1952 the Ministry of the Interior ordered

⁷ On April 27, 1949, the Bangkok newspaper *Siang Thai* reported: "In order to preserve certain professions for the Siamese and in view of the fact that practically all coffee shops and establishments dealing in priests' robes and religious offerings are at present in the hands of Chinese, the government has ordered the Department of Public Welfare to issue regulations immediately restricting such trade by Chinese." Such regulations may have been issued, but the writer has seen no evidence of their enforcement.

⁸ Many of these restrictions on occupations should not be taken at their face value. Often they are not strictly enforced. For example, although the occupation of hair cutting has been restricted to Thai nationals since 1941, an official survey of Bangkok barbers in 1949 revealed that at least 62 per cent were Chinese. Moreover, despite the extensive nature of the restrictions, the Chinese have not been greatly disturbed in an economic sense, both because the restrictions have not thus far affected those occupations (such as, for example, retail shopkeeping, peddling, rice milling and vending, to mention a few) which provide the main economic basis for the Chinese community, and because the latter has been able to evade many of the restrictions.

⁹ *Hsing Tai Wan Pao*, Bangkok, February 23, 1952.

¹⁰ *Bangkok Post*, January 27, 1950.

¹¹ An informal survey of the three largest European firms in Bangkok in 1951 showed this clearly. The 600 employees of Firm A, a sawmill, included no Chinese; the 300 employees of Firm B (commercial) included two Chinese; and the 200 employees of Firm C (also commercial) included four Chinese. These firms are free to hire the Thailand-born children of Chinese aliens if these have retained their Thai nationality.

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the discharge of aliens unless these held jobs which Thai nationals did not want or could not perform. Regulations limiting alien employees to five per cent of the total in any government organization are promised, while the Civil Service Commission, going one step further, has been reported to be considering the desirability of banning from government organizations all persons of alien parentage.¹²

Within the last year or so, the government has encouraged official and semi-official organizations to reduce their dependence on alien (usually Chinese) firms in the interest of national security. Thus, the government-run railways will reportedly eliminate the use of alien-owned transport companies, such as trucking concerns, which might sabotage the transport system in the event of war. Alien-held leases of silos near railways stations are not being renewed when they expire, and the government announced in 1952 that aliens' dock licenses would not be extended beyond their expiration dates. The government is also said to be planning to allow its Thai Rice Company to monopolize rice exports, which have long been the province of Chinese firms for the most part.¹³

For a brief period after the last war, when the domestic and foreign affairs of the country were in a confused state and government controls were relaxed, Chinese schools, both primary and secondary, returned to life. At one time their number exceeded 450. In 1947, however, the government regained control of the situation. No Chinese secondary school was permitted to operate anywhere in the country, and other schools lacking proper permits had to close. By 1950 the number of Chinese primary schools had fallen to less than 300, and by the end of 1951 to some 244. In 1948 the Ministry of Education had announced that only 154 Chinese schools of all categories would be allowed for the entire country. This limitation has not been enforced, although its goal is gradually being approached as Chinese schools are closed for one reason or another and no permits are granted for new ones.

Following negotiations with the new Chinese Embassy, established in Bangkok in 1946,¹⁴ there has been some relaxation of the strict prewar

¹² *Trade News*, Bangkok, January 23, 1952.

¹³ It is perhaps worth noting that previous government plans for preventing Chinese firms from engaging in the rice trade have proved abortive.

¹⁴ Only since 1946 has Thailand maintained diplomatic relations with China. In that year the Chinese government opened an embassy in Bangkok and five consulates elsewhere in Thailand. After the Nationalists' loss of the mainland of China, the usefulness and prestige of their representatives declined sharply among the Chinese population in Thailand. The consulates were subsequently closed and the functions of the embassy have gradually been assumed by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok. This arrangement is not without precedent, since the Chamber often served before the Pacific war as an unofficial intermediary between the Chinese and Thai governments and performed for the Chinese in Thailand many

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language regulations governing instruction in schools. A private primary school may now devote ten hours a week to instruction in a foreign language (with at least eighteen hours weekly being given to instruction in Siamese), although schools which devote only six hours to Chinese are rewarded with a special government subsidy. Alien teachers are now allowed two years in which to pass an examination in the Siamese language, meanwhile being permitted to teach on a temporary license. But examinations are now stricter, re-examinations are more frequent, and no extension of the time limit is granted. For the second term of 1951, the government withdrew the licenses of more than eighty Chinese teachers because of their inability to pass the language examination.

The alleged intrusion of communism into Chinese schools has given the government additional reason to supervise their books and syllabi more closely than ever. Publications deemed to be communistic are banned; in 1951, twenty-two were forbidden in one notification. Teachers and schools suspected of disseminating communism have been deprived of their licenses, the teachers deported and the schools closed. These moves have occasioned no general outcry from the Chinese, such as occurred repeatedly before the war whenever the government clamped down on Chinese education. This failure to protest reveals the extent to which the Chinese community is split between pro-Nationalist and pro-Communist groups, whose existence prevents concerted action in matters involving the problem of communism.

BEFORE the war, the Chinese were not restricted in the areas in which they might live or engage in business. Although they, along with other aliens living in certain designated military areas, were forced to move elsewhere during the war, the Chinese were not segregated or interned as were other alien groups whose governments were at war with Japan, mainly because of their importance to the national economy and the physical impossibility of interning such a large population. Within the last year the government has begun to bar them from vital areas, apparently in an effort to protect national security, and at least one high government official has called for segregation of the Chinese.

Early in 1952 the government forbade aliens (i.e., Chinese) to live within ten kilometers of rivers, railways, bridges or dams. Later they were for-

of the tasks normally assumed by an embassy. Thailand has no official relations with the Chinese Communist regime.

The Chinese population of Thailand has come mostly from South China, principally from the vicinities of Swatow and Canton. Consequently, their strongest ties are with a region now under Chinese Communist control. With the collapse of the Nationalist forces on the mainland, some Chinese from Shanghai and other northern cities fled to Thailand, but these form but an insignificant percentage of the total Chinese population of the Kingdom.

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bidden to rent or "stay temporarily" in buildings adjacent to police stations.¹⁵ Officials have been instructed to purchase land if necessary from alien owners in these strategic areas and under no circumstances to renew leases of government land to aliens. A bill giving the government extraordinary powers, including authority to remove aliens from strategic areas, in the event of national emergency was approved by the National Assembly in February 1952. Chinese living in some provincial areas likely to be restricted under this bill have already begun to move elsewhere.

Perhaps the most serious manifestation of a latent anti-foreign sentiment masquerading as concern for defense needs occurred late in 1951, when a bill designed to oust all aliens from the Province of Bangkok and twenty-seven other provinces¹⁶ was introduced in the National Assembly. Under this bill aliens would have been "deported" from the restricted areas within sixty days after its passage. Since the Chinese are the most numerous alien group in Thailand and comprise almost half of the population of Bangkok itself, they would obviously have been the main sufferers from this measure. In the confusion of the government "coup" which dissolved the National Assembly in November 1951, this bill was forgotten. Yet the idea of segregation was not forgotten, and three months later the Director General of Police, General Phao Sriyanon, who is frequently mentioned as the most likely successor to Phibun as premier, stated publicly that the government intended to set aside a part of each province in which aliens would be forced to live. This procedure, he declared, was modeled on American policy in such matters.¹⁷

In addition to these residential restrictions, which for the most part are prompted by fears of a Chinese fifth column in the event of war involving Thailand and Communist China, the Thai government in recent years has discouraged the sale or rental of land to Chinese—apparently on economic rather than military grounds. Since 1943 the law has forbidden the purchase of land by aliens, with the exception of those whose governments have concluded treaties with Thailand specifically permitting ownership of immovable property. Inasmuch as China has no such treaty with Thailand, Chinese in Thailand have been legally unable to buy land for any purpose since the enactment of this land law. To be sure, Chinese and other aliens have often purchased land in the name of their wives or children who have Thai nationality, or through Thai friends. Yet even these loopholes are being closed, for the Chinese at least. Where land purchases involve children of Chinese aliens, officials in some localities now require the buyer to prove Thai ancestry for three generations, failing which the application

¹⁵ *Kuang Hua Pao*, Bangkok, April 19, 1952.

¹⁶ There are 70 provinces (*changwats*) in Thailand.

¹⁷ *Hsing Tai Wan Pao*, February 15, 1952.

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is rejected. According to reports from the Ministry of the Interior, all provincial governors have recently received a circular warning against land sales to Chinese through the intermediary of Thai nationals. The circular declared that land so purchased would be promptly expropriated.¹⁸

The Ministry of the Interior was reported in August 1951 to have warned Thai residents in certain provinces not to rent land to aliens for business purposes because, it was said, this would "make it impossible for Thai people to earn an independent living of their own in the future".¹⁹ The Royal Estates Department has been instructed not to renew alien-held leases of farmlands and to reclaim the land for use by Thai nationals. The Public Welfare Department, in announcing the completion of a low-cost housing project in Bangkok in 1951, informed applicants that in order to be eligible for occupancy of these houses not only must they be Thai citizens but their grandfathers must have been born in Thailand.

On May 1, 1947, the first immigration quota in the history of Thailand went into effect. It is noteworthy that, under this first quota regulation, Chinese were favored over persons of other nationalities. The annual quota for Chinese was set at 10,000, while that for other nationalities was only 200 persons each. When Phibun Songgram, the ultra-nationalist wartime leader, regained control of the government in 1948, he promptly announced that the Chinese quota would be reduced to 200. This lower quota has been in effect since 1949, but there are indications that, on one pretext or another, more Chinese than contemplated in the quota regulations have been allowed to become permanent residents of the country. Yet, partly because of the quota and partly because of the fortuitous sealing off of China by the Communist regime, Chinese immigration has diminished tremendously in recent years. In 1947 some 64,000 Chinese immigrants entered Thailand through the Port of Bangkok. In 1948 the total dropped to some 9,000, and in 1950 only 434 Chinese immigrants²⁰ (including 179 quota immigrants) were allowed to enter the country, according to official sources.²¹

¹⁸ *Sathianpab*, Bangkok, June 19, 1952.

¹⁹ *Hsing Hsien jih Pao*, Bangkok, August 31, 1952, quoting a dispatch from the provincial commissioner's office in Kanchanaburi.

²⁰ Under the Immigration Law, certain categories of immigrants are permitted to enter Thailand outside the quota. These include regular officials or employees of the Thai government; official representatives of foreign governments, and their families; United Nations personnel; former permanent residents of Thailand; children born to aliens while these were temporarily abroad; etc.

²¹ The number of Chinese immigrants allowed to enter Thailand each year has been further decreased by the device of permitting Chinese already in the country as temporary visitors to apply for quota numbers. Thus, the 1952 quota has been filled almost entirely from Chinese residents of Thailand: of the total of 200, 140 were residing in the country when assigned quota numbers, and an additional 60 residents were reported to be applying for the remaining numbers.

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THE various measures taken by the Thai government during the past two decades have presumably been based on a number of considerations—economic, political and military. The justification one hears voiced most frequently is that the Chinese population is an unassimilated lump in Thai society and, if not controlled, will eventually engulf the entire Thai people. Whatever the merits of this explanation, it is doubtful whether any of the government's restrictions, with the exception of that on immigration, has contributed to assimilation of the Chinese. Indeed, a contrary result is apparent. The Chinese are convinced that the Thai government is deliberately discriminatory, and the anti-Chinese feelings that have been officially displayed in the course of the past twenty years are being increasingly reciprocated by anti-Thai sentiment on the part of the Chinese. In reaction to measures which they consider unjust, they have tended more and more to seek assistance from their own associations, particularly the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and from the Chinese government.²² Instead of becoming a part of Thai society, therefore, the Chinese are bound increasingly to their own community institutions and to their homeland. The government's policy of excluding them from certain activities is producing an occupational separation of the two ethnic groups, and the recent trend toward segregation will, if persisted in, further impede assimilation.

It is not difficult to understand Thai apprehension of the Chinese, who appear to be making a Chinese colony of Thailand. The Chinese in Thailand are said to number three million (out of a total population of some eighteen million), if one counts as Chinese all who consider themselves Chinese rather than Thai, regardless of official nationality. On the basis of these figures, one-sixth of the population has a stronger sense of allegiance to a foreign country than to Thailand. Moreover, the local Chinese are concentrated in the urban centers and often in the vicinity of vital strategic installations, whose loss in the event of hostilities would cripple Thailand's defense efforts. Finally, the Chinese control the nation's economy through their position as middlemen in the rice trade and their predominance in wholesale and retail business throughout the country.

²² The Chinese usually go to their associations and to the Chinese Chamber of Commerce for a variety of services. In the past year the Chinese-language press has reported appeals to these bodies for the following services: to obtain bail money; to secure food, clothing or medical supplies for Chinese held in jail or awaiting deportation; to request the intervention of the association with police officials who may have refused to return certain important documents to an individual after having ordered him to produce them; to ask advice in the event that a Chinese school has been closed; to seek aid for an individual who has been arrested on what he considers to be a trumped-up charge; and so forth. The association or the Chamber acts in such cases as an intermediary between the individual and the government, seeking by the persuasion and personal influence of its leaders to obtain what is needed.

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Yet, greater insight in handling the Chinese problem is needed if the dangers envisaged by the Thais are to be avoided. The government has not always dealt wisely with the Chinese, as, for example, in the case of the recent increase in the alien registration fee. Aliens who reside in Thailand for more than six months must pay an alien registration fee. Because of the large numbers of Chinese aliens in the Kingdom, this fee has become an important source of government revenue. In 1952, without warning, the fee was suddenly raised from 20 to 400 baht per year, presumably as a revenue-producing measure to finance salary increases which government employees had just received. Here again, although the increase in fee applied to all aliens, it was the Chinese who were most widely affected.

Their reaction was instant and ominous. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce and various Chinese associations were deluged with pleas for intercession with the government for a reduction of the fee. For its part, the Chinese Nationalist government sought through diplomatic channels to secure a reduction. When these customary avenues of communication between the Chinese community and the Thai government failed to afford satisfaction, protest demonstrations were organized. Crowds of men, women and children, some numbering several thousand persons, gathered before the homes of certain National Assemblymen and government officials to petition for a reconsideration of the increase in fee. The police broke up several such demonstrations, one of which was marching on the Chinese Embassy, and arrested the leaders. In response to rumors that an even larger demonstration was to be staged in front of the National Assembly building to petition the King, the police throughout Bangkok were alerted and barricades manned by heavily-armed police were thrown around the Assembly building. Perhaps because of these precautions, the demonstration did not occur.

Despite repeated assurances from government leaders that a reduction could be expected, the government finally announced that the fee would stand at 400 baht. Some concessions were made, however, inasmuch as certain categories of aliens—those over sixty and under eighteen years of age and those unable to support themselves—were exempted from payment of the fee. Unfortunately, the damage to Chinese-Thai relations had been done. Nothing else in years has so roused the Chinese and evoked such unity among them. Whereas other measures previously directed at the Chinese community had touched only certain groups or classes, the increase in fee affected everyone and gave them a common grievance. Even the Nationalist and Communist factions forgot their differences to the extent of joining in protest. The plight of the poor was seized upon to demonstrate the callousness of the government in matters affecting the Chinese; and for the first time in several years there were public manifestations of the

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sharp hostility which seems to lie just beneath the surface of Chinese-Thai relations despite the apparent smoothness of face-to-face contacts.²⁸

It is doubtful whether the government has achieved its ends by raising the alien registration fee. In order to pay the higher fee, Chinese merchants have increased their prices, thus raising the cost of living and, in effect, nullifying the government salary increases. Moreover, in protest against the new fee, the Chinese have declined to sell or buy government lottery tickets, thus causing a weekly loss in revenue of several hundred thousand baht and leading to talk of further restrictions and penalties for Chinese on the part of the more anti-Chinese among government leaders.

Bangkok, August 1952

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
Peasant Colonization in Ceylon

ON the assumption that the reader is reasonably familiar with what may be called the geographical and historical background of peasant colonization in the Dry Zone of Ceylon, all that will be attempted here by way of an introduction to the problem is an answer to three simple questions.

First, just what is the "Dry Zone"? Ceylon extends about 220 miles from north to south; one can inscribe the ellipse of Ceylon inside a map of England. If one imagines the centre of a clock to be at Matale, in the middle of the island, then, roughly speaking, the Dry Zone is everything below about 1,000 feet swept out by a hand moving from nine o'clock around to six o'clock—in other words, the whole of the northern and eastern part of the island with the exception of the hillier areas. Thus defined, it comprises about two-thirds of Ceylon's land area.

Second, what are the characteristics of this Dry Zone? The Dry Zone was the seat of ancient Sinhalese civilization from very early times, possibly 700 or 500 B.C., until a period corresponding to the Middle Ages in Europe, when it decayed. Since that time the Zone has been, on the whole, sparsely peopled. There are, however, two areas which for a very long time have supported a fair number of people, namely, the Jaffna peninsula in the far

²⁸ Several clashes between Chinese and Thai have taken place since the end of the war, but most of them have been isolated incidents. The most serious of these occurred shortly after V-J Day, when the Chinese in Bangkok staged a huge parade in celebration of the Allied victory. China had been one of the victorious Allies; Thailand had been leagued, officially at least, with Japan. This demonstration was so charged with Chinese nationalism that it touched off riots and street fighting between Thai and Chinese, and turned some Chinese sections of Bangkok into battlefields on which scores of people were killed before the situation was brought under control.



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north (which is the homeland of the Ceylon Tamils, the descendants of people who perhaps for ten centuries or more have been coming over from India) and the Batticaloa Coast (where there is also a fairly dense Ceylon Tamil population but one which is confined to a narrow coastal ribbon). Parts of the rest of the Dry Zone are virtually unpopulated, particularly in the east and southeast. Elsewhere in the Dry Zone, especially in the North-Central Province, around the ancient capital of Anuradhapura, there are scattered villages, with jungle between them.

Why has this region been one of such sparse settlement? Undoubtedly the dominant repelling factor has been malaria.¹ Malaria was until recently endemic, in fact hyper-endemic, over almost the whole Dry Zone; and earlier attempts to persuade people to settle there failed because of it. Now, with the use of DDT, malaria is well under control, and the results are astonishing. If supplies of DDT can be maintained, no DDT-resistant strain of mosquito emerges, and people are not careless, then the malaria bogey may quite possibly prove to be a thing of the past. Another repelling factor has been drought.² The Dry Zone of Ceylon is climatically very much like the corresponding part of India across the water, the *Tamil Nad*, the Carnatic, which is a region of famine, largely because of recurrent drought; and, in fact, the ancient Sinhalese civilization, like the civilization of Madras, existed only because of irrigation. Most of the major irrigation works broke down during the period of the collapse of the ancient civilization, except for the smaller and simpler works which could be maintained by residual village communities. Then, locally, soil erosion, in fact loss of soil altogether, may have driven the population out and prevented it from returning. This may have been the case particularly in some of the eastern areas behind Batticaloa; it is very difficult to colonize them even with modern techniques, and it was impossible during the period from 1400 to 1930 or thereabouts. So, for all of these reasons, the Dry Zone has remained until recent times an area of comparatively few people.

The third question to be answered by way of introduction is this: what is the history of modern colonization schemes in the Dry Zone? They were started in 1932, very largely because of the inspiration and vision of the late Prime Minister, D. S. Senanayake. There was at the time a growing realization in Ceylon of the narrow basis of the island's economy, increasing landlessness because of the growing population, and mounting unemployment as a result in part of population growth but also of the general depression in the export industry which hit the island in the 1930s.

¹ See C. L. Dunn, *Malaria in Ceylon*, London, 1936.

² See E. K. Cook, "A Note on Irrigation in Ceylon", *Geography*, 1950, pp. 75-85; and B. H. Farmer, "Rainfall and Water Supply in the Dry Zone of Ceylon" in C. A. Fisher and R. W. Steel, eds., *Geographical Essays on British Tropical Lands*, London (forthcoming).

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Earlier work in the Dry Zone up to about 1930 had concentrated on restoring irrigation works (a great deal of which had been done during the British colonial period) and letting the peasant come back if he would. The results were disappointing in many areas, although in the southeast, and to some extent in the North-Central Province, people did drift from the Wet Zone into the Dry Zone. It was not very far to go to these regions, and there was a continuous movement of the frontier of settlement. But in other parts of the Dry Zone, particularly in Tamankaduwa, the District around Polonnaruwa and the site of many relics of really great irrigation works, people did not return. The works there were restored at considerable cost, but, because there were only some 200 or 300 people served by a major work which could easily supply thousands, the capital involved remained unremunerative. Malaria and distance from the established centres of population, together with a fear of conditions in the Dry Zone, kept people away.

There was, moreover, a further factor, a tenurial one. During the British colonial period until about 1930, the initiative in the alienation of new land lay with the individual. If a man wanted land and he applied to the government for it, the lease or outright grant was offered for sale by public auction; if he was successful, he got it. Clearly a peasant living down south would have no chance of getting land in the north under those conditions. He would not know about the land; he would not know how to set the administrative machinery in motion; and in any case he would not be able to put down the money and buy outright.

Aided colonization started about 1932. At first it was a matter of advertising the fact that land was available, and of aiding peasants on a fairly modest scale. This aid, to begin with, amounted to financial help with the clearing of jungle and with fencing, in addition to a monetary grant towards the construction of a house. Subsequently the scale of aid was gradually extended until today it is one of the most generous amongst similar projects anywhere in the world. For instance, the peasants have all of their jungle-clearing done for them; they move onto a farm that is completely cleared, with most of the tree-stumps dug up and most of the main ridges in the paddy fields put in, and with a house already standing; once installed, they receive a subsistence allowance for the first six months and various kinds of financial and material aid. In fact, one can argue that the scale of aid is now too generous.

A second line of attack on this Dry Zone problem was in the field of land tenure. The new order dates from 1935, when the Land Development Ordinance came into force. Under this measure the government takes the initiative: certain land is declared available, and is advertised in the area from which it is hoped to attract peasants; and the choice of colonists is

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made according to merit, not by public auction. The system of tenure is a kind of lease in perpetuity designed to avoid many of the evils of fragmentation and of mortgaging which tend to hang like millstones around the necks of peasants in Asia.

By December 1951 there were twenty-four colonization schemes of various sizes in the Dry Zone, many of them concentrated in the old *Raja Rata*, the old "Kings' Country" of the North-Centre, which is both more fertile and better equipped with ancient irrigation works than the East or South. The size of these colonies varied enormously: some of them had only fifty peasant families, while the largest (Parakrama Samudra) had 2,539 and was not yet at full strength. Altogether, these schemes involve some 8,700 families, or about 50,000 people, plus squatters. Squatters are cultivators, traders and others who have come in on their own initiative, for one of the results of colonization has been to dispel the Dry Zone bogey. People are no longer afraid to go there. In fact, the problem now is to find enough land for all of the thousands who wish to migrate. The colonization schemes embrace about 70,000 acres, of which some 44,000 are under paddy.

ANY analysis of the economic problems of Ceylon will show that, as for most Asian countries, three main types exist.⁸ There is first of all the internal *short-term* problem, the familiar one of providing for a population which has a low standard of living and of trying to raise that standard. What, then, can the colonies do about this? The second problem is the internal *long-term* one of a rapid increase of population. Ceylon has probably one of the highest rates of natural increase of any country in the world—at the moment about three per cent per year; this means that, with an estimated population in 1951 of some 7¼ millions, the present rate of increase is about 200,000 a year. What can colonization do about this? The third problem is the external economic problem. The central feature of this is that about ninety per cent of the island's exports by value consist of tea, rubber and coconut products. These are produced largely on estates which are divorced economically and socially from the general peasant life of the island. Ceylon has to import something like two-thirds of its food-stuffs and most of its requirements for clothing and manufactures. Clearly the ability of the island to feed and clothe its people and to provide them with amenities depends on the earnings of the three main estate products, the prices of two of which (rubber and coconuts) are notoriously unstable. What connection is there between peasant colonization and this rather unstable and narrow-based external economy?

⁸ For a general discussion of Ceylon's economic problems, see Sir Ivor Jennings, *The Economy of Ceylon*, 2nd ed., Madras, 1951.

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Probably seventy-five per cent of the island's population have a total yearly income in both cash and kind of less than £50. This figure is necessarily approximate, but incomes are certainly very low. In established colonization schemes the incomes are far higher. This at least shows that it is possible for Asian peasants, under suitable conditions, and using what are mainly still traditional methods of agriculture with simple ploughs and buffaloes or bullocks, to have relatively high money incomes. The author tried to collect information, as he went around the colonies, about both the money income and the general standard of living of the peasantry; and, generalizing from a mass of somewhat varied information, it seems true to say that the average colonist is able to sell between one-half and four-fifths of his total rice crop. The higher yield is to be expected, of course, if only because of the larger holdings. (In the colonization schemes the peasant normally has five acres of paddy, more recently four acres, together with three acres of "high", i.e., unirrigable, land, whereas the size of peasant holdings elsewhere in Ceylon is quite often one acre or half an acre, or sometimes even less.) When the colonist sells one-half to four-fifths of his paddy, at present prices it yields between Rs.1,000 and Rs.3,000, or roughly £77 to £230; so that the most efficient colonists on the richest land with the best systems of cultivation are, in terms of money, probably five times better off than most of the peasants in the villages.

That very fact, however, raises its own problems. In the first place, the peasant colonization schemes are tending to produce a class of richer peasants, and quite naturally the villagers, especially those in the small, Dry Zone villages nearby, are jealous of the prosperity of the colonists. This is one ground, in fact, for reducing the size of the colonist's allotment. In a big new scheme in the Gal Oya valley, in the East, the amount of paddy land allotted to each peasant has been reduced to four acres and that of high land to two acres, and there has been a certain amount of discussion about reducing the holding even further. Clearly, doing so would have a number of effects: it would reduce the disparity between the peasant in the village and the colonist; it would permit more people to be settled on the same amount of land; and, if only slowly and indirectly, it might possibly ease population problems.

For, as things are at present, with this very large holding of five acres of paddy and three acres of high land, a premium is put on the large family. This, of course, is not deliberate. What happens is that when, under present conditions, ten peasants apply for each available allotment, it is impossible to examine each man's record to learn objectively which is the best potential colonist. The administrator must, therefore, have some rule of thumb. He tends to say, "We will rule out all of the men who are reported to be

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poor cultivators"; and then, having to deal with the mass of applicants remaining, he tends to ask, "Which families are most likely to be able to cope with this large holding?" In other words, he must select the families with more than, say, five children over the age of ten or twelve who can work on the land, because experience has demonstrated that a childless couple is incapable of working the standard size allotment and that, even with two or three children, a couple finds it difficult to do so. Hence, the size of the holding puts a premium on large families. To be sure, peasants do not deliberately have a large family in order to qualify for an allotment; but, clearly, if it should become government policy to encourage parents to have fewer children, proper cultivation of allotments of the present standard size would prove difficult.

Another problem raised by the increased money income in the colonization schemes is that the rise in the material standard of living is by no means commensurate with the rise in money income. It is perhaps right that, in an Oriental society, this should be so, right that material standards should not be the only ones and that people should be able to burn their money on festivals, pilgrimages and rides around the country. Undoubtedly a great deal of the increase in the money income is consumed in such ways. The problem lies not so much here as in the fact that building and sanitation improvements and other capital investments in the holdings are not at all satisfactory in view of the colonists' relatively high money income.

Nevertheless, conditions in the colonization schemes do prove that under suitable conditions the peasant can eat well and produce a good surplus, and yet use what are basically traditional methods of cultivation. There is, however, much room for improvement in these methods.⁴ In other words, there is no real case, at least in this context, for cooperative farming, collectivization, indiscriminate mechanization or a number of the other remedies that are sometimes suggested by people who do not know Asia intimately. In addition to feeding themselves, these people can produce a sizable surplus for consumption elsewhere in the country. Great local variety exists in the amount of the surplus, but probably the average holding in a well-run colony can feed some fifteen persons altogether. That is to say, using round numbers and approximations, that the 9,000 colonists in Ceylon today can feed something like 135,000 people, and thus are making a substantial contribution to the food problem and to the general living standards of the island.

⁴ See B. H. Farmer, "Colonization in the Dry Zone of Ceylon", *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, 1952, pp. 547-64.

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THIS leads naturally to the second problem—the relation between colonization and a rapidly increasing population.⁵ The annual net increase in Ceylon's population at present is of the order of 200,000. On the basis of the rough calculation just made, something like 13,300 families must be settled in colonization schemes each year if colonization alone is to maintain peasant living standards and feed the annual increase in population. But during the four years 1947-51, only some 1,500 colonists per year (about one-ninth of the required number) were in fact settled. There will be more in the next few years because of the very big schemes at Gal Oya and on the Walawe Ganga in the southeast, but it is unlikely that during the next ten years the average number of families settled each year will be more than 5,000—in other words, less than half of the number required to feed the increase in population, to say nothing of raising the standard of living. The rest of the food, then, will have to be found through other ways of settling people on the land, by expanding existing villages, by increasing yields and possibly by industrializing and selling industrial products abroad. Colonization can make a substantial contribution, but it is not, as people in Ceylon sometimes aver, the complete answer to the problem of population pressure.

What of the future beyond the next ten years or so? The standard colonization scheme is based fundamentally on paddy, that is, on irrigable land. The major part of the holding is irrigable, the major part of the money income comes from the sale of paddy, and the major part of the peasant's food supply comes from rice. But even though the Dry Zone apparently has miles of empty spaces, the island is coming to an end of its easily irrigable land. Almost all of the major ancient irrigation works that can be restored have been restored. The Gal Oya and the Walawe Ganga schemes are not ancient works under restoration; they are completely new works, and, as a result, the capital expenditure per irrigated area will be much higher than elsewhere. And then, before very long, the ultimate limits will be reached; there is obviously a limit to the number of acres that can be irrigated, given the water resources of the island. Hence, the Ceylon government has wisely begun experiments in "dry farming", that is, in the maintenance of agriculture in the Dry Zone in areas which cannot be irrigated. Techniques are being developed which conserve water and soil, and which enable such crops as millet, sorghum and other grains to be grown regularly without recourse to artificial irrigation. Clearly, if the population of Ceylon is to go on increasing, and if the limit of easily irrigable land is being reached, some method of using unirrigable land will have to be developed.

⁵ See Irene B. Taeuber, "Ceylon as a Demographic Laboratory", *Population Index*, 1949, pp. 293-304.

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There does not seem to be much hope of extending the existing plantation industries and hence of increasing exports to pay for increased food imports. Moreover, because of demographic and political factors, it is not easy to see where the food imports could come from, even if exports of the three main products could be increased.

FINALLY, what connection is there between colonization and the externally oriented part of the island's economy? In the first place, there is not much direct connection, since the estate economy and the peasant economy of the island are separate elements in a dual economy, and the corresponding societies, too, keep fairly distinct. There is not, in other words, much direct competition for land. The estates are confined largely to the hills, while the colonization schemes are restricted to the lowland Dry Zone. There is a possibility of capitalist agriculture in the Dry Zone, on an experimental basis, but at the moment it does not look as though there will be any conflict for land between plantation agriculture on the one hand and colonization on the other.

The "estates" are, however, important to the colonies as capital formers. Most of the direct expenditure on colonization, that is, on restoration or construction of irrigation works, felling of jungle, building of houses, roads and so on, has hitherto been met by internal loans, floated in Colombo, the resultant funds being allotted to the ministries responsible for colonization. Almost all of the money obtained by these loans is bound to come, directly or indirectly, from plantation agriculture. The peasant does not tend to collect capital; or, if he does so, he puts it into equipment for his own farm. Most of the money, then, that is available for government loans comes directly or indirectly from the plantation industries. Additional capital for the maintenance of the colonies and for certain other purposes comes from taxation, and here again a very large proportion of the government revenue comes directly or indirectly from the plantation industries—for example, from export taxes on the main commodities or from income tax (which affects mostly estate owners or merchants connected with the estate industries). Accordingly, planters often complain that the government is sucking the blood of the estate owner for the sake of schemes from which he will not benefit. The estates and estate industries are bound to be the main internal formers of capital, at least until the day (which may never come) when the paddy farmers on colonization schemes and elsewhere are able and willing to save and to invest appreciable sums, or yield large sums in taxation. (A few colonists already pay income tax.)

The cost of establishing a colonist varies greatly from scheme to scheme, depending upon the extent of irrigation works, the difficulty of jungle felling, and so on. According to figures discussed by Sir Ivor Jennings, the average

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cost per colonist up to the end of 1947 was about £770.⁶ Today it is considerably more, possibly £1,000 or even £1,500. The scale of aid could be reduced, and such a course would offer other than purely financial advantages (especially an increase in the spirit of self-help and cooperation, now at a low ebb in the colonization schemes). In any case, it would appear that the maximum possible rate of capital investment is likely to limit severely the speed with which colonization can proceed, unless, of course, substantial external aid should be forthcoming under the Colombo Plan or some comparable programme.

The colonization schemes which the late Mr. Senanayake launched are thus playing a substantial part in the island's economy. They have probably supported approximately one-ninth of the annual increase in the population of Ceylon in recent years, and in the next few years may support as much as one-third to one-half of the annual increase, in addition to offering a wide field for agricultural, social and economic experimentation.

Another very important benefit is a psychological one. The success of these colonization schemes has given people in Ceylon confidence in the future of the Dry Zone. The files in government offices of twenty years ago and of today offer a remarkable contrast. In the 1930s there were frequent references to drought, to a very high death rate, and to the impossibility of making people stay settled in colonies. The whole project bristled with problems because of the difficulties presented by the Dry Zone and popular fears concerning them. Now all that has been dispelled, and the colonization schemes in the Dry Zone have given the Sinhalese a justifiable sense of achievement. This is mixed with romantic nationalism, the feeling that they are returning to the homeland of their ancestors and recreating the *Raja Rata* of the old days; but it has a solid basis as well. The people now have a sense of confidence in themselves, of ability to conquer problems, which has helped to overcome the colonial inferiority complex noted by foreign observers.⁷

One final point: Ceylon is fortunate to have room for the colonization of new land. Not many Asian countries have two-thirds of their area virtually unoccupied, even though settlement there presents many problems. Nevertheless, the shadow of overpopulation does loom in Ceylon, even if a little further ahead than in India or Pakistan or Java; and realization of this fact is growing in Ceylon. No conscious population policy exists as yet, but there is very lively appreciation of the need for one.

Cambridge, England, September 1952

B. H. FARMER

⁶ Jennings, *op. cit.*

⁷ See, for example, Guy Wint, *The British in Asia*, London, 1947.

Broadening Indonesian Horizons

IN recent years several publishing firms in Indonesia have given first priority to supplying the general public with information on numerous subjects of popular interest. In doing so, they have responded to a widespread desire for enlightenment concerning many things which, while lying beyond the scope of normal daily life, have nevertheless been drawn within the spiritual horizon of the relatively educated Indonesian.

The two companies that have been most successful in this respect were established during the period of Netherlands-Indonesian conflict between the end of the Pacific war and the transfer of Indonesian sovereignty. Even though both are now Indonesian firms, at least part of their success is probably attributable to the fact that both Indonesians and Dutchmen are associated in their management. The extent of their efforts to provide the public with books of general interest is indicated by the fact that one of them—Jajasan Pembangunan—has rented and re-equipped two railway carriages in order to serve the villages that lie along the railways of Java. In addition to selling books, the personnel attached to these carriages exhibit films of an educational and informational character. Plans for serving Sumatra with similar mobile units are reported to be approaching realization.

The books in question are all very much alike, since they are designed to meet a common demand for attractive, well-produced but inexpensive publications. The general practice is to publish books in series form, as in France. Although these series do not merit detailed discussion in these pages, since in the main they represent popularization rather than original treatment of their materials, it may be of interest to mention a few of them.

One such series, devoted to biographies, is published by the firm of Penerbit Djambatan in Djakarta and Amsterdam. These volumes, each of which contains about 125 pages and a few illustrations, deal with: Kartini, the first champion of women's emancipation in Indonesia (by Hurustiati Subandrio, the wife of the present Indonesian Ambassador in London); Sun Yat-sen, "Father of the New Chinese Republic" (by Y. C. Wu); Gandhi (by the Dutch writer A. Pleyzier, translated by A. Z. Ali); Nehru (by the Indonesian poet and essayist Hazil); Rizal, "Hero of the Liberation of the Philippines" (by the Dutchman F. W. Michels, translated by the Indonesian writer Amal Hamzah); Mustapha Kemal (by Suwirjadi); Franklin Roosevelt, "Defender of the Democratic World" (by F. W. Michels, translated by Amal Hamzah); Sayyid Ahmad Khan, "A Modern Muslim and Social Reformer" (by the Dutchman J. M. S. Baljon, translated by Amal Hamzah); and, finally, three other Indonesians—one the founder of the Indonesian nationalist movement, Dr. Soetomo (by Imam Supardi), and the two others

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opponents of Dutch rule in earlier periods, namely, Imam Bondjol (by D. D. Madjolelo and A. Marzoecki) and Teku Umar, hero of the Achinese war (by Hazil). The series is continuing.

The same publishing company has recently launched another series, entitled the "The World Around Us", which is to contain books on various Asian countries. Volumes which have already appeared include "Siam, Rice Granary of Asia" by A. Z. Ali; "Malaya, World Entrepôt" by Suwirjadi; "Burma, Vanguard of the Mongol Peoples" also by Suwirjadi; "China, Whirlpool of Asia" by Adinegoro; "Arabia, Heart of Islam" by A. Z. Ali; and "Pakistan, Young Muslim State" by Amal Hamzah. Each of these books is some 150 pages in length and includes a number of illustrations.

The firm of Jajasan Pembangunan has been widely complimented on its series entitled "Pustaka Sardjana" (Scientific Library), in which the following well-designed books have thus far been published: Harold J. Laski's *An Introduction to Politics* (translated by L. E. Hakim and Sanjoto); A. J. Wisse's "Public Finance" (translated by Parlindoengan Tarip; not previously published in other languages); J. B. Bury's *A History of Freedom of Thought* (translated by L. M. Sitorus); J. P. van Aartsen's "Economic Geography" (translated by Adnan Sjamni; not previously published in other languages); P. J. Bouman's "General Sociology" (translated by Sujono); and A. Teeuw's survey of Indonesian literature (translated from the Dutch edition as "Subject and Style in Modern Indonesian Literature" by Anku Raihul Amar gelar Datuk Besar). The series is continuing. Its relatively high standard makes it less attractive to the general public than the two series mentioned earlier; on the other hand, the fact that reprinting was found to be necessary very soon after publication indicates the extent of public interest aroused by even such books.

Also worthy of mention are several titles which Penerbit Djambatan has brought out independently rather than as part of a series. For example, Muhammad Yamin has added to his long list of publications a brief history of the American Revolution (*Revolusi Amerika*), which he recommends for study by Indonesian youth, although regrettably failing to specify in what respects the American example is relevant to the course of events in Indonesia. "Towards One World" (*Kearah Satu Dunia*), edited by Hazil, offers a lucid, factual survey of United Nations activities. An explanation of the aims and achievements of organized labor (*Sarikat Buruh; Membangunnja dan Tugasnja*), by the Dutch labor unionist J. G. Suurhoff and translated by Asmara Hadi, may help to counteract the effects of current communist efforts to exploit labor unions in Indonesia, although one cannot but wonder whether its cool-headed, rationalist arguments will prevail against communist slogans directed at the illiterate masses.

Noteworthy, too, is the "World Atlas" (*Atlas Semester Dunia*), pub-

lished by Penerbit Djambatan and edited by Adinegoro, Adam Bachtiar, W. F. Heinemeyer, J. E. Romein and Sutopo. This atlas, some 260 pages in length, is of the illustrated type and contains comments and beautifully printed illustrations in addition to clear and useful maps. Its introductory notes on geography and map-making in general are very helpful. The Western reader may be struck by the relatively little attention which the volume devotes to Europe and the Americas, but presumably its purpose is to provide a truly Indonesia-centered atlas—an aim which it achieves very ably. A few mistakes will require correction in a new printing: for example, a photograph of the citadel and Muhammad Ali Mosque in Cairo bears the caption "Al-Azhar University in Cairo, center of Muslim studies". Some improvement is possible in the language as well, especially with regard to terms which have simply been "Indonesianized" even where true Indonesian equivalents exist. Nevertheless, the atlas deserves widespread use.

Hilversum, September 1952

C. A. O. VAN NIEUWENHUIJZE

Philosophies of India

ZIMMER makes a sympathetic and unusual approach to a study of Indian philosophy in this posthumously-published volume.¹ The editor reports that the manuscript was found in various stages of completion and that toward the end the condition of the notes became so rough that the indicated frame had to be filled in with data from other sources. The reader will readily see how excellently the editor has done his work.

Zimmer's love of Oriental thought is well known. Both the average Orientalist and the Western philosopher have had difficulties in understanding Indian philosophy—the Orientalist because of a lack of training in metaphysics, and the philosopher because of the particular meaning that he assigns to philosophy. Zimmer was singularly free from these defects because he combined philosophical training with an acquaintance with the original texts of Indian thought from more than a philological point of view. Therefore he states emphatically that "there exists and has existed in India what is indeed a real philosophy, as bold and breath-taking an adventure as anything ever hazarded in the Western world".

His approach is not the usual one of tracing the development of Indian thought from the Vedic age to the classical period of the systems. His treatment of the philosophies of India is neither chronological nor exhaustive;

¹ *PHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA*. By Heinrich Zimmer. Edited by Joseph Campbell. New York: Pantheon. 1951. xvii, 687 pp., illus. \$6.

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some important systems are not even considered, and certain of the key doctrines of logic and metaphysics of other systems are not dealt with. The chapter on Jainism, for instance, ignores the doctrine of *maybe*, and the account of Buddhism contains no discussion of the doctrine of dependent origination. Zimmer stresses the practical motive and seems uninterested in theoretical metaphysics. This is probably the explanation for his devotion of so much space to legends and biographies, descriptions of the Jaina images, and histories of the Buddhist kings, and for his statement that "the gist of Buddhism can be grasped more readily and adequately by fathoming the main metaphors through which it appeals to our intuition than by a systematic study of the complicated superstructure, and the fine details of the developed teaching".

Zimmer classifies the philosophies of India under two heads: those of time and those of eternity. The philosophy of success, the philosophy of pleasure and the philosophy of duty constitute the first group, which are discussed in their order. The classical systems of Indian philosophy, orthodox and heterodox, with their sources belong to the second group. All of them have a common aim: liberation from the cycle of time. Of these systems, Zimmer selects for consideration Jainism, Sankhya-yoga, Brahmanism, Buddhism and Tantra. Throughout he maintains a delightful, lively style. The work is full of telling phrases, difficult terms are skilfully explained, and symbols and myths are interpreted with understanding. Yet, he seems to have erred in certain respects which require mention, not for the purpose of belittling a work so well done, but to ensure that not all of his statements are taken as true simply because of his admiration for Indian thought and culture.

Zimmer's most serious error is his clear-cut distinction (where none exists) between pre-Aryan or non-Aryan and Aryan elements in Indian thought and practice. "The history of Indian philosophy," he writes, "has been characterized largely by a series of crises of interaction between the invasive Vedic-Aryan and the non-Aryan, earlier Dravidian styles of thought and spiritual experience. The Brahmins were the principal representatives of the former, while the latter was preserved, and finally re-asserted, by the surviving princely houses of the native Indian, dark-skinned, pre-Aryan population" (pp. 218-19). He does not attempt to prove this thesis; he takes it for granted. To him Aryan, Vedic, Brahman and orthodox are synonymous, as are what he considers to be their opposites: non-Aryan, pre-Aryan, Dravidian and heterodox. He fixes upon certain doctrines as Aryan-Brahman, and characterizes the others as non-Aryan. The worship of the gods through ritual and the belief that all is one spirit, Brahman, constitute, according to Zimmer, almost the whole of the Aryan orthodox tradition. The rival non-Aryan, heterodox tradition rejects the authority of the Veda and is

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materialistic, realistic, pluralistic and pessimistic. Not only Jainism and Buddhism, but also Sankhya and Yoga, are heterodox, in Zimmer's opinion, and do not accept the authority of the Vedas. The Tantras, again, which have so profoundly influenced popular Hinduism, have their roots in the non-Aryan, pre-Aryan, Dravidian soil; they emphasize the matriarchal principle as against the patriarchal scheme of the Vedic, strictly Aryan tradition.

The radical distinction drawn by Zimmer between so-called Aryan and non-Aryan thought is, in the reviewer's judgment, arbitrary and unwarranted. It is true that several racial strains have intermingled on Indian soil, giving rise to a composite culture. But it is as futile to attempt to separate these strains as it is to seek to distinguish the waters of different rivers after they have joined the ocean. Some of Zimmer's reasons for regarding a particular teacher or thinker as Aryan or non-Aryan will not bear scrutiny. For example, from the description of the colour of child Parsva as blue-black, Zimmer concludes that the Jaina teacher was a scion of the non-Aryan, aboriginal stock of India. Rama, the hero of the *Ramayana*, is said to have belonged to the pre-Aryan nobility because he was descended from Ikṣvaku, the mythical ancestor of the legendary Solar Dynasty, and *ikṣvaku* means "sugar cane", suggesting a background of plant-totemism. A similar fate awaits Krishna, who, because he was born not of a Brahman but of a Kshatriya line, is branded an aboriginal. It is, again, unreasonable to regard all doctrines other than those relating to Vedic worship and Advaita-Vedanta as non-Aryan. Traces of most of the doctrines listed by Zimmer as Dravidian are clearly to be found in the earliest Vedic hymns and the Upanishads. Zimmer himself recognizes that there were not merely crises and conflicts between Aryan and non-Aryan ideas, but also synthesis and harmonization. He refers, for instance, to "a coalescence of the two traditions" and to "the majestic harmonizing systems of medieval and contemporary Indian thought". Only he does not sufficiently realize that the history of Indian philosophy is the history of a grand synthesis and not that of a continual crisis. It is true that there has been differentiation of Indian thought and belief into various schools, creeds and cults. But alongside and underlying it has been a process of unification and integration.

The philosophies of India are, for the sake of convenience, classified into two groups: orthodox and heterodox. These terms, however, are fluid and are by no means equivalent to Aryan and non-Aryan, respectively. In the conventional sense, "orthodox" means "acceptance of the authority of the Veda". But, in fact, each system is orthodox from its own point of view, and heterodox from the standpoint of what is opposed to it. In the conventional sense, Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaiseshika, Mimamsa and Vedanta are the six orthodox systems, and Carvaka, Jainism and Buddhism are

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the three heterodox systems. Zimmer is clearly wrong in classing Sankhya and Yoga with the heterodox group.

There are several factual errors and misinterpretations in Zimmer's book, but considerations of space permit the noting of only one. The chapter entitled "The Philosophy of Success", which seeks to expound the Indian theory of politics, draws its material mostly from Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. And, even here, stress is laid on statecraft and not on the general principles and practice of government. What results, therefore, is an unrealistically dark picture which is neither true to fact nor faithful to theory. The impression that one gains from Zimmer's account is that India was ruled by successive sets of despotic princes and princelings who struggled among themselves for overlordship and oppressed their people. "Intrigue, conspiracy, distrust, treachery, was the very atmosphere of the royal court"; "any form of government by the mandate of the people was unknown". The rule that prevails in politics is "the law of the fish", "the law of life unmitigated by moral decency, as it prevails in the merciless deep". Success, not righteousness, is the motive of political action relating to internal as well as to external affairs. Lakshmi, it would seem, had nothing to do with virtue, but only with politics and the turn of the wheel of time. Moral and religious considerations, matters of ideology, and common spiritual tradition do not have a place in the conduct of nations. Any federation of the states of the world would then be impossible. Therefore Zimmer characterizes the Indian philosophy of politics as a blank pessimism, untouched by any hope or ideal of progress and improvement. He is universalistic enough to own that in the West, too, the rule of "the big ones eating the little ones" prevails. But he seems to think that despotism is an essential part of the political philosophy of Asia. "What is going on to-day in a large portion of the world would seem, in the light of this book [i.e., Kautilya's *Arthashastra*]," he observes, "to amount to a total Asiatization of political affairs, both international and domestic."

It is unfortunate that Zimmer should have relied upon one book, and have overlooked certain aspects of political philosophy presented therein. It is untrue that there is no place for righteousness in the secular affairs of a state. Zimmer himself recognizes this in his chapter on "The Philosophy of Duty", in which he quotes the following statement from the *Arthashastra*: "Whatever Sovereign, even one whose domination extends to the ends of the earth, is of perverted disposition and ungovernable senses, must quickly perish." The law of the fishes is not prescribed in the *Arthashastra*, which merely describes what obtained in the state of nature, i.e., before the political state was formed, and what would happen in the absence of a sovereign. As Kautilya puts it, "In the absence of the wielder of punishment, the powerful swallows the powerless." If everyone were

Correspondence

perfect, there would be no need for government or for a machinery of punishment. Sanction, then, is the basis of a political state. A ruler in office personifies this sanction, but the ruler as an individual is as much subject to it as every other person. Several instances to illustrate this could be found in the epics and even in Indian history. So, the sovereign can be a despot only at his peril. The goodwill and consent of his people are essential to his remaining in office. Though, in form, the ancient Indian polity was monarchical, in practice there was a good measure of democracy in it. As between different states also, it is not the teaching of the Indian philosophy of politics that the rule of the beasts should prevail. Harmony, concord and peace constitute the goal not only of Indian spirituality but of Indian polity as well. *Rama-raja* in the epics, the empire of Asoka as it was ordered after the king's conversion, and the mission of Mahatma Gandhi in our own time are glowing examples of the grand ideal for which India stands in politics.

Madras, September 1952

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

Correspondence

TO THE EDITOR OF *Pacific Affairs*:

I have recently completed a year's study in the Philippine Islands, where I was engaged on a research project in agricultural geography. Since the results of my findings and my personal beliefs are so diametrically opposed to the ideas stated by Mr. Thomas McHale in his discussion of "Problems of Economic Development in the Philippines" in the June 1952 number of *Pacific Affairs*, I consider a rebuttal to be in order.

Unfortunately, Americans, wherever they study conditions in the Orient, too often are prone to assess problems and remedies in terms of the American "way of life". I believe this to be a general failing of much of the United States foreign aid program in the Far East. Southeast Asians, and Filipinos in particular, do not possess the same wants or desires that Americans do, nor do they have the American philosophy of material culture. I believe that any economic betterment program in the Philippines must be accomplished within the framework of present Filipino social life and organization.

Without possible contradiction, it can be categorically stated that the Philippine nation is basically an agricultural country; at least, it has been such in the past and is so at present. Today agriculture continues to furnish the bulk of the national income in respect to both domestic and export production. Perhaps as much as ninety per cent of the total population of the

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Philippines is directly or indirectly dependent upon agriculture as its main source of livelihood.¹ A reorientation program aimed at changing this basic system of livelihood representing such a heavy preponderance of the population can only meet with an unsurmountable inertia problem.

Agricultural developments in crop yields, in intensive cultivation practices, and in areal expansions of the present agricultural regions offer tremendous potentialities in the fields of economic endeavor within the cultural framework of the Filipinos. Philippine crop yields are all below world averages. In large part these low yields are only the direct reflections of the anachronistic tendencies of the rural Filipinos. Rural education, crop and seed selection, plant breeding and fertilization programs are not widespread in their practice today.

In addition, large areas of the public domain remain untouched by the plow. Estimates place the percentage of potentially arable lands in the Philippines at about fifty per cent of the total land area.² Of this area, not more than fifty per cent (probably much less) is in active cultivation today.³ A long-range agricultural program could envisage at least doubling the present area under cultivation.

The objection that increased acreages will be offset by increased mechanization is open to dispute. Lowland rice, which is *the most important crop* in the Philippines, does not lend itself to any form of mechanization. Plans to change basic landownership patterns—i.e., from small, individually-owned, diked rice paddies to a more extensive cultivation—cannot hope for fulfillment unless fundamental (and unpopular) landownership changes are introduced. Expert claims that the average Filipino rice farmer can farm three or four hectares (seven to nine acres) of rice land largely ignore the basic philosophy concerning increased work held by many of the uneducated farmers. Surplus productions hold little attraction. Once immediate necessities have been provided, additional earnings seldom are of influence. This does not imply laziness, but rather a different philosophy and an easily satisfied life. In the rural areas, changes can be made only gradually, if at all.

Rapid industrialization, on the other hand, is confronted by serious handicaps. Development of light fabrication industries manufacturing products for which the Philippines are well equipped is very necessary. However, most industries lack three elements which, when considered together, virtually preclude their development on a sound basis. These three deficit elements are:

¹ Alden Cutshall, "Problems of Landownership in the Philippine Islands", *Economic Geography*, January 1952, p. 30.

² Cutshall, *op. cit.*, p. 35; R. G. Hainsworth and R. T. Moyer, *Agricultural Geography of the Philippine Islands: A Graphic Summary*, 1945, p. 49.

³ E. H. G. Dobby (*Southeast Asia*, 1951, p. 323) gives fifteen per cent of the total land area as cultivated. Hainsworth and Moyer, *op. cit.*, give thirteen per cent as cultivated.

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(1) a lack of skilled man-power reservoirs, (2) a lack of fuel and power resources, and (3) a lack of raw materials. Physical resources for modern industrialization in the islands are either totally lacking or insufficient in quantity. Commercial fuel resources are almost nonexistent: petroleum appears to be completely lacking; coal is both limited in quantity and of a quality inferior for coking purposes. Although water resources are potentially available in tremendous quantities, they are very unreliable owing to the extreme seasonality of river discharge. Large deposits of low-grade lateritic iron ore are present in the island of Mindanao, but their utilization involves major technological problems. Many valuable minerals are present in quantities sufficient to ensure a minor mineral exploitation economy, but modern industrial development requires extensive use of iron ore and of coal or some other form of power.

Another handicap under which an industrialization program would labor is the unwillingness of Filipino capital to invest in fields other than land-ownership. In the course of three hundred years of Spanish tutelage, an enemy occupation and an unstable political regime, the Filipinos have learned that only land represents a sure investment. Prestige lies in ownership, not of money, but of land.

Separately each obstacle to industrialization can be overcome to some extent, but collectively they pose a problem of tremendous size.

I believe that a light industrial program is desperately needed to balance the Philippine economy, but at the same time I am convinced that it does not offer an over-all solution to Philippine economic woes. Rather, I would suggest an intelligently-planned and well-administered agricultural program aimed at; (1) opening up new agricultural areas; (2) correcting current low crop yields through education, research, irrigation and the application of modern techniques, such as fertilization, plant breeding and seed selection, crop rotation, etc.; (3) diversification of crops for the purpose of achieving agricultural self-sufficiency; and (4) raising the social position of farming as a profession so that young people will be encouraged to participate.

State College, Pennsylvania, September 1952

FREDERICK L. WERNSTEDT

To THE EDITOR OF Pacific Affairs:

I should like to offer several comments in reply to Mr. Wernstedt's communication concerning my article.

I agree that "economic betterment" should be achieved within the context of a "Filipino" rather than of an "American" social and cultural environment. The crucial point, however, is whether this environment is to be regarded as static or dynamic. There can be no doubt that Philippine society has expanded as far as numbers are concerned; the population has greatly increased in re-

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cent years, and its natural rate of growth continues to be very high. An additional factor is the change in the nature of Philippine culture and society, whose average economic goals have altered significantly.

Generalizations about cultural values involving "work", "the future" and prospects for technological change are dangerous because they are likely to serve as over-simplifications and as excuses for not analyzing a complex socio-economic problem in all of its ramifications. That Philippine cultural values differ from those of the United States and other industrialized nations is both apparent and understandable; yet, such differences are present in all Asian agrarian societies, as they were in pre-industrial Japan. Their existence need not preclude the possibility of change.

There is no dispute concerning the possibilities of (a) an extensive expansion of the cultivated land area in the Philippines and (b) increased area yields of all major crops. The argument is not that these are impossible but that they will not in themselves solve the basic economic problem—increasing unemployment and under-employment. Since Mr. Wernstedt does not agree that labor demands on increased acreage can be offset by more mechanization, greater efficiency or larger individual landholdings, the following points may be relevant to this discussion.

All major Philippine crops other than lowland rice lend themselves to mechanization. They account for roughly sixty per cent of the land now under cultivation, and most of the land still to be brought under cultivation is suitable only for such crops. Increased mechanization of agriculture without concomitant economic changes providing alternative employment for displaced labor is theoretically unfeasible if one considers the total Philippine economic picture. However, the present state of mechanization and recent trends in this respect must be considered. Thus, according to a United Nations report,¹ there were 2,100 tractors in the Philippines in 1951, as against 1,300 in 1948. The total number of tractors in the entire Far East was 23,600, or one for every 12,900 hectares of arable land. In the Philippines there was one tractor for every 2,500 hectares, or five times the average figure for the Far East as a whole and by far the highest for any Asian nation considered. Despite the attendant problems, mechanization appears certain to increase steadily in the Philippines.

Most observers believe that the average landholding is too small to support a farm family. Few would argue that this situation is due to any desire on the part of the farmer to limit the area that he may cultivate.

Mr. Wernstedt mentions three major obstacles to Philippine industrialization. The first, lack of skilled man-power reservoirs, assumes that one must train people in skills before such skills are needed and before there is any

¹ "Tractors in the Far East", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 19, 1952, p. 788.

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certainty that they will be used. History has demonstrated that the development of industrial skills accompanies rather than precedes the development of industries. With regard to the second obstacle, lack of fuel and power resources, it is true that petroleum and coking coal do appear to be totally lacking. Known reserves of low- and medium-grade coal are, however, fairly extensive; and, if needed, charcoal from ipil-ipil wood can be produced in large quantities as a substitute for coke.² Water power, despite limitations due to seasonal flows, nevertheless offers interesting possibilities for expansion. Regarding the third obstacle, lack of raw materials, there is no reason why the forest, coconut and hard-fiber resources of the Philippines, which are among the most extensive in the world, cannot be utilized industrially. Even the basic elements of a steel industry are present: charcoal as a substitute for coke has already been mentioned; Philippine high-grade iron ore is at present being used by the Japanese steel industry.

If one accepts Mr. Wernstedt's thesis that the social energies of the nation should be directed toward agricultural self-sufficiency and a strong commercial agriculture, one must then be prepared to accept also: (1) the perpetuation of a colonial type of economic relationship between the United States and the Philippines, (2) continuation of the trend toward smaller average landholdings, (3) a lower standard and level of living than at present, and (4) the consequences of increasing unemployment.

² See Thomas Hibben, *Philippine Economic Development: A Technical Memorandum*, Manila, 1947, p. 26.

Manila, September 1952

THOMAS R. McHALE

BOOK REVIEWS

MAO'S CHINA. Party Reform Documents, 1942-44. *Introduction and translation by Boyd Compton. Seattle: University of Washington Press, in cooperation with the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. 1952. lii, 278 pp. \$4.50.*

THIS book is an important source for an understanding of the Chinese Communist Party. A very clear introduction of fifty-odd pages explains the origin of the documents that have been required reading for Chinese Communist Party members since 1942. The Party expanded very rapidly after 1937 and came to control several scattered base areas among which communications were poor. Control was, of necessity, highly decentralized, and unification of Communist policy could be obtained only by a unification of Communist ideology. These documents represent the type of thinking which the leaders wished to inculcate in the Party in order that the directives of the leadership should be correctly understood and implemented by the widely scattered Party organisation. All Party members were required to join in study and discussion groups based on these documents, which are, therefore, the best possible evidence concerning what might be called the super-ego of the Chinese Communists—the way in which they like to think that they think. Mr. Compton's translation has managed to combine a high degree of accuracy in rendering the Chinese text with a result that is readable English.

The introduction notes that Liu Shao-ch'i "couples an overorganization of material with a periodic disorganization of thought", and the documents reveal Liu as a much more doctrinaire type than Mao Tse-tung, who combines his Marx-Leninism with common sense and touches of humour. But even in Mao Tse-tung's contributions there are curious contradictions. For example, the lecture entitled "The Reconstruction of Our Studies" is devoted to an attack on subjectivism—the attitude which tries to deal with the problems of China in terms of an abstract study of the Marxian classics. As against this, Mao advocates the slogan, "seek the truth by referring to fact". "We should start with actual conditions . . . and derive, not concoct, the inherent regulating laws. . . . If we are to do this, we must not rely on subjective thought, enthusiasm, or books, but on objectively existing facts and on an intimate knowledge of materials, drawing correct conclusions from these facts and materials." In most of the lecture Mao seems to be stating a case for combining Marxism with a scientific attitude. But then, in the last paragraph but one, he suddenly offers a panegyric on *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, "the highest synthesis and summary of the world Communist movement in the last hundred years, a model for the union of theory and practice; in the whole

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world, this is still the one perfect model". From almost everything that has been said before, one might have expected Mao to condemn this work as an example of what to avoid—namely, distortion of the facts to fit a preconceived view.

It is, perhaps, in these contradictions that the Cheng Feng documents are most revealing of Chinese Communist thinking. There was a real contradiction in the Chinese Communist position. On the one hand was a genuine devotion to the Chinese people which, to be effective, demanded thinking in the scientific, empirical tradition. On the other hand was a quasi-religious devotion to the Soviet Union and to the Leninist tradition of Party infallibility. There is no reason to suppose that Mao was making conscious reservations when he advocated scientific thinking, but he always seems to draw back when one might expect scientific thinking to lead him to implied criticisms of the Soviet Union or the Leninist tradition.

The result was that a great deal of Cheng Feng was ineffective. The warnings against treating Communist literature as a sort of magical sacred text simply became part of the corpus of sacred literature and did very little to change the completely uncritical attitude towards any document connected with the Party. For example, in 1945 the reviewer was shown the English translation of a report on public health work which calculated the economic waste from bad health in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Region by multiplying together annual births, average food consumption per person per year, and life expectancy at birth. The report had passed through the hands of a number of cadres, none of whom had been ready to think for a moment and say, "This really is nonsense."

Mr. Compton mentions the differences between the Cheng Feng movement at Yen-an and in the front-line areas. These were the natural result of different environments. Most Party members at the front were engaged in definite practical jobs under competitive conditions, provided by the Japanese, which encouraged scientific, empirical thinking. Yen-an was very largely a study centre in which emotional life centred on political questions and in which the problems of the real world exerted only an indirect influence on purely mental developments within the Party.

By now the elements of Cheng Feng which advocate scientific, critical thinking have become almost purely conventional formulae. But it is still true that the most effective criticisms of present Chinese Communist policy could be made in terms of the principles to which the Chinese Communist Party is still officially committed. For example, an application of the principle, "If you have done no investigating, you have no right to speak", would at once eliminate most of the material on world affairs that now appears in the Chinese press.

Canberra, August 1952

LINDSAY

Pacific Affairs

EASTERN TURKESTAN (in Turkish). By *Mehmet Emin Bugra*. *Istanbul*. 1952. 96 pp. TL.2.

OWEN Lattimore's book on Sinkiang, *Pivot of Asia* (1950), certainly the most up-to-date description and analysis of recent developments in Central Asia, utilizes almost all available reports by foreigners and Chinese, and tries to afford an objective picture of events which were often extremely complicated; but, because of the peculiarities of the materials used, it treats Sinkiang mainly as an object of Chinese and Russian politics. Unfortunately, accounts by native inhabitants of Sinkiang are very scarce, even for those parts of the nineteenth century in which independent governments existed there. (*Oriens*, Vol. 4, 1951, contains a preliminary note on some unpublished manuscripts written in Sinkiang in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and preserved in Ankara.) Mr. Bugra's book, written for the general public, is therefore of value since the author participated in some of the major events of the last twenty years. It is the report of a native of a country which has fought for national independence against Chinese and Russian encroachment.

Its most valuable parts recount the events of the years 1933-34 and 1946-49. In 1933-34 Mr. Bugra headed the nationalist government which he and certain friends established in Khotan. In his opinion, the main reasons for its collapse were Russian interference in favor of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, rivalries between the nationalists and General Ma Ch'ung-ying, the leader of the Tungans, and dissensions of a personal character among the nationalists themselves.

The following years witnessed deep Russian penetration during the rule of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Mr. Bugra stresses this side of Sheng's activities more than Lattimore does, and gives the names of Russian generals and advisers who were active in Sinkiang at the time. He and some of his friends were in Afghanistan in these years, while others—probably those described by Lattimore as "pensioners of the C.C. clique"—stayed in Chungking, where they published such journals as *The Voice of Turkestan*, *T'ien-shan* and *Altay*, which, although quite rare, deserve attention. The latter group sent missions to Turkey and other Near and Middle Eastern countries in the early part of the second world war, and established contact as well with their compatriots in Kabul, with the result that Mr. Bugra went to Chungking. In September 1945, the Chinese government brought him and others to Urumchi, where, in June of the following year, a Turkish-Chinese government, taking account of the general situation, replaced Mesud Sabri with Burhan, a Russian Tartar. Until September of that year, Mr. Bugra served as minister of reconstruction and vice-governor in the Sinkiang government, as he had served as minister in Mesud Sabri's government. Meanwhile, under Burhan's leadership, the familiar tactic of fifth-column pene-

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tration from within was initiated, with the result that the communists gained the ascendancy and liquidated the former intellectual, political and economic leaders of the country.

Mr. Bugra's report adds several details to Lattimore's description of events, especially on the Ili movement and the situation in the Tarbagatai area. His remarks on economic and technical developments also supplement the few details which Z. V. Togan gave in his booklet "The Situation in Turkestan Between 1929 and 1940" (Istanbul, 1940) and, particularly, Lattimore's data.

Berkeley, California, August 1952

W. EBERHARD

RED CHINA'S FIGHTING HORDES. By Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg, USA. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Company. 1951. 378 pp., illus. \$3.75.

MANY books on China have devoted space to the Communist Army, but Colonel Rigg's is the first dealing solely with this subject to be made available to the public. The writer, whose first-hand knowledge of the Chinese Communist forces began in 1945 in Manchuria, has drawn upon a wealth of material, ranging from the military essays of Mao Tse-tung and assessments of the Communist Army by the commander-in-chief of the Nationalist forces to contributions from a number of United States sources, documentary and other. He describes vividly the iron grip and relentless drive of the Communist rulers, emphasizing the integration of the Army with the non-military administration. It is perhaps inevitable that his account, though cast in narrative form, should resemble a textbook; moreover, in several places the distinction between fact and opinion is hardly discernible. Nevertheless, the picture presented is impressive. Clear descriptions are afforded of the Communist leaders and of the People's Liberation Army, its weapons, training, strategy and tactics, and the influence of the years of guerrilla warfare is clearly traced. Ever since the formation of the Weihaiwei Regiment in the early 1900s, it had been apparent that the Chinese would make good soldiers, yet few observers believed that they could achieve such a high standard by 1950 virtually unaided. Colonel Rigg describes the methods employed by the Communists to achieve their military goal.

Since his book went to press in 1951, the course of events in Korea has highlighted certain aspects of his appreciation of the Chinese war potential. His cautious optimism regarding the future success of the United Nations forces, due to the many inherent weaknesses apparent in their opponents' fighting machine, was not entirely unjustified; and the soundness of his warning that the latter's air potential should not be underrated has become quite clear.

Where so much information has been compressed into relatively brief

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space, it is perhaps unfair to complain of omissions, but it may be noted that there is no reference to the defence of the Sovietised region in Kiangsi, against which Chiang Kai-shek launched so many "bandit-suppression" campaigns in the 1930s, nor sufficient detail concerning either the decisive Huai-hai campaign of 1949 or the enveloping operations after the crossing of the Yangtse and the subsequent encirclement of Shanghai.

The book's well-presented charts and tables, together with good photographs, a useful appendix and full index, contribute to its undoubted value. For a study of such a complex subject, this volume is most readable. It will not only interest students of military affairs but will also provide food for thought for all who are concerned with the role of communism in the world today.

London, July 1952

R. V. DEWAR-DURIE

AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES OF CHINA. By T. H. Shen. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1951. xviii, 407 pp. \$5.

THE vast bulk of China's unknown millions depend directly for their existence on the produce of the land; the nation as a whole depends on its agricultural resources—using "agricultural" in the broad sense, as Dr. Shen does, to include pastoral, forest and fishery resources. In the absence of any real census of population or of agriculture, it is fatally easy to adopt a point of view coloured by political beliefs. Dr. Shen's book is entirely objective, the work of a true scientist who seeks the facts and does not hesitate to use whatever sources may yield useful information. His Preface is dated from the relative exile of Taiwan, so that data given for that island are as recent as 1950, whereas his latest information concerning the mainland is dated 1948.

Brief but succinct chapters, in which not a word is wasted, pass in review the background of agricultural production—relief, climate, soils, plant nutrients, pests, diseases, water resources and control, land tenure, marketing, labour and equipment. In such matters as land tenure, the book recounts what the Nationalist government did or set out to do, but naturally takes no account of the sweeping changes under the Communist regime. A vital chapter on agricultural regions serves to stress the contrasts in a land situated mainly in mid-latitudes but embracing a very wide range of physical conditions. The growing reliance on wheat gives point to the separation of fall-wheat and spring-wheat regions. The limits imposed on many crops (including a remarkable range of eighty-five vegetables) by the average dates of the last killing frost of spring and the first of the fall will strike a note familiar to North American readers.

A detailed consideration of each important crop occupies the second half of the book. No chapter fails to include a well-balanced general account

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combined with suggestions for future expansion and development. With little or no capital and a minimum of primitive equipment, the Chinese peasant cultivator has achieved a worldwide reputation for his high output per acre; nevertheless, Dr. Shen clearly believes that much more could be accomplished with the use of improved strains.

The book as a whole is a model of its kind. Despite an encyclopaedic range, it is readable and well illustrated with excellent maps and diagrams and with statistical tables which make the most of the restricted sources available.

London, July 1952

L. DUDLEY STAMP

BRITISH TRADE AND THE OPENING OF CHINA, 1800-42. *By Michael Greenberg. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 1951. 238 pp. \$4.*

IN this book, Mr. Greenberg has digested and made available the rich materials of the Jardine Matheson business papers. The discovery of these manuscripts in a Hong Kong godown and their later transfer to Cambridge University Library make possible for the first time a detailed account of any "private English" firm of the pre-treaty days. Fortunately, this sole remaining file is that of the largest and most influential private English company trading into China down to 1842. Tracing its origins to the firm of Cox and Reid, established in 1782, Jardine Matheson and Company emerged in 1832.

The story which Mr. Greenberg very effectively tells is the struggle of a private English merchant against the monopoly of the East India Company on the one hand and against the monopoly of the Chinese Co-hong at Canton on the other. It places in clear view the pre-eminent place of opium in the private trade, the consistent demand of the private merchants for a commercial treaty with China, and the identification of the English manufacturers and the independent American traders with the interests of the "private English", as opposed to those of the East India Company. The records show that the "country trade" between India and China occupied a far more important place in the economic picture than has generally been realized. Color of detail and personality are also added from the voluminous correspondence of members of the firm.

The value of this work lies in Mr. Greenberg's critical and understanding analysis and summary of the extensive business records and letter files. This adds much to the previous knowledge of the period based on East India Company records and official Blue Books. Students of business and economics as well as historians will find this an invaluable addition to the literature of Anglo-Chinese relations.

The shortcomings of the work are inherent in any study based primarily on a single source. The provincial character of the English trader has not

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been broadened by an application of modern scholarship involving the use of Chinese materials or the techniques of modern Sinology. No effort is made to identify the contemporary place and personal names with modern Chinese usage. Nothing has been added to the limited and distorted view of the British merchant confined to Macao and the Canton factories from the now available knowledge of the Chinese merchants and officials who participated in the drama.

As noted in the author's preface, the English merchants were "in China, not of it", so these papers cannot be expected to reveal the impact of the West on China. It is, however, observed that "a century earlier by both Voltaire and the Jesuit missionaries, China had been praised as the most civilised and well-governed country in the world". After opium and British arms had reduced the "Mandarin Empire" in 1842, it seemed but a "wretched burlesque, incapable of resisting the new princes of Europe, the spearheads of an industrial West". The Chinese, in signing the Treaty of Nanking, chose "between danger and safety, not between right and wrong". During the war, the author observes, "the opium ships followed the flag", and he quotes Alexander Matheson to the effect that after the treaty "The drug continues to prosper". The opium theme is stressed throughout the book, but insofar as any reference is made to its effect on China, it is economic rather than moral or social.

Besides the obvious value of the unique and previously unexploited source material, which complements Morse's analysis of the chronicles of the East India Company, this book also presents a distinct point of view and an unorthodox analysis of British relations with China. In general, this is a direct outgrowth of the subject matter—opium, economics and private trade—as opposed to the usual content of Anglo-Chinese relations—diplomacy, international law and monopoly trade. This interpretation curiously but closely parallels (1) the traditional and still widely accepted American judgment, as opposed to the unpopular "pro-British" position of John Quincy Adams, (2) the consistent Chinese point of view, both contemporary and modern, and (3) the articles on China by Marx and Engels published in the *New York Daily Tribune* a century ago.

Boulder, Colorado, August 1952

EARL SWISHER

HISTOIRE DU VIÊT-NAM, de 1940 à 1952. By Philippe Devillers. Paris: Editions du Seuil. Distributed in the United States by the Institute of Pacific Relations. 1952. 479 pp. 900 frs.; \$3.50.

M. DEVILLERS has performed a notable service in writing the first authoritative and comprehensive account of the early postwar years of Vietnam. He tells the story with clarity, despite its wealth of detail and

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documentation, and his strong convictions remain clearly separated from the general objectivity of his account. His title, however, is misleading: both more and less ground is covered in the volume than it indicates. M. Devillers reaches far back into the history of Annam and also describes its first contacts with and conquest by the French. On the other hand, there is little or no treatment of the relations of the Vietnam Republic with Cambodia and Laos, of the significance of the Pau conference of 1950, or of the internal evolution of the Bao Dai regime. In some cases, only a footnote is accorded important developments in recent Cabinets of the Vietnam government. Perhaps a more accurate title for this book would be "History of French Policy Respecting Vietnam from the Inter-war Period through 1949". The book conveys an impression of having been finished some time before it was published: the last two years are outlined only sketchily so as to give the whole an up-to-date appearance.

An obvious explanation for this concentration on the immediate postwar period is that M. Devillers' sojourn in Indochina ended late in 1946. During the crucial period after the Japanese surrender, he was press attaché for General Leclerc and correspondent in Indochina for *Le Monde*. The outbreak of Franco-Vietnamese hostilities at Hanoi in December 1946 appears to have put a term to M. Devillers' first-hand knowledge of the Indochina scene. But in any case he would have had extreme difficulty in maintaining intimate contact with developments inside the Republic after that date. From the beginning of 1947 on, the book deals chiefly with French policy toward Vietnam—a vital aspect of the Vietnamese problem which, fortunately, he could follow best in Paris.

As ably recorded by M. Devillers, the story of postwar Vietnam reflects the gradual, graceless and grudging surrender of French authority over the erstwhile colony to certain groups of Vietnamese. And it substantiates Ho Chi Minh's reported statement that "the key to the Indochina situation is domestic French politics". The year 1947 was crucial in respect to crystallization of French policy toward Indochina. And, as M. Devillers clearly shows, it was not the hostilities which broke out in December 1946 but rather the disintegration of the Third Force and the rise to power of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire that led one year later to the fateful French decision to close the door on further negotiations with Ho's Republic. The Vietnam Republic, for its part, seems to have misjudged the drift toward the Right in French politics and—particularly at the Fontainebleau conference of July 1946—to have made the mistake of identifying its cause with the French Left, which had neither the political power nor the economic means to satisfy Vietnamese aspirations for independence and unity.

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For the Vietnam Republic, the year of decision was 1949, when Mao's victories in China gave the pro-Communist members of the Tong Bo the chance to assert their ascendancy over the nationalist supporters of the Republic and to orient their country toward the Soviet bloc. The game played by China, M. Devillers finds, is essentially the same, whether it be the Kuomintang or the Communists who hold the power in that country—i.e., to make Vietnam a satellite of China.

With the handling of the main theme of M. Devillers' work, it would be hard to take issue. He has gathered a mass of seemingly incontrovertible material to show how the Gaulliste and later the M.R.P. policy (launched by d'Argenlieu, perpetuated by Pignon, and backed in Indochina by French colonialists, the civil service and the army) came to triumph over the Sainteny-Leclerc point of view, which was supported by the left wing in France. He believes that the former group, by deliberately undermining the March 1946 agreement with the Republic, made a conflict with the Ho regime virtually unavoidable and forced the nationalist supporters of the Republic gradually under the control of their communist colleagues. Later international events superficially transformed what was an essentially colonial war into an active battlefield in the larger East-West conflict. He maintains, further, that this same group, in its short-sighted determination to retain power, did little more than concede enough authority to the Bao Dai regime to transform a French campaign of reconquest into a civil war.

To the reviewer, some of the author's conclusions seem questionable. For example, in an analogy unflattering to the United States, Devillers compares the Chinese attempt to control Vietnam, first through the V.N.Q.D.D. and the Dong Minh Hoi and later through the Vietminh, to what he pictures as American determination to dominate Indochina, first through wartime secret agents of the United States and later by supporting Bao Dai. In his opinion, a negotiated settlement between Ho and Bao Dai, without intervention by third parties, seems to offer the only hope for ending the Indochina war. One wonders whether this conclusion, perhaps valid in 1950, is so now. Also questionable is his explanation that the lack of accurate and total information on the part of the French public concerning the situation in Indochina has been the main reason that France has continued for seven years "to compromise its finances, mortgage its foreign policy, and weaken its army in such a cause". Nevertheless, students of Southeast Asia owe M. Devillers a large debt of gratitude for his scholarly account of an extremely complex and obscure period in Vietnamese history.

Exe-sur-Mer, France, September 1952

VIRGINIA THOMPSON

Book Reviews

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES. By Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1951. 315 pp., illus. \$4.

HITHERTO students new to the history of the United States in the Philippines have had no alternative when embarking on the subject but to travel through the standard authorities, and that journey, however exciting and varied, is not an easy one. Distinguished as these works are, they do not provide a clear trail for the inexperienced traveller. Henceforth such students will find the journey less difficult if they take along Messrs. Grunder and Livezey as guides.

Even experienced travellers will enjoy tracing the path marked by these authors, though they will not find it different from the one which they already know. Indeed, at certain points they will be inclined to challenge the guidance offered them. Thus, are these guides always accurate in their spelling of place names? Do they appreciate the difference between a caribou and a carabao? Do they not on occasion err in their dates? And why do they persist in referring to the Organic Act of 1902 as the Cooper Act, a name normally reserved for a less important law of 1905?

But no seasoned travellers will wish to halt for long to debate such points. For they will find in this volume a concise account and a critical appraisal, long needed, of the evolution of United States Philippine policy from 1898 to 1946. The usefulness of this admirable survey is enhanced by a comprehensive bibliography.

Barry, Wales, August 1952

IFOR B. POWELL

POPULATION GROWTH IN MALAYA. A Survey of Recent Trends. By T. E. Smith. London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1952. 126 pp. \$3.

In his foreword to this book, F. W. Notestein emphasizes that our demographic information "is most adequate where it is least important, and least adequate in the very regions in which problems of health and economic and social development are most closely tied to those of population change". In this situation, he continues, "one sound analysis is worth a hundred discussions". Herein lies the importance of this book. It is a modest one which attempts no more than the title implies. It sticks to analysis, which may become a little laborious to the impatient reader but provides an excellent illustration of the considerable distance that can be traveled by the skilful handling of imperfect basic demographic data.

More analyses in depth of this type in restricted areas could do much to throw further light upon the patterns of population change, particularly

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in Southeast Asia, which, once established, might assist the determination of policies designed to improve the material welfare of the populations. True, the basic problem of Asia as a whole—and less in Malaya than in Indonesia or in China and India—is simple enough: expanding rates of growth as a result of teeming fertility and reduced mortality, with as yet nothing more than primitive technology. But within that simple framework there are differential rates of growth in the strata of the populations which are the product of real differences in fertility as well as of variations in mortality. A more adequate knowledge of the former may yet become an important factor in population control in Asia.

Malaya, a minute appendage of Asia, cannot of course be considered as typical, certainly not of the major land masses of India and China, nor yet of densely populated Indonesia; but the form of analysis which Dr. Smith uses could be applied to regions in each of these. It would be helpful to have such studies undertaken.

Quite apart, however, from the methodological lessons to be learned from this valuable work, it has its own considerable value as an analysis of the demographic patterns of the three major components of Malaya's population—the relatively low fertility and high mortality of the Malay, the high fertility and medium mortality of the Indian, and the high fertility and low mortality of the Chinese. It is the last which attracts the reader's attention, for the Chinese now comprise forty-five per cent of the male and forty-three per cent of the female population. Restrictions were imposed on the immigration of male Chinese in 1933, but females remained free from such restrictions until 1938, with the result that there was a substantial reduction in the imbalance of the sex ratios and consequently a more rapid increase in the number of Malayan-born Chinese. Malays and Chinese still constitute essentially separate communities, but, as Dr. Smith rightly emphasizes, "there will be for many years to come a sufficiently even numerical balance of the two peoples . . . to make a fusion of their interests quite essential to the political and economic well-being of the country". But when Dr. Smith's analysis is linked with the economic composition of the two populations, it is hard to see how the race will not go in the long run to the Chinese and their descendants. They have the highest *actual* and *potential* rates of increase and, because of their occupational and regional distribution, are likely to gain in both economic and political influence.

But this is speculation, and this is not what Dr. Smith is primarily concerned with. Yet the very thoroughness of his demographic analysis justifies the indiscretion of a little speculation.

Canberra, September 1952

W. D. BORRIE

Book Reviews

CEYLON, PEARL OF THE EAST. By Harry Williams. London: Robert Hale; New York: Macmillan. 1951. 460 pp., illus. \$5.

Mr. Williams' book is an informative account of the history, the fauna and flora, and the contemporary peoples of Ceylon. It views the Island's history through the eyes of the indigenous chroniclers; but since their narratives end with the deposition of the last king of Kandy by the British in 1815, the development of modern Ceylon is seen from a Western standpoint. "Western knowledge" differs, however, from what it was a century ago. Time was when the economic development of the Island, the "emancipation" of the inhabitants from the traditional pattern of life, and their "enlightenment" by Western education through the medium of the English language, were considered worthwhile achievements, if not moral duties. The old Colonial Service attracted men of "culture and high feeling", but their full-blooded enthusiasm for bettering the condition of mankind, in conjunction with their keen materialism, sowed "the seeds of future reaction". Mr. Williams is a typical representative of that reaction. And throughout his seemingly objective account of the British period, it is the voice of Mr. Williams that is heard—a voice which clearly manifests the prejudices of his compatriots.

The achievements of British enterprise which the author lists are impressive. The nineteenth century was an era of "development", whose inevitable consequences are not to the author's liking. It now appears that the material civilisation which England grafted on a cultured Oriental people has led to unhappy results, "chief among them being the debasement of the peasantry". "One is tempted to believe that the store of philosophy and wisdom of this ancient race varies in inverse proportion to the amount of Westernised education that it has received."

If the Europeans are critical of the effects of their civilisation in the East, the Sinhalese are deeply concerned with the problems arising from the grafting of a foreign culture on an age-old way of life. Mr. Williams patronisingly suggests that "the Sinhalese have a great opportunity, and they are a gentle, humorous, good-natured people, with many gifts, but they are weak . . . and alone" and "in a difficult position . . . with which I have every sympathy". But sympathy is a matter of degree, and nowhere does the author reveal real understanding of the economic and cultural problems of modern Ceylon, or of the obviously genuine, if not always successful, efforts of the people to face them squarely. In the economic sphere one need mention only the recommendations of the Kandyan Peasantry Commission for resettling landless peasant families, ousted from their ancestral holdings to make way for plantations; the revival of the ancient irrigation works in the Dry Zone, and particularly the Gal-Oya scheme; or the various state industries. In the cultural sphere there has been a revival of interest

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in the art-forms of the past which are of merit. Mr. Williams thinks that "there are few indications anywhere in the life of the Sinhalese of any deep feeling for art, and still less for music". He sees no merit in Kandyan architecture, although it is precisely this distinctively "national" style which has been considered appropriate for the new University in Peradeniya—regarded as the most beautiful in the Commonwealth. Apart from a photograph, there is no account of the most highly developed art-form in Ceylon—Kandyan dancing. Nor is mention made of the establishment of the National Languages Commission, the attempts to recreate a Sinhalese literature, or the recent revival of the Sinhalese music-drama.

As a tea-planter of long experience, Mr. Williams is most authoritative when he writes of life on the plantations, particularly the social life of the Indian labourers and the sexual problems of their European masters, which are discussed with rare understanding. The side-lights on European social life in Ceylon can be seen best through Western eyes. And for those who do not know the "Pearl of the East", the book contains much useful information.

Colombo, August 1952

RALPH PIERIS

THE LEGISLATURES OF CEYLON, 1928-1948. By S. Namasivayam. London: Faber & Faber. 1950. 185 pp. 18s.

THE editors of the "Studies in Colonial Legislatures" did well to include a volume on that of Ceylon, for though the island is now a Dominion, it attained this status very recently. Mr. Namasivayam has reviewed this achievement with the scholarship and thoroughness which characterise the other volumes of the series, of which his is the fifth.

As the title of the volume indicates, the author's treatment of the period within his personal knowledge is fuller than that of the early years of British rule. Mr. Namasivayam makes no reference to the memorandum presented to the British Cabinet by the Chief Justice of Ceylon in 1809, fourteen years after the British had taken control of the island's maritime provinces from the Dutch, in which he urged that "a Constitution of Government, similar in principle to the British Constitution, but so modified as to suit the religious and moral feelings of the natives, and the peculiar circumstances of the country, be guaranteed to all the inhabitants of the Island by an Act of Parliament". The Chief Justice may have been before his time in making this proposal, but it was just such a constitution that was granted to Ceylon in 1947. For sixteen years before this final stage, however, Ceylon had a constitution which involved a marked departure from the British pattern. The Board of Ministers comprised the chairmen of seven standing committees which enjoyed executive jurisdiction over groups of subjects. The Board did not, however, have collective responsibility for the govern-

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ment of the country, which is the vital element of a British Cabinet, except in respect of the Budget. The committees were elected by the legislature fortuitously, and their personnel were not necessarily qualified by knowledge or experience to deal with matters which came before them. Since the committees enjoyed executive powers and assumed administrative responsibilities, much inefficiency and some corruption crept into the business of government.

There were, however, notable benefits from the Donoughmore Constitution, which introduced the committee system, modelled, it was said, after the London County Council. In a country in which the last remnants of feudalism had not been uprooted, the introduction of adult franchise accelerated social legislation and compelled closer attention to the needs of the common people. The abolition of communal representation was another admirable feature of the Constitution. Mr. Namasivayam thinks that "of all the Ceylon constitutions of the era of British rule, the constitution that will be placed highest by the constitutional historian and the expert in political institutions was that in existence in the years 1931-47, as it enshrined certain new and daring changes which have stood the test of time and produced beneficial results". This claim is sound to the extent that in an evolutionary process the last stage is (or should be) better than its predecessors. But the Ceylonese leaders and the British government both believed that the constitution as an instrument of self-government contained serious drawbacks. They reverted to the British pattern with the constitution of 1947, which, with a few changes, was easily converted in 1948 to a Dominion Constitution not unlike those of the older Dominions.

Colombo, August 1952

H. A. J. HULUGALLE

TALKS WITH NEHRU. By Norman Cousins. New York: John Day. 1951. 64 pp. \$2.

THE essence of this slight book is formed by two conversations recorded in March 1951 between the author and the Indian Prime Minister. It was a period of growing misunderstanding between the governments of the United States and India, and Mr. Cousins felt the need for "an honest exploration and understanding of whatever differences there are between the countries". This to him was the more important because "there is a widespread ignorance in America about the historical record in India", and "the American press as a whole carries very little news about India". The conversations range rather loosely over most of the main political and economic problems of the world today. They were first printed in the American press, and one wonders why it was thought useful to make a book out of them.

London, August 1952

C. H. PHILIPS

Pacific Affairs

AIR TRANSPORT IN AUSTRALIA. By *D. M. Hocking and C. P. Haddon-Cave*. Melbourne: *Angus & Robertson*, under the auspices of the *Australian Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations*. 1951. 183 pp. 25s.; \$2.75.

THE development of air transport in Australia, whose history is here treated in a thoughtful and well-documented manner, is of general interest because of the dramatic competitive struggle between the pioneer private airlines and the more recently established government air carrier. Australians are among the most air-minded people in the world. On a per capita basis, their air-route mileage and plane miles flown equal or exceed those of any other country.

When the Labour Government came to power, it attempted to create a public corporation which would have a monopoly of air transport. Debarred by the High Court from achieving this objective by legislative methods, the government undertook to do so by economic pressure. It withdrew air-mail support from the private airlines, and confined its own operations almost exclusively to duplicating existing services. The government's control over dollar exchange enabled its carrier to purchase new American aircraft, while the private carriers had to use less modern equipment. Airport and airway charges were increased; licenses for private carriers were revoked or refused; and government officials were restricted to travel by the government airline, which initiated a bitter price war. Despite these and other competitive devices, the two major private domestic operators managed to survive, largely because of their strong affiliations in the shipping and highway-transport fields. Since the defeat of the Labour Government in 1949, there have been signs of increasing cooperation between the privately-owned carriers and the government-owned line.

In the international field, the government has assumed complete ownership. Qantas-Empire Airways, in which the British Overseas Air Corporation formerly held a half-interest, is now government-owned and operates the international routes to Asia and Europe. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines (BCPA), owned jointly by Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, operates the trans-Pacific routes. There has been a recent suggestion that Britain and New Zealand may eventually quit BCPA in order to run their own Pacific services, leaving Australian Pacific operations in the hands of a Qantas-Empire Airways Eastern Division.

*Messrs. Hocking and Haddon-Cave are to be congratulated for having produced the most authoritative and complete source of information available on the development of air transport in Australia from its beginnings after the first world war through the early days following the more recent war.

Washington, D. C., July 1952

J. PARKER VAN ZANDT

Book Reviews

THE SAMOAN DANCE OF LIFE. By John Copp and Faafouina I. Pula.
Boston: Beacon Press. 1950. 176 pp. \$2.50.

MR. Copp has combined the application of methods of psychological research with years of teaching experience as master of a boys' college in Samoa to produce a type of study that is new in the field of literature on this area. As a teacher studying boys assembled in an institution away from their home environment, he lacks some of the experience of a field officer who shares many of the intimacies of village life. His method was to elicit information by question and answer in collaboration with a Samoan informant, who in turn was sometimes obliged to enquire of third persons or groups. A technique which depends in certain cases on the observations of other persons is open to obvious objections; but some at least of the subject matter is of such a nature that other methods could not easily have been employed. In any case, Mr. Copp and his collaborator have wrought exceedingly well. The author's accurate and revealing portrayals of Samoan mentality, obviously the result of careful personal observation and unhurried analysis, are among the best portions of the book. Some can be fully appreciated only by those who are familiar with the Samoan culture and language.

In the realm of village scenes and activities, Mr. Copp's touch is not always so sure, but much of this material also is very good. He has dealt with things that are fundamental—birth, marriage and death, for instance—but he agrees that his picture of Samoan village life is not complete. This is a field that would richly repay study along the lines followed in this book. At a time when the rapid development of education is unfortunately drawing Samoan youth away from the land and their own way of life, it could well be of assistance in planning education and economic advancement to know what the present generation thinks and feels—and why—about some of the things which an older generation found so satisfying. Among the subjects not dealt with in detail are the everyday work of the young men in the village, the laying out and care of plantations, the harvesting of crops, the cooking of food (so pre-eminently a duty of the young men), the teaching of fishing lore, the highly-developed skills of house- and boat-building, and the passing on of traditional and family lore and genealogies. There must be a number of quite different reasons why some of these activities do not command the respect or interest that they did in the past. Further competent studies like Mr. Copp's, in collaboration with Samoans themselves, might convey a better understanding of what those reasons are.

Apia, August 1952

F. J. H. GRATTAN

Pacific Affairs

TRANSFORMATION SCENE: The Changing Culture of a New Guinea Village. By Ian Hogbin. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1951. 326 pp., illus. 30s.

MUCH has already been written about the effects of New Guinea on the war in the Pacific; but of reverse effects, and especially the impact of this war upon native life and thought, remarkably little has been heard. In military and journalistic accounts of what really happened in the bird-shaped land from 1941 onward, the permanent residents who helped to fashion the Allied victory appear mostly as inarticulate shadow figures, a thin fringe of nameless "boongs" from whose ranks only an occasional individual stood forth to receive a medal or a prison sentence. Official publications have thrown little light on the subject; and information open to public scrutiny has been so meager that understanding of New Guinea's problems and of the new roles of her people in a world they never made remains spotty and incomplete. The appearance of this first postwar field study of the total culture of one changing New Guinea village, therefore, is a timely and welcome event.

The author calls his account "a descriptive study of the village of Busama". A larger than average coastal community of some 600 Christianized cultivators, Busama is located on Huon Gulf approximately equidistant from the booming port of Lae and the deserted ruins of Salamaua. If not typical—the typical New Guinea village has yet to be discovered—it is at least representative of coastal settlements which have experienced a creeping foreign domination since German times at the turn of the century. Hogbin's investigations, sponsored first by the Australian Army (in which he served as lieutenant-colonel) and later by the Territorial Administration, began in 1944 on the very heels of the Japanese retreat and were continued intermittently until early 1950, when physical rehabilitation of the bombed-out village was substantially complete and it had re-adapted itself to the new normality of the postwar regime. As a case study, his book provides a wealth of new data and interpretation which will be useful not only in practical problems of an enlightened trusteeship but also in extending theoretical knowledge of culture change in underdeveloped areas. Apart from its utility in the hands of active or passive social scientists, however, it offers a richly revealing description to the average reader who seeks only a better understanding of processes of modernization in the so-called backward areas during the last half-century of increasing European contact and control.

Opening with a detailed summary of what the war did to Busama and its people, the author devotes roughly the first half of his account to a vivid reconstruction of its prewar culture. Here one learns of the structures and patterns and persistent traditions in Busama; and, equally important, one

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meets many of the three-dimensional people who make these patterns work. This concerns the post-contact culture of the 1900-40 period, when missionary, trader and administrator were already making their imprint felt on traditional customs and belief. The second half deals with problems directly traceable to the expanding aims and activities of Europeans in the area, an infiltration which reached its apogee during the war and now stands uneasily at the cross-roads of trusteeship and neo-colonialism. This discussion moves away from traditional concepts and values which stem from essentially native roots into the realm of superimposed systems of administration and justice, wage labor, Christian belief and inter-racial relations. But since the book focuses throughout on the people of Busama, the inseparability of these disparate components in their present and future culture is made abundantly clear. Indeed, Hogbin's great skill in depicting social realities, a skill perfected during more than two decades of intensive field work around the island rim of the Coral Sea, has never been demonstrated with more felicity of style or in a more convincing manner. The long chapter on native Christianity, for instance, is one of the best accounts yet given of the missionary impact on the Melanesian community; and the objective treatment of the corrosive concept of "white prestige" in social relations in the Territory strikes a new note in anthropological reporting for the area.

The story of Busama's progress into the modern world adds to the impression that Australians have an almost unique opportunity—one may fairly say a responsibility—to write a fresh chapter in the long, and sordid history of European contacts with native peoples. They will successfully meet this challenge only if more reports like the present are produced, studied and used. An index, two maps, and six statistical appendices accompany the text; and the author's virtuosity with the camera has never been seen to better advantage than in the twenty or more illustrations.

New Haven, June 1952

STEPHEN W. REED

PACIFIC OUTPOST. American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia. By Earl S. Pomeroy. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1951. xx, 198 pp. \$5.

THE subtitle of this study is misleading: Mr. Pomeroy is not here concerned with the role of Guam or Micronesia in naval strategy during the last war. His "curiosity was aroused . . . by the apparent disparities between our [i.e., American] territorial acquisitions and responsibilities on the one hand and our strategy and effective military strength on the other, between our strength and our whole foreign policy, between our policy as a nation and our individual attitudes and conduct". It is mainly as "a test case" in this sphere that the region under consideration interests him.

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Ever since the nations of Europe first ventured abroad and world power became equated with naval power, a few tiny areas have assumed an importance quite disproportionate to their size. Most of them—e.g., Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, Singapore and Panama—are situated within a globe-encircling belt characterized by an intricate interlacing of continents and bodies of water, the zone of mediterranean seas, of trades and monsoons. The Antilles chain, screening the American mediterranean sea, witnessed the early intrusion of powers competing with Spain. Does the Micronesian island screen, of which Guam is a focal point, occupy a similar position with respect to southeast Asian mediterranean waters? Is Guam a counter-weight to Singapore? What is the significance of such places in a world in which air power has come to rival sea power and in which the consolidation of a Eurasian continental nation has caused all previous geopolitical arrangements to be reshuffled?

Mr. Pomeroy devotes careful attention to these problems, even if he does not subject them to a technical analysis; but his chief interest lies elsewhere. He is concerned mainly with the political aspects of his subject, by which he means for the most part American policy. American occupation of the Philippines and of the Pacific islands, which lie much closer to Asian or even Australian than to North American shores, was clearly prompted by overseas interests and brought the United States into competition with other powers. Whether the United States acted in the interest of whalers, China traders, coaling stations, mooring sites for submarine cables, naval or air bases, its reasons were precisely the same as those which had impelled other nations to become colonial or even imperialist powers. Their country's new role confronted Americans with entirely new diplomatic and strategic problems that did not accord with traditions of non-interference. Mr. Pomeroy discusses these matters almost exclusively from the American point of view, without explaining what the Carolines meant to the Germans or Guam to the Japanese. One could wish also for a deeper insight into the medley of interests (especially economic ones) and underlying political or strategic considerations that affected national policies. There is no mention, for example, of the fact that the early trade in copra brought Hamburg traders to the Pacific islands and thus influenced German interests. But here, again, the author has other aims in mind. By unfolding the panorama of constantly shifting political and military attitudes, he invites the reader to reconsider the lore of history with a view to the future.

His book is extremely successful in demonstrating, particularly to the non-American reader, the special difficulties that confronted the policy of a country with a background of diplomatic history such as that of the United States in bringing public opinion and political and strategic decisions

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into line with responsibilities which many were unprepared to recognize or to accept. The price paid during the last war was a high one. Mr. Pomeroy does not exaggerate the importance of Guam, but he was happy in his choice of this sensitive spot as a point of departure for a discussion of broader problems.

Heidelberg, August 1952

G. PFRIFER

THE COMMONWEALTH IN ASIA. By Sir Ivor Jennings. London, New York, Toronto, Melbourne and Bombay: Oxford University Press. 1951. 124 pp. \$2.50.

ALTHOUGH the Waynflete Lectures which form the substance of this volume were delivered in Oxford in 1949, their content and presentation remain remarkably fresh. This is only partly due to the fact that publication was delayed until certain important supplementary material became available. The author was thus able to make use, among other things, of the material on the Colombo Conference as well as of the final text of the Indian Constitution. His basic concern, however, is to examine certain fundamental factors in the new Asian dominions in their bearing on the effort to establish democratic government and on their continued relation with the rest of the Commonwealth.

It is of course obvious that the attempt to adapt Western political institutions and ideas to an Asian society must encounter many problems consequent on the many differences in social structure and in intellectual and religious traditions. It is these special features of Asian conditions to which Sir Ivor chiefly directs his examination. The caste system is only one of the factors to be taken into account. Divergences in race and language, and the communalism that has resulted, are also of prime significance. Sir Ivor insists throughout that communalism existed long before the British introduced communal representation, but in his chapter on responsible government he makes it clear that the establishment of the representative system greatly accentuated the significance of communal divisions. Caste and communalism have a bearing also on the political aspect of class interests, although the author believes that "the class divisions due to westernization are much more dangerous" and provide real material for revolutionary communism in lands marked by extremes of wealth and poverty. He is particularly interesting in his discussion of the importance of the English language, not merely as the sole common instrument of communication, but as a neutral instrument in contrast to the special privilege that would result from adopting any single native language as the national tongue in India or Pakistan or Ceylon.

In some ways the title of the book is misleading. The reader will find very little direct discussion of Commonwealth relations as such, though a final

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chapter does assess the attitude toward the Commonwealth connection. Nonetheless, the themes that are discussed, while primarily internal in their nature, are of direct significance for the future evolution of the Commonwealth, whose nature has already been radically changed by the emergence of the Asian dominions. They are discussed with the subtlety of understanding and the lucidity of style that one naturally expects from the author, and they may well evoke profitable reflection, not only among the citizens of the Commonwealth, but in other democratic nations to which the future course in Asia is of vital concern.

Toronto, June 1952

EDGAR McINNIS

PRACTICAL CO-OPERATION IN ASIA AND AFRICA. By *W. K. H. Campbell*. Cambridge, England: *Heffer*. 1951. xxii, 275 pp. 21s.

Mr. Campbell, who has studied cooperative problems in a large number of under-developed countries, is deeply impressed with "the enormous difference which exists between the methods which can be successfully used on the inhabitants of highly developed, well-educated and sophisticated countries on the one hand, and on undeveloped, ill-educated and poverty-stricken masses in less fortunate countries on the other". Having regard to the attempts under expanded technical assistance programmes to encourage the development of cooperatives in under-developed countries, this is perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from Mr. Campbell's book by well-meaning cooperative enthusiasts from the West. For one can imagine no greater risk of disaster than that involved in the attempt to transplant abroad the methods of "developed" countries, which have had generations of success and failure to guide them, and can both draw on advanced business and technical skills and marshal large resources for whatever undertakings may be necessary.

One consequential difference brought out by the author is the greater relative importance of the role of government in stimulating, guiding and supervising cooperatives. It is a matter of experience that few under-developed countries have evolved strong cooperative movements except where the government has played a more active role than in the West. Nevertheless the primary aim of cooperation "must always be to teach the people to do something for themselves rather than to do it for them. Hence a co-operative department should all the time be trying to build up secondary bodies, which will later be able to take over these duties"—i.e., propaganda, organisation and supervision. It would have been interesting to have a fuller discussion by one of Mr. Campbell's experience of the ways by which unions for these purposes, as distinct from functional unions (e.g., for credit or marketing), might best be encouraged. In view of the importance of such

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an eventual transfer of functions from government to secondary cooperative bodies, the consideration of supervising unions is rather sketchy. The reviewer would also have welcomed a fuller discussion of methods of cooperative education and training, from officers of societies through to registrars; for cooperative education of one sort or another may well play an important part in technical assistance programmes, and it would be useful to know how the problem has been tackled in, for example, Ceylon, which is outstanding among under-developed countries in the vigour and scope of its cooperative societies. These observations are only another way of saying that this reviewer, at least, having partaken of Mr. Campbell's rich offering, is greedy for more. For the author succeeds not only in bringing out principles of operation with admirable clarity but also in getting down to practical details when these illuminate the principles.

After covering problems in starting cooperatives, the functions of government and of the cooperative registrar and his staff, and cooperative law, the book deals with the organisation and problems of cooperative credit, supply, marketing, stores and other types of society. The author gives first importance to credit societies, a view shared by many, if not most, persons who have worked with cooperatives in rural areas in under-developed countries in which debt under onerous terms is a major obstacle to improvement. In illustrating his arguments, the author draws on experiences in a wide range of countries in Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. Examples from China are rather outdated and make no reference to the considerable war-time expansion and the causes of subsequent collapse. One doubts whether the author's view that there has been no material change in practice could be sustained.

Cooperatives are of value, not simply as a means of economic improvement, but also as agencies through which people may effectively participate in public programmes for economic development—a condition necessary for their success—and equally, as C. F. Strickland points out in a Foreword, in laying foundations for democratic self-government. But, as the long record of failures shows—and not simply in under-developed countries—uninformed enthusiasm is not enough, and may indeed do much harm. Mr. Campbell's book provides not only an antidote to enthusiasm of this type, but also an encouraging exposition of what cooperatives may achieve when soundly established, and a wise and timely account of principles and methods.

Wellington, July 1952

H. BELSHAW

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